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Abstract
This inquiry into the thought of three political thinkers in pre-war Japan is motivated
by a concern of our own time: the absence of credible opposition in the present-day
political system. The widely accepted view is that Japanese society is "conformist",
and the pressure for conformity comes from traditions and cultural norms. My
general position in this dissertation is that very often conformity is not only a matter
of inherent cultural norms but is a political and social force appropriated,
strengthened and enforced by those in power: the weak tradition of public debate has
historical foundations.
However, mainstream historiography (Marxism and the school of
modernisation theory), rarely pays attention to one of the most significant motors of
dissent, the tension between authority and the individual, especially as it was
exacerbated by the Meiji Restoration. I therefore hope to engage with previous
accounts in the following ways. The first concerns definitions of modernisation, and
the other, methodological, is concerned with the relations between individual and
society. To highlight the role of the general populace in the emergence of political
modernisation, I borrow from Jiirgen Habermas his concept of a civil society and his
investigation of the transformation of the "public" sphere. I also employ
methodological perspectives based on the cultural theory of Raymond Williams, with
his emphasis on the material dynamics of social change.
To examine the mechanics of opposition in pre-war Japan based on this
combination of definition and methodology, I focus on the careers of three prominent
"dissidents": Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948), a constitutional scholar, Sakai
Toshihiko (1870-1933), a socialist reformer, and Saito Takao (1870-1949), an
opposition member of Parliament. All three were outspoken critics of discretionary
power, and realised that the Meiji Restoration by no means ensured a civil society.
Nevertheless post-Restoration Japan witnessed drastic changes in the forms of
authority and in the people's engagement with them. Hence all three were articulate
critics of government, and witnessed, recorded, and participated in those changes
through their writings and political activities. The dissertation traces the
contributions of each to the emergence of a Japanese civil society, and examines the
viability of liberal positions within a period of highly "engineered" social change.
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Chapter 1
The Post-Meiji Restoration: Modernisation and the
Rise of the Authoritarian State
1.1. Introduction: modernisation and discretionary power
In any study of national governance the following question seems inescapable: is it
possible to pursue national unity and free government simultaneously? How is it
possible to find a balance between authority and the individual? The question is crucial
for any society, particularly so with respect to the formation and evolution of
government. Nevertheless political authority, either realised in the form of government
or perceived as coterminous with the state, is primarily a construction of the perceptions
and choices of a people, although history and tradition will give a particular hue to such
"constructed" authority. In this study of Japanese conditions I hope to show how this
abiding tension is present in modern Japan.
Absolutism and constitutionalism therefore constitute complementary
expressions of an informing dynamic. Hobbes of course, concerned with the restoration
of social order in a period of civil war, endorsed absolute power. He proposed absolute
submission to Leviathan, "an undivided sovereign power", which might be one man or
an assembly of men. Locke, on the other hand, denied absolute power. Lawmakers make
laws, he says, but they also have to obey them.1 Locke asserts that legitimate
government must have the consent of the governed.
Yet these contrasting views towards legitimate political authority reflect a
common concern for good government in the defence of intellectual and political
freedom. Deeply sceptical about man's ability to possess absolute knowledge, which
1
See, for instance, Richard H. Cox (ed.), Second Treatise of Government (Illinois: Harlan Davidson,
1982), pp. 51-3. All subsequent references to Hobbes will be to the revised student edition of Leviathan,
Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
itself was a strong defiance of the prevailing scholasticism of the time, Hobbes endorsed
a strong state that could protect individuals from the influence exercised by the restored
Church of England. Locke defended the political opposition mounted by Parliament
against the arbitrary rule of King Charles II. The contrasts reflect the social and political
conditions of their times and the divergent results of a shared concern.
In our own times Jiirgen Habermas has described the shift from absolutism to a
civil society as a transformation in the "public" sphere. In his civil society, state
authority is "monitored" through "informed and critical discourse by the people". On a
cursory view it may seem difficult to detect the emergence of such a civil society in
post-Restoration Japan. Yet the Meiji Restoration appears to have ushered in elements of
absolutism and a civil society simultaneously. How was this possible? And if so, what
shifts in the public sphere occurred, and how was it transformed? This study assumes a
radical metamorphosis in the Japanese "public" sphere and its transformation by the
tensions of post-Restoration politics and social change.
Indeed the tension between collective well-being and the rights of the individual,
between unaccountable government authority and participatory democracy, is the
leitmotiv of Japan's modernisation. In the evolution of Japan from a federation of han
domains under the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate to a centralised modern state, this
tension is central.
The tension is observable both at personal and at national levels, as a drastic
oscillation of social policy or thought, a feature common throughout modern Japanese
history. Thus Fukuzawa Yukichi, a staunch critic of Confucianism and a champion of
bunmei kaika (civilisation and progress), became a strong imperialist in his attitudes
towards the rest of Asia in the 1880s. Okuma Shigenobu, who sought the establishment
of parliament and who was expelled from government as a result, is also the very prime
minister whose Cabinet submitted the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915, an action
that confirmed Japan's image as international aggressor. All opinions mutate, and it is
dangerous to generalise from individual cases. Yet such "changes of mind" are
2
Jiirgen Habcrmas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
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recognised by historians as highly representative of Japanese intellectuals and political
leaders and are given the name "tenko" (recantation).
The oscillation is similarly drastic in domestic policy. In 1868 the Charter Oath
and the repressive Five Board Notices coincide, in 1875 the promise to open parliament
coincides with various press laws and laws to restrict political activities, and in 1925
universal male suffrage is contemporary with the Peace Preservation Law, a law used to
oppress domestic opposition in the late 1920s and 1930s. The Meiji Constitution of
1889, as I hope to show, encapsulates such tensions very vividly. Simultaneous
implementation of "liberal" and "oppressive" measures is a consistent pattern in post-
Restoration Japan.
How to assess this tension influences the historian's assessment of Japan's
modernisation. The so-called "Marxist" historians, whose views are influenced by that
of the Communist International of the 1930s, tend to ignore the tension, since they are
more concerned with the authoritarian aspect of the Japanese State. On the other hand,
one school of thought (modernisation theory), which is more interested in Japan's
economic and industrial progress, also tends to underplay the tension. It claims that it
was understandable to use oppressive measures to implement a liberal policy. It is
political wisdom to implement "carrot-and-stick" measures: Japan is no exception in this
respect.
Both views, I think, are unsatisfactory. The "Marxist" view tends to ignore the
diverse debate about forms of government that persisted throughout pre-war Japan until
it was forcibly terminated in the 1930s. Instead, the tension is subsumed into reductive
"feudal" elements of Japanese society. The interpretations of the modernisation school
also have problems. When we assess Japan's history, from the Meiji Restoration to the
outbreak of the Pacific War, as one integrated sequence, the "political wisdom"
argument seems more than a little threadbare: Japan's experience highlights problems of
government, as well as its benefits.
There seems, however, to be broad consensus that the pre-war Japanese state was
indeed authoritarian. A key question therefore is whether or not the social and political
conditions of pre-war Japan could justify the operation of such a state and by what
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criteria. Also, when we discover that the very system that was created in the Restoration
was inseparable from the rise of the militant state in the 1930s, it becomes necessary to
examine the underlying trajectories of the Meiji polity. In my view the most effective
way to expose this divided heritage is to listen to those who lived through the period,
who, through their writings and political activities, were part of its collective conscience.
This study therefore proposes a close examination of the lives and careers of three post-
Restoration radicals in order to show how their thought and behaviour illuminate the
larger problems of their society.
In his well-known account of "the system of irresponsibilities", Maruyama Masao gives
a most penetrating analysis of the problems of the modern Japanese political system.
Maruyama was concerned with the rise of militarism and xenophobic nationalism in the
1930s. In his 1949 essay Maruyama analyses both the "psychological" and
"institutional" problems of the political system that resulted in the rise of the militaristic
state.3 The absence of accountability is the key to both types of problem.
Maruyama links the system of irresponsibilities to obligation. Obligation takes
precedence over personal responsibility. The hierarchical structure in which the sense of
"obligation" is the major commanding force results in a fragmented, arbitrary structure
of authority. In this sense, the "public" is not created by "informed and critical discourse
by the people", but is the creature of "hierarchy". In this hierarchical structure,
autonomy is lost, and one becomes subject to "blind outside forces": the casualties of
such forces are objective vision and effective leadership.4
Thus, in his account of Japan's war-time leadership, Maruyama vividly describes
the breakdown of the system, in which the Army and the Navy were constantly
3
Maruyama Masao, "Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders", Thought and
Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 84-134.
4
Maruyama here quotes the former United States Ambassador Joseph Grew: "Their view of reality was
hopelessly obfuscated" because "when the obligation runs counter to their own interests, as they conceive
them, they will interpret the obligation to suit themselves and, according to their own lights and mentality,
they will very likely be perfectly honest in so doing" {ibid., p. 96).
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bickering, and within the Army its War Minister and the General Staff Office (sanbo-
honbu). The Navy was also beset by similar problems. Maruyama does not concern
himself with the flaws of institutions, but instead tries to identify the source of the
problems in Japanese traditions. His approach is understandable, since he is essentially
concerned with norms of behaviour.
Crucially, however, Maruyama pays scant attention to the political role of the
population as a whole. Thus although the Meiji Restoration was by no means a popular
revolution, the question of how to bring the people into the national structure was a
major concern for the political leaders from the very beginning.5 Certainly Maruyama
most articulately identifies the key elements of modern Japanese political conflict, the
recurring clashes between those seeking concentration of power (statism) and those
seeking public support (liberalism).6 However, he does not fully assess the role of the
n
people to explain the origins and evolution of the tension. Instead he identifies the early
Meiji leaders as promoters of "liberal elements" and assesses Japan's descent to
militarism as the gradual overtaking of the liberal tradition by "authoritarian elements"
in the 1930s. Yet it is difficult to explain this shift without paying attention to the
5
Some historians, including Irokawa Daikichi, Yasumaru Yoshio, Miyachi Masato, and Carol Gluck,
observe that the people were not the mere recipients of government policy but often resisted new
measures. The leaders were deeply aware of their resistance and made enormous efforts to tame it. See
Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985).
6 "Sound Joi" (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians" and "kogi koron" (public debate and opinions)
are two doctrines behind the Meiji Restoration, and their interaction shaped post-Restoration Japanese
politics and society as if they were "two main themes that recur alternately in a sonata", according to
Maruyama. See Maruyama, "Meiji Kokka no Shiso," Senchu to Sengo no Aida: 1936-1957 (Tokyo:
Misuzu Shobo, 1976, reprinted 1982), p. 204. Sonno Joi evolved into "kokken-ron" (statism), while "kogi
koron" became "minken-ron" (people's rights). The political necessity for unity (to stave off foreign
colonisation) and Japan's historical conditions (the Meiji Restoration as a shift from feudalism to
absolutism) resulted in their co-existence. For the early Meiji leaders, national unity and individual
advancement were thus inseparable, according to Maruyama. But this unity began to crumble with the
advent of imperialism and capitalism (ibid., p. 228)
7 This neglect of the people influences Maruyama's interpretation and analysis of the evolution of political
power exercised in Japan. He recognises the early Meiji leaders' attempt to suppress the Jiyuminken
Undo, a movement for popular rights, as the origin of an absolute regime, and that this regime created "the
various symptoms of political disintegration". The ineffectual Parliament led to "the pluralism of political
power", which he calls the "original sin of modern Japan." But Maruyama's assessment of the early Meiji
leaders is favourable, in that he sees their diverse experience, sense of responsibility, and charisma as
desirable requirements for political leaders. Thus the system of irresponsibilities loomed large when "the
autocratic sense of responsibility receded; and no democratic sense of responsibility arose to take its
place". See Maruyama, "Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's War-time Leaders", pp. 126-8.
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leaders' perception of the people, how they responded to their resistance, and how they
tried to bring the people into the political system. The early Meiji leaders were both
oppressors and reformers, and such duality can only be explained by their attitudes to the
people they governed.
This study is deeply indebted to Maruyama's work, but I will use the concept of
"discretionary power" instead of irresponsibilities in order to emphasise "institutional"
problems. By discretionary power, I mean executive power exercised without "legal
constraints", although the very meaning of "legal" requires further clarification. I will
leave exact definitions of the modes of constraint to my discussions of the three people
in this study, but I will assume that resistance to such power itself constitutes an attempt
to form a civil society. Thus although my primary concern is with individual responses
to authority (and Japanese statehood), I wish at the outset to outline some of those forces
which prompted, in time, a tradition of opposition to the centres of power. That tradition
is rooted, in a highly visible fashion, in responses to discretionary power. For Japan's
"coerced" modernisation not only required discretionary power in government but also
resulted in an institutionally fragmented government, in an ideologically authoritarian
state, and a tradition of creative resistance.
How, therefore, does the concept of discretionary power help us to understand
the problems of Japan's nation-building? To answer the question, English constitutional
history provides us with useful insights. Thus A. V. Dicey, speaking of the English
situation, defined the discretionary powers of government as "every kind of action which
can legally be taken by the Crown, or by its servants, without the necessity for applying
o
to Parliament for new statutory authority". The history of the English constitution was
to put "a legal check" on the exercise of discretionary powers, shifting the power from
the King to Parliament. From this process emerged "the two guiding principles" of the
English constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law. Moreover the
sovereignty of Parliament is linked to that of the electorate and of the people, and thus it
represents the nation. The rule of law is synonymous with the authority of the courts.
8 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edition (London: Macmillan
Press, 1959), reprinted 1975, p. 423. The first edition was published in 1885.
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Thus the two principles are fundamental to the operations of English society: emphasis
on general (public) agreement and equality under the law. "If the sovereignty of
Parliament gives the form, the supremacy of the law of the land determines the
substance of our constitution."9
Dicey however suggests several problems inherent in discretionary power by
pointing out what would happen if the two principles, the supremacy of Parliament and
the rule of law, are breached. One problem is that discretionary powers would
undermine free government. In this respect legal equality is inimical to discretionary
power.
The rule of law, which means equality under law, derives from the tradition of
common law. Whoever exercises power, he or she is subject to possible conflict with
ordinary common law, if he or she violates it. In principle, common law does not
discriminate between the holder of power and his subjects. "In England the powers of
the Crown and its servants may from time to time be increased as they may also be
diminished. But these powers, whatever they are, must be exercised in accordance with
the ordinary common law principles which govern the relation of one English man to
another."10
Thus legal equality works as a check on any collective action. For instance, the
presence of a standing army potentially contains the tension between national
independence and free government. Dicey says, "With a standing army the country
could not, they feared, escape from despotism; without a standing army the country
could not, they were sure, avert invasion; the maintenance of national liberty appeared to
9
ibid., p.471. Compare Dicey's statement with the following passage by J. K. Bluntschli: "The State has
two aspects: rest and movement, continuance and progress, body and spirit. There are two political
sciences corresponding to this internal distinction, Public Law and Politics; and so too there are two great
principles which, like two stars, illuminate and fructify the life of the State, conditioning both its form and
content: justice (justitia) and the public weal (salus publico). Statesmen have especially the latter before
them, jurists the former. The idea of justice determines public law, the idea of welfare guides politics"
(Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, authorised English translation from the sixth German edition of his
Allgemeines Statsrecht [sic], Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892, p.70). The first volume of the third edition of
Allgemeines Statsrecht (1863) was translated into Japanese by Kato Hiroyuki and published by the
Education Ministry in 1872. Part of Kato's translation and the German original are included in Kato
Shuichi and Maruyama Masao (eds.), Honyaku no Shiso, Nihon Kindai Shiso Taikei, vol. 15 (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1991), pp. 43-90.
1(1
Dicey, op. cit., p. 387.
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involve the sacrifice of national independence."11 England solved this problem by means
of the supremacy of common law. Army law is subject to common law so that the
soldier must be a citizen first before complying with military regulations. Conflicts of
loyalty are therefore meant to be resolved by resorting to higher principle.
By contrast Japan took exactly the opposite course, separating the military from
the "common" community. Bureaucrats were also deliberately isolated from the "public"
sphere. In these areas notions of general accountability were neither encouraged nor
established in precedent. In these and other ways Japan's modernisation failed to create
a public arena where the people as a whole could pursue a common agenda.
Dicey also emphasises that discretionary powers tend to undermine the
12
legitimacy of government. Who, for example, authorises the collection of taxes? Who
legitimately distinguishes the army from a private militia? The answer to both questions
is Parliament. Parliament has the ability to transform private activities into public ones.
What distinguishes the tax collector from the thief is that the former's act is endorsed by
Parliament and the latter's is not. This mandate of Parliament derives from the concept
of popular will. The will of the people is hard to define, Dicey acknowledges. Yet in his
definition, Parliament as an institution, elections as a means, and the people as a
principle are combined to give the concept of general acceptance a real political
function. Discretionary powers without such backing are always vulnerable to the
alienation of the popular will.
Dicey argues too that the exercise of discretionary powers without perceived
general acceptance can erase the form of constitutional government. Very relevantly the
system of irresponsibilities formulated by Maruyama highlights how a cluster of
political institutions, including that of the emperor, the military and bureaucrats, worked
in the absence of a containing political structure. Maruyama attributes the cacophony of
"
Dicey, op. cit., p. 298.
12
Compare Maruyama, who says, "... the pluralism and irresponsibility of power in war-time Japan has a
deep cause. It obeys a law of dynamics common to absolute monarchies, everywhere, especially when
they have reached their stage of decadence" (Maruyama, "Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's
War-time Leaders", p. 125). Maruyama here seems to refer to discretionary power in using the expression
"a law of dynamics common to absolute monarchies". My point is that discretionary powers are pluralistic
and irresponsible, whoever exercises them.
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institutions to the dominant psychology of obligation, as we have seen, and also to the
disappearance of central authority due to the retirement of the early Meiji oligarchs. Yet,
as Dicey demonstrates, discretionary powers can lead to institutional problems, because
they undermine public will, which provides constitutional government with its form,
legitimacy, and direction.
A third relevant problem Dicey identifies is that discretionary powers prevent the
formation of a civil society where political authority is constructed and monitored by
public consent and debate. This concept of a civil society is a logical consequence of
constitutional government as envisaged by Locke. If power is not absolute, it must be
"created". Constitutional government needs a civil society where general agreement and
discussion are ensured, because they are indispensable for such construction. It is not
enough that political power is limited, but it must be allowed to form.
Once again we are back to the abiding question of the relations between authority
and the individual. The tension exists in any society, and freedoms of speech and
assembly are crucial to settle the tension. Constitutional government and freedoms of
speech and assembly are the two sides of one coin. If one disappears, the other also
ceases to exist. The contradiction of the Meiji Constitution is, as I hope to show, not
only that it endorses imperial absolutism and constitutional government simultaneously,
but also that it fails to protect those freedoms from the encroachment of authority.
Discretionary powers are therefore a one-way and open-ended exercise of power,
incapable of sustaining debate in a civil society. Yet national unity and free government
are not competing ideas, but inspire the "form" and "substance" of constitutional
government. They complement each other, and check each other so that the whole
system can cohere. The substance props up debate, while the form is strong enough to
sustain the dynamics of debate. If on the other hand national unity is detached from free
government, it prompts undisciplined, arbitrary powers. By endorsing discretionary
powers, the Japanese, through the Meiji Constitution and its operation, created their own
Leviathan, institutionally fragile and ideologically absolutist.
Extenuating factors do of course exist. There were various forces which
prompted Japan to rely on discretionary power. After the Restoration, government was
9
both initiator and guardian of far-reaching social and political reform. Thus Japan
introduced, symptomatically, the idea of administrative law, derived from the European
13
continent, which gives precedence to the role of government in regulating civic life. '
Yet Dicey says of the French concept of droit administratis "In France, on the other
hand, whilst the powers based in the hands of the administration might be diminished, it
is always assumed that the relationship of individual citizens to the State is regulated by
principles different from those which govern the relation of one French citizen to
another."14 Administrative law therefore contrasts sharply with English common law.
And as the role of government expanded in Japan, so did the role of administrative law.
A more important reason, however, is the perceived need for prompt
modernisation. The "late comer" theme is not just an interpretation given by historians,
but was also amply used by the Meiji leaders to carry out reform, and then to suppress
political opposition. To catch up with the West speed was considered crucial. Here
existed the usual conflict between ideals and "necessity". Yet this justification,
pragmatic or otherwise, was also responsible for the further skewing of relations
between authority and the individual. "Principles" were often sacrificed to "necessity",
and "necessity" tended to be defined by those in power. But such collective self-
justification also began to collide with domestic and international realities, with the
emergence of a pluralistic society at home, and with nationalism in various parts of the
world after World War I. As we will see, successive governments responded to the gap
between "necessity" and those realities with various compromises. Yet those
compromises tended only to involve the further use of discretionary power.
Discretionary power therefore was crucial for Japanese governments to carry out
drastic reform, but it was also responsible for the fatal undermining of reform. In the
13 Administrative law is a key concept of continental law. Dicey compared administrative law and the
common law tradition, and criticised the former as "discretionary". For him the dominance of the
common law in England is in sharp contrast with the French concept of droit administratif. "Droit
administratis 'n short, rests upon ideas absolutely foreign to English law: the one, as I have already
explained, is that the relation of individuals to the State is governed by principles essentially different
from those rules of private law which govern the rights of private persons towards their neighbours; the
other is that questions as to the application of these principles do not lie within the jurisdiction of the




remainder of this chapter I will trace the process by which the various discretionary
powers were created, and which, by the 1930s, led to the subversion of the ideals of the
Meiji State.
1.2. The Charter Oath and the Five Board Notices: promise and
betrayal
National unity and social progress were the key principles under which the Meiji leaders
initiated radical social and political change. The participation of the people was
recognised as crucial to build a new political community and emphasised through
various "egalitarian" measures. At the same time the people had to be "controlled".
Despite their "enlightened" ideas, the early Meiji leaders had to rely on various
discretionary measures, which included a reinforced role for the military, newly
impressed "national" symbols, and arbitrary edicts, in order to consolidate their power,
because they lacked a solid power base. This section aims at locating the origins of these
discretionary powers and demonstrating that the tension between national unity and free
government was present from the outset.
The Meiji Restoration is inseparable from the global situation in the early
nineteenth century. Growing industrial activities in major European countries, such as
Britain, Russia and France, fanned commercial ambition and technological development,
particularly in navigation, and fuelled the search for markets abroad. "The state" became
a major organ in the support of private enterprise.15 This nineteenth century
Weltanschauung, in which nations competed with each other through trade backed by a
strong military, dominated the world until the end of World War I. It was this
worldview, and the concept of the state based on it, which inspired the Meiji leaders in
their quest for national unity and change.
15 See Eric Hobsbawm, "The nation as novelty: from revolution to liberalism", Nations and Nationalism
Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch I.
However, the degree to which the Meiji Restoration was initiated by domestic
causes as well as by international influence has been one area of contention among
historians.16 Hence it is true that the bakufu system was under attack from all fronts in
the early nineteenth century. Farmers' and city dwellers' protests became more common.
Each domain, as well as the Tokugawa government, was struggling to make ends meet.
The fact that the early Meiji leaders came from peripheral but economically and
politically self-sufficient domains, such as Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, also
suggests the importance of domestic factors. It was those relatively young, low-ranking
samurai who, through their own experience of dealing with their domain affairs, came to
understand "the wealth of society" and directed the country into an utterly different
political system.
Nevertheless it was international influence, and those leaders' understanding of
the global situation, that shaped the major characteristics of the Meiji reform. The arrival
of the U.S. naval squadron led by Commodore Perry in Tokyo Bay in 1853 triggered
volatile and intense debate inside the country about alternative forms of government. In
1854, the Tokugawa government signed a friendship treaty with the United States,
which was followed by similar treaties with Britain and Russia, ending the country's 200
years long international isolation. The opening up of the country resulted in economic
and political instabilities (inflation was high), and fuelled anti-foreign sentiment. Indeed,
until around 1860, foreigners were often targets of attack by anti-foreign samurai. Yet
those anti-foreign patriots became pro-foreign when they witnessed at first hand the
military and technical might of the West. Okubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, and other
future Meiji leaders were all initially anti-foreign. But their contact with the West
converted them to belief in co-operation. Okubo saw Kagoshima, the capital of his
domain, bombarded by British ships in retaliation for the murder in 1863 of a British
16
During the debate about the nature of Japanese capitalism in the early 1930s (the debate between the
Koza-ha and Rono-ha schools of thought), the emphasis was shifted to Japanese domestic factors, such as
the growing contradictory character of the bakufu system. Since the 1960s, however, many historians have
tried to interpret the Meiji Restoration by combining both internal and external factors. Historians also
argue whether there was a real threat of foreign colonisation. See the debate between Toyama Shigeki and
Inouc Kiyoshi, and Toyama Shigeki and Shibahara Takuji. For a useful summary of the debate, see
Tanaka Akira, "Kurofune Raiko kara Iwakura Shisetsudan e", in Tanaka (ed.), Kaikoku, Nihon Kindai
Shiso Taikei, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), pp. 448-52.
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merchant by a samurai of his domain. And the following year Kido witnessed the major
port city of his domain, Shimonoseki, under attack by ships from Britain, France, the
United States and Holland. Such experiences were decisive.
Contact with China also reinforced the perceived need for national unity.
Takasugi Shinsaku, one of the early revolutionary samurai, who in 1863 organised
samurai-farmer garrisons in his native Choshu domain, went to Shanghai in the previous
year. The Chinese city had become one of the first treaty ports after the first Opium War
of 1839-1841, and Takasugi witnessed China's "colonisation" by the West. Takasugi
saw the Qing Dynasty attacked both from within and without, witnessing the domestic
chaos caused by the Taiping Rebellion of 1851-1864, and the poor living conditions of
indigenous Chinese exploited by the Western powers. For him national unity became of
utmost importance.
These revolutionaries came to realise that the country needed a new political
structure that would be independent and internally secure. Regardless of whether the
Western powers did or did not have aggressive intentions, they saw the West both as a
genuine threat and as a model of a new society. Hence the 15-year period of domestic
unrest that followed the signing of the friendship treaties was also a period of diverse
debate, albeit taking place privately, about alternative forms of government. Ideas about
international law, republicanism, constitutional government, and the role of parliament,
were all introduced during this period17, and culminated in the Charter Oath of 1868, the
first constitutional text issued by the Meiji provisional government. Thus began the
search for a new society: for these leaders, "the state" (kokka) was both a political Utopia
and a practical necessity.
17
Although some Japanese knew about the British parliamentary system through Dutch sources as early as
1789, the Chinese defeat in the Opium Wars, and the increasing presence of the Western powers prompted
interest in Western political systems in general. A Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton's Elements of
International Law was reprinted by the Tokugawa government's Kaiseisho in 1865. Kato Hiroyuki, then
working at the Bansho Shirabesho, the government's central institution for Western learning, advocated
the introduction of a British-style Parliament to avert the country's imminent crisis in his "Saishinron" in
1861. The essay was then read only privately. "Saishinron" is included in Kenpo Koso, Nihon Kindai
Shiso Taikei, vol. 9 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), pp. 3-25. In 1866, Fukuzawa Yukichi translated the
United States Declaration of Independence. For Japanese knowledge of the British parliamentary system,
see Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji Rikken Shisoshi ni okeru Igirisu Kokkai Seido no Eikvo (Tokyo. Yushindo, 1969).
13
Ideals clashed with realities. The Meiji government lacked a solid power base,
and had instrumental fragility. The composition of those who gathered around the
emperor and ousted the Tokugawa government in the Osei Fukko coup d'etat on 9
December 1867, was highly diverse. They included court officials, young samurai in
anti-bakufu domains, and their lords. They had varying attitudes towards modernisation
and foreign influence, and included both Western-educated "reformers" and students of
nativism (kokugaku) with strong anti-foreign sentiments. Yet they were united in their
belief that the Tokugawa government had lost credibility in the running of affairs in the
18face of Western threats. Their conflict, however, soon became visible.
Many in fact were still involved in civil war with the pro-bakufu forces, as well
as engaging in their own internal wars of adjustment. Furthermore military victory could
only partially legitimise their rule. Hence military victory must be consolidated by
means of new "national" symbols, and decrees. These edicts are important tools not only
for preventing social disorder but also for discrediting their opponents. Yet even as the
Meiji leaders promoted the concepts of a united nation, of imperial government and a
convenient "public" so as to buttress their own authority, so also did they attempt to
calm their own fears. In devising the blueprint of a new order they also attempted to
accommodate themselves to their own actions: the plethora of their public statements
suggests both unease and reformist zeal.
Hence the extraordinary number of edicts issued by the Meiji provisional
government reflects a tension between ideals and necessity, as well as defining the
tension between national unity and free government. In 1868 alone, the government
issued 1,171 edicts.19 These edicts can be divided roughly into two groups; one intended
18 In May 1869, for instance, a group of domain representatives who had joined the Meiji government
complained that Mori Arinori was advocating the banning of samurai from carrying a sword. They also
complained that the leadership led by Iwakura Tomomi, Kido and Okubo ignored their opinions, despite
the initial agreement on "public debate". See Miyachi Masato, "Haihan Chiken no Seiji Katei," Banno
Junji and Miyachi (eds.), Nihon Kindaishi ni okeru Tenkanki no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan,
1985), pp. 48-9. As the main causes of concern for the Meiji leaders as to the stability of their government,
Miyachi cites the pro-bakufu forces, domain representatives critical of their policy, and popular
discontent.
19 Those edicts are compiled in Horei Zensho. Compilation was started by the Dajokan office in 1885. The
edicts issued after October 1867 were compiled retrospectively in 1886.
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to legitimise and construct the new government, and the other to maintain social order.
Most important and representative of the first group is the Charter Oath, and that of the
second the Five Board Notices.
The two documents were issued almost simultaneously, just four months after
90
the Restoration. They are markedly different in character, one being of a constitutional
nature and the other a brief criminal code. They were in fact intended for different
audiences. The former was for the political elite, such as court officials and heads of the
han domains, and was promulgated through an elaborate court ceremony. The latter was
for the general public, and was issued through a traditional way of disseminating decrees
to the public, erected street boards. Both reflect the Meiji leaders' urgent need to claim
their authority, and reveal the dilemmas that they faced in legitimising their rule.
The Charter Oath is a five-article text, promulgated as the emperor's pledge to
the "gods". Its first article reads: "Assemblies shall be widely convoked and all
21
measures shall be decided upon by open discussion." The article asserts a new political
authority backed by or public debate. The public in this case is a limited one, as
the rigid status system of the Tokugawa period is still in place. Yet the article clearly
announces a new departure for it entails the denial of the domain system, the key
foundation of the Tokugawa government.22
20 The Charter Oath and the Five Board Notices are included in Hdrei Zensho (1868) as Decrees No. 156
(14 March) and No. 158 (15 March), respectively.
21 This English translation is provided by Nobutaka Ike, The Beginnings ofPolitical Democracy in Japan,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 36. Several English translations are available, W.
McLaren's version perhaps being the best known ("Japanese Government Documents," Transactions of
the Asiatic Society of Japan, XLII-1, 1914). Yet McLaren's translation is less clear about Article 2, in
which he translates "keiron" as social order. "Keiron" has a diverse meaning, but I agree with Ike in his
emphasis on the economic implication.
22 This assertion may be contested, however. For the Charter Oath had undergone several revisions. Yuri
Kimimasa of the Echizen domain wrote the first draft, which was revised by Fukuoka Takachika of the
Tosa domain. Fukuoka's draft was revised by Kido Takayoshi of the Choshu domain and Kido's version
became the final text. Fukuoka's draft includes the phrase "rekko kaigi o hiraki" (an assembly of han lords
shall be convoked). Robert Spaulding speculates that Kido himself left the phrase unchanged and replaced
it with "hiroku kaigi o okoshi" (assemblies shall be widely convoked) only under the influence of Iwakura
Tomomi, a court noble. (See Robert Spaulding, "The Intent of the Charter Oath", Studies in Japanese
History and Politics, The University of Michigan Press, 1967.) Thus government leaders may then have
had different views about the role of the han lords in the new system. However, it is difficult to assume
that those leaders, who themselves were not han lords, would have envisaged a decision-making body that
would exclude them. In fact, Kido began to discuss with other leaders the abolition of the han system later
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The second article asserts that "The government and the governed shall be of one
mind, and the national economy and finances shall be greatly strengthened". It
emphasises the importance of economic development, reflecting the Meiji leaders'
desire to make the country not only militarily but also economically strong. It calls on
"high and low" to be united to promote financial activities and the economy. The idea of
Fukoku Kyohei (Enrich the Nation, and Strengthen the Military), which will become the
key slogan of modernisation, is already prominent.
Thus the Charter Oath is a radical political statement which denounces the
existing system as "absurdist habit" (roshu), and elevates the emperor to lead this
"revolution". The emperor is presented as a champion of modernisation. Thus Article 4
reads: "All absurd customs of olden times shall be abandoned, and all actions shall be
based on international usage." And Article 5: "Knowledge shall be sought for all over
the world, and thereby the foundations of Imperial rule shall be strengthened." The
abiding message is the need for national unity so as to make Japan a modern state, and
the reason for it is that the country is in such a serious crisis that it requires
"unprecedented reform". To carry out such reform, national unity must be exerted, and
the state the writers envisage is fairer and better because it is dictated by koron, public
debate.23
The Five Board Notices, on the other hand, are clearly repressive. They evoke
the "old" morality and regulations issued by the Tokugawa regime to maintain social
order. They contain seven regulations, three written on one board, and each of the
remaining four on one board. The first three orders relate to the observance of the five
in the year. See The Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Volume I: 1868-1871, translated by Sidney Devere Brown
and Akiko Hirota (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1983), p. 116.
23 The interpretation of koron differed even among the key writers of the text. Inada Masatsugu suggests
that Yuri Kimimasa's usage implies the people as a whole, while that of Fukuoka Takachika is restricted
to han lords and other members of the political elite. Yuri was influenced by Yokoi Shonan, a pro-
Western Confucian scholar, and Sakamoto Ryoma, a leader of the pre-Rcstoration anti-bakufu movement,
both of whom more or less endorsed the Anglo-American style of people's participation in politics. Inada
quotes Yokoi saying in Kokuze Sanron [Three Principles of National Policy] "In England, government
operates based on what ordinary people think. All people are consulted about each action to be taken by
administrators, major or small. If it is not likely to benefit them and not favoured by them, the action is not
imposed". Koron was later used widely by jiyuminken (freedom and people's rights) activists and Taisho
democratic movement activists seeking wider public participation in the political decision-making process.
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cardinal rules of Confucianism24, compassion for the weak and those who have lost their
spouse, a ban on murder, arson and other criminal acts. The fourth ban is on class action
in political protest and in fleeing from the land. The fifth ban is on Christianity, and the
seventh ban is on leaving one's own han domain. The sixth ban on violence against
foreigners complies with the country's opening up to the rest of the world. The Five
Board Notices are an expression of the Meiji leaders' strong concern for the
maintenance of social order, and they are among a number of such regulations conceived
with this end.
Thus the Charter Oath and the Five Board Notices appear at odds with each
other, calling for the acceptance of "universal" law on the one hand and tight domestic
control on the other. Typically, the ban on the dissemination of Christianity in the Five
Board Notices contradicts the Charter Oath's internationalism; it met with immediate
protest from Western countries, and was lifted in a few years.
This seeming duality, with openness and oppressiveness in uneasy relation, is a
major characteristic of the decrees of the Meiji provisional government and occurs in
other sections of the texts as well.
Thus the ban on free movement in the Five Board Notices comes with a
memorandum which encourages the people to speak up if they have a complaint to the
government. This is a repetition of similar decrees issued in the previous months in the
same year.25 Yet the pattern is the same, simultaneous endorsement of a kind of freedom
See Inada Masatsugu, Meiji Kenpd Seiritsushi [The Establishment of the Meiji Constitution], vol. 1
(Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1960), pp. 1-22.
~4
The five cardinal rule of Confucianism are loyalty to one's master, close relationship between father and
son, different roles for husband and wife, importance of seniority, and trust between friends.
25 At least two decrees were issued to this effect, Decree No. 86 (9 February) and Decree No. 137 (4
March), both in Horei Zensho (1868). A partial translation of Decree No. 86 is as follows: "At this time
of the Restoration of imperial rule, the utmost task (of the imperial government) is to look after the people,
and many ongoing events are expected to resolve gradually so that the people will feel safe and content.
However, audacious gangs are running away in all directions. Trying to win fame using the emperor's
name, they may trick good people, steal money and food, make people work hard, and exploit the strength
of the people (minryoku), thus violating the imperial goal of looking after the people. Because those things
are possible, if you have private problems, lodge your complaints with the imperial government without
any hesitation, even if they may be antagonistic to its policy." (Here and elsewhere, translations are my
own except when otherwise indicated.) The decree requests that local land administrators (rydshu and
jito) refer such complaints to the imperial government. It also encourages people to complain directly to
the imperial government, if "absurd customs" (roshu) make it difficult for them to complain to their
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of speech and a ban on free movement. The duality again reflects the Meiji leaders'
radicalism and their simultaneous need to maintain social order.
At the same time, the duality reflects their political awareness that they need to
win support to legitimise their rule, as well as their private difficulties in dealing with
legitimacy. They are leaders of their own domains who have organised lower-class
samurai and even farmers to challenge the Tokugawa authority. They know the power of
"the masses", since they have exploited it for their revolutionary cause. Hence Article 3
of the Charter Oath gestures at participation by asserting that "civil and military officials
as well as the common people shall achieve their aims, and thus the people's minds shall
not grow weary".
Yet their attitude towards the people is ambiguous, and their encouragement of
free speech is far from complete. So in the following month a censorship decree appears
26which makes official permission necessary for book publication. Censorship of
newspapers follows almost immediately.27 Hence the Restoration has the familiar
28
despotic character of revolution: forced change is accompanied by assertive authority.
Nevertheless egalitarianism was a key characteristic of the Meiji provisional
government. In the early Meiji period state and society are often interchangeable
concepts. Both represent an ideal community, independent externally and united
internally. Yet in both, the people form an indispensable part. This new vision of
society, with the Charter Oath stressing national unity based on individual commitment,
suggested that all were "equal" under the emperor's leadership in the country's striving
for modernisation. And this emphasis on a new public went beyond rhetoric, as the new
government removed various status regulations that had been the linchpin of the
Tokugawa regime. Thus the abolition of the domain system in 1871 was preceded by a
immediate landlords. The decree also includes a ban on passing post-station towns on main transportation
routes without an official pass.
26 Decree No. 358 (28 Intercalary April) in Horei Zensho (1868).
27
Decree No. 451 (8 June) in Horei Zensho (1868).
2S
Discussing the French Revolution, de Tocqueville points out the similarity between the way in which
power was exercised by the French revolutionaries and the ancien regime. He attempts to find the
continuity between the two in the idea of droit administratif. Dicey also sees the origin of administrative
law in Napoleon's effort to combine the two elements, revolutionary and conservative. See Dicey, op. cit.,
pp. 335-8.
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decree to abolish the titles "kugyo" (court nobles) and "shoko" (han lords) on 14 June,
1869, and by a decree to abolish the titles "tai, fu, shi" (assigned to various ranks of
samurai) on 2 December 1869. This in turn was followed by a decree to abolish the
status of eta and himin (outcasts) on 28 August 1871. The classification between former
samurai and commoners remained in the koseki (household registers) system introduced
on
in 1871, but they were now allowed to intermarry.
The removal of these barriers was not, of course, purely ideological. A
centralised government required a tax-paying people, and a people who would accept
national conscription. Obstacles to commercial activities had also to be removed.
Households, not individuals, would replace the rigid status system as the basic unit for
administration. Nevertheless, an emphasis on egalitarianism, together with
->/x
internationalism, was the undercurrent of Japan's modernisation."
Each egalitarian measure met resistance, and the Meiji leaders had to rely on the
emperor's newly acquired authority. They had other advantages as well, such as a
monopoly of technology and the ability to assemble capable personnel, so as to
3 1consolidate their power. Yet it was this emphasis on equality and their own assertion of
fairness that legitimised their government. Discrimination remained, but the idea of an
equal society transformed Japan and unleashed a more mobile society, nurturing such
grass-roots activities as the Jiyuminken Undo in various parts of the country.32 The three
"dissenters" I discuss later are all a product of this newly mobile society. Thus the
emphasis on egalitarianism is one reason why in its early years the Meiji State as a
political structure was never fundamentally challenged, despite its institutional problems
as seen in the Constitution. Even opposition to government constantly returned to the
Charter Oath. Future governments would be criticised for betraying the promises made
by the Restoration ideals.
29 The classification was abolished in 1914.
30
Egalitarianism was also promoted by such intellectuals as Fukuzawa Yukichi. The first volume of his
Gakumon no Susume became a best-seller in 1872.
1 The government's successful monopoly of technology is seen in the Saga Rebellion of 1874. See John
R. Black, Young Japan: Yokohama and Yedo 1858-79, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, printed in
Tokyo, 1968), pp. 415-16. The original edition was printed in 1883 by Baker, Pratt & Company.
3" The Jiyuminken Undo in the western part of Tokyo is vividly documented by Irokawa Daikichi,
Shinpen Meiji Seishinshi (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1973).
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However there was always a potential tension in government policy. Political
leaders were aware that they needed to win public support in order to legitimise their
rule. At the same time they had to suppress opposition. Their seemingly self-
contradictory aim is especially discernible in the introduction of various press laws and
other laws to restrict public meetings, and it is to these less open aspects of government
that I will now turn.
1.3. Extension of discretionary powers: press and assembly laws
The tension between national unity and free government in post-Restoration Japan is
nowhere more apparent than in the many measures introduced in order to regulate
freedom of the press and assembly. Indeed such regulations played a central role in the
"administration" of the people by successive governments in pre-war Japan. The origin
of those regulations was already present from the outset, as seen in the Five Board
Notices. Yet as Japanese society became more pluralistic, the task of incorporating the
people into the political system while containing dissent became more complex and
strenuous.
This section aims at demonstrating how successive governments used various
regulations in order to quell their political opponents. When dissent became more vocal,
the language in these regulations became more inclusive, thus more discretionary. The
regulations were always reactionary, however, and were targeted at people who those in
government saw as a major threat to their rule. At first they were designed to quell
jiyuminken activists seeking popular rights. But when Japanese society became more
"industrialised", the primary targets became labour and tenant activists and socialists.
Yet even these regulations could not stifle the emergence of a pluralistic society entirely.
For they acknowledged the emergence of a "civil" society even as they were driven to
increased use of arbitrary executive power. At the same time the evolution of these
regulations from those targeting individual opponents to those designed to prevent and
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contain any potential opposition reveals the inner trajectory of the Japanese state, from
an authority fragile at the outset to an authority increasingly able to curb and define
individual activity.
For the newly assembled government, the need to create national unity required a
mechanism for disseminating policy across the community. Thus it introduced its
official gazette on 20 February 1868. A decree issued shortly after described its aim as
the dissemination of the government's goals and intentions "throughout society",
including isolated rural communities and people both high and low. "
Yet information detrimental to government policy must be controlled. Thus a
censorship decree appeared in Intercalary 28 April 1868, which made official permission
necessary for book publication. Newspaper censorship, as we have seen, quickly
followed.
Hence the need to create a new national community coincided with the need to
suppress opposition. This pattern, in which publication is "encouraged" while criticism
of government policy is banned, is present in a number of subsequent regulations.
Representative is the first press ordinance introduced in 1869. Newspapers were
then expected to play the role of a contemporary encyclopaedia, disseminating
technology and new ideas. Their publication was encouraged, although prior permission
was required. An article in the 1869 regulations says: "Natural disasters, prices, policy
and regulations, military affairs, fires, marriages, births and deaths, arts, banquets,
clothing, food, various government notices, translations from Western books, and events
abroad. Everything, which is not injurious to society, should be reported."34 At the same
time, opposition must be discouraged. Thus, "policy and regulations" in the article is
followed by a parenthesised ban on "flippant criticism". "Military affairs" has a
parenthesised warning that the publisher will be punished if the newspaper carries wrong
information and has not corrected it.
33 Decree 217, issued on 5 April 1868.
4
The press regulations and the regulations on the freedom of assembly issued by the Meiji government
between 1867 and 1890 and quoted in this section are included in Matsumoto Sannosuke and Yamamuro
Shinji (eds.), Genron to Media, Nihon Kindai Shiso Taikei, vol. 11 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), pp.
403-50. The pre-war criminal and civil codes, the Peace Police Law, and other laws quoted in this section
are included in Wagatsuma Sakae (ed.), Kyuhdreishu (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1968).
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Nevertheless the government actively promoted the publication of newspapers.
The Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun, which is considered to be the first modern-format
daily published in Japan, was published in 1870 with the support of the then governor of
Kanagawa Prefecture. The government also bought copies of the newly launched
newspapers to distribute them across the country.35
This delicate balance between the need for publicity and the need for control is
also discernible in the shinbunshi jorei, new press regulations introduced in 1871. These
encouraged the publication of newspapers as a means to enlighten the people. One
article advises that newspaper articles should not be written casually and without factual
evidence, but also should not be too difficult and formal to be understood by ordinary
readers. At the same time separate articles ban criticising government policy and
regulations, and disseminating heresies (isetsu) that may confuse the people.
Full control of the media is clearly not possible, unless there is only one
newspaper which is a government gazette. Plurality of newspapers means diversity of
opinion. Thus from about 1873 on newspapers began to discuss politics more
critically.36
In that same year the encouragement of publication remains present in new
regulations issued on 9 October. Article 7 of these regulations ensures that newspapers
can carry articles about any subject unless it is injurious to society. Yet regulations
intended to ban criticism increase. Now the concept of the state (kokka) is crucial for the
government to defend its policy against its critics. Thus Article 12 says: "Newspapers
should not discredit national polity (kokutai), criticise principles of the nation
(kokuritsu), and advocate laws of other countries so that enforcement of the laws of the
nation (.kokuho) will not be hampered." The article reiterates the concept of the state in
35 For a brief history of the mass media in the Meiji period, see Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Shinbun no Tanjo
to Seiron no Kozo [The Birth of Newspapers and Structure of Political Debate (in Meiji Japan)]", Genron
to Media, pp. 452-76.
36 The Nisshin Shinjishi, which was published from 1872 to 1875, carried an opinion by Jiyuminken
activists calling for the introduction of parliament on 18 January 1873. Kato Hiroyuki's opposition to the
opinion appeared in the same newspaper on 3 February. Both camps exchanged opinions in the paper
several times. Their articles are reprinted in Toyama Shigeki and Sato Shigero (eds.), Jiyutoshi, vol.1
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957, reprinted in 1997), pp. 89-93, 97-119. The original edition of Jiyutdshi
was edited by Itagaki Taisuke, founder of the party, and published in 1910.
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newly institutional terms in order to label criticism of government unpatriotic and
treasonable. Government leaders still feel their authority fragile, and resort to ideological
persuasion and the language of coercion.
The fragile co-habitation of a free press and state control was severely damaged
when the Jiyuminken Undo became a real threat to the government. The Meiji
government had already been in serious disarray, and after Itagaki Taisuke and other
leaders left the government in 1873 over the Seikanron dispute, Kido Takayoshi, another
major figure in the original formation, left office in 1874 in protest at the government's
decision to send troops to Taiwan. In 1875, they were persuaded to return to the
government. Yet a serious rift remained, this time between Kido and Itagaki about the
timing of introducing Parliament.
Behind Itagaki, there were growing grass-roots calls for prompt introduction of
Parliament. In response the government issued an imperial rescript in April 1875,
promising that Parliament would be introduced in the future. This promise encouraged
the Jiyuminken Undo further. While Itagaki, Kido and other government leaders were
debating about a future plan, the Jijosha, an association advocating Parliament's
introduction, circulated a petition urging the government to introduce a fully popular
government. Some local bureaucrats also supported the group's plan at their meeting
organised by the government (chihokan kaigi) in June. Alarmed by the growing support
for the Jiyuminken Undo, the government pushed through two new regulations intended
to quell their voices, an ordinance against slander (zanbd-ritsu) and new press
regulations (shinbunshi jorei), later in the month.
The zanbo-ritsu and the shinbunshi jorei were both issued by the Dajokan, the
central administrative body that existed between 1868 and 1885. A mere rhetorical ban
on criticism of government policy in the previous regulations was now replaced by
concrete forms of punishment under the shinbunshi jorei. Thus the new regulations
allowed the government to impose imprisonment and fines on those whose articles "are
intended to induce others to commit crimes, incite a riot and intimidate government
officials" (Article 12). Similar sanctions were levied against those who "support a fall of
the government or the destruction of the state" (Article 13), or who "slander
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administrative laws (seihd) and violate the principle of the people's obligation to obey
law" (Article 14). Of these articles, Article 14 seems most relevant to discretionary
power, since it makes criticism of seihd, regulations made by government, a punishable
offence.
Because their aim was to quell immediate opposition, the shinbunshi jorei
banned newspapers from carrying petitions to the government without permission from
relevant ministries. The disclosure of confidential government documents, minutes of
closed-door meetings, and military information was already banned. But this new ban on
the publication of private requests to the government seriously undermined the role of
newspapers as the major channel for debate between government and the people. And
the ban was preserved in subsequent press regulations, including the Press Law
(Shinbunshi Ho) of 1909.37
Active publication in pre-war Japan, however, both in newspapers and books,
shows that the media were still capable of promoting individual opinion, despite those
restrictive measures. Yet the loss of publicity for petitions severely tilted the relationship
between government and the people in favour of the former. By contrast the
government's promise to open parliament in 1875 was a direct response to a petition
which was signed by several prominent people, including Itagaki, and appeared in a
newspaper. With the new ban, similar exchanges between government and people
became difficult. Newspapers could no longer offer a venue where government and
"3 Q
people could discuss a policy on equal terms."
In the following year, as Jiyuminken Undo increased in force, the government
took a major step to suppress opposition. To punish those who had written critical
articles was now not enough. It issued a one-sentence ordinance allowing the Home
Affairs Ministry to terminate the publication of newspapers if they were deemed to harm
37 Article 20 of the Press Law.
3S In parallel with the zanbo-ritsu and the shinbunshi jorei, restrictions on public servants discussing
politics in newspapers and magazines were reinforced in 1875. A similar ban had existed since 1873. Yet
the preceding regulations specified the areas that government workers should not discuss in the media:
their immediate work and issues that would hamper diplomatic affairs. The new regulations adopt more
inclusive language, saying that government workers should not discuss administrative and political affairs,
except those reported in the Government Gazette. The ban, "kauri no seimu kiji keisai kinshi tatsu", is
reprinted in Genron to Media, p. 415.
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the safety of the nation (,kokuan).39 Thus by 1876 the prototype of the draconian press
regulations of pre-war Japan was already in place.
Yet changes made to the press regulations in 1883 transformed the outlook and
contents of the press regulations even further. Revised shinbunshi jorei, which
incorporated the one-sentence 1876 ordinance, reflected the growing confidence of those
in government. Furthermore the legal system was now almost established, after the
introduction of the criminal code in 1880. Now a Home Affairs Minister, not the
ministry, could terminate the publication of a newspaper. Article 14 states: "A Home
Affairs Minister can ban or terminate the publication of a newspaper if it is found to
contain information that damages public safety (chian) or upsets social mores (fuzoku)."
Article 15 states: "Governors and other local administrative heads can order publishers
to terminate their newspapers issued in the area under their jurisdiction if the papers are
found carrying such information as mentioned in the preceding article. They should
report the case to the Home Affairs Minister and wait for his instruction." And Article
16 states: "After banning or terminating the publication of a newspaper, a Home Affairs
Minister can confiscate the remaining copies, ban their sale, and confiscate their printing
devices if the case is found serious." Behind these articles is a government increasingly
confident, one that has secured its administrative structure and confirmed its ideology. It
is a government that has transformed itself from a cautious guardian of the media into a
harsh oppressor of free opinion.
This new "legalisation" of the Japanese State is also reflected in more specific
and formidable qualifications for publishers. Publishers now even have to pay guarantee
money to the government before publishing a newspaper or journal. Only Japanese men
aged 20 or older are allowed to publish, and those who are stripped of their "civil" rights
(.koken) are banned altogether.
39 This ordinance was called "kokuan bogai hakkin fukoku [ordinance to ban publications deemed to harm
the safety of the nation]", and was issued by the Dajokan on 5 July 1876. The ordinance was issued
because the zanbo-ritsu and the shinbunshi jorei would not stop criticism of the government in the media,
although many journalists were arrested under the regulations. See Okudaira Yasuhiro, "Ken'etsu Seido",
in Ukai Nobushige, Fukusama Masao, et al. (eds.), Koza Nihon Kindaiho Hattatsushi series (hereafter
KNKH), vol. 11 (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1960), pp. 133-205. Okudaira asserts that this new power to
terminate publication was the central means used by successive governments to police publication. The
ordinance is also reprinted in Genron to Media, p. 415.
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Such suppression of publication reflects the emergence of the authoritarian Meiji
State supported by what would be later called tennosei (imperial absolutism). Thus the
1883 regulations add a ban on discrediting the imperial family.40 Article 36 stipulates
that the government can confiscate printing devices owned by those publishers who are
found violating the provisions of Chapter I of Part II of the criminal code. Part II is
entitled "Serious and Minor Crimes Regarding the Public Weal (koeki)", and begins with
a chapter about crimes against the imperial family. Those who "harm or try to harm" the
emperor, his wife, and the wives of the preceding two emperors will receive the death
penalty. 41 A blanket ban on lese-majeste is thus introduced without clear definition of
what acts constitute the crime. In the new scheme of things the emperor represents a
"public". And this "public" entails new divisions of society. Soldiers, the servants of the
emperor, are exempt from punishment under the criminal code. Instead they are
subjected to separate military laws.42 Murder of a prisoner committed by a public
servant will be treated as physical violence, not murder.42 By labelling critical discussion
of the imperial family a crime, the press regulations now became part of the emerging
absolutism.
The shinbunshi jorei was revised in 1909 to become the Press Law, which
regulated the publication of newspapers until the end of World War II.44 The law
preserved most aspects of the discretionary powers accorded to a Home Affairs Minister
by the previous regulations.
Women, however, could now openly publish a newspaper and a journal. Thus a
group of women formed a literary association Seito (Bluestocking) and began publishing
a journal, also titled Seito in 1911. This new tolerance obviously reflects a growing call
40 The heaviest penalty in the zanbo-ritsu is for slandering the emperor. The ordinance and the regulations
created the impression that criticising the government was punishable for the same reason as criticising the
emperor was punishable.
41
Taigyakuzai, crimes against the emperor and other members of the imperial family, were passed into the
criminal code revised in 1907 (Article 73 of the criminal code).
42 Article 4 of Chapter I of Part I, General Rules, in the criminal code.
43 Article 280. Thus public servants would escape from the death penalty for murdering prisoners. Yet
Article 292 states that premeditated murder will always receive the death penalty.
44 The shinbunshi jorei was revised in 1887. In Articles 19 and 20, discretionary powers are accorded to a
Home Affairs Minister to ban publications that he deems harmful for "public" order. See Genron to
Media, pp. 421-5.
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among women for wider political freedom. And also the Meiji Constitution had indeed
guaranteed "liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and association",
"within the limits of law" for all subjects of the country. On the other hand, the article
excluded from publishing two groups whose obedience was crucial for the survival of
the burgeoning Japanese Empire: soldiers, and people in the newly acquired territories.
For Japan was about to annex Korea, after obtaining Taiwan in 1895. Whether or not
domestic laws, including the Meiji Constitution, should be applied in those new
territories remained controversial both within the government and among legal experts.
Yet in those areas press freedom was not recognised. Military officers could not express
their opinions in newspapers.
This situation of course is characteristic of the Japanese State and society during
the Taisho period (1911-26), when Japan is commonly described as "liberal
domestically and imperialistic externally". Indeed during this period, various internal
civil movements gained momentum, and various steps were taken to expand people's
political participation. Yet this expansion of "civil" liberties also coincided with the
expansion of executive power which could be exercised when those in authority felt it
necessary. Thus the Press Law of 1909 adds Article 42, which was not included in the
previous press regulations, which says: "The publisher, the editor, and the printer who
carries articles that discredit the imperial family and are intended to change government
(,seitai) or to abuse the rules of the nation (choken) will be imprisoned for up to two
years or fined up to 300 yen." Acts that "discredit the imperial family" or "are intended
to abuse the rules of the nation" are of course difficult to define. Such definitions are
open-ended, and ambiguous. Their vagueness is harmless as long as the article is not
invoked. Yet once it is invoked, vague and inclusive language can be effective in
checking dissent.
Thus when Minobe Tatsukichi was accused of discrediting the imperial family
through his Emperor-as-Organ theory in 1935, the Publication Law, a sister law of the
Press Law, was invoked. Under its Article 19, the Home Affairs Minister banned three
of his major works. A complaint was filed against him for violation of lese-majeste, and
the Justice Ministry discussed whether to charge him for violation of Article 26 of the
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Publication Law, which has exactly the same phrasing as Article 42 of the Press Law,
except that articles are replaced by books and pictures, editor by author, and by slightly
lighter punishment.45
At the turn of the century then the Japanese government was facing the persistent
challenge of how to pursue "national" goals while containing political dissent. It had to
recognise the demands of the people, and at the same time it needed their obedience.
Increasing emphasis on imperial authority and "public" morality, as seen in the Boshin
Shosho of 1908, reflects the pressures felt by those running government. And their
uneasiness is recognisable in the abundant use of discretionary powers in the 1909 Press
Law. In that law, authority and individual are unable to meet, because as soon as
individuals protest they become law-breakers.46
At the same time the regulations aimed at restricting public meetings and
political association have the same origin and purpose as those of the press regulations:
the enforcement of arbitrary power, characterised by ambiguous language, in order to
define the illegality of private activities. Yet these regulations reflect the government's
fear, more clearly than the press regulations, that their opponents might unite to become
one powerful force.
The origins of these regulations concerning public meetings and political
associations may be traced back to the government's order, issued for police personnel
45 Article 26 of the Publication Law of 1893 reads: "The author, the publisher and the printer who
published a book or a picture that discredits the imperial family and is intended to change government
(seitai) and abuse the rules of the nation (kokken) will be imprisoned no less than two months and up to
two years or fined no less than 20 yen and up to 200 yen." The ministry decided not to charge Minobe,
since his books were already banned and he resigned from his official posts. See Miyazawa Toshiyoshi,
Tenno Kikansetsu, vol.1 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1970), pp. 241-6.
46 The regulations on the publication of books were less stringent than the restrictions on newspapers, but
according to the regulations in 1872, author and publisher still required a licence from the Education
Ministry for book publication. This authority was shifted to the Home Affairs Ministry in 1875, when the
zanbd-ritsu and the shinbunshi jorei were introduced. But the initial licence requirement was changed to a
post-publication check, although both methods would practically serve the same purpose for rejecting
"unsuitable" books, for the state and society. Taking the same pattern as the 1883 press regulations,
Article 15 of the shuppan jorei introduced in 1887 stipulates that petitions submitted to the government
are not allowed to be published unless permission from relevant ministries is granted. Article 16 says: "A
Home Minister can ban the publication of a document or a picture that is deemed to harm chian (public
safety) and damage fuzoku (social mores), and can confiscate the original and copies." Article 25 also bans
passages that encourage destruction of government and misuse the law of the state (choken). The shuppan
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in 1877, to monitor and stop anti-government activities. The order again reflects the
government's concern about the growing Jiyuminken Undo movement. Thus "If he finds
evidence that people have secretly gathered for forging conspiracy, or the speeches at a
meeting are found harming the safety of the nation (kokuan), the policeman should stop
the meeting and report the incident to his superior," the order says.
Such fear of any collective action echoes the Five Board Notices, and is passed
into the shukai jorei in 1880. Thus the regulations ban one organisation from associating
with another. Now associations or meetings intended to discuss politics (seiji) require
police permission. Police can attend those meetings and order them to disband if they are
deemed to harm the stability of the state (Article 4). Yet government itself cannot avoid
sponsoring public meetings. Therefore the regulations exempt meetings organised by
seihd, that is, droit administratif "laws" enacted by the government. Thus the character
of a meeting is dependent upon which law is applied and by whom.
In the 1880 ordinance, the government identified political activities as its biggest
threat, and banned the following groups from joining a political organisation or
attending a political meeting: incumbent and reserve soldiers of the Army and the Navy,
policemen, teachers and students, and trainees of agriculture and crafts. These people
were supposed to support government, and therefore they should not be involved in any
activity that would threaten its existence.
The shukai jorei was tightened in 1887, as the first opening of Parliament
approached.47 And then a new law restricting press freedom and freedom of assemblies
was again introduced in 1890 simultaneously with the first general election. The term
"the safety of the nation" (kokuan) of 1880 is changed to annei chitsujo, echoing the
phrase used in the newly introduced Meiji Constitution. This and previous laws made it
a norm to ban meetings or political associations suspected of harming annei chitsujo,
both a priori or on-the-spot. Nevertheless, the government had to recognise the
emergence of a more demanding public. This recognition is observable, for instance, in
jorei was revised to become the Publication Law (Shuppan Ho) in 1893. For the regulations on book
publication introduced by the government between 1868 and 1887, see Genron to Media, pp. 425-35.7 As a result of this ordinance, about 570 jiyuminken activists, including Ozaki Yukio, Hoshi Toru, and
Nakae Chomin, were forced to leave Tokyo.
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their lifting a previous ban on out-door public meetings. A previous ban of contacting
other groups to form bigger organisations is also dropped.
In 1900 the new law was amended to become the Peace Police Law, in response
to perceived threats from socialists and labour and tenant activists. Its Article 17 singles
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out those groups. Political organisations are banned if they are considered by the
government as harming "the public peace" (annei) or "the public peace and order"
(.annei chitsujo). Yet Article 14 baldly states that any "secret" association is banned.
Secrecy and individual autonomy are, of course, inseparable. The secrecy that allows
free debate is the foundation for people to act together. The law thus further undermines
the foundation of a communicable society.
Such consistent resorting to discretionary power and convenient ambiguity of
language reflect the insecure legitimacy of Japanese government authority and the
absence of a system to solve "social problems". The government was insecure because it
was not based on genuine popular support. The introduction of a parliamentary system
in 1890 was seriously inadequate, since the eligible voting population was extremely
small due to strict asset-based requirements. The insecurity of legitimacy and the
absence of a viable system to accommodate the demands of the masses required the
government to rely on "the emperor", "the law", the police, and even the military to
enforce its policy. By aligning politics with anti-government and anti-social activity, the
Peace Police Law further deprives the people of the chance to discuss its own collective
life.
Nevertheless even the Peace Police Law mixes tolerance and control. The law for
the first time allows those opposed to a Home Minister's decision banning their
Article 17 reads: "(1) It is banned to use violence against, threaten, or publicly slander others for the
following purposes 1, 2, and 3, and to entice or mobilise them for purpose 2.
1. To force them to join a group aimed at taking joint action over working conditions and pay, or prevent
them from joining such a group.
2. To sack workers or reject their offer to work in order to lay them off en masse, or to prevent other
workers from accepting an offer of employment in order to stage a strike.
3. To force the employer or workers to accept working conditions and pay.
(2) Landlords and tenants are banned from using violence against, threatening, or publicly slandering each
other to force the other to accept conditions over tenancy of the property." See Kyuhdreishu, pp. 60-1.
Article 17 was dropped when the law was revised in 1912.
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association to lodge a complaint with an administrative court.49 Subsequent oppression
under the law proves such a safeguard illusory. Yet the law gestures at constitutional
government. Also the law relaxes a ban on specific groups of people from attending a
public meeting.50 Thus oppression and "liberalism" coexisted even in the law. That was
possible because of discretionary notions of political authority: a convenient fluidity of
language and entrenched authority had again combined to define the illegality of
"private" activity. Thus the Peace Police Law accords almost limitless power to the
police and to the Home Affairs Ministry in the banning of "political" activities. These
and other laws laid the groundwork for the tighter controls of the future, when those in
power felt it even more necessary to oppose dissenting opinion.
1.4. The Meiji Constitution: imperial absolutism and constitutional
government
The divided alignments of post-Restoration Japanese politics are especially apparent in
the Meiji Constitution. Lorenz von Stein, one of the German advisors to the
government's constitutional writers, described the newly introduced Constitution as "a
unique mixture of [theocratic] monarchism and [representative] democracy".51 Thus the
law of the state was promulgated by the emperor by "virtue of the supreme power" that
he inherited from his ancestors. He was the head of the Army and Navy, as well as the
state bureaucracy, and the right to initiate revision of the Constitution belonged only to
him. Parliament would not be allowed to "interfere" in matters of the imperial family,
49 Article 8. See ibid., p. 60. However, the Press Law of 1909, and the Publication Law of 1893 and its
revision of 1934 do not include an equivalent provision. See ibid., pp. 65-6.
50 Restrictions on the formation of political associations remained tight in the Peace Police Law. Thus,
Article 5 bans the following people from joining a political association: incumbent and reserve soldiers of
the Army and the Navy, policemen, Shinto priests, monks and other religious practitioners, teachers and
students of public and private schools, women, minors, and those whose civil rights are suspended (see
Kyiihoreishu, pp. 60-1). Women had been banned from joining a political organisation or attending a
political meeting since 1890, when the shukai jorei was revised. The Peace Preservation Law imposed a
similar ban on Shinto priests and monks.
51
Quoted by Inada Masatsugu, Meiji Kenpd Seiritsushi, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1962), p. 954.
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and amendment of the Imperial House Law would not require parliamentary assent.'52 At
the same time the emperor exercised the rights of sovereignty "according to the
provisions of the present Constitution". Therefore "Every law requires the consent of the
imperial Diet". And the emperor promises to "respect and protect the security of the
rights and of the property" of the people, and to "secure to them the complete enjoyment
of the same within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the
law". Stein saw the Constitution as a skilfully crafted compromise between imperial
absolutism and representative government.
The Constitution however leaves open the question of whose decision is more
authoritative. Hence the ambiguous division of authority is embodied in the parallel
presence of imperial ordinance (chokurei) and law (ho). Chokurei is applied to taiken,
executive power. Chokurei is issued in the name of the emperor, and its legitimacy is
based on "emergency" situations. The Meiji Constitution contains a number of articles
endorsing the use of chokurei as an urgent measure, including Articles 8 (emergency
ordinances), 9 (police ordinances), 10 (the autonomy of the bureaucracy), 11 and 12
(autonomy of the military), and 14 (the law of siege). On the other hand, ho requires
Parliament's sanction to be valid. Thus the ho structure ensures parliamentary politics.
Ho appears most frequently in the chapters the "Rights and Duties of Subjects" and "The
Judicature".
Chokurei and ho rarely appear together in an article, except in Articles 8 and 9.
Yet when the articles containing chokurei and ho are collated, there emerges a blurring
of the real centre of power.
Thus Article 8 allows the emperor to issue emergency ordinances to "maintain
public safety or to avert public calamities" when Parliament is not sitting. Article 9 gives
52 Kokkai (the Japanese national assembly) is normally translated the Diet in English based on the official
translation of the Meiji Constitution. However, Parliament, not the Diet, will be used throughout the text
for semantic clarity, unless I am quoting official documents.
53 Article 14: "The emperor proclaims the law of siege. The conditions and effect of the law of siege shall
be determined by law." Yet like many other articles, this article is unclear regarding the conditions in
which the law of siege can be invoked. A particular omission is the role of Parliament. In fact, no law was
enacted by Parliament to determine "the conditions and effect of the law of siege". Instead, the
regulations for dealing with kaigenrei (martial law), which were issued by the Dajokan in 1882, were
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the emperor police ordinance power "for the maintenance of the public peace and order,
and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects". The two articles themselves are
susceptible to abuse, because they leave unclear the conditions under which such
ordinances can be issued.54 Yet at least they stipulate that imperial ordinances are
subject to law. Thus Article 8 requires the government to seek Parliament's consent in
the next parliamentary session, and Article 9 confirms that no ordinance can alter the
existing laws.
However, the Constitution undermines such already fragile assurance of the
superiority of law to imperial ordinances in other articles. Article 31 specifically says
that civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution and ho can be overridden by taiken in the
case of emergency. The article, which is included in Chapter II, the "Rights and Duties
of Subjects", says: "The provisions contained in the present Chapter shall not affect the
exercise of the powers appertaining to the emperor in times of war or in cases of a
national emergency." The Constitution therefore not only separates ho from chokurei,
but also allows the latter to undermine the former.
This contest between chokurei and ho, between imperial executive power and
representative government, continued throughout Japan's pre-war history. For example
in 1897, when party politics was strengthening, Parliament revised the Press Law to
eliminate a Home Affairs Minister's right to ban publications deemed injurious to
society. But the provision was restored not by Parliament but by the government through
the issuance of an imperial ordinance in 1905 in the wake of the Hibiya Riots of that
year. The Constitution also stipulates that the conditions and effect of siege be
determined by law. But no law was ever enacted for this purpose. Instead the law of
siege was proclaimed as an administrative order during the Hibiya Riots, the Kanto
Earthquake of 1923, and the February 26th Incident of 1936, allowing police to ban
public meetings and publications deemed injurious to the situation (jisei). Okudaira
maintained. Thus the law of siege was issued as an administrative order during the Hibiya Riots (1905),
the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923), and the February 26th Incident (1936) for the Tokyo metropolitan area.
54 Tomio Nakano indicates how such undefined powers heighten the power that may be exercised in the
emperor's name. Thus, "the powers which are not limited in their manner of exercise by the Constitution
may be exercised by the emperor in any manner he pleases" (Nakano, The Ordinance Power of the
Japanese Emperor, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1923, p. 5).
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Yasunori asserts that the frequent invocation of chokurei without parliamentary sanction
was a major reason why freedoms of speech and publication were so severely hampered
in pre-war Japan. "If the executive power is so elastic and discretionary, individual
freedoms are difficult to foster."55 Thriving therefore on arbitrary declarations of
emergency, and with the Constitution its fertile ground, the ubiquitous presence of
chokurei undermined both the sovereignty of Parliament and legal equality, the
Constitution's form and substance.
Thus the contest between chokurei and ho mirrors yet transcends such
confrontations between government and its opponents as the conflict between kokken
(statism) and minken (rights of the people) during the Jiyuminken Undo movement, and
between kokutai (national polity, and fundamental character of Japan) and goken
(protection of the Constitution) during the Taisho liberal period.56 The "unique mixture"
of absolute imperialism and representative government was in fact an impasse of non-
accommodation.
The contest between executive power and free government is most obvious in
two aspects of the Constitution, the separation between Parliament and Cabinet, and the
inadequate constitutional guarantees of legal equality. Both aspects reflect the intentions
of the original writers.
The initial drafts of the Constitution were written mainly by Ito Hirobumi, Inoue
Kowashi, Ito Miyoji and Kaneko Kentaro between 1886 and 1888. The Sumitsuin
council started to discuss the draft in June 1888.57
Previous studies show that the writers of the Constitution had studied the
constitutions of various European countries, particularly the Prussian Constitution of
CO
1850." Ito Hirobumi, Ito Miyoji and other government officials visited Germany and
55 Okudaira Yasuhiro, "Ken'etsu Seido", in KNKH, vol. 11, 1967, p. 149.
56 The debate between Minobe Tatsukichi and Uesugi Shinkichi in 1912 was also about which has greater
authority, the emperor's taiken or law enacted by Parliament.
57
Many constitutional scholars believe that the first stage was crucial. Thus, Kojima Kazushi says that the
fundamental character of the Meiji Constitution had been determined by the four people, and the role of
the Sumitsuin was "fine-tuning". See Kojima, "Meiji Kenpo Kiso Katei no Shiryoteki Kenkyu", Nihon
Gakushiin Kiyd, vol. 15, no. 3, 1957, pp. 271-99.
58
According to Inada, European constitutions that influenced the writers of the Meiji Constitution are
those of Prussia (1850), Bavaria (1818), Wiirttemberg (1819), Austria (1867), Saxony (1831), Baden
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other European countries between March 1882 and August 1883 to discuss the
envisaged Constitution with legal experts. German scholars such as Rudolf von Gneist,
Albert Mosse and Stein were key advisors. Hermann Roesler, a German legal advisor
who lived in Japan from 1878 to 1889, also wrote a draft in 1887, which is believed to
have influenced the final draft before it was submitted to the Sumitsuin council.
Nevertheless by dint of much editing and revising, the Meiji Constitution as a Japanese
text became "indigenous".
Taiken appears three times in it, and is rendered by an ambiguous phrase, "the
powers appertaining to the emperor" (Articles 17, 31, and 67), in the official translation.
It appears once in the preamble and is translated as "the rights" of sovereignty of the
State.59 Taiken cannot be divided because it "resides" in the emperor. Yet the writers had
to combine taiken with the constitutional principle that the emperor has to obey the law
to which he gives sanction.
Taiken and the constitutional principle were therefore combined through their
interpretation of representation. Constitutional government as envisaged in the
Constitution is not parliamentary government, but "representative" government, in
which representatives exercise taiken on behalf of the emperor. Thus Article 55 defines
state ministers as representatives of the emperor, not of Parliament or of people. Ito
Miyoji explains:
There are two types of constitutional government, parliamentarian and representative. In
representative government, equilibrium of government is maintained by the monarch (kunshu), and
in parliamentarian government by representatives (of Parliament). The Meiji Constitution endorses
representative government, but not parliamentarian government. Therefore, all taiken belong to the
(1818), as well as English, French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Danish, and Swedish
models. Among them the Prussian Constitution's influence is most prominent. Articles 8 and 31 were
influenced by the Prussian and Austrian Constitution. At the same time Inada asserts that Japanese classics
such as Kojiki, Nihonshoki, Dai Nihonshi, and Nihon Seiki also influenced the writers. Echoing Stein's
description, Inada concludes that the Meiji Constitution was written based on the "kokutai" concept and
Inoue's theocratic concept of political authority and at the same time was influenced by those European
constitutions. See Inada, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 889-912.
59 Ito Miyoji uses taiken for two different English phrases, sovereign rights and monarchical power, in his
"Dai Nippon Teikoku Kcnpo Engi", which is reprinted in Emura Eiichi (ed.), Kenpo Kosd, pp. 348, 350.
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emperor, except cases stipulated in the Constitution, and every matter will be determined by
imperial decision (chokusai).6°
However once proxies have been brought in to exercise taiken, the emperor is exempt
from any political responsibility. Thus the Constitution spares the emperor from any
constitutional obligations to Parliament. Ito Miyoji in this regard explained the
deliberate divergence of the Constitution from European models. "In Prussia and other
German states," he says, "a monarch cannot enforce ordinances unless he has made a
constitutional oath [to Parliament], The Meiji Constitution rejects such provisions."61
He also says that "in constitutional government, the respective Ministers of State shall
give their advice to the emperor and be responsible for running government. Only if
such policy is ensured, can the public weal and the emperor's personal irresponsibility
be preserved".62 Thus, in effect, the Meiji Constitution countenanced supreme political
authority with little or no accountability. For theoretically no institution could check or
stop executive power exercised in the name of the emperor, because it was detached
from constitutional restraints through "representation", and also by the absence of any
constitutional oath. The defect of this construction is the opportunity it provides for the
creation of discretionary powers.63
Nevertheless the role of the people was at the heart of the debate about a form of
constitutional government both before and after the promulgation of the Constitution in
1889. Contrasting views are most apparent in the debate in 1881 between Okuma
Shigenobu and Inoue Kowashi as to whether to choose the British "king in Parliament"
practice or the Prussian emphasis on the monarchy's political role as the head of the
60 ibid., p. 348.
61
ibid., p. 350. Emphasis added by the author. Ito also said, "...in Belgium a future king must declare
before the two houses of Parliament that he will protect the Constitution, laws and the independence of the
people. The Prussian constitution also includes a provision to that effect. It is only then that ordinances
issued by the king will be considered valid."
62 ibid., p. 354. A more accurate translation for the Japanese word 'funinseki-ken" would be non-
responsibility. Yet, irresponsibility was Ito's own choice, as the kana letters for the English word were
added next to the Japanese in the original text.
63 The definition of discretionary powers here differs from that of Dicey, which I summarise as executive
power exercised without a legal check. In Dicey's definition, "legal" refers to both courts and Parliament.
The definition here emphasises Parliament, since the courts had much less power in Japan than in Britain
in examining the "illegality" of government action.
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executive power. Many constitutional historians regard this event as the most decisive
moment in shaping the Meiji Constitution. And the basic framework of the Constitution
is already apparent in the arguments. Thus, if we compare Okuma's and Inoue's
opinions, the genesis of the Constitution, and the conflicts it implies and anticipates,
become clear.
Thus Okuma asserts that a prerequisite for good government is to respect the
people's will (kokujin no yobo), and that parliament is necessary in order to realise it. He
sees the source of social stability and strength in the people's acceptance of their
government and asserts that good government needs their mandate. In this sense, Okuma
is a loyal successor of the Meiji ideals that emphasise the combination of national
strength and the enlightenment of the individual. But what sets Okuma apart are his
ideas about the relationship between authority and the people. For him a balance can be
achieved only when the people accept government, and he endorses active interchange
between the two.
Thus Okuma insists not only on Parliament but also on accountable government.
He proposes to divide government employees into two groups, professional
administrators and politicians. The latter will be replaced by the people if they fail to
perform satisfactorily. Okuma supports "continuous" changes of government responsive
to public opinion.64
Yet this mere assertion of British style parliamentary politics was not acceptable
to other Meiji leaders. They feared the imperial government was still unstable and that
government could not afford to "change".65
Thus if Parliament was to be introduced, any mechanism that would threaten the
stability of government had to be eliminated. A Cabinet was the first and most obvious
64 Asai Kiyoshi says that this claim most alarmed other government leaders and resulted in Okuma's
dismissal from the government. See Asai, op. cit., pp. 201-6.
65 Iwakura expresses their anxiety in the following passage: "Since the Restoration, imperial rule has not
yet been fully disseminated among the people. Because of the abolition of the han domains (in 1871). the
government remains the target of hatred. If the country now accepts the British party system and a
government that can be replaced through a majority opinion in Parliament, it is very clear that those
opposed to the government will try to win a parliamentary majority to take over the Cabinet. Some
opinion leaders insist that smooth changes of a Cabinet will result in stability of the country. They are
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casualty of their strategy.66 The British style of joint responsibility in Cabinet was
dropped because it would be more susceptible to opposition attack in Parliament, and
also because it might lead to the emergence of a decision-making body responsible to
Parliament as had happened in Britain. Thus all references to a Cabinet were expunged
and state ministers became representatives of the emperor.
Such a structure was clearly fragile. Non-accountable power could be exercised
by anyone or any institution in the name of the emperor. Articles 11 and 12 gave the
Army and the Navy excuses to ignore decisions made by a civilian government. In 1907,
the independence of military power was ensured with the issuance of gunrei, when the
military and the civilian government were at loggerheads. Article 10, along with Article
7, gave bureaucrats significant autonomy since they were working directly under the
emperor. Thus the Constitution created several autonomous authorities protected from
checks and balances, because there was no constitutional directive on policy co¬
ordination. The powerful imperial executive power was in fact a collection of several
powers, which were not accountable to anyone. In this way the Meiji Constitution
became the creator of discretionary power distributed to the military, the bureaucrats and
government. And in the early twentieth century the military and the bureaucrats began to
issue their orders in the name of a nineteenth century imperial ordinance. Thus the
ultimate irony of the Meiji Constitution is that the attempt of its authors to consolidate
their own authority, led, in time, to the emergence of competing authorities, all
unchecked, all bent on their own agendas. Such developments are one more element in
the genesis of dissent.
merely enchanted by the British system and ignore Japan's reality" (Iwakura Tomomi, "Iwakura Tomomi
Kcnpo Taikoryo", in Kenpd Koso, p. 227).
66 When the four men wrote a draft in 1887, the draft (Natsushima-soan) still mentioned the Cabinet's
involvement in the exercise of the executive power. However, it was dropped in their 1888 draft (Nigatsu-
soan), apparently because they had accepted Inoue Kowashi's opinion. The elimination of articles
regarding a Cabinet reflects his ideas about the emperor's authority and administrative power. In the
preface to his Otsu-an draft (1887), Inoue objects to separating the prerogatives of the Cabinet and those
of various administrative branches because he believes that they are all subject to the imperial prerogative
(taiken). See Inada, op. cit., vol. 2, p.69. For the Natsushima draft, see ibid., pp. 198-205. The major
drafts, including the Natsushima draft and the final draft by the four men, are found in Kokugakuin
Daigaku Goin Bunko Kenkyukai (ed.), Goin Bunko Eiin Meiji Koshitsu Tenpan Seitei Honshi (Tokyo:
Taisei Shuppan, 1986), pp. 575-94.
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Legal equality, a key principle of constitutional government, is another casualty
of the writers' attempt to eliminate any element that would upset government. Although
it devotes its second chapter to the "Rights and Obligations of Subjects", the Meiji
Constitution nowhere mentions legal equality. In this respect too the Japanese
constitution departed from its European counterparts.
But the early drafts, written based on the European models, do include a passage
referring to equality under law. For instance, Article 50 of the Natsushima draft says:
"Japanese subjects receive equal protection of government and are equal before law, and
may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil
or military offices equally, and may fill any other public offices." The article survived
more or less in its original form until the four draftees agreed on the final draft that was
submitted to the Sumitsuin.67 In that draft, and then in the Meiji Constitution, the article
simply became: "Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws
or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military offices equally, and may fill any other
public offices." Here, equality was no longer an unassailable principle, but was reduced
to the assurance of "equal" opportunity for joining the state apparatus.
The elimination of any reference to legal equality (ho no mae no byddd) reflects
deep concern among the writers that the people should not be given too many rights.68
The writers' uneasiness with the rights of the people is reflected in such equivocal
expressions as "within the limits of law" and "kolcyd" (public). The Constitution
recognises freedom of speech and assembly "within the limits of law".69 Yet the role of
''7
Inada speculates that the passage was dropped around 15 February 1888 when the four met (Inada, op.
cit., vol. 2., p. 397). The change was due to Inoue's suggestion. Inoue restricts the definition of equality to
"no preferential treatment in protection and punishment, taxation, and appointment of office". "Equality
under law does not mean the exploitation of the idea of equality in order to disturb social order and safety
of property" (quoted by Inada, ibid., p.341).
68 Thus Inoue opposed enumerating the people's rights, saying that constitutional emphasis on those rights
are all dangerous and unpractical, and excessive emphasis would help to keep alive "the spirit of the
French Revolution", in the preface to his Otsu-an draft (see Inada, ibid., p. 69).
69 This expression is founded in a Japanese translation of the German "nach Massage der Gesetze" (as
provided in law, or according to law) in the draft Herman Roesler wrote in 1887, and was passed to the
subsequent drafts and the Meiji Constitution itself. Roesler's draft, Article 57: "Es besteht Freiheit dcr
Meinungsausserung, der Versammlungen und Vereine nach Massgabe der Gesetze." Japanese translation:
"The freedoms of expressing one's thought and of meetings and assembly exist as provided by law." See
Kojima Kazushi, "Roesureru Nihon Teikoku Kenpo Soan ni tsuite", Meiji Tenken Taisei no Seiritsu
(Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1988), p. 27. Kojima points out that there are two translations for nach Massgabe
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law is unclear for ensuring those rights.70 Thus "kokyd" (public) appears as in "kokyo no
annei chitsujo" (the public peace and order) in Article 9 of the Constitution. The original
phrase is found in the Japanese translation of the German phrase "die djfentliche
Ordnung oder das Gemeinwohl" (the public order or the well-being of the community)
in the Roesler draft.71 Yet the two concepts, public order and the commonweal, were
fused into "public peace and order" in the Japanese expression, thereby erasing the idea
72of what was common or shared by people who were legally equal.
Thus the Meiji Constitution, bending to the executive power, failed to ensure
legal equality and a participatory community. Its ambiguous language reduced its ability
to safeguard individual rights from executive excess. And along with the separation
between Parliament and Cabinet, its inadequate guarantees of legal equality and
individual rights posed serious handicaps for those who tried to realise constitutional
government.
Nonetheless despite the dominance of executive power in the Constitution,
parliamentary politics did begin to function. Already in 1898, less than ten years after
the first general election, Japan's first party-based Cabinet was established as a result of
intensifying confrontation between government and Parliament. Despite their initial
attempt to alienate parties from politics, Ito Hirobumi and other government leaders
chose to form their own party in 1900, paving the way for the short-lived but full-
fledged two-party system in pre-war Japan.
Such developments suggest that the idea of a parliamentary system was now
fully understood by many Japanese.73 And Dicey here relevantly asserts that many
constitutional rules are in fact merely conventions, and that no statutory regulations are
der Gesetze, "horitsu no han'i ni oite" and "horitsu no han'inai ni oite". The former is in Ito Hirobumi's
version, and the latter in Ito Miyoji's version. The difference between the two expressions is subtle, yet the
latter is a slight mistranslation because of the emphasis on "han'i". Because of the emphasis, the
subsequent Japanese drafts and finally the Meiji Constitution all contained "uchini", which means
"within".
70
Thus, the task of defining the relationship between law and the rights of the individual was left to future




The Japanese translation, "dyake no chitsujo arui wa kokyd no annei", omits "gemein" (common, or
general), as "dyake" and "kokyo" are synonymous.
73 See Asai Kiyoshi, op. cit.
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necessary for the operation of an assembly. The experience and knowledge that Japanese
political leaders gained during the Jiyuminken Undo, both inside and outside
government, and the debate preceding the Constitution together helped their
understanding of how Parliament and party politics would work. And the Constitution
brought in the idea of a "legal" state, however defective it may have been. Thus the
Constitution was able to maintain constitutional process, so far as there was basic
understanding of constitutional government among the people who used it. Yet once that
understanding was ignored or forgotten, constitutional government had little defence
against discretionary powers, which were also endorsed by it. The second half of Japan's
pre-war history shows how fragile a political system can be without an integrated
mechanism of checks and balances, and shared understanding of how the system works.
1.5. The Consequences: the emergence of the 'infallible state' and the
pressures of political extremism
In the previous sections we have seen how discretionary powers were created in
response to the tension between national unity and free government. Discretionary
powers undermine free government, as Dicey claims. Yet more seriously, if national
unity and free government are allowed to diverge unduly, then in principle and in
practice, executive power can proceed unchecked. Thus the division between national
unity and free government is highly relevant to the rise of the militant state in the 1930s.
Two factors are relevant to this development: Japan's emergence as an imperial power,
and the institutionalisation of the "state" (kokka) with its attendant impact on extremist
politics.
Thus in 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote a now famous article about Japan's
future. Loyal to the Meiji tradition of biinmei kaika (civilisation and progress),
Fukuzawa advocated that Japan should strive even further to join the Western "civilised"
camp, cutting off its historical and cultural ties with its Asian neighbours, China and
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Korea. His assertion was in tune with the growing spirit of nationalism. This assertive
nationalism, described as "kokken-ron" (statism) in contrast with '*minken-ron" (practice
of people's rights), focuses on the expansion of national strength and prestige rather than
on individual needs and freedoms. The "survival of the fittest" worldview, and the
increasingly prosperous regional status of Japan, were behind the rise of this particular
nationalism. There was a widespread perception that it was not with the West but with
its neighbouring countries that Japan had to compete in order to make further progress.
Fukuzawa's essay appeared amid growing hostility towards China in the wake of the
Kapsin coup in Korea in 1884.74
This statist nationalism is also a product of "coerced" modernisation. "Identity is
7^
perception", says Liah Greenfeld in her examination of national identity. Any national
identity must be perceived and then endorsed by the population as a meaningful
characteristic of the community. The early Meiji leaders were aware of the need to
create such collective identity. That is why they resorted to "national" symbols,
including the emperor. Indeed, as Carol Gluck demonstrates so fully, the inculcation of
76collective identity was "an affair of state".
The idea of external threat was found to be most effective in persuading the
people to unite and to form a community. For the Japanese the state (kokka) represented
this new community. Even after the Western threat had receded and their sense of
achievement began to prevail, this collectivist national identity continued to dominate
the minds of the political elite and then of ordinary people. Hence the "Fukoku Kyohei"
slogan: the country ought to be an economic and military power. Not all Japanese shared
this view, but the sentiment intensified each time the country won a war.
74
By 1880, Japan's international boundaries had been secured, following the expedition to Formosa in
1874, the signing of the Kanghwa treaty with Korea in 1875, and the annexation of the Ryukyu Islands
(the islands became one of the Japanese prefectures) in 1879. The initial threat of the West, both real or
perceived, began to recede. Japan and China were competing over the hegemony of Korea. In 1884, the
group led by Kim Ok Kyun who was seeking radical reform and independence from China staged a
political coup (Kapsin political coup) with the support of the Japanese consulate, seizing the Palace. The
revolt was quashed by the Palace army supported by Chinese troops. China and Japan mitigated their
deteriorating bilateral relations by signing the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) in the following year.
75 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993), p. 13.
16 Carol Gluck, op. cit., p. 3.
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Japan's first major war, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894—95, which many
historians see as the start of Japan's imperialism, involved renewed emphasis on national
77
unity. This notion of collective destiny had enormous appeal because it was flattering,
was about one's identity, and epitomised "progress". Jiyuminken Undo practically
ended.78 Parliamentary opposition also temporarily ceased. Japan's victory changed the
meaning of Fukoku Kyohei among government leaders. Now Fukoku Kyohei came to
mean national economic strength supported by the military. The military had now
acquired a new raison d'etre, in addition to constitutional backing.
Support for the country's expansion continued throughout pre-war Japan, even
among opponents of government. And the nationalistic trend severely undermined free
government. Those who advocated equality and individual freedoms had to face the
criticism that they were damaging the national principle and were thus traitors to the
state and society.
Thus the Taisho period, which is associated with a wide range of democratic
movements, also coincides with Japan's imperial expansion. To possess a colony was
considered by many as a legitimate act of a modern state. "Constitutionalism
domestically, and imperialism internationally" was a common slogan for popular reform
79
movements. The fact that the government, backed by Kenseikai, a more liberal party
than Seiyukai, served the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915 demonstrates the deep-
rooted imperialism of the Japanese establishment. Even Kenseikai's platform included
national expansion.
By now new generations of politicians had emerged, replacing the genrd (Meiji
oligarchs). These included Hara Takashi, who in 1918 became the first prime minister to
be chosen based on his party's strength in Parliament. He and his government pushed
through arms reductions, signing the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty in 1922. And
77
See, for instance, W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
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Irokawa Daikichi says, "... The national unity movement (kyokoku itchi) in the wake of the Sino-
Japanese War was a turning point, as the historical mission [of Jiyuminken Undo] as the promoter of
grass-root democracy ended. At the same time, grass-roots nationalism gradually fused with collective
statism, which became a major social awareness of the new imperialistic trend"(Irokawa, Shinpen Meiji
Seishinshi, p. 457). Many contemporary opinion leaders, including Tokutomi Soho, also turned
nationalistic in the wake of the war.
79 See Matsuo Takayoshi. Taisho Demokurashi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), pp. 37-8.
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his finance minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, advocated the abolition of the General Staff
Office (sanbo- honbu) to curb the assertive military. Yet they could not abandon the idea
that Japan had legitimate rights in expanding its power in Manchuria, an idea shared by
80members of the extreme right, including Kita Ikki.
Such statist nationalism not only prevented politicians from envisaging a new
policy to accommodate changing Japanese society and the growing anti-Japanese
nationalism in China and Korea, but also left them exposed to the charge that they were
risking the survival of the country and thus the well-being of the people. Thus, Hara and
Takahashi were among several civilian politicians assassinated by fundamentalist
nationalists, Hara in 1921, and Takahashi during the February 26th Incident in 1936. The
motives of the assassin (or assassins) may have differed in each case, yet all those
politicians had to confront the radical idealism prompted by notions of nation and people
when they implemented what they saw as practical policy.
In such a climate, "liberal" politicians had to compromise. But compromise
could facilitate the dissolution of constitutional government. Hence in 1925 the
simultaneous endorsement of universal male suffrage and the Peace Preservation Law
not only epitomised the familiar clash between collective goals and free government, but
also anticipated the demise of civilian government.
Historians often describe the simultaneous endorsement of universal male
suffrage and the Peace Preservation Law as a "carrot-and-stick" procedure, an
unfortunate but inevitable manoeuvre on the part of a "liberal" government. Universal
male suffrage had been realised only 35 years after Parliament had been introduced,
81
enfranchising 20 percent of the entire population of the time. This was a sign of the
80 Usui Katsumi, Chugoku o tneguru Kindai Nihon no Gaiko (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1983), p. 40.
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Japan took only 36 years to eliminate tax-based eligibility restrictions for men after the first general
election in 1890. In comparison, universal suffrage (including women) was not be introduced until 1918 in
Britain after the major electoral reform in 1832. Only 12 percent of the population were eligible by 1886
after a series of electoral reforms in 1867 and 1884 in Britain. "None the less most countries failed to
make the change until shortly before the First World War or just afterwards" (see, for instance, Andrew
M. Carstairs, A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe, London: George Allen and Unwin,
1980, and also the entry "franchise reform" in John Belchem and Richard Price (ed.), A Dictionary of
Nineteenth-Century History, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2001, pp. 229-30). Matsuo Takayoshi
asserts that the relative promptness of introduction of universal male suffrage is "a reflection of Japan's
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government's recognition of the growing presence of the proletariat and of pro-
democracy demands, although it strategically eliminated women, soldiers, "those poor
who receive either public or private support," and those convicted of crimes, including
crimes against the imperial family. On the other hand, the Peace Preservation Law
merely increased the government's discretionary powers to suppress opposition.
Although the word "kokutai" had been used in various imperial rescripts, including the
Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, the Peace Preservation Law was the first law to
use the word to discredit political dissent. The law was aimed at preventing the
dissemination of communism and anarchism in the wake of the Russian Revolutions and
the establishment of the Comintern in 1919. Yet the law became a powerful weapon to
eliminate any kind of dissent, including that of liberals and academics, when in 1928 it
was revised by imperial ordinance to include the death penalty.
Significantly, both bills were introduced under the coalition government led by
Prime Minister Kato Takaaki. Kato headed Kensaikai, the party that proclaimed itself to
be the legitimate successor of the Jiyuminken Undo movement and the "progressive"
earlier Rikken Kaishinkai and Kensei Honto. The party was the main critic of the House
of Peers, which its members saw as an obstacle to Parliament's representation of "the
people".
Universal suffrage and the Peace Preservation Law represented two ideologically
different strands. Yet since 1920 the Home Affairs Ministry and the Justice Ministry had
been trying to write a bill to police political thought in order to prevent revolutionary
ideas from filtering into the country. The bill, Kageki Shakai Undo Torishimari Hoan [A
Bill to Curb Radical Social Movements], was passed by the House of Peers after major
amendment in February 1922, but was rejected by the House of Representatives because
it felt the law oppressive. However a relevant regulation was successfully introduced in
rapid modernisation and the rapid growth of the proletariat" (Matsuo, Futsusenkyo Seido Seiritsushi no
Kenkyu, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989, p. 328.)
82 Article 1 of the law reads: "Anyone who organises a group for the purpose of changing the national
polity (kokutai) or of denying the private property system, or anyone who knowingly participates in said
group, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offence actually
carried out shall also be subject to punishment" (the translation is taken from David Lu, Japan: A
Documentary History, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 397).
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the form of "chokurei" in the wake of the Kanto Earthquake in 1923. This imperial
ordinance stipulated that those who disturbed annei chitsujo (the public peace and order)
would receive punishment of up to 10 years in prison. The House of Representatives,
including Kenseikai, endorsed the imperial order in 1923 when the government sought
Parliament's endorsement retrospectively, as stipulated by Article 8.
Meanwhile Kenseito had advocated universal suffrage while in opposition.
Previous bills to introduce universal suffrage had been blocked repeatedly by the House
of Peers. To ensure the passage of universal male suffrage, and the ratification of
normalisation with the Soviet Union earlier in the year, the Kato government, which
came to power in June 1924, had to compromise on the Peace Preservation Law.
The Peace Preservation Bill was "a long-pending piece of legislation, the passage
of which was precipitated by Kato's need to smooth the way for other measures",
according to one historian.83 "In fact, the Kato government never had recourse to the
law, but in more zealous hands, it became an instrument for repression. This was a lack
of foresight on the part of the Kenseikai leadership, not an error of deliberate
84commission."
Yet the simultaneous passage of universal male suffrage and the Peace
Preservation Law echoes the familiar pattern in which the expansion of popular political
participation is checked by a new measure. It clearly confirms the failure of Japan's
transformation into a "civil society". The law, which also made "denying the private
property system" a punishable offence, pre-empted the formation of proletariat parties. It
stifled parliamentarianism. Thus Matsuo Takayoshi says: "The proletarian and petit
bourgeois were disappointed by a Parliament indifferent to their benefits, and
smouldered with disgust for the corrupt, existing parties. The decline of party politics
and the rise of the military [in the 1930s] can be traced back to the way in which male
83 Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968), p. 203. "Kato's biographer calls it the 'passport for passage of universal suffrage




universal suffrage was introduced at the expense of the political participation of the
proletariat."85
Moreover the Peace Preservation Law, which came in tandem with the
normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, reinforced a pattern in
which the domestic operation of the state and its international operation were
"legitimately" separated. The Kato government signed the Soviet-Japanese Basic
Convention on 20 January 1925. The convention banned each signatory from sponsoring
activities or financing organisations that would "endanger the order and security in any
part of the territories" of the other.86 Yet the ban could not stop contact and exchange of
opinions among individuals, as the convention also "guaranteed reciprocal freedom of
movement and protection for each country's nationals in the other's territories". Thus a
tighter, more comprehensive control of political activities became all the more
87
necessary, prompting the government to propose the Peace Preservation Bill. Within
the government little substantive debate took place as to the compatibility between
diplomatic and domestic policy. Vague notions of the national interest, such as the
containment of Soviet aggression and possible economic benefits, were thought
persuasive enough to deflect attention from the bill's potential repressive power.
Nevertheless it seems incontestable that the Peace Preservation Law made it
easier for the military to overcome "seditious" activities. For the invocation of "kokutai"
could now shield them from criticism, rendering dissent suspect and unpatriotic.
Language as well as legislation was increasing the authoritarian grip on power. It was
the civilian government's facilitation of this process, through both strategic concession
8
Matsuo, Futsusenkyo Seido Seiritsushi no Kenkyu, pp. 331-2.
86 Its Article 5 reads: "The High Contracting parties solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live in
peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted rights of a State to order its own
life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and retain all persons in any governmental service
for them, and all organisations in receipt of any financial assistance from them, from any act overt or
covert liable in any way whatever to endanger the order and security in any part of the territories of Japan
or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is further agreed that neither Contracting Party shall permit
the presence in the territories under its jurisdiction—(a) of organisations or groups presenting to be the
Government for any part of the territories of the other Party, or (b) of alien subjects or citizens who may
be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organisations or groups."
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For analysis of the convention and the Peace Preservation Law, see Kobayashi Yukio, "Nisso Kihon
Joyaku Dai Go-jo to Chian Iji Ho", Jinbungakuhd, vol. 10, March 1959, pp. 133-64.
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and its failure to define national interests relevant to the population as a whole, which
88led to the demise of party politics in pre-war Japan.
Modernisation in Japan also meant the increasing domination of institutions over
people's lives. The country's imperial expansion was accompanied by a growing
emphasis on public morality in state education. A Shrine Office was established within
the Home Affairs Ministry in 1900, the first step to establish "State Shinto". In 1904, the
government ordered schools to use ethics textbooks that it compiled. Former ethics
textbooks had included such sections as "other people's freedoms", "social progress"
and "competition" which were now replaced by the more nationalistic "kenkoku" (the
foundation of the nation), "kokutai no seika" (the refinement of national polity) and
on
"chuko ittchi" (unity of loyalty and filial piety). Government attempts to align public-
spiritness with its own policies are also especially apparent in the Boshin Shdsho of
1908, an "imperial announcement" that emphases frugality, hard-work, saving, and a
moral life to stave off financial difficulties after the Russo-Japanese War, increasing
labour disputes and public discontent. Colonial developments, too, as well as the sheer
pace of internal change, made a compliant people all the more necessary. Domestic
control is the other side of Japan's modernisation and expansionism.
Thus, from the earliest stages of colonialism, a variety of writers began to
consider the relationship between government and the individual.90 The tension between
social (political) power and individual lives became a theme for many of them, including
Mori Ogai (1862-1922), Natsume Soseki (1867-1917), Tokutomi Roka (1868-1927),
and Ishikawa Takuboku. Ogai's Kano yoni of 1912 depicts a man who studied in Europe
8I<
Co-ordination of diplomacy and domestic policy became increasingly difficult for civilian government.
Thus emerged the dual structure of power, one represented by Parliament-backed government and the
other by the military which claimed to work directly for the emperor. Accordingly, Japan signed the Pact
of Paris of 1928 (a non-war international treaty), declaring that the country was exempt from the non-war
clause since the supreme command of the Army and Navy belonged to the emperor under its Constitution.
When the government led by the civilian Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi signed the London Naval
Limitations Treaty in 1930, it had to overcome the Navy's opposition that the ratification was in violation
of the supreme command of the emperor.
89 Ishida Ichiro, "Meiji no Seishin to Kokumin Dotoku no Keisei", in Furukawa Tetsushi and Ishida (eds.),
Kindai no Shiso 1, Nihon Shisdshi Koza 6 (Tokyo: Yuzankaku Shuppan, 1976), p. 229.
90 The High Treason Incident of 1911, in which 11 socialists and anarchists were executed for treason,
shocked many writers as a demonstration of state power.
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and would like to write a real history of the country but fears that some power
(traditions) may not allow him to do it. Soseki's Kokoro [The Heart] of 1914 portrays a
student torn between personal feelings and social obligations. Roka wrote Muhon-ron
[A Theory of Treason] shortly after the arrest of Kotoku Shusui, in which he said, "the
best government is like a well-made hat that you will not notice wearing". Particularly
incisive is an essay by Ishikawa Takuboku, "Jidai Heisoku no Genjo [No Way-out in
Our Time]" written in 1910, when the author was 24.91
This essay was written in response to an earlier essay by another writer which
had urged young people to challenge the state. Takuboku shares the view that the state is
a threat to individual freedom. Nevertheless Takuboku finds the real problem to be the
absence of interaction between authority and individual. Thus he says:
We the Japanese youth have never confronted authoritative power [the state] and have had no
occasions to recognise the state as a real enemy... We are concerned with the state only when the
state interferes in our personal interests. Once an encounter is over, we become strangers again.
For Takuboku the state is alien and remote, the promoter of a status quo fortified by
"institutions" and a capitalist economy. And young people especially are powerless,
their choice either detachment or uncritical acceptance of the system. But both
indifference and acceptance are tacit endorsements of the status quo. Takuboku is
concerned with general social problems, such as unequal educational opportunity, high
unemployment among graduates, and urban poverty, and proposes a critical assessment
of the state and society. "It is impossible to build our own society without examining the
status quo", he says. Takuboku, a poet himself, is equally concerned with Japanese
writers' inability to discuss social realities with empirical vigour and sympathetic
concern. Instead he finds they merely indulge in undigested "realism" or such
transcendental values as "morality" and "aestheticism". Takuboku dismisses both
91 "Jidai Heisoku no Gcnjo" is included, for instance, in Ishikawa Takuboku, Kansho Nihon Kindai
Bungaku 6 (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1982), pp. 197-209.
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approaches as a failure to combine action and observation, and to present human beings
92
as autonomous, social beings.
Such sentiments contrast markedly with the situation 50 years before, when
Itagaki Taisuke and others left government over the Seikanron debate, saying that they
could no longer work for a government led by the emperor. For them state power was
still embryonic, engaged with the structures as well as the realities of power. Now 50
years later, those structures are firmly in place, and for some, especially the young, they
are the cause of increasing concern. Takuboku's generation, born after the Jiyuminken
Undo had subsided and who entered school after the promulgation of the Imperial
Rescript on Education, was confronted by the enormity of state institutional power. For
them their country was already an empire. The emperor's position as head of the state
and of government was secured by the Constitution. The initial stages of a capitalist
economy were firmly established. At the same time, the state sponsored recurrent
conscription, a highly meritocratic educational system, and burdensome taxation.
Takuboku proposed an end to acquiescence in a vigorous and critical assessment
of the status quo. By calling for a return to first principles, Takuboku is advocating a
civil society where political authority is not an established fact but a creation of critical
debate among its members. His essay crudely yet eloquently anticipates the concern with
individual freedoms within civil society of the new generation of social radicals. The
three subjects of this study, Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948), a constitutional scholar,
Sakai Toshihiko (1870-1933), a socialist reformer, and Saito Takao (1870-1949), an
opposition politician, all belong to this category. All were searching for a liberal political
community, where the individual could coexist with the commonweal.
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Maruyama Masao and other historians regard the late Meiji period as a period of crucial transformation
of Japanese nationalism. The emphasis on Japanese nationalism (nihonshugi) was renewed by Takayama
Chogyo and other young writers at the turn of the century. "This new nationalism was fundamentally
different from nationalism advocated by their predecessors, such as Kuga Katsunan. The aspect of grass¬
roots demands for freedom and equality, which was prominent in earlier nationalism, was now replaced by
authoritarian statism. Thus, those young nationalists mythologised the emperor as absolute sovereign,
denied freedom of thought, speech, and academic inquiry, and took a fully imperialistic view towards
Taiwan. Sympathy for the socially deprived, particularly for poor workers, which was also discernible in
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In 1867 the definition of national goals had been relatively easy for government leaders.
Yet as the role of government expanded, so did the need to control the people. As we
have seen, various measures were introduced to quell political opponents, and to limit
freedom of expression. Press laws were crucial for the new government from the very
start. These laws targeted all shades of political opinion. Therefore, by the new century,
both left and right tended to view government as oppressive. Armed with this image of
government, and their own interpretations of the Meiji Restoration as a revolution by
force, nationalist groups found their excuse for violent resistance. Ultra-nationalists and
militarists had been present in the Meiji State from the outset, but by the 1930s they had
become extremely active. Hence if government's persistent attempts to coerce the
people had prompted an extremist backlash, alienation from government was now
endemic because of the emergence of "the infallible state". Nationalist pressure,
93
however, prompted the government into further repression of liberal opinion.
So in 1935 Minobe's Emperor-as-Organ theory was publicly declared heretical
by the government. As the emperor had become increasingly the symbol of national
unity, so Minobe's denial of absolute imperial sovereignty became more and more
unacceptable for right-wing nationalists. Anxious for its own tenure on power, the
government proclaimed "the sacredness" of imperial sovereignty in a public statement.
A little later, in 1937, the government published the Kokutai no Hongi a month
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, because, the booklet explains, "it is an
urgent task to clarify the national polity (kokutai) and inspire the national sprit". Now
the emperor embodies indisputable evidence of national existence in the past, present
and future. To obey him is to preserve the very essence of Japan's nationhood. The
Constitution is an order, and the order a fact, leaving no room for debate. This
earlier nationalism, had now disappeared. Instead the Darwinian law of the jungle had become their
principal view on both domestic and external affairs" (Maruyama, "Mciji Kokka no Shiso", pp. 231-2).
93 The Manchurian Incident in 1931 was a watershed in terms of domestic nationalism. The incident made
many Japanese "nationalist". Excluded from the decision-making process, they could only perceive the
state as an image, mostly provided by the government. They were connected to the state emotionally, but
they were alienated from government. Without accurate information about their government and the
international situation, and only fed with this image of "national crisis", many Japanese were susceptible
to state ideology and propaganda.
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document, product of a beleaguered party and the forces acting upon it, constructs a
notional Japanese society, harmonious and orderly, a "family" with the emperor as its
head, and this family is dissent-free. Dissent is now un-Japanese, incompatible with
membership of the "kd", the national body "politic".
Thus discretionary measures and arbitrary social edicts, used first by the early
Meiji leaders to steer reform and buttress their fragile authority, had now completely
overtaken constitutional government. Discretionary powers now sustained an
authoritarian state, because national policy had been pursued at the expense of
egalitarian concepts and practices. Economic and political imperatives may have forced
the political elite to continue relying on the use of unaccountable power, but such power
was self-destructive in the long run. Thus Dicey implies that discretionary powers
cannot be used to achieve national independence and free government simultaneously.
Japan's failure therefore was not to ensure free government. But what constitutes free
government? What kind of free government was possible in pre-war Japan? Minobe,
Sakai, and Saito all criticise the discretionary power of government and address the role
of government with regard to the people. Scrutiny of Minobe's legal state, of Sakai's
economic egalitarianism, and of Saito's parliamentary government will allow us to
locate some of the key difficulties, problems and tensions that the Japanese faced when
they tried to build a civil society.
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Chapter 2
Minobe Tatsukichi: The Legal State and its
Obstacles
Japan's "coerced" modernisation required and resulted in the creation of
discretionary power in government. As we have seen the arbitrariness of executive
power was institutionalised in the Meiji Constitution in such concepts as taiken (the
imperial prerogative) and seifu (government). However, the question of legitimacy—
how to bring the people into the political system—remained an unmet challenge for
successive Japanese governments: their coercive attempts to eliminate dissenting
opinion testify to a failure to solve the question. Minobe Tatsukichi's commitment to
the legal state, Sakai Toshihiko's vision of economic egalitarianism, and Saito
Takao's emphasis on parliamentary government were all inimical to the exercise of
such governmental authority and to the pre-war state ideology. This chapter will
discuss Minobe's constitutional theory as a critique of the political and legal
structure of the pre-war Japanese state.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the arbitrariness of executive power was
institutionalised in the Meiji Constitution and in various related laws by means of a
fluidity of language and the absence of a self-regulating mechanism. Thus the
Constitution legitimised the operation of discretionary power by incorporating into
the political structure such open-ended concepts as taiken and seifu without clear
rules for regulating them. It also failed to establish parliamentary control of the
Cabinet and of the military, while in the press-laws and laws to restrict political
activities, elastic phrases such as "annei chitsujo" (public peace and order) allowed
those in authority to define the illegality of private activities on their own terms.
Such institutional fragility was also accompanied by a high degree of emotive
political manipulation. In the light of these factors the dissolution of constitutional
government and of parliamentarianism in the 1930s is a pernicious consequence not
only of contextual forces but also of institutional flaws.
Minobe Tatsukichi steadfastly criticised the operation of such "lawless"
authority through his insistence on the legal state. This chapter will therefore follow
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Minobe's thought and career in its criticism of the discretionary powers of law and
its exercise. However, although Minobe is widely regarded as the father of modern
constitutional studies in Japan, his theory has also been criticised, by pre-war
Marxist-trained scholars and by some of the post-war generation of political
scientists, for the inadequacy of its support for parliamentarianism and the rights of
the people. The chapter will therefore attempt to shed light on the Japanese society of
the time through the problems Minobe encountered in asserting a legal state, but it
will also attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his theory.
2.1. Introduction: brief biography and previous studies
Minobe Tatsukichi was born in 1873 in Takasago City, Hyogo Prefecture as the
second son of a doctor of Chinese medicine.1 Because the family was not wealthy,
the father had to supplement the family income by teaching Confucian and other
Chinese classics at home. Minobe studied English at a school run by an English
missionary in Kobe before attending the First High School's preparatory course in
1888. He had to interrupt his studies for two years, perhaps because of financial
difficulties. After graduating from high school, Minobe studied at the Tokyo Imperial
University thanks to financial support from his older brother who had already begun
his career and through a scholarship from the university. He graduated from the
university in 1897, and joined the Home Affairs Ministry against his initial wish to
continue his studies.
In the following year, Minobe resigned from the ministry and returned to the
university to study comparative legislative history. Between 1899 and 1901, he
studied in Europe, in England and France, but particularly in Germany. Upon his
1 The biographical information provided in this section is based on the following: Ienaga Saburo,
Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisdshiteki Kenkyu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1964); Matsuo Takayoshi,
"Minobe Tatsukichi", in Inoue Kiyoshi (ed.), Nihon Jinbutsushi Taikei, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Asakura
Shoten, 1960), pp. 269-307; Frank Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in
Japan, Chapter II, "Minobe's Career to 1934" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp.
22-42; Nakase Hisaichi, "Minobe Tatsukichi no Gakusetsu", in Kishimoto Eitaro and Koyama Kokcn
(eds.), Nihon Kindai Shakai Shisdshi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1959), pp. 328-44; and Okudaira
Yasuhiro, "Minobe Tatsukichi", in Hasegawa Masayasu (ed.), Bunken Senshu, Nihonkoku Kenpd, vol.
16 (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1978), pp. 197-210.
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return, he began to teach comparative legislative history at the university as professor
of law, a post he maintained until his retirement in 1934 at the age of 62. Thus
Minobe began his career as an expert on comparative and administrative law,
although he is most remembered as a constitutional scholar. However it was not until
1920 that Minobe began to teach constitutional law at the university when he was
appointed to a second chair in the discipline.
Although his name is frequently associated with the Minobe Affair of 1935,
in which the government was forced to denounce his constitutional theory as
"heretical", Minobe's career was deeply grounded within the establishment. He was
a member of the higher civil service examination board from 1903, and a member of
the Imperial Academy from 1911. He sat on various government committees,
including one established by the Kato government in 1922 to discuss revision of the
electoral law.2 By the time of his retirement he had been promoted to "the first rank
of the higher civil service" (chokurtin ittdkan). Minobe was also appointed a member
of the House of Peers in 1932, a post he had to give up three years later. In 1903, he
married a daughter of Kikuchi Daikan, president of Tokyo Imperial University
(1898-1901) and an education minister (1901-3) in the first Katsura Cabinet. His
mentor at the university, Ikki Kitokuro, also assumed various key government posts:
home affairs minister in the Okuma Cabinet (1914-16), official advisor to the
emperor (1925), head of the Sumitsuin (1934-6), and minister of the imperial
household in 1936. Ikki was among a group of senior officials of the Okada
government (1934-6) who were regarded by their political opponents as pro-Anglo-
American, parliamentarian and liberal, and his political career also ended in the wake
of the Minobe Affair.
By the time of his retirement, Minobe was already a celebrated scholar.
Between 1899 and 1934, he published some 45 books and 270 academic papers,
excluding more informal articles that appeared in commercial newspapers, popular
intellectual magazines, and the university's newspaper. Admittedly, a significant
number of these were not truly original, being translations from German or English
2 Minobe's view of universal suffrage is examined by Matsuo Takayoshi, Futsiisenkyo Seido
Seiritsushi no Kenkyu, p. 257.
1
A list of his publications between 1899 and 1934 is included in Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (ed.),
Kohogaku no Shomondai, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1934) as an appendix.
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and intended to introduce the government structures and constitutions of other
countries to the Japanese academy. Yet he also wrote a large number of articles about
contemporary domestic issues with respect to law and government. Here he returned
repeatedly to constitutional questions, including constitutional restrictions on taiken,
the superiority of ho (statutes) to chokurei (imperial ordinances), state ministers'
responsibility to Parliament, and the auxiliary role of the House of Peers to the House
of Representatives, even before his views triggered a fierce public debate with
Uesugi Shinkichi, who held the first chair of constitutional law at the university, in
1912. Reform of the electoral law is also a recurring theme, as are the principles of
administrative law,4 and he attended constantly to the permissible jurisdiction of
administration vis-a-vis the rights of the people. Thus Minobe frequently wrote about
the abuse of police power and the necessary reform of the courts, and it is at this
juncture between theory and its application that he transcended his role as arbiter and
became a critic of existing practices.
This combination of theory and practice is a rare trait for Japanese academics,
according to Ienaga Saburo. "Since the establishment of the modem academy in the
second decade of the Meiji period, academics tended to separate 'knowledge' from
thought, except for the enlightened early Meiji thinkers. Scholars either were
preoccupied with absorbing new knowledge and technology while ignoring
philosophical questions, or indulged in metaphysics void of empirical argument...
Minobe's legal theory is a rare example in which logic based on intellectual tenacity,
and philosophy with practical aims are combined."5 Ienaga's view is disputed,
however. Many see the combination of Minobe's logicality and his "natural law"
thinking as flawed. This is because they see it as a combination of science and
subjectivity, of logic and opinion, which they assume are incompatible. Thus Frank
Miller says, "His [Minobe's] format was highly systematized, giving an appearance
of close logic, accented by a terse, lucid style. This appearance was somewhat
4
Miyazawa Toshiyoshi likens Minobe's role to that of Otto Mayer in Germany who in his country
established administrative law as a discipline with a theoretical structure. See Miyazawa, "Minobe -
sensei no Gyoseki", Nihon Kenseishi no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), p. 315. The article
appeared originally in Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 62, no. 7, 1948. Okudaira Yasuhiro also points out
Mayer's influence on Minobe as well as that of Jellinek, but Minobe was responsible for introducing
into Japan concepts of administrative law. See Okudaira, "Minobe Tatsukichi", p. 207.
5
Ienaga, op. cit., p. 341.
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deceiving, for the blueprint to which he ordered the body of constitutional and
administrative law reflected his own peculiar orientation, his will to find in that body
of law a harmony with constitutional principles as he understood them."6 Miller
even describes this combination of logical discourse and private ideology as
contradictory. Yet as I hope to show in this chapter objective logic and subjective
opinion are compatible and their co-existence is one of Minobe's strengths, as Ienaga
says.
In any event Minobe's Emperor-as-Organ theory received wide attention
when he published Kenpd Kowa in 1912 based on the lecture he had given a year
earlier to middle-school teachers in a seminar organised by the Education Ministry.
In both the text and the lecture Minobe articulated his constitutional theory: that the
state is an independent organisation, that sovereignty resides in the state, and that the
emperor exercises the will of the state as an organ of the state based on the
Constitution. In this theory, the emperor no longer exercises his personal authority,
but rather enjoys power entrusted to him by the state through law.7 Yet this denial of
the emperor's personal rule ran directly counter to the forces of discretionary power,
which stressed the political and symbolic role of the emperor in the newly formed
centralised government, and their reinforcement through the Constitution.
Thus Suzuki Yasuzo, one of the first scholars to assess Minobe's works
against the background of the country's political and social situation, distinguishes
three schools of constitutional theory that existed in Japan after the Meiji
Restoration: absolute monarchism, constitutional monarchism, and popular
sovereignty. But since popular sovereignty never gained full support as an academic
theory, the history of constitutional theory in Japan involves a constant battle
o
between absolute and constitutional monarchism.
For those who supported absolute monarchism, the emperor and the country's
history are inseparable and their fusion was enough to justify any authority exercised
6
Miller, op. cit., p. 55.
7
Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, a constitutional scholar and one of Minobe's pupils, wrote in 1948 shortly
after Minobe's death: "Before Minobe, theocratic absolutism, a Japanese version of the divine right of
kings, was the dominant theory in the academic community. Minobe challenged this theory squarely,
and attempted to eliminate all irrational and undemocratic arguments from the discipline in order to
establish truly scientific constitutional studies." See Miyazawa, "Minobe-sensei no Gyoseki", p. 317.
8 Suzuki Yasuzo, "Nihon Kenpogaku no Seitan to Hatten", Shiso, May 1934 (vol. 144), pp. 159-96.
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in his name. Thus, for them, sovereignty resides in the emperor, the Constitution is
his order, and Parliament is an office run by the executive power. Taiken, the
imperial prerogative, embodies the unlimited authority of the monarch. Iwakura
Tomomi, and Inoue Kowashi, who wrote the Constitution with others, represent this
school. However it was Hozumi Yatsuka, a professor of constitutional theory at the
university since 1889, who for the first time formulated an absolutist interpretation of
the Constitution based on his selective acceptance of various German theories,
kokugaku (nativist) learning, and a particularistic interpretation of kokutai, or
national polity. Hozumi's theory of taiken became orthodox in the early days of the
Constitution's operation because its constitutional interpretation justified the
operation of the hanbatsu plutocracy's "transcendentalism".9
On the other hand, the school of constitutional monarchism insisted that
sovereignty resides in the state, and that the monarch and the people should
participate in the management of state affairs jointly through Parliament. The
school's rise and fall reflects the evolution of the state structure and change of
economic and social conditions in the country, according to Suzuki.10 Thus, when
party politics gained strength in the 1890s, the school was given momentum by Ariga
Nagao and Minobe's mentor Ikki. Yet it was left to Minobe to consolidate the school
with his Emperor-as-Organ theory.
Thus in the preface to Kenpd Kowa, Minobe criticised Hozumi's theory
without naming him, saying that "some scholars pretend to support constitutional
government but in fact they advocate autocracy through exploitation of the concept
of kokutai, while undermining the rights of the people and demanding their absolute
obedience". Here Minobe criticises Hozumi's historicism, Japanese particularism,
and the endorsement of imperial discretionary powers at the expense of popular
rights. His views, says Suzuki, were "extremely liberal in principle and approach"
compared with the conventional school led by Hozumi."
Along with his career itself, the vicissitudes of Minobe's Emperor-as-Organ
theory serve as a barometer of political change, and indicate shifts in the political and
popular support for representative government, and of tolerance towards Japanese
9 ibid., pp. 177-81.
10
ibid., pp. 192-3.
" ibid., p. 194.
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freedom of thought. Thus when the theory received wide attention following the
Minobe-Uesugi debate of 1912, Minobe was able to say confidently that the idea of
12
state sovereignty had been commonly accepted. " Many academics also supported
Minobe's position in the debate. However by 1934 Minobe had to concede that the
absolute monarchism advocated by Hozumi had become "de facto official theory"
and that it could be found in the school texts produced by the government.13
Minobe's theory had gained prominence when political power was shifting to
political parties from the hanbatsu plutocracy, backed by the state bureaucracy and
the military. In fact the Minobe-Uesugi debate is contemporary with the Taisho
Political Crisis, an event often described as the beginning of the Taisho democratic
movement. In early 1913, the Katsura Cabinet, which the public saw as colluding
with the military in supporting its fiscal demands, faced violent mass demonstrations
in Tokyo, Osaka and other cities. The cabinet's attempt to stay in power by issuing
an imperial instruction after Parliament had adopted a vote of no confidence against
it failed, and with thinning support even among the senior leaders it was forced to
resign. By contrast, the demise of Minobe's theory 20 years later echoes Japan's
increasing international isolation and attempts by the military to buttress its activities
after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. By then confrontation between the civilian
government and the military was already intense. In 1930, for example, Prime
Minister Hamaguchi Osachi had had to overcome the Navy's opposition, when his
government signed the London Naval Limitation Treaty: the Navy claimed that the
government violated the supreme command of the Army and the Navy, which
belonged to the emperor. Minobe was a chief advisor to the government on this
matter. Nevertheless the Manchurian Incident led to Japan's withdrawal from the
12
However, there was also strong hostility to Minobe's theory within the government. The Tokyo
Nichinich Shimbun reported, retrospectively on 17 March 1935, that Yamagata Aritomo, then
chairman of the Sumitsuin, demanded Minobe's resignation from the university. His demand was
blocked by Okuma Shigenobu and Ikki. The article is quoted by Miyazawa, Tenno Kikansetsu Jiken,
vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1970), fifth impression 1972, pp. 198-9.
13
Minobe, Nihon Kenpd no Kihonshugi (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1934), p. 11. In 1934 Suzuki
Yasuzo also observed that Minobe's Kenpd Satsuyd had been criticised as a "sophism intended to
change kokutai". "After the death of Uesugi, the historical school had disappeared from the academy.
However, the recent political climate has brought it back, and it is challenging constitutionalism. Their
confrontation is not purely academic. Already the bourgeoisie, or part of it, is planning to undermine
parliamentarianism by calling for totalitarianism, the establishment of a unified Cabinet and a national
council. Even among those who are not the bourgeoisie, some people are calling for an end to party
politics. Thus the country's constitutional studies have come to a grinding halt" (Suzuki, "Nihon
Kcnpogaku no Seitan to Hatten", p. 193).
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League of Nations one and a half years later, to tighter coercive pressure at home,
and to the growing influence on policy making of the military and of bureaucrats
calling for radical reform of government.14
Thus in 1935, at a pivotal moment, Minobe's theory was criticised in the
House of Peers as incompatible with the country's national polity, kokutai. Elements
of the military, military reservists, and extreme nationalists joined hands to demand
Minobe's dismissal. Under pressure, the government declared the theory "heretical"
and banned three of Minobe's major works on the Constitution. After some
resistance, Minobe resigned from the house. The affair is widely regarded as marking
the end of constitutional government in pre-war Japan.15
Nevertheless after he had withdrawn from most of his public posts, Minobe
continued his legal studies privately, particularly in administrative law and the
examination of legal precedent. What Ienaga Saburo calls his indispensable book on
the electoral process, Senkyo Bassoku no Kenkyu. [A Study ofSanctions for Violations
ofElectoral Law], was written during this period. Minobe also participated in private
constitutional studies,16 and after the war, he advised the government when it tried to
revise the Constitution under the pressure of the Supreme Command for the Allied
Powers. Minobe defended the monarchy and opposed any move that would hold the
emperor responsible for his involvement in the war and would lead to his abdication.
Still a highly contentious figure, Minobe died in 1948.
If Minobe's position in defending the Constitution and Parliament has been
firmly established, assessments of his work are mixed. This is partly because of
difficulty in assessing pre-war Japanese liberalism as a whole.
14 Both groups now began to formulate their own policies. The Army published a pamphlet "Kokubo
no Hongi to sono Kyoka no Teisho" on 1 October 1934, which one historian describes as the Army's
first attempt to take over government fully through a policy proposal. See Ouchi Tsutomu,
Fuashizumu e no Michi, Nihon no Rekishi series 24 (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1967), p. 377. The so-
called "new" bureaucrats also began to become more vocal after the Manchurian Incident.
15 For such an interpretation of the Minobe Affair, see, for instance, Mitani Taichiro, "Tenno
Kikansetsu Jiken no Seijishiteki Imi", in Ishii Shiro and Higuchi Norio (eds.), Soto kara mita Nihonhd
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), pp. 433-61.
16 The study group was organised by Count Ito Harumasa in 1941. Leading constitutional experts,
including Minobe, Sasaki Soichi and Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, joined the group. See Emura Eiichi (cd.),
Kenpd Koso, pp. 490-2.
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Broadly speaking two main approaches have been taken to assess Minobe's
theory historically. One attempts to use the theory to explain the metamorphosis of
the country's constitutional and political institutions. Thus these works focus on the
Minobe-Uesugi debate of 1912, and the Minobe Affair of 1935, as clear yardsticks of
the alternating strength and demise of constitutional principles and
parliamentarianism. Most previous work belongs to this category.
The other approach emphasises intrinsically liberal values in Minobe's theory
and attempts to understand it as a defence of civil liberties against intrusive state
power. Of course the two approaches often overlap, yet comprehensive studies of
Minobe's thought in the second category are relatively few. Ienaga Saburo's study of
1964 remains an exception, yet it is this approach that I hope to follow.
Among the earliest works that see Minobe as a promoter and defender of civil
17
liberties is Ukai Nobushige's essay of 1948. Ukai, a legal scholar and one of
Minobe's pupils, describes Japan's modern history as a conflict between statism and
citizens' demands for liberties, and sees Minobe's theory as an attempt to bring "the
concept of liberty into the authoritarian and absolutist state created by the Meiji
Constitution". Ukai singles out the following areas of Minobe's work as
manifestations of his liberalism: his call for restrictions on taiken, his support for
civil liberties, and his emphasis on the need for a curtailing of the discretionary
powers of the administration. Such perspectives continue to be fundamental.18
Ukai's views were developed by Isomura Tetsu, a specialist in civil law
(,minpd), who followed the Koza-ha Marxist interpretation of the Meiji Restoration.
For him the Meiji Restoration was a revolution "from above", which resulted in the
reinforcement of traditional feudalistic absolutism combined with industrial
capitalism. He too assumed that the growing prominence of the school of
constitutionalism, to which Minobe belonged, was in response to changes in
Japanese society. However, rather than attributing the rise of Minobe's theory to the
growing political assertiveness of the capitalist bourgeois class, Isomura allies
Minobe with a group of legal scholars who began to emphasise civil liberties during
17 Ukai Nobushige, "Minobe Hakase no Shiso to Gakusetsu", Horitsu Jihd, vol. 20, no. 8, August
1948, pp. 45-9.
18 Ukai asserts: "A battle against government power (kanken) was Minobe's life-long work." And he
confirms Minobe's insistence on the illegality of key government decisions (see, especially, ibid., p.
49).
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the Taisho democratic movement.19 Isomura sees Minobe not as a bourgeois
20
apologist but as a promoter of civil rights.
Hence, in this view, the progress of a capitalist economy after World War I
prompted workers and tenant farmers to assert their rights in the economic sphere.
This new assertiveness challenged the "traditional" social order based on the
patriarchal family, the informal yet rigid status system, and the traditional communal
mentality, on which Hozumi's absolutism had relied. Thus, during the Taisho
democratic movement, absolutist capitalist authority was challenged "from below".
Such a force demanded a civil social order in which the legitimacy of political
authority would be recognised only by law. Minobe's contribution, along with that of
other shimin hogaku scholars, was to try to establish a legal basis for the relationship
between state and people, rather than simply to accept the master-servant relationship
which had underpinned Meiji absolutism.
Furthermore, to protect civil liberties, state authority must be restricted. Thus,
Isomura continues, Minobe's organ theory intends "to detach state authority from the
unquantifiable, patriarchal, and personal control of the emperor and to define it as an
9 1
independent, self-complete process". Thus Isomura asserts that Minobe's
theoretical work laid the groundwork for the transformation of Japan into a civil
society by proclaiming the autonomy of the law and putting a legal check on the
exercise of political power.
Isomura's view that Minobe's legal theory aimed at preventing abuse of state
power is further developed by Ienaga Saburo in his Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisdshi
teki Kenkyu of 1964. Ienaga too finds the essence of Minobe's theory to lie in his
assertion that no political power is limitless, in direct antithesis to Hozumi's and
Uesugi's imperial absolutism. Substantive restriction should come from Parliament
and also from institutional reform. Thus Ienaga emphasises Minobe's criticisms of
the abuse of discretionary power in such areas as inadequate attention to due process,
insufficient protection of freedoms of speech and thought, and the treatment of
19 Isomura refers to the school as "shimin hdgaku" (studies of law for citizens), and describes
Minobe's theory as an attempt to establish civil liberties through interpretation of law and its
application. A leading figure of this school is Suehiro Izutaro. See Isomura, "Shimin Hogaku" (part
II), KNKH, vol. 9, pp. 161-94.
20
ibid., pp. 170-1.
21 ibid., p. 182.
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suspects in the criminal justice system. Minobe was one of the very few legal experts
who recognised the right to resist illegal police action, at a time when an orthodox
view in the academy was that the police could charge people with obstruction of their
"public" duties even if the duties were not necessarily legal. 22
In fact, as the exercise of discretionary power became more apparent,
Minobe's criticisms had gone straight to the heart of the workings of government.
Thus he had criticised the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, its revision of 1928, and
then the increasingly assertive military. In October 1934, against the background of
the accelerating fragmentation of state authority, the Army published its first
independent policy statement, seeking the public's direct support for the
23
reinforcement of the country's military capability. Minobe, in an essay he wrote
shortly after the publication of the pamphlet, criticised the document's totalitarian
implications, saying that the country's post-Restoration history demonstrated that
what made the country strong was individual creativity, not military power, and that
demanding the people's slavish subjugation was tantamount to destroying the
country's constitutional arrangements.24
Again in January 1935, shortly before he was criticised for reaffirming his
theory, Minobe had criticised the treatment by government prosecutors of the
suspects in the Teijin Incident, including their arrests without concrete evidence,
detention without adequate legal grounds, and forced confession. Ienaga, by
highlighting these and other incidents in the life of a man of firm principle, concludes
that central to Minobe's criticism of "illegal" political power is a liberal creed, to
which he may have been drawn under the influence of traditions of civil liberty
expressed by Locke and the bills of rights of the United States and France.26
22
Ienaga, Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisoshiteki Kenkyu, p. 178.
23 "Kokubo no Hongi to sono Kyoka no Teisho" published by the Army Ministry's press section.
24
Minobe, "Rikugunsho happyo no Kokuboron o yomu", Chud Koron, vol. 49, no. 12, November
1934, pp. 125-32. In this essay Minobe calls the publication an "undisciplined, irresponsible" action
based on the military's private will. He also points out its propagandistic nature, as in the proposed
replacement of the country's official name "Empire" with "Imperial State".
25
Despite his keen concern with the protection of human rights and due process of law, Minobe could
not complete his study of criminal prosecution, according to Ienaga. This was because criticisms of
investigation and prosecution procedure were extremely difficult due to the limited information
available. See lenaga, op. cit., pp. 224-5.
26
Ienaga, ibid., p. 199.
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Nevertheless even as Minobe's reputation as a defender of constitutionalism,
parliamentarianism, and civil liberties now appears to have been established, he is
still subject to criticism as an advocate of state law and as a defender of the emperor.
Here Minobe is associated with the "undemocratic" aspects of the Meiji Constitution,
for he adhered to the constitutional monarchy under the constitution, and opposed its
revision after World War II. Both issues remain contentious, and Isomura and Ienaga
address them at some length.
Isomura asserts that Minobe continued to support the emperor's "ethical"
role, and thus justified the preservation of kokutai in the ethical realm.27 He claims
that such a sentiment reflects Minobe's failure to envisage a social order for a fully
autonomous people. In his view, "Transformation of the relationship between the
state and the people into one based on a material order by eliminating relationships
of subjugation such as imposed obedience must coincide with the establishment of a
personal ethics." The theory that regards the state as a legal person falls short of
carrying out this task, since its attempt to overcome the patrimonium of absolutism is
restricted to the legal system: it does not lead to the concept of a community as one
consisting of "autonomous, conscious individuals". In this sense, Minobe's thought
is incomplete. However, says Isomura, such limitations were perhaps inevitable, as
Minobe tried to "rationalise" the existing structure of power under pressures coming
from the emperor system, and the general value system that supported it. "Minobe's
limitations reflect a general failure of thought in Japanese society in its
28modernisation process," according to Isomura.
This judgement, that Minobe was "a liberal interpreter of the Meiji
Constitution" but only in terms of the limited social and political conditions of the
time, has, I think, several problems. For present within it is the Marxist view that
individual thought and action are reflections of the economic and political conditions
29of society. However, such views tend to subsume the individual within a reductive
27
Isomura., op. cit., p. 185. Isomura quotes Minobe as follows: "kokutai should be maintained based
on ethical and spiritual relationships between the benevolent emperor and the loyal people" (Minobe,
"Teikoku no Kokutai to Teikoku Kenpo", in Hoshijima Jiro (ed.), Saikin Kenporon: Uesugi Hakase
tai Minobe Hakase, Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihonsha, 1913, p. 320).
28
Isomura, op. cit., p. 183.
29 Thus, for Suzuki, "... the rise and fall of an ideology or theory about a country's constitution is
ultimately determined by the country's objective economic and social conditions of the time" (Suzuki,
op. cit., p. 192). This view, reflecting the Koza-ha school of Japanese Marxism, remains influential
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and all-encompassing construct of society, as if one's thought is always and only an
expression of external conditions. Since Japanese imperial absolutism is seen as
feudalistic and capitalistic, such critics attribute the weaknesses of Minobe's thought
to these supposedly determining characteristics of Japanese society.
An immediate problem with this approach is that it underestimates the role of
the individual within the processes of social change. The problem is reflected in the
common assessment of modern Japanese thought as if the individual is incapable of
creative criticism of the time. However, individuals are not mere passive recipients
of social or political values. One prominent British Marxist sees "the whole" not as a
predetermined structure of its parts, but as a fluid product of complex interactions
between them. Hence people actively participate in the creation of the common life,
in society and in history. And if we discard "elements of persistence, adjustment,
30
unconscious assimilation, active resistance and alternative effort" , we may not be
able to understand history as "lived experience". Thus it is extremely important to
recognise the elements of creative criticism in Minobe's thought in order to
understand both him and his period.
Conversely a limitation of the relevant Japanese historiography is its
excessive emphasis on the idea of personal failure. Isomura seems to assume that a
civil society is realised only if its members become sufficiently autonomous and
individualistic. Such a view, though important, again takes our attention away from
more central questions about the sources of social change. For while personal
consciousness is clearly a key factor in social change, it cannot be divorced from
perceptions of, and interactions with, the whole structure of society. Excessive
emphasis on personal failure or "inner ethics" underestimates the role of institutions
in social change while overestimating human judgement.
Thus, as Habermas demonstrates, the public sphere in the West emerged not
because individuals had become more autonomous and liberal, but because they had
been able to develop institutions that allowed them to discuss their own affairs.
These included salons, coffee houses and reading societies, as well as the "public"
not only in the assessment of Minobe's work but also of that of pre-war Japanese society as a whole.
Indeed, Suzuki's essay of 1934 remains one of the most methodical and articulate expositions of the
historical significance of Minobe's theory that has so far appeared.
30
Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 46.
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forums offered by newspapers. Growing public consciousness encouraged political
change, including that of the legal system. Such changes were of course inseparable
from the progress of a capitalist economy. Yet Habermas claims that these actual
institutions were central to creating a civil society as a "public sphere" of debating
individuals. Personal failure should therefore always be discussed in tandem with
close analysis of existing public practices, including not just those of the law,
economy, and political convention, but also of those habits and institutions which
relate to the exchange of ideas. Only then will we be able to have a more balanced
view of the relations between society and the individual.
Thus if we wish to discover why a more complete civil society failed to
emerge in pre-war Japan, we must begin by asking whether its putative members had
enough opportunities to form such a society. In Chapter 1, we observed how severely
such opportunities were curtailed by government. An inquiry into these
circumstances, it seems to me, should precede discussion of collective or individual
traits. And Minobe's role should be discussed first in terms of his attitudes towards
the available institutions, imperfect though these may have been.
Previous criticism of Minobe's supposed emperor worship is also, I think,
unpersuasive. As Matsumoto Sannosuke demonstrates, organ theories had a double
31
function in the formation of community, as did the role of the emperor.' For the
formation of a political community always requires some form of central power,
regardless of whether the power is absolute or not. Crucial here is whether there is an
acceptable balance between that power and the members of the community and how
this balance should be achieved. Minobe's theory should therefore be assessed in
terms of his overriding concern for questions of civil liberty and legal equality, rather
than of any imputed emperor worship or feudal mentality. For his efforts, as Isomura
says, were always to eliminate the emperor from the political structure, and this is far
more important than any question of imperial investment.
However, along with emperor worship, Ienaga sees an excessive emphasis on
the role of the state as a major weakness of Minobe's theory, preventing him from
fully developing a theory suitable for a civil society. For him, Minobe's excessive
reliance on the concept of the state is both backward and dangerous, because such a
31 See Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Tennosei Hoshiso" (part I), KNKH, vol. 10, 1961, p. 10.
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state could easily become fascist. "The contradictions of capitalism", he says,
"cannot be solved by merely strengthening state control without increasing the role
of the proletariat, particularly when state power is directly or indirectly controlled by
capitalists. Rather such a state may transform itself quite easily into a fascist state
that swaps the legal state for a 'cultural' state. In fact, from the Manchurian Incident
onwards, the Japanese state was heading towards destruction of constitutional
politics through gradual strengthening of state control. Minobe's insistence on
increased state control appears to be in line with such a fascist orientation, and thus
with the advocacy of the reform of the state structure supported by the right wing, the
32
military and those who advocated state socialism."'
This view remains controversial, and poses difficult questions about lines of
demarcation between totalitarian and representative governments. In fact how
persuasive is it to say that Minobe's emphasis on the role of the state actually
exacerbated the forces he sought to contain? However, even as this study will remain
loyal to Marxist traditions and be concerned with social, political and economic
conditions, it will also attempt to assess Minobe's theory by avoiding as much as
possible such impenetrable concepts as "feudalism", "cultural traits" or "backward
traditions" (all deriving from Marxist notions of Asiatic modes of production). This
does not mean to dismiss such concepts as irrelevant to Japanese society, but rather
to try to understand Japanese liberalism, and its limitations, as "lived experience".
Assessments of Minobe's vision of the state will also be made within this
perspective.
Fundamental then, for many historians and political scientists interested in
this period, including those of the Koza-ha school, are questions about the inner
trajectory of the Japanese state from its inception (the Meiji Restoration) to the
emergence of the imperialistic, militant state of the 1930s. Their shared concern,
which was first addressed most vigorously by the immediate post-war Japanese
historians and political scientists, including Maruyama Masao, is with ideas of
change, continuity, genesis and possible resolution.
Some historians attempt to see these forces in the political system. Yasuda
Hiroshi, for instance, responds to the challenge by differentiating the personal
32 ibid., p. 92.
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characters of the three emperors, Meiji, Taisho and Showa, as "active" or "passive"
monarchs.33 Eguchi Keiichi describes what he sees as the co-existence of
constitutionalism and absolutism in imperial constitutionalism (tenndsei
rikkenshugi).34 Developing Eguchi's formulation, Masuda Tomoko centres her
analysis on the two seemingly contradictory principles, absolute monarchy and
constitutionalism. She tries to account for changes in the political structure in terms
of confrontation between these two leading ideas. Masuda sees that confrontation
most clearly in the behaviour of government leaders over key political decisions (as
in the Taisho Political Crisis and the country's ratification of the London Naval
Treaty). And she explores the concept of taiken seiji, politics based on the imperial
prerogative, articulated by Hozumi to identify imperial absolutism and a political
style persistent in pre-war Japan, treating Minobe's constitutionalism as its antithesis.
Since my own concern is with the evolution of civil society in Japan, this
study will assume such perspectives, not only in government but also in the
relationship between authority and the individual. I will present Minobe's theory as
an attempt to shift from absolutism to constitutional government, and to conceive in
a Japanese context, and within the shifting perspectives of an individual life, the
elements of a civil society. Exploiting the studies that have been outlined here, I hope
to reassess Minobe's theory in terms of the tension between imperial absolutism and
free government that lies within it.
2.2. The Minobe-Uesugi debate: Minobe and the traditions of
conservative thought
Ideological resistance to Minobe's legal state was most famously articulated by
Uesugi in an exchange on the Emperor-as-Organ theory in 1912. In their debate, the
most striking difference between the two men is in their views of how social order
33 Yasuda Hiroshi, Tennd no Seijishi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1998).
34
Eguchi Keiichi, Nihon Teikokushugishi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1998). Masuda Tomoko
provides a useful survey of recent debates about historiography dealing with this period. See Masuda,
Tenndsei to Kokka (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999), especially pp. 11-13.
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should be achieved. For Minobe, "Individuals have their own purposes in life. One of
the most important ethical requirements of constitutional government is to respect
their personalities and free them from enslavement." " For him, public consent is
crucial for political power to be legitimate, regardless of whether it is obtained
through Parliament or recognised in "common law". On the other hand, for Uesugi, a
man depends on society and the state. "Without the state, we would not be able to
assume our vocations whereby we can demonstrate our distinctive abilities... One's
own activity neither reflects one's sole power nor belongs to oneself alone...""
Thus Uesugi urges people to fulfil their prescribed social roles, thereby maintaining
the basic fabric of society, while Minobe emphasises social and individual freedom.
As we have seen, the debate of 1912 occurred at a time of fundamental
37
change in the political structure and in people's attitudes towards authority."
Political parties had moved to take over executive power, challenging the
government, which was associated with the hanbatsu plutocracy in the public eye.
Minobe articulated political principles in tune with this more assertive public. It was
no coincidence that Minobe, then a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University,
delivered his lecture on the Organ theory to middle-school teachers in 1911, just a
year before the Taisho Political Crisis, when politicians in the opposition,
businessmen against military spending, journalists, and ordinary citizens unhappy
about government policies, joined forces. At the same time, Minobe's exposition
scrutinised the legitimacy of political authority, and challenged "traditional"
concepts of authority and social order: Uesugi responded to this new force with his
staunch loyalty to emperor-centred national unity.
35 Minobe, Kenpo Satsuyd, p. 152.
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Uesugi Shinkichi, Shinko Kenpojutsugi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1924), eighth impression 1928, pp. 10-
11.
37 The editors of the 11-volume KNKH series published from 1958 to 1967 divide the pre-war period
into four phases from the viewpoint of legal history: transition (1868-89), formation (1890-1914),
readjustment (1915-31), and collapse (1932-45). The Minobe-Uesugi debate took place at the start of
the readjustment period.
38 Matsumoto Sannosuke points out that the Minobe-Uesugi debate reflects pre-existing disagreement
over the meaning of kokutai (national polity) in the late Edo period, including that between Yoshida
Shoin (1830-59) and Yamagata Taika (1781-1866). See his Tennosei Kokka to Seiji Shiso (Tokyo:
Miraisha, 1969), pp. 118-58. A similar view is taken by Furukawa Jun, "Uesugi-Minobe Ronso:
Kokkashugi, Kokutai Kenpogaku to Jiyushugi, Gikaishugi Kenpogaku", in Sugihara Yasuo (ed.),
Kenposhiso, Koza Kenpogaku no Kiso 4 (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1989), pp. 209-39.
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I now propose to analyse such reactionary views as Uesugi's, which were
built on traditional thinking, so as to understand the ideological obstacles that
Minobe encountered, before we examine his theory more fully.
In fact, Uesugi's ideas are an amalgamation of German statism and Japanese
"indigenous" traditions, such as kokugaku (nativism), Shinto, neo-Confucianism, and
meibunron, just as Hozumi synthesises Mito Ideology (his family-state concept
derived from Aizawa Yasushi), kokugaku, and ideas drawn from the neo-Confucian
mainstream ("ethical and political orders are one"), and from German-legal
positivism, particularly that of Laband.39 When Uesugi says that law is a single
complete system from which an individual rule is deduced, he is echoing the
Germanic constitutionalism that underlies Japanese administrative law. In this
thinking, law and political authority are fused, and law is regarded as "a rational
expression of political authority". His view of the state has both Platonic and
Hegelian elements, and these Western concepts fit comfortably with his traditional
view of loyalty based on imperial absolutism and meibunron.
For Uesugi, the ideal state is led by the emperor, who is benevolent, and the
subjects obey his orders. Such a community is harmonious. The right to rule results
from the sovereign's declaration. Such emperor-centred national unity tolerates
neither heresy nor individual freedom. Uesugi says, "The subjects owe
comprehensive obedience to the rights of sovereignty (tochiken). These obligations
are absolute, unconditional and unlimited. They are inherent in the existence of the
subject."40 In his discourse, government, society, and people are fused into the state.
As members of the state, the people possess the status of the subjugated (fukuju).
Thus he dismisses the idea of popular sovereignty altogether, saying that the
Japanese polity (kokutai) began with the assumption of rule by the emperor's
ancestors. This negation of popular sovereignty should be seen as part of Japan's
unique experience, setting the country apart from all other monarchies.41
39 For Hozumi's amalgamation of "Western" and "Japanese" thought, see Richard H. Minear,
Japanese Tradition and Western Law, Emperor, State and Law in the Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), chs. 7 and 8.
40
Ucsugi, op. cit., p. 264.
41 ibid., p. 267. "Kokutai", Uesugi says elsewhere, "is determined when the sovereign himself
recognises his status... This arrangement does not depend on a contract between him and the members
of the state... It does not derive, as the historical school claims, from the confidence that common
people have in the person so that they will recognise him as their sovereign. With the sovereign's own
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For Uesugi, an ideal state exists in unity between the emperor and the people,
and no obstacle should be placed between them.42 In this hierarchical structure, not
only individuals but also government is subjected to kokutai. "When kokutai
changes, a country will disappear. Change of seitai (government) is merely a matter
of convenience, determined by considerations of loss and benefit depending on the
social and political circumstance of the time (jisei)."43 In his definition, kokutai, the
national essence, transcends government.
Therefore, Uesugi criticises both hanbatsu and the existing political parties,
since they are trespassing on this unity. His view anticipates Kita Ikki's call for
drastic reform of the country's polity, including the termination of party politics,
which was promoted by young military officers in their attempted coups in the
1930s. And it anticipates the totalitarian notions of the New National Unity
Movement (taisei yokusan undo) and the Kokutai no Hongi in the late years of that
decade. Uesugi's thought reveals the resilient core ideas of emperor-centred national
unity: the denial of popular sovereignty, the emphasis on obedience, the rejection of
"heresy", particularism (the emphasis on kokutai), anti-parliamentarianism, and anti-
liberalism.
In this emphasis on ideas of national unity, ethnic pride, and antipathy to
Parliament, Uesugi's views have much in common with those that underlie European
fascism. And yet his view of a national unity based on the people's total subjugation
to the emperor contrasts with the emphasis on the role of a dominating party by his
European counterparts.44 In Japanese totalitarian thinking, party leadership is less
important than the emperor's absolute authority and his subjects' unswerving loyalty
to him. It is these totalitarian tendencies which most clearly clash with Minobe's
ideas of the legal state.43
recognition alone, kokutai will be determined and the foundation of the state will be laid down".
Uesugi Shinkichi, "Kokutai to Kenpo no Unyo", in Hoshijima Jiro (ed.), Saikin Kenporon, pp. 245-6.
42 Thus he says, "The members of Parliament who come from all across the country should try to offer
the best possible policy they can think of to the emperor so that he can reign over the country, and
should carry out their duties granted by the emperor with utmost sincerity" (ibid., p. 285).
43 ibid., p. 250.
44 See Maruyama, "The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism", in Thought and Behaviour in
Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 25-83.
42 Thus Nakamura Yujiro interprets the Minobe-Uesugi debate as a clash between universalism and
particularism. Minobe tries to interpret the Meiji Constitution in terms of universal principles and
constitutionalism, while Uesugi emphasises Japanese particularism and the unity of politics and
national rites (seikyd itchi). See his "Minpo Ronso to Minobe-Uesugi Kenpo Ronso", in Miyakawa
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To better appreciate Uesugi's imperial absolutism and his ideas of social
order based on "prescribed hierarchy" and status (bun), we need to examine more
closely the formation and change of modern Japanese nationalism that unfolded
around the role of the emperor. For in doing so we will understand more clearly the
forces Minobe chose to engage. Two issues are relevant here. One is how Japanese
historians dealt with the dual structure of political authority, the emperor and the
shogun, before the Restoration, and how that historiography affected the Meiji
political structure. The other is how Japanese neo-Confucianists responded to what
they saw as the two looming "national" crises, the threat of the West and the
domestic weakness of the country, in the early nineteenth century.46 The two are
essential to the formation of the idea of national unity, and to the traditional ideas
Minobe sought to contest.
Ideologically then the Meiji Restoration has its antecedents in the dual
structure of traditional political authority, emperor and shogun. Indeed it was
Tokugawa Mitsukuni, the seventeenth century lord of the Mito domain and a
grandson of Tokugawa Ieyasu, who initiated the compilation of the Dai Nihonshi
[History ofGreat Japan], a comprehensive account of Japanese history starting from
the country's origins and the legendary Emperor Jimmu. Nevertheless, through the
project, the imperial family emerged as a moral ideal that represented the country's
existence and continuity, thus transcending political events. The Mito scholars'
articulation of the dual stmcture, in which an emperor was defined as the real head of
state and the shogun as his "regent", portrayed the bakufu government as a
temporary authority and thus made it vulnerable to replacement when calls for
national unity grew. Thus, by around I860,47 the project, which had begun in 1657
and was still in progress, had helped foment Japanese nationalism, synthesising neo-
Confucianism, Shinto, and kokugaku into the powerful ideology of "sound joi
Restoration nationalism was a product of such interaction, and no group was more
responsible for its articulation than the Mito scholars.
Toru, Nakamura Yujiro, and Yoshida Hikaru (eds.), Kindai Nihon Shiso (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1963),
pp. 67-96.
46
J. Victor Koschmann, The Mito Ideology: Discourse, Reform, and Insurrection in Late Tokugawa
Japan, 1790-1864 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 45.
47 A group of Mito samurai assassinated the top bakufu official li Naosuke in 1860 at the
Sakuradamon gate of Edo Castle.
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Thus Mito historiography's emphasis on the imperial line and its treatment of
the dual structure of political authority has had a lasting influence on Japanese
thinking on government.48 It is discernible in the Meiji Constitution as the parallel
presence of imperial orders (chokurei) and laws (ho). The problem is not the parallel
presence itself, but the tendency, both ideological and institutional, for the emperor
to represent higher authority than government. Implicit in Uesugi's objections to
Minobe's legal state is the transgressive potential of unaccountable power that
remained such a problematic aspect of Japanese government right until the end of
World War II. And Uesugi's meibunron is in the direct line of Mito thought and bias.
Two scholars in particular, Fujita Yukoku (1774-1826) and his disciple
Aizawa Yasushi (1782-1863), were most articulate and influential in the formation
of the Mito ideology. Fujita and Aizawa both belonged to the late Mito school, and
each headed the Mito Historiographical Institute (Shokokan), which was responsible
for compiling the Dai Nihonshi. Both had an acute sense of crisis within late
Tokugawa society, sensing financial depletion, the slackening of samurai morale, and
low agricultural productivity accompanied by natural disasters and famines. Nascent
imperial absolutism and meibunron were their response to what they saw as
"evidence of social disintegration".49 How to maintain social cohesion became a
major concern for both of them, and the imperial family emerged as a source of
natural order and social unity. Thus Fujita affirms in the Seimeiron [On the
Rectification of Names] of 1791,
If the shogunate reveres the imperial house, all the feudal lords will respect the shogunate. If
the feudal lords respect the shogunate, the ministers and officials will honor the feudal lords. In
4S However the attitude of treating the emperor as an absolute and sacred monarch can be traced back
to Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682), the founder of "Confucianised Shinto" (Suika Shinto). "Yamazaki's
synthesis for seventeenth-century ideology is of the greatest importance for an understanding of late
Tokugawa Mito thought. That is particularly so because, by the end of the eighteenth century,
Yamazaki's epigones in the Kimon school of neo-Confucianism had secured a strong position in the
Bakufu College and through the Kansei Reforms had established a kind of orthodoxy. Many Kimon
ideas found their way into memorials written by Aizawa Seishisai [Yasushi] and other Mito reformists
in the early to mid-nineteenth century" (Koschmann, ibid., p.8). "Underlying this [Yamazaki's] social
agreement with respect to hierarchy was an ontology that equated mental and cosmic states. Virtues
that were innate to man, such as reverence and loyalty, were also inherent to the makeup of the
universe and would therefore manifest themselves spontaneously in social order. The central virtue
was reverence (kei)\ beyond that, loyalty. Rebellion was unthinkable" {ibid., p. 10). Also see Herman
Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 218-9 and p. 248.
See Koschmann, op. cit., pp. 29-34.
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this way high and low will give support to each other, and the entire country will be in accord.
What qualifications enable the shogunate to unite the country? Above, [it is] its reverent
attitude toward the emperor, and below, its protective treatment of the feudal lords. Its rule,
however, is nothing more than the exercise of the emperor's sovereignty...50
For Yukoku, although he is by no means a fanatic imperialist, the emperor is an
established authority immune to censure. He emphasises "prescribed" social
hierarchy in order to promote social and political reform without upsetting the status
quo. For him the emperor is associated with "a changeless, natural order", and this
order is sacred. Emphasis on social order is necessary to avoid "the Chinese
Confucian tradition of legitimate dynastic overthrow (ekisei kakumei)".51
Thus Yukoku emphasises the maintenance of names and status (meibun) for
pragmatic purposes. "How essential it is in a state [tenka kokka] that names and
status distinctions [meibun] be correct and rigid. They must be as unchanging as
Heaven-and-Earth itself! In the beginning there was Heaven-and-Earth, and then the
ruler and his subjects. Sovereign and subject set the precedent for high and low in the
social order. Once high and low were distinguished, there was a base for rites and
ceremonies." Yukoku's primary concern is to reform the domain, far from ousting
the bakufu. Thus meibun represents a "natural" order, which must be restored.
According to Bito Masahide, meibunron is a Japanese offshoot of Chinese
neo-Confucianism. The Zhu Xi (or Chu Hsi) school of Confucianism, generally
called neo-Confucianism, was founded by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) in Song Dynasty
China (960-1279). He built his philosophy on two contrasting concepts, li (ri in
Japanese) and qi (ki in Japanese). The former means "principle" or "reason", and the
latter "ether" or fundamental components of a material. Zhu emphasised the role of
50
Quoted in Herschel Webb, "The Development of an Orthodox Attitude Toward the Imperial
Institution in the Nineteenth Century", in Marius B. Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes
Toward Modernisation (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 177. Webb asserts that
the full identification of the emperor with state power did not occur until the Meiji Restoration.
"There is nothing in the long line of imperial loyalist thought which tended to so close an
identification of the throne with the state power" (ibid., p. 189).
51 See Koschmann, op. cit., p. 41. Koschmann quotes H. D. Harootunian, Tokugawa Restoration
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 15, to the effect that the emperor was now
transformed from a "historical" into a "political" principle.
12
Koschmann, op. cit., p. 43.
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principle; it is logic that determines the way in which a material exists. A rationalism
that respects principle is one important character of neo-Confucianism.53
The Zhu Xi school of Confucianism was introduced into Japan in the
thirteenth century. Yet even as it underwent drastic transformation in Japan over
time, it is most clearly identifiable in meibunron, the doctrine that urged individuals
to honour one's social position (mei) and role (bun).54 In Chinese, mei (name) is
aligned with ideas and ideals, and jitsu with reality and the material. However, such a
dichotomous view was transformed in Japan. Now the name was no longer
associated with ideals, but with external norms one was supposed to obey. In this
view, reality (jitsu) is demoted to anything that would threaten those norms. Instead
of the neo-Confucian emphasis on the need to subjugate reality by means of the ideal
(thereby ensuring the Mandate of Heaven) social norms are now made paramount.
Thus, according to Bito,
Neo-Confucianism endorses a moral training that emphasises observation and action in each
case, and also the need to find a universal principle that encompasses those individual cases. In
contrast, meibunron, advocated by Yukoku and others, puts more emphasis on the diversity of
roles that individuals play in society and the differentiation of moral obligations (dotokuteki
saimu) attached to those roles... It is more concerned with the conditions of different roles,
bun, than with the universality of li (principle or reason).55
In this way the two views clearly differ in their approach to individual and society:
for where Neo-Confucianism emphasises the individuals that constitute society,
meibunron emphasises the social system. Bito cautiously points out that the former is
more sympathetic to social change, yet as he himself admits, this is a very simplistic
view of Japanese neo-Confucian thinking.56 And as Koschmann demonstrates,
53
Nevertheless, its dichotomous world view, subjecting every object and material to li, principle,
created rigid stoicism. It tended to undermine human feelings, which were labelled a distraction in
realising one's li. Such "rationalism" suited the rulers of the time, and the new Confucianism became
official teaching in China in the fifteenth century, and spread to its neighbouring regions and countries
in East Asia, including Korea and Japan. For neo-Confucianism, see Shimada Kenji, Shushigaku to
Ydmeigaku, Iwanami Shinsho, 1967, and also Yamai Yo and Bito, "Shushigaku", in Kokushi Daijiten
Henshu Iinkai (ed.), Kokushi Daijiten, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1986), pp. 369-71.
54 See Bito, "Seimeiron to Meibunron", in Emura Eiichi, Kano Masanao et al. (eds.), Kindai Nihon no
Kokka to Shiso (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1976), pp. 8-9.
55 ibid., p. 20.
56 Various Confucian scholars were attracted to the rationalism of the Zhu Xi school, including Nakae
Toju and Arai Hakuseki. In the eighteenth century, emphasis on the stoicism of the doctrine declined.
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Mitogaku as an ideology did indeed prompt the people, samurai and farmers,
eventually to challenge the Tokugawa government. On the other hand Tokugawa
Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa government, himself fully understood he had to
support the Mandate of Heaven in order to legitimise his regime vis-a-vis the court.57
Nevertheless, ideas of the social order based on one's bun articulated in
Yukoku's meibunron are shared by Uesugi, and then assimilated into the Kokutai no
Hongi. However this does not mean that Uesugi was an uncritical follower of
Yukoku's thought, for he too interpreted meibunron to justify his monistic views.
Thus for Uesugi, national prestige is of paramount importance and the individual
should strive to develop the national spirit in a very competitive world. Such an
expansionist position is either absent or only implicit in Yukoku's thought.58
Uesugi's absolutism, and by the same token Minobe's constitutionalism,
therefore have their antecedents in the sense of malaise and inadequacy perceived by
such Mito scholars as Aizawa Yasushi, whose Shinron was written in response to the
promulgation of the "Order to repel foreign ships" (Ikokusen uchiharai-rei) in
1825.59 Amid a growing sense of national crisis, national unity was now increasingly
emphasised. And it is difficult to imagine that the bakufu would have been ousted if
it had been seen to be dealing successfully with that crisis. Hence, as we have seen,
the "regent" was much more vulnerable to replacement, when threats were perceived
from outside and calls for national unity grew.
Aizawa, one of Yukoku's disciples, also contributed to the calculated
"elevation" of the reigning emperor as the embodiment of moral goodness, and the
and more pragmatic thinkers emerged, such as Ito Jinsai (1627-1705) and Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728).
For Sorai's criticism of neo-Confucianism and his view of objective social order, see Maruyama,
"Soraigaku ni okeru Senkai", Nihon Seiji Shisdshi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
1952), reprinted 1989, pp. 208-22. The influence of the Wang Yangming school, which was anti-
scholastic emphasizing the union of thought and action, is also recognisable in the thought of pre-
Restoration revolutionaries. Moreover Rangaku (Dutch Studies), "one important sidestream of the
Neo-Confucian tradition", provided the intellectual ground for absorbing certain Western ideas (see
Minear, op. cit., pp. 162-3).
57 For the debate about legitimacy during the Edo period, see Kate Wildman Nakai, "Tokugawa
Confucian Historiography: The Hayashi, Early Mito School and Arai Hakuseki", in Peter Nosco (ed.),
Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.79, and
also Matsumoto Sannosuke, Tenndsei Kokka to Seiji Shisd, pp. 142-3.
58 For Uesugi's nationalistic views, see Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 34.
59 "Although ostensibly written solely for the inspiration and enlightenment of his teacher Fujita
Yukoku and his lord Tokugawa Narinobu (1797-1892), the book-length document soon 'leaked out'
and was widely disseminated in various versions by samurai activists" (Koschmann, op. cit., p. 56).
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symbol of national unity. As with Yukoku, Aizawa's concern was how to reform
politics and society without upsetting the existing social order. Yet because Aizawa's
Shinron was written 34 years after Yukoku's Seimeiron, his emphasis on national
crisis was more acute. Combining neo-Confucianism, the Confucianised Shinto
developed by Yamazaki Anzai, and kokugaku, Aizawa emphasises filial piety and
loyalty as fundamental to social order. His ideal order is presided over by the
emperor, because the emperor is a direct descendant of Amaterasuomikami. The
"unbroken" blood connection is the justification for the emperor's legitimacy as the
sole person capable of making the people be "of one mind". For him the emperor is
the fundamental concept in a pragmatic theory of national unity.60
Inadvertently Aizawa weakens the moral foundations of the Tokugawa
bakufu. Yet more importantly, because of his concern with social cohesion, he is
particularly intolerant of anything that can be said to threaten the unity of the state.61
Thus he advocated rejecting foreigners (joi), endorsing the country's 200-year-old
policy of seclusion. It is this intransigence that passes into Uesugi. For both Hozumi
and Uesugi would anathematise Minobe's constitutional views, and Minobe was only
too aware of the burden of tradition he had to confront.
Nevertheless some ideas central to Yukoku and Aizawa were unpalatable to
Uesugi. Thus in Aizawa's theorisation of the emperor's superiority, "the popular
will" is essential. He says, "It is not by intimidating the people, and forcing them into
obedience for one dynasty at a time, that an imperial sovereign is able to pacify the
four seas, govern in peace for extended periods, and preserve the realm in perfect
tranquillity. His only bulwark is that the people should be of one mind, love their
ruler, and harbor no desire to separate themselves from him."62 From this emphasis
60 Koschmann, ibid., p. 66-7.
61 Aizawa characterises social problems in two ways: problems that occur with the passing of time,
and problems caused by heresy. The first is inevitable, but the second must be contained. "Aizawa's
history writing also follows the common Tokugawa practice of adhering to a cyclical concept of
change, often combined with the assumption that structures inevitably deteriorate over time. This
degenerative concept of the historical process provides the framework for Aizawa's explanation of
how the Japanese polity reached its contemporary state of disrepair. The second major category of
abuses plaguing the nation is the evil of heresy... Religion...must serve the cause of unity and
obedience to duly constituted authority if it is to find justification.... Whereas changes in the
momentum of time (jisei no hen) have to do with institutional relationships among land, people and
authority, the issue of heresy (jasetsu no gai) focuses on the problem of religion. Yet the remedy for
both must be sought in kokutai (the national essence)" (ibid., pp. 61-4).
62
Quoted by Koschmann, ibid., p. 67.
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on "the people", he advocates a new relationship between authority and the populace.
Thus he says, "To make the people ignorant and the soldiers weak may be a clever
plan from the point of view of politics. But where there is benefit, there is also
damage, so that strategy must now be reformed."63 Koschmann remarks of this that
Aizawa here "explicitly advocates a flexible practicality as the best policy in a world
of incessant change".64
It seems true then that meibunron ideology came relatively late in the
Tokugawa period, and became popular only when the bakufu system began to decay.
Using the Confucian discourse with which he was familiar, Yukoku questioned the
legitimacy of the status quo while identifying its inability to deal with social and
political problems. Yet as Herschel Webb points out, the emperor was not yet linked
to any concrete state power.65
Thus it is extremely important to remember that the meibunron associated
with Meiji neo-Confucianism differed from that of Yukoku and Aizawa in intention
and emphasis. Crucially it was reinterpreted by those who were then in government
and used expediently as an instrument. Certainly Yukoku anticipates Uesugi's views
of a hierarchical social order, in which high and low are connected through
"reverence", "respect" and "honour". Yet at the same time, Yukoku's question
"What qualifications enable the shogunate to unite the country?" echoes Minobe's
"Why do we have to obey the State?"66, a question he in turn had learned from
Jellinek but nevertheless made his own. Thus meibunron polemic in the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji periods grapples with questions of legitimate political
authority, from which both major principles of the Meiji Restoration, "koron" (public
opinion) and "swrnd" (revere the emperor), derive.67 Yet if the divided trajectories
of later political debate are implicit in it, it does not project the later triumph of
absolutism.
63
Quoted by Koschmann, ibid., p. 79.
64
ibid., p. 79.
65 Webb, op. cit., pp. 177, 189.
66
Minobe, Nihon Kenpo (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1921), p. 148.
67 For a study of the concepts of legitimacy in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period, see
Matsumoto, "Bakumatsu ni okeru Seitosei Kannen no Sonzai Kcitai", in his Tennosei Kokka to Seiji
Shisd. Maruyama Masao also examines the genesis of the "koron" ideology. See his Chusei to
Hangyaku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1992), pp. 22-7.
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Thus the Meiji Restoration was carried out in the name of the emperor, yet he
by no means represented absolute authority. Rather he symbolised a moral authority
fairer and thus more legitimate than that of the Tokugawa government. In this way
the Charter Oath projects an image of the emperor as the moral and symbolic leader
of the country's quest for modernisation. Even the Boshin Shosho of 1908 preserves
this practice, portraying the emperor as one who spearheads the country's
advancement based on the co-operation of his subjects. In the Kokutai no Hongi of
1937, however, the emperor no longer asks the people for support, and is excused
from explaining his reign. His authority is absolute and legitimate, historically and
culturally, and linked firmly with the idea of the state. Sometime between the Boshin
Shdsho and the Kokutai no Hongi, a radical metamorphosis of the emperor's political
role had taken place. With the demise of party politics, the emperor had emerged as
the head of the monolithic state.
In a rapidly changing society, where ideas that natural law could provide
were constantly challenged, it is easy to see why many Japanese, including Hozumi
and Uesugi, were attracted to such a synthetic view of the emperor. The pervasive
portrayal of a country in constant danger, frequently reinforced by government
policy statements, including imperial rescripts, moved the emperor to the status of
myth. And the myth flourished at a time when the constitution's flawed arrangements
lent themselves to the purposes of reactionary opinion. Minobe's defence of the
claims of the legal state and of constitutional government was thus both provoked
and undermined by the emperor's dual role, by government's constant resort to the
rhetoric of national crisis, and by the accommodatory aspects of traditional political
thought.
Nevertheless, throughout his career, Minobe sought to appraise both policy
and institutions in the light of his own vision of national well-being and the rights of
the individual. Thus, if Uesugi's reinterpretation of meibunron marks a shift in the
evolution of Japanese nationalism, a shift from neo-Confucian justification of social
and political change to rigid endorsement of political conformity, so by the mid-
19305, when nationalism had been thoroughly mobilised in the name of kokutai,
Minobe's liberal views suddenly found themselves serving as defining principles for
such nationalism, but only through their negation.
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2.3. From organicist theories to constitutionalism: the denial of
absolute power
The essence of Minobe's constitutional theory is that no political power is absolute
and limitless. This claim forms the foundation of his conceptualisation of the legal
state. At the same time Minobe's constitutional views are often associated with the
German concept of Staatslehre, translated as kokkagaku (the theory of the state),
which has been criticised as a defence of statism by the post-war generation of
political scientists.68 Notions of Staatslehre, organicist and holistic, became part of
the mainstream of legal and political thought in Japan after the promulgation of the
Meiji Constitution. The prevailing interpretation of organicist theories is that they
were devised to defend monarchical authority.69 Proclaiming the supremacy of the
state, they played an "undemocratic" role in defending the monarch against the
increasingly assertive bourgeoisie in political and legal debate in Germany.
However, organicist theories vary in emphasis, and those concerned with the
protection of individual rights are closer to constitutionalism. Furthermore natural
law elements are discernible in some theories. Minobe's theory is organicist, and yet
natural and common law thinking is recognisable in his vision of constitutional
government. This section aims to clarify Minobe's constitutional views, and to show
how far he departed from his predecessors and colleagues in his interpretation of
organicist theory.
Organicist theories of the state reflect two prevailing concerns of Europe after
the French Revolution: an emphasis on unity, and a search for new social principles
in a "post-Christian" world. Recent social change is implicit in the theories'
emphasis on the whole, which is more than a collection of individuals, and the role of
law. Romanticism, nationalism, and the idea of social progress (which was prompted
by the Industrial Revolution and the development of science) also entered into
68 See Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 14. Miller notes that Minobe's constitutional views "emerged
from and in large part remained within the limits of the official political science of the Imperial
University, a political science which in Royama's words, 'neither saw with its own eyes, nor stood on
its own feet. Rather it depended on Staatslehre.' It was not an independent science but an auxiliary of
the state bureaucracy in administration and legislation."
69 See Miller, ibid., p. 10, and Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, "Minobe Sensei no Gyoseki", Nihon Kenseishi
no Kenkyu, p. 318.
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theories of the state. The plethora of theory reflects the breadth of debate about the
relationship between authority and the individual at a time of fundamental change in
society.
Theories of the state were pursued most vigorously in German states from the
late eighteenth century, when national unity and nation-building became prime
concerns of many intellectuals, including legal experts. In time they were developed
into a vast body of knowledge as Staatslehre, which the Japanese enthusiastically
tried to master. In 1887, a society for promoting study of the theory of the state
(kokkagakkai) was established within the Tokyo Imperial University. Prime Minister
Ito Hirobumi was among its founding members. Political science and law were
studied as part of Staatslehre.
Of the organicist theories introduced into Japan through Staatslehre, the
schools of historical law and of legal positivism were most influential.70 Japanese
scholars, including Minobe and his opponents Hozumi and Uesugi, all learned the
idea of national sovereignty from these two schools. Nevertheless, Minobe's
organicist theory markedly differs from the theories advocated by his opponents.
Minobe's position becomes clearer if we distinguish between the different organicist
viewpoints.
Friedrich Savigny (1779-1861) is often described as the founder of the
historical school. Reflecting the emerging German national consciousness in
response to the wars against Napoleonic France, Savigny challenged the hegemony
of natural law, with its emphasis on rationalism, universalism, and individualism. He
saw law as historical and peculiar to a people, so that law is "discovered" not
"made". Thus he tried to find "an organic principle" in law through examination of
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history.
On the other hand, the legal positivism established by such scholars as C. F.
von Gerber (1823-1911) and Paul Laband (1838-1918) provided Japanese legal
70 See Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law, p. 35.
71
For Savigny "All law is originally formed in the manner in which... customary law is said to have
been formed: i.e., that is first developed by custom and popular faith, next by jurisprudence, -
everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver"
(quoted by Minear, ibid., pp. 36-7). Thus Savigny opposed codifying German law modelled after the
French civil code. For a brief description of the school of historical law in Germany, see Ernest
Barker, "Translator's Introduction", in Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory ofSociety J500-1800
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 1-liv.
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experts with the concepts of state and constitution. Sovereignty (shaken) and the
legal person (hojin) are two key concepts developed by the German positivists that
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entered into Japanese legal discourse. Here the state is defined as a legal person, to
which sovereignty is attributed. This formulation shifts the source of supreme
political authority from a monarch or a group of people to a quasi-metaphysical state.
Richard Minear quotes Laband as saying "the legal personality of the state consists in
the fact that the state has its own rights of rule for the fulfilment of its tasks and
duties". Accordingly "the will of the state is distinct from the will of its members",
and "it is not the sum of their wills, but a will independent of them". Thus
sovereignty is no longer a matter of personal authority, but of an "indivisible"
Leviathan.
Questions remained, however, as to how the rights of the metaphysical state
could be defined vis-a-vis the traditional concept of the rights of the monarch and the
rights of the individual. And it was not until the late nineteenth century that a new
generation of European legal scholars began to discuss "the needs and demands of
social forces" in the theory of the state. Most prominent of all those who then
developed the theory of individual rights based on positivist tradition was Georg
Jellinek (1851-1911), and it was to Jellinek, as we will see, that Minobe eventually
turned. Most significantly, as Miller points out, where "Laband was concerned
primarily with the formal law... it remained for Jellinek to broaden the focus of law
to permit serious consideration of the social forces Laband placed outside the law".74
72 Nevertheless when the Japanese began to write their own civil code in 1870, it was the French code
that they turned to. The government had invited the French legal expert Gustave Emile Boissonade, in
1873, for consultation on the code. Boissonade stayed in Japan until 1895 and taught French law and
Roman law at the Justice Ministry, the Dajokan, and other government institutions. Notions of the
legal person, social rights, and the distinction between public law and private (civil) law thus entered
into Japanese legal discourse from the French. Yet for Minobe's generation the German system, which
shared the Roman law tradition with the French, was most influential. For the influence of French law
on the Japanese legal system, see Otsuki Fumihiko, "Mitsukuri Rinsho kunsen" (1907), in Kato
Shuichi and Maruyama Masao (eds.), Honyaku no Shisd, Nihon Kindai Shisd Taikei, vol. 15 (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1991), pp. 303-15, and Boissonade, "Horitsutaii Kogi" (1880), in Matsumoto
Sannosuke and Yamamuro Shinichi (eds.), Gakumon to Chishikijin, Nihon Kindai Shisd Taikei, vol.
10, 1988, pp. 292-388. The latter is a translated summary of Boissonade's lectures.
73 Minear summarises Laband's legal positivism as follows: (1) a definition of law as sovereign
command, (2) an absolute dependence on reason for the creation of a science of law, (3) the separation
of law from ethics, (4) the positing of a personality for the state, and (5) a denial of fundamental
liberties except as specifically guaranteed by law (rights by reflex). See Minear, op. cit., pp. 40-9.
74
Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 51.
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Nevertheless, although German theories started to dominate studies of law
and political science in Japan around 1890, the first organicist theory introduced into
Japan was not positivist but strongly rooted in the tradition of natural law,
emphasising reason and individualism. Thus in 1872 Kato Hiroyuki (1836-1916)
translated Bluntschli's Allgemeines Staatsrecht [The Theory of the State]. Bluntschli
too emphasised "the cohesion of the nation". And using the common metaphor of a
living creature he theorised that "in the State spirit and body, will and active organs,
are necessarily bound together in one life. The one national spirit, which is
something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens,
is the spirit of the State; the one national will, which is different from the average
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will of the multitude, is the will of the State." Bluntschli's fusion of collective
vitality and national unity was in tune with what was already enshrined in the Charter
Oath. For it offered the Meiji leaders and intellectuals a Utopian vision of the state
and society where collective and personal aspirations complemented each other.
However, Bluntschli's organicist theory was founded on a delicate balance
between collectivism and individualism. And when he says that the state has "an
external growth" he anticipates the arrival of imperialism. At the same time
individual freedom is central to his theory. For him the state is "an arbitrary work of
individual freedom".76 "[The] modern mind does not begin with the state, but with
the individual."77
Thus Bluntschli criticises the German historical school for mythologising the
state at the expense of individual rights. He criticises Hegel: "Even Hegel in his
theory of Law (Rechtslehre) paid more regard to the historical formation of states
than the earlier theories of natural law. He supposed indeed that he found in the
history of the world a dialectical process of reason. The 'existing' appeared to him
'rational'. His theory especially glorified the Prussian state, as it then existed, still
7' J. K. Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, pp. 17-20. "This organic nature of the State has not always
been understood... It is the especial merit of the German school of historical jurists to have recognised
the organic nature of the Nation and the State. This conception refutes both the mathematical and
mechanical view of the State, and the atomic way of treating it, which forgets the whole in the
individuals... and so too the nation is not a mere sum of citizens, and the State is not a mere collection
of external regulations" (ibid., pp. 18-19).
76 "The State indeed is not a product of nature, and therefore it is not a natural organism; it is
indirectly the work of man" (ibid., p. 19).
77 ibid., p. 65. Even the absolutist Hobbes and the radical Rousseau are in agreement in this respect,
according to Bluntschli.
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absolute although governed in a spirit of public duty. He defended the power of the
monarchy, and did not care for the advance of constitutional freedom."78 These
criticisms will find their echo in Minobe's criticisms of Hozumi and Uesugi.
Bluntschli also endorsed the power of law to link the common life and the
State. Thus the constitution is "the articulation of the body politic".79 "Man has his
rights as an individual, private law is sharply distinguished from public law, and is
rather recognised than created by the State, rather protected than commanded.... The
sovereignty of the State is constitutionally limited."80 Thus Bluntschli's organicist
and constitutional theories champion the rights of the individual and endorse the
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philosophy of natural law. Kato's translation of 1872 became a best-seller.
In this way, the earlier organicist theories some Japanese came to know were
accompanied by the concept of inalienable rights, which was promoted by the so-
called enlightened (keimd) thinkers, including Nishi Amane, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and
Kato, through their activities at such private societies as Meirokusha. Inalienable
rights were a prominent concept in the bunmei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment)
movement,82 and were then taken up by jiyuminken activists in their confrontation
with the government.
Along with the touchstone of progress, these organicist theories were highly
influential for post-Restoration Japanese political leaders and intellectuals in shaping
their views of the state as a new political community. In their frantic efforts to
introduce Western legal and economic systems, they needed a suitable theory to
envisage a new "objective" social order. However, as consolidation of state power
78 ibid., p. 73.
79 ibid., p. 20.
80 ibid., p. 59.
81 A list of annual best-sellers between 1861-1998 is provided in Nagahara Keiji (ed.,), Iwanami
Nihonshi Jiten (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999), pp. 1773-84. Kato was influenced by Hobbes, and
says in a draft of Shinsei Taii, published in 1870: "Why cannot people live safely with the State?...
Firstly, people have inherent rights. This means that every person can act with free will and without
being restricted by others. Those rights are the ultimate treasure for people since their birth. However,
if people fail to create the State and live separately with each other like dogs and cats, they would
waste that treasure. More importantly, because people differ from each other in physical strength and
spirit, the weak would be constantly controlled by the strong, and the meek would be harassed. No
one would feel safe because a strong person might be defeated by someone stronger. Thus the people
might not safely maintain their free rights. This is the major reason why people have to form the
State" (quoted by Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Tennosei Hoshiso" (part II), p. 22).
82 The first volume of Fukuzawa's Gakumon no Susume, based on Wayland's Moral Science, and a
translation of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, were published in 1872. A translation of Smiles's Self
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proceeded through the introduction of various institutions, including that of the legal
system, the initial emphasis in the organicist theories shifted from inalienable rights
to national unity. Thus Kato publicly recanted his previous adherence to the idea of
inalienable rights in 1881.83 In a crucial development, the organicist theories were
now co-opted so as to strengthen the role of the emperor and to justify bureaucratic
control of state affairs.
Ishida Takeshi attributes this transformation to the initial absence of an
absolute state and the weak sense of civil liberties in Japan. In Germany, organicist
theories were formulated as an antithesis to the idea of civil rights, which itself had
stemmed from people's conscious resistance to the absolute state. Since most
Japanese had not recognised political authority as an "apparat" until the Restoration,
the concept of civil liberties was not fully developed. Yet in a society without a
strong emphasis on civil liberties, organicist theories were now placed at the service
of an authoritarian state, neither absolutist nor constitutional and with the true centres
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of power obscured behind the presence of the emperor.
Minobe's persistent denial of absolute power, however, demonstrates the
lasting influence on him of the organicist theories that emphasised inalienable rights
as in Bluntschli. His Emperor-as-Organ theory is an outgrowth of such earlier
oc
organicist ideas, modified to take into account the presence of the emperor.
Yet it must be said also that Minobe had his predecessors in embracing
German-origin "organicist" theories. Most influential of all was his mentor Ikki
Kitokuro. Ikki also believed that sovereignty resided in the state, not in the emperor
as Hozumi claimed. However, Minobe and Ikki differed in their attitudes towards
law. Minobe argued that civil liberties could not be violated unless sanctioned by
law, while Ikki insisted that the people could not refuse orders unless the law allowed
it. Their difference in emphasis stems from their different views of political authority
Help was published in 1871. They were widely read. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics was also
translated and published in 1881, as well as Rousseau's The Social Contract.
83 For Kato's tenko, see Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Kato Hiroyuki", Shiso no Kagaku, May 1962, pp.
34-9.
84 Ishida Takeshi, "Nihon ni okeru Kokka Yukitaisetsu", Nihon Kindai Shisdshi ni okeru Ho to Seiji
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), pp. 161-8.
88 The bibliography of Minobe's Nihon Kenpo of 1921 includes Bluntschli (Lehre vom modernen
Stacit of 1886 and others), Dicey (Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution, seventh edition,
1908), and H. J. Laski (Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty of 1917, and Authority in the Modern
State of 1918), as well as Georg Jellinek (Allgemeine Staatslehre of 1900 and others).
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defined as "the sovereignty of the state". Ikki argues that "the subjects can refuse a
state order which is not sanctioned by law, only if the state recognises that this is a
case in which legal justification is necessary to order the subjects to act in a certain
way. I cannot accept the assertion that the state can issue an order to the people only
if it is based on law, except for when the Constitution stipulates otherwise."86
Clearly here Ikki commits himself to the "unlimited" power of the state so
that the people can defy it only if law allows them to do so. For Ikki, the sovereignty
of the state is a corollary of state authority. Thus he realigns the centre of power from
emperor to State, but does not question the legitimacy of political power in relation
to the people. For Minobe, however, the basic component of society is the people,
and law is necessary to protect their liberties. And he assumes that state power is not
limitless and sacrosanct but subject to legal restrictions as well as practical
restraints.87 Here Minobe departs from his mentor in his attempt to restrict the
operation of political powers.
Minobe's scepticism about absolute state power had been present from the
very beginning of his professional career and is present in his first academic paper
published in 1889. At that time the question of how to distinguish laws (ho) and
ordinances (meirei) had become a subject of academic debate soon after the
promulgation of the Constitution. Echoing legal positivism, Ikki had claimed that
laws and ordinances are both enacted by the state, but that laws have higher authority
88
because they can be amended or abolished only by other laws.
Although Minobe confirms the superiority of law to ordinance, he dissents
OQ
from Ikki's explanation, saying that the Constitution operates in a contrary fashion.
The Constitution, he says, is itself an ordinance implemented without sanction of
Parliament. He quotes Article 74: "No modification of the Imperial House Law shall
be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet." Thus
ordinances, not laws, are responsible for revising the relevant law. Furthermore the
House of Peers is also regulated by ordinances and not by laws, for Article 34 says,
86
Quoted by Ienaga, Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisdshiteki Kenkyu, p. 14.
87 ibid., p. 218.
88
Quoted by Minobe, "Kcnpo no Kaishaku ni kansuru Giji Susoku [A few questions about the
interpretation of the Constitution]", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 13, no. 143, January 1899, p. 36.
Minobe here refers to Ikki's Nihon Hdrei Yosan Ron, published in 1892.
89 ibid., p. 44.
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"The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House
of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of
nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated there by the Emperor." In
Minobe's view such lingering manifestations of imperial power expose the
limitations of both Ikki's analysis and of present political arrangements.
Characteristically Minobe attempts to ground the difference between laws
and ordinances in constitutionalism. In an absolute monarchy, he says, there will be
no difference between laws and ordinances, because both are enacted by the
sovereign (kunshu) or his officers. The law's superiority on the other hand derives
from the introduction of Parliament. "Differences between laws and ordinances
become effective only under constitutional government." This assertion would
inevitably lead to the fundamental question of who held ultimate authority, a
government which could invoke the emperor's authority, or Parliament. Although
Minobe's position at this time was by no means fully achieved, this essay is
undeniably important. For it acts as a prelude to his later concern for the legitimacy
of law, the role of Parliament, and the importance of individual "rights".
The first expression of Minobe's Emperor-as-Organ theory occurs in another
early article which he published in 1903 after three years of study in Germany.90
Here for the first time he asserted that sovereignty resided in the state and the
monarch was an organ of the state.91 Yet Minobe's essay already reveals his
constitutional stance. The influence of legal positivism is clear, which he must have
assimilated while in Germany, and he comfortably deals with such concepts as the
legal person and the rights of the individual, as well as with German metaphysical
philosophy. Minobe dissents from Hozumi's claim that sovereignty resides in the
emperor in person, saying that such a claim merely concerns physical reality alone,
but legal studies require logical persuasion. He also rejects Hozumi's particularism,
saying that the state as a concept has characteristics applicable to any country,
,0
Minobe, "Kunshu no Kokuhojo no Chii", Hogaku Shirin, vol. 50, November 1903, pp. 1-6.
Identifying this article as one of the earliest statements of the theory, Miller says, "he [Minobe] set
forth briefly and dogmatically elements of a theory which was to become the crux of a thirty-year
academic and political struggle" (Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 27).
91 The organ theory Minobe adhered to was not new to the Japanese academy, however. In 1889 Ariga
Nagao had already claimed that the emperor, as one of the organs of the state, had to comply with the
Constitution in exercising his authority. For the Ariga-Hozumi debate in 1889, see Suzuki Yasuzo,
"Nihon Kenpogaku no Seitan to Hatten", pp. 184-5.
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including Japan. And he advocates a flexible interpretation of written laws so that the
aim of constitutional studies is always to explain legal principle.
These two early articles anticipate Minobe's life-long concern with the
legitimacy of both law and state. Regarding the former he appears to have sought
"universal" principles, somewhat close to natural law. With respect to the state he
sought a viable mechanism for national unity. Linking the two themes is the ever-
present question of the relationship between state and the individual. Minobe's
adherence to Parliament is the primary reason for his opposition to absolute power.
In 1904, he published two linked essays intended to criticise Laband's legal
positivism. Minobe is much more confident here than in his 1889 article in asserting
that the superiority of law derives from the authority of Parliament. Thus the "...
Parliamentary sanction of a law has a legal power completely different from that of a
decision by a group of scholars. This is because the former, as the organ of
legislative power, agrees to give the decision a binding power." Furthermore, "in a
constitutional monarchy, state sovereignty (kokken) is not exercised by the monarch
alone. Organs independent of the monarch take part in the operation of state power.
It is mistaken logic to assume that state power is indivisible, and can be exercised by
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the monarch alone."
Here Minobe departs from the earlier German positivists (such as Laband)
and resorts to Jellinek. Minobe had chosen Jellinek from among those of the German
school whose ideas were closest to Anglo-American constitutionalism. Yet strong
attachment to Parliament as a containing political principle is also deeply personal to
him. And the same is true in the cases of the other two subjects of this study, Sakai
Toshihiko and Saito Takao. For when these men grew up, Jiyuminken Undo was still
strong, and the opening of Parliament was the ultimate goal for national liberation
within the movement. The promulgation of the Constitution and the eventual opening
of Parliament were part of their immediate experience. Consciously or unconsciously
93Minobe was a parliamentarian first before becoming a constitutional expert.
Minobe, "Floritsu no Saika ni tsuite [On Legal Sanctions]", Kenpd oyobi Kenseishi Kenkyu (Tokyo:
Yuhikaku, 1908), reprint 1987, p. 139. The article appeared originally in Hogakukyokai Zasshi, vol.
22, no. 3, 1904. Minobe published its sequel "Futatabi Horitsu no Saika ni tsuite" in the same journal
later in the year (vol. 22, no. 12), also included in Kenpd oyobi Kenseishi Kenkyu.
93 At least 137 petitions, signed by 320,000 people in total, were submitted to the government between
1874 and 1881, demanding the opening of Parliament, according to Emura Eiichi, "Bakumatsu
Meijizenki no Kenpo Koso", in Emura (ed.), Kenpd Koso, p. 455. Emura speculates that about one-
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Minobe's attachment to Parliament had made him acutely sensitive to any
claim that endorsed the operation of unrestrained power. Yet central to Minobe's
constitutional theory is not the state but law. For him law springs from the life of
society (shakai seikatsu), not the state, which is an artificial organisation. In this
sense law precedes the state. Hence "... social life is a prerequisite for the
establishment of law. Yet law does not presuppose the establishment of the state, at
least theoretically. Law is necessary as long as social life takes place, even without
the state. The prerequisite for the existence of law is the life of society, but not the
state."94
Thus Minobe accepts the premises of natural law to assert that law is
paramount. Yet because the state cannot exist without law, he claims that the state's
action must be controlled by law.95 This claim is a direct corollary of the state-self-
control theory formulated by Jellinek.96 Natural law and Jellinek's state-self-control
theory together prompt Minobe to claim that one aim of a constitution is to restrict
state power (kokken). In the process he criticises Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau, Seydel,
and Hozumi for endorsing absolute power: Hobbes for supporting a monarchy's
absolute power based on contract theory, Rousseau for his assertion that the general
will which underlies legislative power is limitless, and Hozumi for saying that state
Q7
power transcends a constitution, and cannot be controlled by it.
In more recent years Jellinek's state self-control theory has been criticised by
legal experts such as Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) as self-contradictory. How is it
possible for the state to impose law and at the same time be controlled by it? Minobe
defends the theory, however, saying that "the will to obey self-imposed rules" does
exist, for instance, in international law and private contracts, in which there is no
fourth of the whole population (37 million as of 1881) may have been involved in the nation-wide
movement, given the various restrictions in place, such as only heads of households being signatories,
the various obstacles on women's political activities, and the poor communications and transport
infrastructure.
94
Minobe, Nihon Kenpd, p. 46.
95 ibid., p. 53.
96 Minobe cites Jhering as the first person who pointed out that all laws restrict the organs of the state.
Yet Jellinek developed the theory further, saying that if its organs are controlled by laws, the state also
should be controlled. Minobe quotes Jellinek as saying, "Laws include pledges that the organs of the
state make with the people, and that they act according to those laws"{ibid., p.55). Such self restraint
is crucial for the organs of the state to ensure the people's trust in them, a prerequisite for the people
to predict the consequences of their actions and thus carry out their social life, according to Jellinek.
97 ibid., pp. 219-20.
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supreme law imposer. Yet here Minobe's analogy seems not entirely convincing,
because what motivates nations or individuals to obey international law or private
contracts is mutual consent between the parties. In the state self-control theory,
mutual consent is irrelevant, unless the concept of the people is introduced, because
there are no equal parties involved.
At the same time, Minobe holds that the state and the people can be treated as
two equal legal persons. The concepts of the legal person, which Minobe learned
from legal positivism, and of individual rights, which Minobe absorbed from
Jellinek's work, contribute to the claim. However, it was only at the end of his career
that Minobe was able to explain definitively why the state, the highest authority, had
to obey its own rule.
Minobe answered this question unequivocally in Nihon Kenpd no Kihonshugi
published in 1934, just six months before the outbreak of the Minobe Affair. Here
Minobe advances beyond the metaphysical state as the highest authority, and simply
states a key self-regulating principle of constitutionalism, the rule of law: no one is
above the law, and those who make it also have to obey it.
As Ienaga has pointed out, Minobe in this regard seems to have reversed his
opinions rarely. His basic constitutional points remain more or less the same
throughout his works. What shifts exist are more of articulation and emphasis rather
than of any fundamental change in thought. Thus in Nihon Kenpd no Kihonshugi he
asserts that even if it was imposed by the government, the introduction of the Meiji
Constitution brought in a legal "revolution". Adhering to the main principle of
Staatslehre, he reiterates that pouvoir constituant (authority to write a constitution)
and pouvoir constitue (authority created by a constitution) are one and the same. Yet,
instead of using this assertion to solidify state power, Minobe anchored that power to
law. For once a constitution has been introduced, no state power transcends it. And
once the law is interwoven with such essential principles and institutions as
inalienable rights and a functioning Parliament, it creates a formidable
counterbalance to the state in his theory.
At this point therefore Minobe has clearly moved towards English
constitutionalism as articulated by Locke and later by Dicey. For "all state laws can
maintain their validity only because those who have enacted the laws recognise that
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they too have to comply with them".98 His previous adherence to the state is less
ardently expressed, but the state remains the highest authority. For Minobe state
power (kokken) is externally independent and internally supreme. However, it is not
absolute, in that it is subject to self-restriction, practical restraints, and international
and domestic laws. Thus, in his definition, "supreme" and "absolute" are two
different concepts.99 Yet it is Minobe's rejection of absolute authority which his
opponents saw as a major threat to their vision of national unity.
Thus in its fullest and most timely development Minobe's constitutional
theory celebrated the rule of law at a time of increasing danger from discretionary
power. The appeal to law was itself deeply subversive, just as much as the denial of
absolute power. For in the context of the 1930s, constitutionalism's self-regulating
mechanism, the rule of law, was increasingly incompatible with the totalitarian
system that many began to believe necessary for the survival of the state. Thus
Minobe's theory was criticised at precisely the time of its greatest political relevance:
in retrospect his ostracism seems a clear index of achievement. Dissent, thus, had
been imposed on him by historical events, but also by the flawed constitutional
arrangements he had long scrutinised.
At the same time Minobe's rejection of absolutism is closely connected to
philosophical and practical questions about legal norms. Why and how do people
come to obey the law as the embodiment of norms of behaviour? How should such
norms be determined? With these and other questions, Minobe probed the self-
regulating mechanisms of constitutionalism. Thus, in our next section, we will
discuss one aspect of Minobe's theory conducive to norm creation, common law.
2.4. Minobe and the endorsement of common law
Minobe's adherence to social consciousness (shakai ishiki) and his rejection of the
absolute state led him to adopt a more flexible interpretation of legal norms than
Rechtsstaat orthodoxies. In the latter, law is expected to provide "functional"
9K
Minobc, Nihon Kenpd no Kihonshugi (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1934), p. 60.
99 See Minobe, Nihon Kenpd, pp. 146-7.
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rationality, regularity, and predictability.100 Thus administrative law became central
to the Rechtsstaat, and Japan vigorously followed suit. In this system, legal norms
were held to be deductive from prescribed general norms. Minobe by contrast was
inclined to seek a more "empirical" rationality, despite being a leading authority on
administrative law. This aspect of his theory and its significance can be examined in
his endorsement of common law.
As we will see, and despite his alignment with British legal tradition,
Minobe's concept of common or customary law is not entirely equivalent to English
common law. Nevertheless it is based on the idea of "equal, private" persons, whose
public lives are regulated by law. In Japan such a concept was inimical to the
hierarchical view of state power as envisaged in the Constitution and supported by
those opposed to parliamentarianism. It was also antagonistic to both reactionary and
traditional ideas about social order and obligation. Nevertheless Minobe's position
was regarded as orthodox until the demise of party politics in the 1930s. To contrast
Minobe's views with those of his opponents therefore highlights an underlying
conflict which climaxed in the triumph of totalitarianism. This section aims to show
the centrality of common law thinking to Minobe's ostracised views.
In the narrowest sense, common law is a system of court-based principles
developed through individual rulings based on the reinterpretation of previous
decisions. It is a system of norm creation by induction rather than by deduction from
general rules. Aware that Japan does not have the tradition of well-established,
common-law courts, Minobe is clearly not referring to the exact system of English
common law when he mentions customary law. Rather his usage is a translation from
the German Gewohnheitsrecht, meaning customary norms of practice and behaviour
accepted as rules. Nevertheless, Minobe's concept of customary law shares some key
constitutional principles with common law, notably law as a set of malleable norms
responsive to changing realities, and law as a counterbalance to politics. Together
they lay down a legal foundation for the public sphere in Habermas's definition,
where political authority is not absolute but examined through the critical debate of
well-informed members of society. Minobe's defence of freedom of speech and his
objection to the operations of absolute authority should always be understood in
100 Sec Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Tennosei Hoshiso" (part II), pp. 47-50.
92
terms of his view both of the broader, political community and of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism, however, has a different character if we contrast the Anglo-
American tradition with that of the European Continent. In the Anglo-American
tradition, common law embodies "constitutional" ideas, while on the continent, under
the strong influence of Roman law, constitutions tend to defer to traditions of
absolute power.
Harvey Wheeler explains the evolution of common law in England with
regard to natural law and constitutionalism. Citing anthropological studies, Wheeler
claims that "natural law" is common to any primitive society. Communities would
evolve shared assumptions and "universal" principles concerning what was just and
wrong. In primitive "courts", these hypotheses about norms of behaviour would be
examined in particular cases against evidence. Through the process of collation
between principles and evidence, new "prescriptive norms" would emerge, based on
which new cases would be examined. For principles are only effective if they are
capable of accommodating reality and evidence. Thus common law denies the
presence of fixed, absolute norms, and instead insists on a self-regulating mechanism
based on interaction between "natural" principles and reality.101
This "natural law" principle in common law can also be effective in checking
the operations of political power. Despite John Austin's emphasis on legal
102
sovereignty, the "monolithic" state is a historical rarity, according to Wheeler.
Thus in medieval England the dualistic tradition was founded between the king's
absolute authority and the voice of "the people". "There the popular aspect of
monarchy was assimilated into what is sometimes called the folk spirit, but more
often the common law; for the common law was thought of as the common
possession of the entire people. This dualistic Anglican tradition became
institutionalised in a series of conflicts between various English kings and their chief
10^
barons." " The Magna Carta of 1215 is the product of such a conflict. "Gradually,
over many centuries, this form of baronial civil disobedience became
institutionalised in Parliament through impeachment proceedings against errant
101
Harvey Wheeler, "Constitutionalism", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.),
Handbook ofPolitical Science, Volume 5, Governmental Institutions and Processes (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 1-91.
102 ibid., p. 46.
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ministers of the crown. This in turn led to the emergence of the working principles of
the British constitution: the king acts only on the advice of his ministers; the
ministers of the king's cabinet are responsible to Parliament for acts done in the
name of the crown; and a cabinet must resign if it loses the confidence of Parliament.
In a sense then the British contribution to constitutionalism is the institutionalisation
of civil disobedience."104 Thus Wheeler asserts that the common law tradition played
a key role in the development of British constitutionalism, which he defines as the
tacit sponsor of creative dissent.
Such procedures prompt of course fundamental questions about the
legitimacy of law, for in what does the final authority of the law consist? In Japan,
given the dominant role that seihd (administrative law) played in the formation of the
centralised government after the Restoration, such questions occurred to Minobe
repeatedly. Yet in almost every case his final resort was to invoke the principles and
tradition of "common" law.
Thus shortly after his return from study overseas, Minobe wrote in 1904 two
important articles about sanctions within the law.105 And in the following passage he
echoes Bluntschli's constitutional view that the people's assent is indispensable for a
law to be effective, and boldly challenges administrative law:
Laws are effective only as regulations. I cannot believe, however, that even as regulations laws
are effective just because they are written down. The ultimate reason why laws have power
rests in the awareness of the people (kokumin no jikaku). Laws are effective because they are
obeyed. If people do not obey, a law cannot be said to have legal power even if it has been
enacted by the state (kokka).106
Matsuo Takayoshi quotes this passage to assert that by 1905 Minobe had
envisaged a British-style constitutional monarchy for Japan and established the
framework of his constitutional theory, "a chain of control with the people on top".
104 ibid., pp. 47-8.
105 Minobe, "Horitsu no Saika ni tsuite" and "Futatabi Horitsu no Saika ni tsuite", Kenpd oyobi
Kenseishi Kenkyu, pp. 129-71. The phrase "horitsu no saika" appears in Article 6 of the Meiji
Constitution as follows: "The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and
executed." These two articles contain almost all the arguments that Minobe would develop as his
Emperor-as-Organ theory.
106
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In this chain, the people control Parliament through elections, Parliament controls
cabinet ministers through dismissal, and cabinet ministers control the emperor
through refusal to authorise "all laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts of
whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of State". Article 55 of the Meiji Constitution
requires a counter-signature by state ministers to authorise those documents. Thus
Matsuo concludes that Minobe had come quite early to deny the emperor's
107
monopoly of sovereign power by endorsing popular sovereignty.
Minobe also moves to endorse interpretative changes in the law. For, "if the
people's awareness changes according to social change, the effectiveness of a law
will change even if its articles remain the same".108 In this way law may be said to
belong to the people, not to the state.
In the above passages Jellinek's influence on Minobe is very strong. For
around this time Minobe was tirelessly translating Jellinek's works into Japanese,
including his Verfassungsdnderung und Verfassungsxvandlung [Constitutional
Revision and Change]. These articles also show the influence of a new branch of
legal studies in Germany, Rechtssoziologie (the sociology of law), which can be
traced back to Savigny and affected the later generations of German legal scholars
including Jellinek. Savigny's interpretation of law as rules inherent in a community
can be described as a conservative response to the growing demands of the
bourgeoisie for codification of the law in order to protect their interests against the
arbitrary rule of government.109 However, his claim that "law belongs to society" is
clearly subversive in the face of the ever increasing use of statutes. Thus when Eugen
Ehrlich (1862-1922) later advocated "lebendes RechC (living law), it too was
directed against "the compulsive norm of the state", and was thus strongly anti-
statist."0 Ehrlich's emphasis on ltlebendes RechC again reflects the persistent
107 See Matsuo, "Minobe Tatsukichi", op. cit., pp. 275-8.
108 Minobe, "Futatabi Horitsu no Saika ni tsuite", p. 158.
109 "With the great codifications of civil law a system of norms was developed securing a private
sphere in the strict sense, a sphere in which private people pursued their affairs with one another free
from impositions by estate and state, at least in tendency. These codifications guaranteed the
institution of private property and, in connection with it, the basic freedoms of contract, of trade, and
of inheritance" (Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 75).
110 "The similarity of Ehrlich's to Savigny's approach lies in his emphasis on the 'living law of
people,' based on social behaviour rather than the compulsive norm of the state. Norms observed by
the people, whether in matters of religious habits, family life, or commercial relations, are law, even if
they are never recognised or formulated by the norm of the state" (Wolfgang Friedmann, Law in a
Changing Society, second edition, Penguin Books, 1972, p. 20).
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resistance to the expanding role of government (the state) in many countries in the
late nineteenth century. Thus in a country where "law" was thought essential to
create centralised government, Minobe's attachment to the law of society and the law
of the people inevitably led him into confrontation with the law of the state. As with
Ehrlich this was especially so with respect to the legitimacy of legal statutes.
Statutes are regulations and rules written by either government or Parliament,
although constitutional government requires that any statute needs the sanction of
Parliament. Statutes differ from common law, in which various rules grow
"organically" through interpretations by judges and lawyers of previous decisions.
They are laws intended to deal with the population as a whole, while common law is
responsible for cases between two individuals but extended to all applicable cases.
This recognition that there are two types of law, one concerning the
relationship between the state and the people and the other between individuals, was
keenly felt by legal experts such as Jellinek.111 In the countries where the tradition of
continental law was strong, including France and Germany, the separation between
"public" and "private" laws became prominent. This separation, which is traced back
to "ius publicum" and "ius privatum" in Roman law, also passed into the Japanese
legal system. So in Japan, "public" laws were intensely exploited as administrative
law, because it was felt necessary to insist on the role of government vis-a-vis the
people amid government's expanding role both domestically and internationally. In
such a climate, where legal studies begin to assume the character of an achieved
political science, the state is an accomplished fact. And any serious inquiry into the
legitimacy of statutes tends to be ignored. Typically then the Meiji Constitution was
promulgated arbitrarily, by the emperor, "in virtue of the supreme power" that he
inherited from his ancestors.
Temperamentally and professionally Minobe revolted against this trend,
although he was already a prominent member of the legal establishment. Thus in
1908, he argued that laws stipulated by the state may not be so authoritative as we
assume. And as an alternative to statutes, he proposed the claims of customary law.
111
However, in England, with its powerful tradition of common law, Bentham and John Austin tried
to explain the legitimacy of statutes through utilitarian thinking, or legal positivism. Although their
intention was to protect the autonomy of the legal profession, they defined law as a command of
supreme authority. Therefore, the people have to obey it whatever the reason. See Roger Cotterrell,
The Sociology ofLaw (London: Butterworths, 1992), p. 26.
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Thus "... the conventional opinion is that customary law is less effective than
statutes, customary law cannot alter statutes, and statutes cannot be altered unless by
another statute". Yet Minobe has long doubted such a view, for "laws introduced by
the state do not have such power. Statutes have legal authority not simply because
they are the expression of the will of the state but also because they have various
forces behind them that give them legal authority".112
As examples of such forces, Minobe cites the common law as practised in
England, and natural law based on rationalism and a sense of justice. In English
common law history, the interpretation of the law has often been changed: some laws
have ceased to be effective because changed social conditions rendered interpretative
change necessary or the existing laws no longer valid. Hence, for Minobe, it is
"superficial" to say that the law is "almighty".113
Again in an article he wrote in 1909, Minobe cited customary law and the law
of reason {riho) as "non-statute" law. Customary law had two sources, social
customs and case law. English legal history once more provides highly convincing
evidence that case law can indeed become general law: the state, says Minobe, must
always be willing to admit into its rulings the accumulated wisdom of its own
institutions.114
Minobe would later incorporate his adherence to customary law and his
suspicion of statutes into his major claim that there is no such thing as absolute
power. Thus in Nihon Kenpd no Kihonshugi of 1934, he articulates more clearly than
ever before the "natural" forces that restrict the exercise of state power. These are the
customary law that develops naturally in society, and the law of justice, international
forms of these, and the restrictions that the state imposes on itself.115 Thus Minobe's
112
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assertion that state power must be legally controlled is reinforced by his insistence on
the autonomy of law in society.
Minobe's attempts to retain concepts of "society" at the centre of his legal
theory are also reflected in his criticism of legal positivism and in his call for flexible
legal interpretation. In a paper of 1930 he criticises Kelsen for treating law as a
science of pure logic and for eliminating psychological, social and political factors
from jurisprudence.116 Kelsen had assumed that laws are imposed rules. He proposed
to deal with laws as a system of norms against which "reality may be measured". For
him, national unity is possible only through a concrete mechanism such as law.
Therefore law must be interpreted as logically as possible, and for this reason Kelsen
117
opposed an interpretative approach towards law.
Minobe's objection to Kelsen's legal positivism is based on two of his main
concerns. One is the superiority of law to the state. The other is the legitimisation of
law, which Minobe thought Kelsen's theory unable to provide. For Minobe (as for
Kelsen), law consists of two parts, "is" (sein), its essence, and "ought" (sollen),
specific mles. The former refers to law's universal and eternal character applicable to
any society and any time. The latter changes according to time and society. Minobe
criticises Kelsen for ignoring "is", since "ought" alone cannot explain why people
have to obey. For Minobe, society is capable of sustaining "is" in law. In this way
Minobe was advocating flexible norm creation, which he assumed achievable in
common or social law.
Minobe claims that the so-called "is" elements of law derive from social
consciousness (shakai ishiki) or social psychology (shakai shinri), which are capable
of changing "ought". For him social consciousness consists of three elements: the
people's willingness to obey, custom, and a socially derived sense of justice. And
social consciousness changes as society changes. Thus to explain social
consciousness, Minobe resorts to English common law, asserting that "human
rationality and sense of justice are forces that change and modify customary law and
statutes. If customary law contradicts a sense of justice, a small group of people may
116
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begin to complain about the contradiction, their claim will be accepted as a court
ruling, government begin to treat it as a norm, and this new norm be gradually
accepted in society. This may lead to revision of existing laws or their change
because of a court's ruling or in actual administrative treatment."118
Social consciousness is therefore the embodied concept of Minobe's
constitutionalism, his recognition that values, if they are to be shared by the people,
must result from the interaction of fact and idea. Hence the norms that bind the
people spring from social reality, not from legal reality as Kelsen proposes.
Social consciousness (shakai ishiki) also underlies Minobe's assertion that the
people are the final arbiters of legal authority. Thus, in this same essay, Minobe
attempts to justify a contract theory by invoking social consciousness. In his
definition, such a contract is not based on agreement between the state and the
people, but nevertheless a contractual pledge is recognised by social consciousness.
Thus "if 'natural law' is understood properly, it [social consciousness] can be called
a kind of natural law, which restricts the state directly regardless of the will of the
state".119 Here Minobe departs from Jellinek's state self-control theory, saying that
constraints on the state come not only from the rules that it imposes on itself in the
i 20
form of statutes and international law but also from customary and "natural law".
Thus the mitigating power of social forces becomes central to Minobe's
1 ^ 1constitutional thinking, reflecting not only the influence of Jellinek but also his
"s Minobe, "Keruzen Kyoju no Kokuho oyobi Kokusaiho Riron no Hihyo" (1), p. 1206.
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anthropological, or geographic, as well as juristic. For both, methodological discrimination was
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own inclination towards natural and common law. At the same time, Minobe's
insistence on social factors exposed deep ideological divisions over the role of law in
a society which many Japanese had begun to regard as highly defective. For
Minobe's insistence on common and natural law was unpalatable not only to those
who favoured bureaucratic control, but also to those who identified with a Marxist
view of class struggle.
Central here is the role of law in a highly unequal society. And Minobe
himself recognised the economic, social and political defects of the country in
another key essay of 1930. "Unfortunately", he says, "nobody can deny that the
entire domestic situation is far from sound. Economically, the distribution of wealth
is extremely uneven, and the plight of the farming communities and the misery of
unskilled workers appear endless. The domination of venality is also prominent. If
you have money, no matter how inadequate your talent, you can have high social
status, obtain a peerage or orders of decoration, and become a member of the House
of Peers. What is worse, party politics has begun to reveal flaws no less than those of
the hanbatsu plutocracy, and for the moment the former appears to have replaced the
latter. Scandals involving government officials, members of Parliament, and leaders
of the political parties have begun to spring up, and people have the strong suspicion
122that further excesses have now been swept under the carpet".
Such perceptions inevitably raise questions about the role of law in society.
Should law play a more positive role to "rectify" society's flaws? Thus Ukai
Nobushige points out that Kelsen's "pure theory of law" had really aimed at
protecting a minority from the encroachment of authority. Kelsen had dismissed the
idea of social consent, asking whether such a notion could be effective, or even
created in a society where its members were subject to coercion. He had shown how
the concept of justice differs so often from the concept of law. For "law is said to
represent justice conceptually. But close examination reveals that law merely
represents a concept of justice held by the ruling group, and differs from other
necessary as a means of defending positive juristic science against the corrupting influences of
conceptual patterns which might be valid for sociological, political, or philosophical thinking, but
which conduced irresolvable contradictions and erratic departures in juristic thinking" (Miller, op. cit.,
p. 46).
Minobe, "Kyosanto Jiken ni tsuite no Kanso", Gendai Kensei Hydron (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1930), p. 422-3. Even in an essay in which he condemns communist movements assisted by "foreign"
forces, Minobe has to recognise the growing inequality of Japanese society.
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concepts of justice held by other groups". In the face of such pressures, Minobe's
social consciousness appears ineffectual for directing society towards "better" and
"fairer" arrangements.
Thus Kuroda Ryoichi criticises the school of liberal interpretation, with
which Minobe is closely associated, for compromising on capitalist representative
government. For him, "...the school insists on 'living law' or 'norms based on social
consciousness', which are in fact not consciousness of the whole population, but
consciousness of the ruling class..."124 Echoing such views, Miller also asserts that
Minobe's grasp of society is incomplete. "His [Minobe's] ideas of law and state, here
and elsewhere, are tenuously anchored to 'reality' in the form of 'society.' But this
society comprised a shadowy substance imperfectly displayed in his recognition of
the existence of society apart from the state, in his reliance on social psychology in
the definition of law, and in his inclusion of the 'rational conscience of society'
among the sources of law."125 However, Minobe's excessive reliance on social
consciousness is partly to be explained by his understanding of the judicial system.
For Minobe did not recognise judicial review. Thus he had to rely on social
consciousness excessively in order to ensure the autonomy of law.
Thus "Marxist" or "positivist" criticism of Minobe as a bourgeois apologist
cannot fully invalidate his inquiry into the legitimacy of the law. For it is still
possible to defend Minobe's position as a strategy for envisaging a civil society
where autonomous people can conduct the common life. This is because of the "civil
disobedience" aspect of common law, to which Minobe subscribes. Thus when the
totalitarian system with the emperor as nominal head began to prevail (when state
power began to dominate social life), Minobe's claim that the law of justice may
have more authority than statutes and imperial ordinances became truly subversive.
This of course earned him the opprobrium of the nationalists, and they attacked
Minobe's claim that the judicial power was independent of the executive power and
was not subject to the authority of imperial ordinances.
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Ukai, "Uingakuka [Vienna School of Constitutional Theory]", p. 138.
1-4 Kuroda Ryoichi, "Kenpo Kaishaku no Ichikosatsu", in Suzuki Yasuzo et al (eds.), Kenpogaku no
Kadai (Tokyo: Kciso Shobo, 1954), p. 77.
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Miller, op. cit., pp. 46-7.
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Yet despite his challenging of a pernicious consequence Minobe's view of
judicial power expressed in Chikujd Kenpd Seigi is not entirely coherent. For his
strong opposition to any judicial review of statutes tends to undermine his defence of
judicial power against the encroachments of executive power.126 Nevertheless, in his
defence of the independence of the judicial power, we can recognise his
characteristic adherence to the self-regulating mechanisms of the law.
This stance is clearly discernible in his defence of the jury system that Japan
1 ^7introduced in 1923. " The Japanese jury system was much less comprehensive than
similar systems in Britain and the United States. It was exercised only in local courts
with regard to criminal cases. The defendant could choose between a jury trial and a
trial by judges. When a presiding judge thought that a verdict by a jury was
unsatisfactory, he could call for another jury. Minobe himself expressed the concern
that non-professionals might not be able to grasp complicated legal matters.
Nevertheless, he supported the system, saying that it provided ordinary people with a
chance to take part in the exercise of judicial power, as well as helping to reduce the
excesses caused by one-sided judgements (by kanken bureaucrats and police), and
that it also helped to mitigate public discontent.
Minobe also defended the jury system against the prevailing criticism that it
was unconstitutional because jurors were not agents of the emperor as Article 57
128indicated. Minobe saw jurors, who were ordinary people, as tacit "law-makers".
Thus he asserted that the Constitution should not be applied pedantically, and that its
essential aim should be respected. More importantly, he defined judicial power much
more broadly than was conventional, saying that jurors formed part of that power.
Thus "... not only are jurors involved in the trial but also prosecutors and lawyers,
who try to affect rulings using their own oratory. It is clear that if the latter do not
violate the independence of the courts, then by the same token jurors' decisions do
I ?Q
not violate that independence even if they can affect court rulings."
126 For his opposition to judicial review of statutes, see Minobe, Chikujd Kenpd Seigi (Tokyo:
Yuhikaku, 1927), reprint 1932, p. 591.
1-7 The law intended to introduce a jury system was enacted in 1923, and enforced in 1924.
128 Article 57: "The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name
of the Emperor. The organisation of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law."
I2)
Minobe, Chikujd Kenpo Seigi, p. 587.
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Minobe's adherence to the ideals of common law justice is also supported by
his clear awareness about what constitutes legitimate political power. He repeatedly
asserts that the legitimacy of statutes derives from the people's recognition that they
are made by members of Parliament who are legitimately recognised as "law¬
makers".130 Thus Minobe's support of Parliament is deeply rooted in his definition of
legitimate political power. His views, constituting a strong defence of the legal state,
are therefore subversive of "taiken" ambitions, where power is based on expediency
and repudiates appropriate form.
Nevertheless historians are divided over Minobe's adherence to
parliamentarianism after the May 15th Incident in 1932, when Prime Minister Inukai
and other government leaders were assassinated by young officers who criticised
them for ignoring the plight of ordinary people. At that time Minobe reluctantly
welcomed the formation of a national unity Cabinet led by Admiral Saito Makoto.
From then on, for some historians, his support for party politics waned.
For Ienaga, "it is undeniable that Minobe became pessimistic about the future
of parliamentary politics after the Manchurian Incident in 1931".131 Banno Junji also
thinks that after the formation of the Saito cabinet, Minobe became close to "Tosei-
ha" military officers and bureaucrats calling for reform, joining the study groups
established by them. Minobe then began to call for the establishment of a national
council to debate national policies, thereby undermining parliamentary politics.
Banno adds: "Minobe did not support party government consistently. He was
conservative and had a tendency to support rightwing thought. He openly opposed
the attempt by Seiyukai to form a Cabinet because in his view the party was more
132
concerned with private interests than politics." Thus Banno asserts that Minobe is
one of the intellectuals who supported the further weakening of constitutional
government, providing theoretical assurance for the shift from the national unity
Cabinet to a government of "constitutional autocracy".133
130 In this argument, Minobe is concerned not only with the essence of statutory laws but also with
correct procedure. Principle is not enough to ensure legitimacy. Appropriate form, which he believes
is provided by Parliament, is just as important. Here the assent of the people is again central to his
understanding of legitimacy.
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Ienaga, op. cit., p. 240.
132 Banno, "Seitoseiji no Hokai", in Banno and Miyachi Masato (eds.), Nihon Kindaishi ni okeru
Tenkanki no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1985), p. 395.
133 See Masuda Tomoko, Tenndsei to Kokka, p. 244.
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The charge deserves careful scrutiny, for it proposes a kind of apostasy. Yet
as Ienaga points out, Minobe's views of national unity were markedly different from
those who called for national unity under the emperor's leadership.134 And such
contrasts are essential if we are to distinguish Minobe's vision of a civil society from
the forces that supported totalitarianism.
Hence one month before his ostracism, in an act of deliberate defiance,
Minobe returned to his old theme of the limitations of statism. Now he warned
against xenophobic nationalism and the militarism that would damage society and
endanger the country's survival. For Minobe excessive identification with the state
was anathema, for one is a member of society and of a family, and also an individual
with one's own personality, before one is a member of the state. Excessive
nationalism simply divides the public mind (minshin). "Excessive nationalist
sentiments would create a minority who blindly follow their emotions or pretend to
be following them, and these tend to label people who oppose their beliefs as
criminal and unpatriotic and silence them even by resorting to violence. I assume that
this is one reason why we have heard common criticism over the past few years
135about the frequent suppression of freedoms of speech."
In this important passage, Minobe criticises not only those extreme
nationalists who proclaim the absolute importance of national policy even at the
expense of society and of individual lives, but also the government that has tried to
silence dissent. Here Minobe's strong opposition to state power is backed by an
unequivocal adherence to free speech. Clearly, for him, national unity entails a
society where individuals can maintain their freedoms and personal autonomy. Thus
even if Minobe's call for a national unity government can be judged a grave mistake
in terms of the protection of parliamentarianism and party politics, nevertheless such
a claim does not contradict his adherence to free government. Here, even within his
political miscalculation, his commitment to principle remains clear. Minobe did not
capitulate but continued in the spirit of his own enquiry.
134
Ienaga indicates three distinctive differences between Minobc and the mainstream when both
called for stronger state control: Minobe's sympathy towards socialism, although he never fully
accepted socialism or communism, his criticism of fascism, and his critiques of militarism. See
Ienaga, op. cit., p. 242.
135
Minobe, "Kokkashugi no Shiso to sono Genkai", Kaizo, December 1934, p. 10.
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Common law thinking is therefore central to Minobe's vision of free
government, and sharply contrasts with the "positive" law advocated by his
opponents. What links the emperor-centred nationalism of Uesugi and the Japanese
Marxist view of an ideal society is their common insistence on fixed norms, and that
society should strive to achieve them. Minobe's view, entailing the denial of fixed
norms and calling for a mechanism for norm creation, is unacceptable to both. For
the nationalists, it is too flexible, allowing for continuous and disruptive change. For
the "Marxists", Minobe's theory is a compromise, failing to assert the creation of
new norms by the working class. However, for Minobe, their joint insistence on
fixed norms hinders the growth of a civil society precisely because they see norms as
prescriptive. Such solutions do not allow for the development of a self-regulating
mechanism of society, in which freedom of speech is a crucial component: for
Minobe the potential emergence of new norms, unimpeded by state or party, remains
paramount.
It now remains to discuss Minobe's views of political rights and
representation, two key components of civil liberties, where his inclination to support
customary law and an autonomous mechanism of society clashes with his equally
strong views on the proper role of statutes. Yet in these areas also Minobe's
heterodox liberalism once again informs an examined critique of Japanese politics
and society.
2.5. Minobe's concepts of rights and the public sphere: definition
and resistance
In a pamphlet he wrote in English in 1872 aimed at explaining religious freedom in
Japan, Mori Arinori, a key reformer and future education minister, affirmed that the
Japanese had enjoyed no real concept of freedom of conscience.136 This
136 Mori Arinori, "Religious Freedom in Japan", privately printed, included in Meiji Bunka Kenkyukai
(ed.), Meiji Bunka Zenshii, vol. 12, Shukyohen (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1992). Quoted by
Maruyama Masao (Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 3, Iwanami Shinsho, 1986, p.
125). But Maruyama also says that Mori asserted that no political power could intervene in man's
inner freedom (Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso, Iwanami Shinsho, 1961, p. 41).
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interpretation of the Japanese understanding of freedom of thought has been more or
137
less accepted by subsequent scholarship. ~ Thus the failure of the Japanese to create
a civil society is often attributed to their weak sense of autonomy, of individuality,
and of personal rights. This section will deal only indirectly with the question of
whether or not this claim is justifiable. But through examining Minobe's inquiry into
public and private rights, I hope to present an alternative view that freedoms or rights
are not directly attributable to a people, but are rather implicit in a consciously
deployed language of assertion and resistance in a dynamic process of social
definition.
In post-Restoration Japan, there is no better word than "kd" (meaning the
public, or the population as a whole) to record this process. At this time the word
appears often in new combined forms such as "koron" (public opinion), "koho"
(public law), and "kdeki" (public interest). The two contrasting nuances of the word,
implying what is common and shared on the one hand, and self-less and self-
abnegating on the other, coexisted during the period.
Thus "koron" appears in the Charter Oath of 1868, representing the key
principle of the Restoration, public debate. "Koron ' was used widely by later
generations seeking wider public participation in the political decision-making
process. At the same time, for Shintoists, who became administrators of the new
government, "fa?" meant absolute authority, which was just, transcendent, and
embodied in the person of the emperor. As Japan became an imperial power and
political leaders began to feel the strains of a pluralistic society, "kd" increasingly
came to mean the surrender of one's private life for the sake of the nation.
The linguistic malleability of "fa?" and its strategic usage are clearly related to
the metamorphosis of the Meiji state. Relevantly, Ishida Takeshi points out the
eventual interchangeability of the concepts of state and of people. In his view the two
concepts were clearly distinguished in the first half of the Meiji period. Yet the
distinction began to blur in the late Meiji period with active promotion of the idea of
the state as a metaphorical family. During the Taisho period, the concepts separated
again, only to fuse once more in the 1930s. Ishida indicates that the notion of a
public based on the amalgamation of people and state tends to encroach on people's
137
See, for instance, Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Tennosei Hoshiso" (part II), pp. 14-15.
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private lives, and he provides a Foucauldian analysis: "... If the state and the people
are understood as interchangeable, the state will be perceived not as an artificially
created structure but as 'naturally given'. [In this definition] the state leaves no room
for choice or change. Also it defies any limit on its definition and functions, and
creates the tendency for state power to intervene in private lives."138 With increasing
bureaucratic control and people's identification with the state, ideas of the public
tended to be identified with the state itself. In such a "public" sphere, the private
inhabits a compromised realm of highly vulnerable personal freedom. Thus the
state's encroachment on the public domain may be said to align itself with the
foundations of Japanese fascism in the 1930s.
Nevertheless, the concept of individual "rights" is also central to Japanese
political thought, and was enthusiastically promoted by the early Meiji reformers and
then by jiyuminken (freedom and people's rights) activists seeking the establishment
of Parliament.139 In fact, the introduction of such concepts of private law as rights,
contract, and the legal person drastically transformed the economic and social
arrangements of the country. Such incorporation was initially pragmatic, as the Meiji
leaders recognised that to introduce Western law was central to the country's
modernisation: amongst other things it was a political necessity in order to terminate
the "unequal" treaties that Japan had signed with the Western powers before the
Restoration. The implantation was problematic, however, as a draft civil code based
138 Ishida Takeshi, "Kuni towa nani ka", Nihon no Seiji to Kotoba, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1989), p. 158. Andrew Barshay also defines the "public" sphere in pre-war Japan as "a
vast area of social thought and practice concerned with the national life, one that fed and transcended
official and purely private life" (Andrew Barshay, State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The
Public Man in Crisis, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. xiii).
139 Mitsukuri Rinsho (1846-97), who was ordered by the Meiji government to translate the French
criminal code in 1869, claims that he took the words "kenri" for rights and "gimu" for obligations
from the Chinese translations of the two English words in Henry Wheaton's Elements of International
Law. In 1870, he and his group led by Eto Shinpei at the Seidokyoku of the Dajokan started to draft a
civil code based on the French Code Civil. Mitsukuri invented minken for droit civil. "When I used
minken for droit civil, some members of the staff complained that it was unacceptable to assume that
the people (min) have rights. I tried to defend my stance, but the debate was fierce. Luckily Eto
intervened and settled the matter." See Otsuki Fumihiko (ed.), "Mitsukuri Rinsho-kun Den", in Kato
Shuichi and Maruyama Masao (eds.), Honyaku no Shisd, pp. 303-12. On the other hand Boissonade,
explaining human rights to Japanese students, says that the French constitution includes provisions
about human rights. They have not yet been written down in Japan, although such rights have been
recognised there. Human rights mean no discrimination between master and slave. Roman law
includes slaves as tradable objects. But "I was told that there is no tradition of slave trading in Japan".
See Boissonade, "Horitsutaii Kogai", in Matsumoto Sannosuke and Yamamuro Shinichi (eds.),
Gakumon to Chishikijin, p. 328. Both "kenri" and "gimu" had become part of Japanese vocabulary
well before 1890, according to Kato, "Meijishoki no Honyaku", Honyaku no Shisd, p. 363.
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on the French Code was abandoned in 1892 after "traditionalists" opposed its
provisions dealing with the family as too libertarian and detrimental to "indigenous"
social values. So, in 1896, provisions dealing with material assets survived relatively
unscathed, but in 1898 provisions regarding the family were drastically rewritten so
as to grant overwhelming power to the head of a household. Yet concepts of
individual rights and of the legal person who assumes both rights and obligations,
and of contract between two legal persons, nevertheless took deep root in Japan.
Minobe's thought in this area exists at the conjunction of increasingly intrusive
notions of the public sphere with resilient and resistant notions of individual rights
and the legal person.140
In this way "public" law became central to Minobe's thought as part of his
exploration of the role of the state and its relationship with private liberties. This
section will therefore deal with two aspects of public law relevant to Minobe's
thought: his concept of individual rights and his characteristic engagement with
discretionary power.
The pre-war Japanese civil code, in which rights are dealt with, bears the
distinctive influence of the French and German codes, and thus of the Roman law
tradition. Roman law distinguished between laws applicable to the citizens of Rome,
jus civile, and law applicable to the rest, jus gentium. Under this distinction, rights
and a capacity for rights were also distinguished. Everyone might have a capacity for
rights, but in order to exercise them one had to be a Roman citizen.141
This distinction between rights and a capacity for rights also entered into the
Japanese civil code. For instance, minors, wives and mentally disabled people are
140 Habermas argues that such private law concepts as contract and the legal person provided a central
model for contractual relationships in a market economy characterised by free commodity exchange
and social labour. These private law principles also prompted various legal changes in Europe,
including the formulation of civil codes on the continent in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. These were intended to ensure private rights, particularly "free power of control over
property", and also constitutions. "The status libertatis, the status civitatis, and the status familiae
gave way to the one status naturalis, now ascribed generally to all legal subjects—thus corresponding
to the fundamental parity among owners of commodities in the market and among educated
individuals in the public sphere" (Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p.
75).
141 "Thus the Roman law while recognising a slave as a natural being, and therefore one who had to be
considered in a general classification of persons, regarded him nevertheless as utterly devoid of legal
existence. He had no 'caput' and as Modestinus observes, he only acquired a civil status on the day of
his manumission" (W. H. Rattigan, Roman Law of Persons, London: Wildy & Sons, 1873, reprinted
by Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, 1994, p. 3)
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deemed legally incapable of exercising their rights under the code. Minobe follows
this tradition, when he says that the principle of legal equality introduced after the
Meiji Restoration is equality of capacity, not bona fide equal rights.142 Thus everyone
can assume a public post as a citizen of the state (Staatsbiirger), but only if one has
obtained appropriate qualifications. Yet this in turn is a significant departure from the
samurai era when social status was hereditary, and access to the avenues of state and
han authority exclusive.
At the same time Minobe recognises natural rights, such as property rights,
that even the Constitution cannot restrict, and asserts that in any conflict between
individual rights and the common good a compromise must be found between them.
Hence "the most important ethical requirement of constitutional politics is to respect
the people as individuals and to liberate them from enslavement. To achieve this
goal, present-day state law guarantees individual freedom and security of property.
Individuals possess rights so that freedom and property cannot be taken away as long
as such individual rights do not damage the safety of society and other people's
benefits."143
Thus Minobe uses the word for rights (kenri) in two ways, one based on the
Roman law tradition, rights deriving from membership, and the other, "inalienable"
rights to be defended from interference. The first usage is more prominent in his
major works on the interpretation of the Meiji Constitution. However, it is the second
usage that sustained his inquiry into the legitimacy of power.
Minobe owes to Jellinek his conceptualisation of rights. He is attracted to the
German scholar's thought precisely because the latter explains rights as a claim on
one's freedom, a concept conceived in opposition to the incursions of state power.
Shortly after he returned from Germany in 1901, Minobe translated and published all
of Jellinek's works related to the concepts of rights and the public sphere: an outline
of System der subjektiven djfentlichen Rechte [The System ofPublic Rights] in 1903,
Dos Recht der Minoritdten [The Rights of Minorities] in 1904, a chapter of his
Allgemeine Staatslehre entitled "Die geschichtlichen Haupttypen des Staates [Major
142
Minobe, Nihon Gydseiho, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1936), third edition 1941, p. 76.
143
Minobe, Kenpo Satsuyd, p. 152.
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Historical Types of the State]" in 1904, and Die Erklcirung der Menschen- und
Biirgerrechte [The Analysis ofBills ofRights] in 1906.144
Jellinek's emphasis on rights reflects his concern for the protection of private
lives in a highly centralised political structure, and also his awareness of the
emergence of the "masses." He assumes that the individual, and thus his freedom,
preceded the creation of state power. In fact, he says, integrated state power is a
relatively modem phenomenon, in contrast to the less impeded play of interests of
previous centuries. Hence the idea of rights emerges in response to the growth of a
centralised state and the pressures of mass society.145
In this way concepts of individual and social rights, and also written
constitutions, are alike legacies of the multipolarity of power and the recognition
that, in some areas, individuals should be deferred to even by state power. The state
empowers itself with at least the nominal aim of the protection of individual
freedom.
For Jellinek individual freedom is the necessary ground of civil society. Thus
in The Rights ofMinorities, he criticises the "tyranny" of majority opinion created by
Parliament or expressed through public opinion. His pamphlet was written against
the background of what he calls the "ever widening process of democratisation" and
the "collectivistic tendency in the framing of human society" in the late nineteenth
century. Hence, as with de Tocqueville, he highlights the dangers of "a democratic
Majority" in order to proclaim the importance of protecting minority opinion. For
Jellinek, social freedom must be protected from absolute power, whatever form it
may take.146
At the same time, for him, the state is a metaphysical community, and yet a
concrete reality of life within which people have to learn how to live. He too assumes
the state's essential force. Membership of society comes with obligations, and
conflicts between those obligations and one's private life are inevitable. Thus
144 Jellinek published the System der subjektiven offentlichen Rechte in 1892, the Das Recht der
Minoritdten in 1891, the Die Erklarung der Menschen- und Biirgerrechte in 1895, and the Allgemeine
Staatslehre in 1900.
145 In the Analysis of Bills of Rights, Jellinek asserts that the idea that individuals were superior to the
state was established in England by the seventeenth century, deriving from the old Germanic idea that
state activities be limited.
146 See Georg Jellinek, The Rights of Minorities, translated from the German by A. M. Baty and T.
Baty (London: P.S. King & Son, 1912), pp. 32-4.
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Jellinek divides rights into two types, public and private. Public rights, offentliche
Rechte, are rights that individuals possess as a member of the state, and which they
can invoke in their dealings with the state. Private rights are inherent in every person
and operate on two parties equally. Yet as Jellinek himself acknowledges, public and
private rights trespass on each other because sometimes the state acts as the ruler and
sometimes as a private person. Nevertheless Jellinek's assertion of public and private
rights is his recognition that one's private life must be protected from the "rights" of
the common community through negotiation.
From Jellinek and his intellectual forebears Minobe inherited this tension
between collective well-being and the rights of the individual. For him rights
proclaim the assertion of the will for the sake of one's benefits. Obligations are
restraints on one's will for the sake of others' benefits.147 In this formulation, rights
and obligations can be mutually compatible, since the benefits of individuals and of
the state are to some extent reciprocal. Thus one's public rights can contain an
element of obligation, according to Minobe. At the same time, he is inclined to assert
the inalienable in "public" rights, and criticises the automatic separation between
private and public. "Strictly speaking, every right should not be violated in an
unlawful way... Every private right has elements of public right. That is to say,
individuals have the right to demand that the state not interfere in the exercise of
their private rights."148 This led Minobe to the problem of how to assert inalienable
rights in the absence of constitutional guarantees.
Highly relevant here is that the Constitution does indeed include both a bill of
rights, Chapter 2, and the independent police ordinance power of government,
Article 9. Yet the article grants the emperor the power to issue ordinances necessary
"for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the
welfare of the subjects", as well as for implementation of laws, independently of
Parliament. And although the article stipulates that no ordinance can alter the
147 Minobe's definition here is based on that of Jellinek. Combining definitions of rights by Hegel
(one's will) and Rudolf von Jhering (one's benefits), Jellinek says that rights are one's profits that are
legally protected because law recognises one's will. See Minobe's translation of Jellinek's System der
subjektiven offentlichen Rechte, "Ierinekku-shi Kokenron no Gaiyo", Kenpd oyobi Kenposhi Kenkyu,
p. 643. The translation originally appeared in Hogaku Shinpd, vol. 13, 1903.
148
Minobe, Nihon Gyoseiho, vol. 1, p. 131.
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existing laws, the embryonic stage of statutory law makes the relationship between
laws and ordinances subject to varying interpretations.
Some of Minobe's younger contemporaries, albeit only a few, pointed out the
incompatibility of Article 9 and the bill of rights. For independent police ordinance
power is the residue of an absolutist state, epitomising the arbitrary executive power
attributed to a monarch, according to Nakano Tomio.149 However, in Europe the
progress of the idea of civil liberties after the French Revolution had gradually
subjected such power to civil control, which meant statutory regulations. Legislative
power emerged as a new power strong enough to challenge monarchical executive
power. With this shift in emphasis, the meaning of law also changed. Law no longer
meant ordinances imposed by a ruler, but statutes enacted by Parliament.150 Thus in
European constitutional history, bills of rights had eliminated the operation of
arbitrary executive powers, at least theoretically.151
Article 9 of the Meiji Constitution is an exception in this respect. Nakano
speculated that the framers of the Constitution, who consulted the Germanist theory
of Stahl, Gneist, Stein and Giron, nevertheless "did not have any clear conception of
legislative and police power". Thus he concluded that Article 9 had no real
significance, and so could be ignored, saying that the bill of rights listed in Chapter 2
could not be curtailed by police ordinances as Article 9 stipulates.152
Yet Article 9 gave Minobe genuine difficulty in assimilating it to his stance.
He knew that constitutional principles entailed the protection of civil liberties from
arbitrary executive power, but he was also concerned with viable statehood. Thus,
following Jellinek, he insists that no individual shall be controlled by the state except
in a lawful way. For him the bill of rights of Chapter 2 offers an exemplary list, but
only the more significant rights are specified. Therefore he asserts that law is
necessary if any civil right which may not be included in Chapter 2 is to be curtailed.
149 Nakano asserts that "In the early period of European constitutional history European Governments,
especially German Governments, used in practice to issue police ordinances without any express
constitutional or statutory authorization" (Nakano, The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor,
pp. 99-100).
0 ibid., p. 100.
151 Even the newer constitutions written under the strong influence of the German constitutional
system, including those of Denmark, Russia, Roumania, and Turkey, did not include "an independent
police ordinance". See ibid., pp. 100-1.
132 ibid., p. 110.
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However, instead of dismissing Article 9 as incompatible with constitutional
principles, he accepts Article 9 as a constitutional "exception". In a trade-off with
principle, Minobe concludes that independent police ordinance power can override
the bill of rights in exceptional circumstances.
Here Minobe contravenes the mainstream legal opinion of his time which
asserts that citizens can claim only the rights listed in Chapter 2, and that Article 9
cannot intervene in the rights listed in the chapter. Yet Nakano, while agreeing with
Jellinek and Minobe that rights are inherent and that restriction of them requires legal
sanction, asserts that such an interpretation is valid only under constitutions in which
the executive is not vested with independent ordinance power. Therefore to apply
Jellinek's theory inflexibly to a constitution where executive power is given such a
large degree of discretion, is untenable. At the same time Nakano is also led to
1 o
criticise Minobe for providing a theory that accommodates government practice.
However, Minobe's view of the relationship between the bill of rights and
Article 9 was subject to change. Modifications are especially discernible in his
growing dissatisfaction with police power. Thus in an essay of 1907 he is keen to
endorse the "positive" function of the police in order to "promote the welfare of the
people".154 Here promotion of the welfare of the people has nothing to do with the
infringement of civil liberties, and the police should therefore be allowed to issue
ordinances for this purpose. As yet Minobe does not seem to be concerned with a
situation in which civil liberties may be infringed in the name of "public peace and
order". At the same time he strongly endorses natural rights, and criticises other
scholars, including his mentor Ikki, for claiming that property rights are private
rights and therefore ordinances are sufficient for the state to restrict one's use of
one's own land.155
Minobe here is concerned with two things. He is dissatisfied with the
common opinion that ordinances can be used to curtail rights outside Chapter 2. He
also wants to explain common practices legally. For him, the Meiji Constitution is an
accomplished fact, and it is unthinkable to disregard some articles as
153 ibid., p. 106.
154
Minobe, "Rippoken to Meireiken tono Genkai o ronzu", Hogakukyokai Zasshi, vol. 25, nos. 5, 6,




"unconstitutional", as Nakano will do 15 years later. In time Minobe became more
aware of the defects of the Constitution and began to suggest its change. However, in
1907, his concern was still with how to explain government practices within the
Constitution rather with wholesale change.
Here we need to remember that Minobe's main principle is still that civil
liberties cannot be curtailed by any ordinance, and Article 9 is the only exception.156
He wants to emphasise the exceptionality of Article 9 in order to assert that
ordinances cannot override civil rights which may not be included in Chapter 2. At
the same time he is inclined to support a "positive state". Bluntschli had criticised the
Kantian definition of the legal state (Rechtsstaat) for being too narrow: in that
definition, law existed only to protect individual freedoms.157 Bluntschli held that it
diminished the concepts of "public" and "people". Relying on an organicist theory
close to Bluntschli's, Minobe too recognises the state's active role for the sake of the
general public good.
Clearly then Minobe's early view reflects the then far-reaching role
accredited to the police to run and regulate society. In this essay, he regards the
police not as the oppressors of free government but as the "supervisors" of drastic
social and economic change. He cites eleven areas where regulations might be
rendered unconstitutional unless interpretation allows Article 9 to override the bill of
rights: oil provision, bakeries and sweet potato roasting factories, kankdba markets,
electricity, yose entertainment places, theatres, exhibition venues, entertainment
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halls, cemeteries and burials, and nagaya public housing construction. Here we
sense the emergence of a society busy with active commerce, industrialisation, mass
culture, and urbanisation. The police's role stretches even to the administration of
social services, such as housing and burial practices. Obviously an urban society had
existed long before the Meiji Restoration, and various regulations were deemed
necessary to restrict people's every-day lives. Yet such "systematic" and regulatory
control of a mass population is new.
156 Minobe is aware that this article is peculiar to the Meiji Constitution, and no similar articles are
found in the Belgian and Prussian constitutions, two of the major models for the Japanese constitution.
157
Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, p. 68.
158
Minobe, "Rippoken to Meireikcn tono Genkai o ronzu", Kenpd oyobi Kenpdshi Kenkyu, pp. 8-9.
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Hence like the evolution of the press laws, the establishment and evolution of
the police reflects the metamorphosis of forms of government. Thus shortly after the
Restoration, each han domain had remained responsible for maintaining the social
order of its respective region. Yet when the Justice Ministry was established in 1871,
police authority was concentrated there, and then transferred to the Home Affairs
Ministry in 1874.159 Through various decrees, the police force became that part of the
administration responsible for supervising shops and other public operations, even
public health. It also extended its functions so as to suppress political dissent during
the jiyuminken movement. Police stations began to be set up in all municipalities in
1888. This variform function, both administrative and social, was reinforced by the
rise of labour disputes and socialist movements after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
5. Tokko, a special branch of the police responsible for political activities, were
created in Tokyo and Osaka after the High Treason Incident of 1911, and then
introduced in other parts of the country in 1928 when the first general election took
place after the introduction of universal male suffrage. In this way the police, as well
as administering commercial and social activities, increased their role as a "safety-
net" so as to contain public discontent.160
At this stage Minobe seems to accept the role of the police as "administrators
and supervisors" of commercial, industrial and social activities. For instance, he does
not seem to be concerned with the Gyosei Shikko Ho enacted in 1900, which allowed
the police to detain people without a warrant issued by a court to counter the
disturbance of public safety (koan).161 In effect Minobe's belief in a positive state
and his recognition of the "social" role of the police had caused him to underestimate
the discretionary nature of independent police ordinances, the same forces that would
159 In October 1871 police units were created modelled after the British police system, first in Tokyo
and then in various parts of the country. Police forces become more centralised after police authority
was transferred to the Home Affairs Ministry in 1874 based on Kawaji Toshiyoshi's report on police
provision in France and Prussia. See Oe Shinoo, "1880-1900 Nendai no Nippon: Teikoku Kenpo
Taisei", Iwanami Kdzci, Nihon Tsushi, vol. 17, Kindai 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), p. 14.
160 For some Meiji leaders, such as Iwakura Tomomi, the police were expected to play a similar role to
the military to maintain domestic order under the leadership of the emperor. Oe Shinoo quotes
Iwakura in 1882: "Supported by the Navy, the Army and keishi (police) that are the recipients of the
emperor's benevolence and are supposed to play an important role for kokka (the state), [the
government] must be able to face the people strictly (shitani nozomi) and impress them deeply
(senritsu)" (see ibid., p. 14).
161 For the Gyosei Shikko Ho (Administrative Enabling Law), see Elise K. Tipton, The Japanese
Police State: The Tokko in Interwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 60-1.
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eventually undermine the concept of law and of civil liberties, and of which he
himself would later become a victim.
However, in an essay of 1913, Minobe significantly modifies his
wholehearted endorsement of police action for the promotion of the welfare of the
162
people. Here he concentrates instead on the abuse of police power. Now he is
much more circumspect that the power enjoyed by the police will always be
employed for benign and supervisory purposes. Active here are a variety of factors:
Minobe's involvement in the Goken Undo (the movement protecting the
Constitution) in the Taisho Political Crisis of 1913, his increased exposure to
academic debate about the role of the police in Germany and other constitutional
European countries, and his recognition that as Japanese society had become more
pluralistic it was impossible to move a diverse range of individuals in any one
direction.
Here too he asserts contentiously that while a trend may be injurious to
society in the short term, it may nevertheless advance the common good. And he
recognises that individual needs sometimes may take precedence over that good and
advance it. Such views will later sustain his criticism of the press laws. Now,
asserting that it is not the police but politics that co-ordinates the conflicting interests
of society, he reverses his previous claims, and says,
... It is an obligation for the people not to create problems serious enough to damage the social
and public peace (shakai kdkyo no chitsujo) as long as they form the social life (shakai
seikatsu) together. Therefore it is an obligation for the state as a guardian of the public good to
use its power to stop people from harming their own society.... On the other hand, it cannot be
said that the state has a compulsory obligation to force people to act in a certain way so as to
promote social progress and facilitate general welfare. Social progress can be made only by
individual efforts. Individuals have social and ethical obligations to contribute to social
progress, according to their own talent and ability. However, talent and ability vary from
person to person. It is not appropriate to use law in order to force the people to act in certain
162
Minobe, "Keisatsuken no Genkai o ronzu", Horitsugakkai Zasshi, vol. 31, no. 3, March 1913, pp.
87-115.
163 ibid., pp. 102-3. Here Minobe mentions Otto Mayer et. al.
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Thus Minobe effectively dismisses his previous claim that police power can be
imposed on the people in order to promote their welfare. The jurisdiction of the
police should be restricted to the removal of "problems" (shdgai) in society. In
Minobe's definition, society is now a self-regulating public sphere that defies the
state's intervention.
Ishida Takeshi, investigating the change of meaning of "kokka" (the state) in
Japanese political discourse, assumes that the ability to distinguish the state and
society conceptually was proportional to one's criticism of statism. For the role of
the police and of administration had often blurred in Japan's post-Restoration nation-
making. Thus the centralisation of power had required the establishment of a national
police force to contain domestic discontent. Nevertheless, social and economic
change had begun to make for a less pliable people. Indicators of change are the
Taisho democratic movement and the growing numbers of politically active workers
in the 1910s.165 As arbiter, translator, and assessor, responding fluidly to the pressure
of events and unafraid of modifying his views, Minobe plays his part in the general
movement towards a more autonomous society.
The conflict between constitutional principles and practical needs remains in
Minobe's thought, however. And the tension is everywhere apparent, in Kenpd
Satsuyo, Chikujd Kenpd Seigi, and Nihon Gydseihd, as well as Nihon Kenpd no
Kihonshugi. In Chikujo Kenpo Seigi of 1927, Minobe's adherence to the "positive"
role of the police was further weakened. He now refers to Article 9 as "an extreme
exception to constitutional principles", and says "the intention of the article is vague,
which is regrettable. It is difficult to interpret it accurately".166
In Gydseihd of 1940, published after the Minobe Affair, Minobe entirely
drops his adherence to the police's "positive" role. Thus if Article 9 seems to allow
165 Ishida Takeshi, "Kuni towa nanika", p. 175. Indeed the Taisho period sees major changes in private
relationships and also relationship between authority and the individual. For instance, Carol Gluck
notes, quoting the political scientist Ukita Kazutami: "Already in 1912, as one commentator argued,
in an age when families did not always live together and husbands and wives worked in different
factories, the five Confucian relationships enumerated in the Rescript on Education no longer sufficed
to encompass social morality" (Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, pp. 281-2). In 1916, the Supreme
Court upheld a claim for compensation filed by the bereaved family of a child who was killed in an
accident in the sports ground of a primary school run by a municipal government and ordered the
authority to pay compensation. This is believed to be the first case in the country's legal history in
which a court recognised authority's negligence and ordered it to compensate citizens for the damage
it had incurred. See Ienaga, op. cit., p. 196.
166
Minobe, Chikujd Kenpd Seigi, p.228.
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three types of police ordinances (aimed respectively to enforce the existing laws,
maintain public peace and order, and to promote "the welfare of the subjects"), then
this third type of ordinance is incompatible with the nature of the relevant
legislation.167 Here Minobe becomes more acutely aware than ever of the potential
clash between civil liberties and the powers granted to the police in the name of the
emperor. Police powers should not be exercised freely, and their discretionary use
must be legally restricted. Clearly distinguishing between state and society, with the
latter having its own working mechanism,168 Minobe urges that such powers should
not be used to implement government policy and that the essential purpose of the
police is to contain the lapses of society.169 Furthermore, the police must not violate
individual privacy, unless one's behaviour directly damages the public peace. And
any pre-emptive restriction of freedom must always be in keeping with the price of
inaction. Hence the police should always maintain "a sound, common sense of
170
society", and obey due process of law.
By this point Minobe clearly recognises the misuse of state power as
exercised either by police or administration. That power becomes illegal when it is
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exercised beyond the volition set by law. Minobe's alertness to discretionary
power fuels his protests against the encroachments of political authority on personal
167 Minobe, Nihon Gydseihd, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1940), 1941 impression, p. 64.
168 This claim may be a natural consequence of Minobe's earlier position, and also reflect Jellinek's
view that the state can be discussed both as social phenomenon and legal concept. Miller, however,
notes : "For Minobe, as for Jellinek, the distinction between the juristic and the social or political
aspect of the state was a matter of analytic technique rather than an absolute... His ideas of law and
state, here and elsewhere, are tenuously anchored to 'reality' in the form of 'society'.. .It can hardly be
said that he came to grips with the problem of synthesis between sociological and juristic concepts.
The sociology upon which he founded his jurisprudence was itself a purely conceptual system,
unconcerned with empirical investigation... He could attack Kelsen for failure to recognise the nature
of law as 'social reality' and the nature of jurisprudence as a social science, but he himself failed to
grasp the reality of the social phenomena underlying constitutional systems" (Miller, op. cit., pp. 46-
7). I agree with Miller that Minobe's grasp of society is incomplete and that at times he fails to locate
existing problems in society that are closely related to constitutional principle: his mixed attitude
towards Article 9 is one such example. Yet Minobe was constantly searching for what he thought
better relationships between state and people, and his emphasis on society should be understood as
part of a continuous process of thought.
67 Minobe discusses the restrictions in Nihon Gydseihd, vol. 2, pp. 70-9.
170 Minobe says, "It would be unacceptable abuse of police power if the police interfere in the life¬
styles of individuals because they could not overlook the slightest possibility of damage, when
common sense suggests otherwise" (ibid., p. 77).
171 Minobe explains administrative discretion as "delegation" of legal rights to the administration to
determine people's rights and obligations within the limit of law (Minobe, Nihon Gydseihd, vol. 1, p.
24). He also says that permissible administrative discretion is subject to legally binding power, which
means that administrative action will become illegal if it exceeds the boundary drawn by law. See
ibid., pp. 167-71.
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freedom. That personal freedom Minobe cherished dearly. Thus, as early as 1908, in
111
an essay on the repressive Publication Law, Minobe's concern went beyond
conflict between state and society, to conflicts over underlying values. Thus values in
society cannot and should not be determined by bureaucrats. There should be an
appropriate balance between such cultural values and the need to maintain social
order: the role of the state is to protect the public peace, and yet freedom of
publication is "one of the most important freedoms in a civilised society". Minobe
sees the present system, whereby a Home Minister can ban publications unilaterally,
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as grossly unjust. Hence, in a later article, Minobe defends press freedom as a
guarantee of social development. "Any social activity cannot avoid producing some
harmful effects... Printed materials are no exception." But censorship is always a
sign of weakness, and the arts have a value beyond the convenience of bureaucrats.
"It is regrettable to see fine work banned from publication, which will hinder the
progress of culture."174 So in 1919, Minobe calls for revising the law so that courts
can no longer ban the publication of newspapers (Article 43), and that Army and
Navy ministers cannot prevent newspapers from carrying articles about the country's
i nc
military and diplomatic affairs at their own volition (Article 27). However these
provisions remained intact until the end of World War II.
Nevertheless, Minobe's tendency to rely on bureaucratic rationality in these
matters is clearly recognisable in a second essay of 1910 on the Publication Law.
Here he proposes the establishment of a bureau that will investigate new
176
publications, run by bureaucrats and assisted by university professors. Such a
bureau might ban publication, but publishers should be allowed to lodge complaints
with the bureau, and then with an administrative court. However, it is difficult for
172 Minobe, "Horitsujo yori mitaru Hatsubai Kinshi Mondai", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 22, no. 8,
1908, pp. 991-1000. Minobe begins the article by saying that he is writing with great concern about
the government's intensifying censorship. It has already banned some "major" works it deemed
"injurious to public morals", which include translations from some of Moliere's collected works, a
translation of Zola's "Paris", and some works by Ihara Saikaku.
173 In 1897, Parliament succeeded in eliminating a Home Minister's unilateral right to ban the
publication of newspapers from the press regulations. However, the government used an emergency
imperial order to reinstate the right in 1905. A similar right to ban publications was maintained in the
Publication Law throughout the pre-war period. See Okudaira Yasunori, "Ken'etsu Seido", on. cit.,
pp. 148-52.
174




Minobe, "Shuppanho Kaisei Shigi", Hogaku Shinpd, Chuo Daigaku Hogakkai, vol. 20., no. 6,
1910.
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administrators to be neutral over their own judgement, for they are part of a
hierarchical system, whose efficiency depends on how well they execute their
superior's decision. And if the judicial system is insufficient for people to challenge
administrative action, this problem of checks and balances will be compounded.
Minobe's emphasis on what he calls the "objective facts" in bureaucratic decision
making is valid only as long as objectivity is ensured as part of the legal system
through independent judicial review of administrative measures.177 The pre-war
context appears to be short of such assurances. Here the criticism that Minobe was
not ruthless enough to appraise the system thoroughly seems justifiable.
Further flaws of assessment are also apparent in that Minobe does not
recognise judicial review of the Constitution. "With regard to our country's
Constitution", he says, "the task of maintaining it is entrusted to government and
Parliament alone. Even if unconstitutional laws are enacted, there is no way of
vetoing such [illegal] legislation".178 Instead, Minobe proposes reliance on people's
"sound" judgement. "Thus it is particularly necessary to prevent violation of the
Constitution by means of the people's sound understanding of the Constitution and
1 -7Q
sound public opinion." However such claims are fragile unless backed by firm
institutions and working practices. The demise of constitutional constraints in the
1930s demonstrates the limits both of Minobe's assessment and of the resources on
which he relied.
Another weakness in Minobe's vision of discretionary power is that his view
of the role of administration still depends significantly on patronage. Thus, he says,
the provision of certain rights or benefits for the people is at the discretion of
administrators. He is thinking of such things as the appointment of civil servants,
approval of naturalisation, licences for public corporations, permission to use public
1 80
spaces, and public subsidies. However, in such arrangements, the relationship
177 Minobe says, "Discretionary power should be exercised by recognising objective facts. As civil
courts rule whether a contract is valid or not by recognising whether it damages public mores, or
whether it damages public order, administrators should judge the aim of a particular law based on
objective circumstances and a socially acceptable common sense"(Minobe, Nihon Gydseihd, vol. 1,
p.168).
178
Minobe, Chikujo Kenpo Seigi, p. 31.
179
ibid., p. 31.
180 Minobe, Nihon Gydseihd, vol. 2, p. 171. Minobe does say that administrators have to give a licence
as long as the anticipated operation of a business does not harm the public good (ibid., p. 168).
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between administrators and ordinary people cannot remain that of equals. No matter
how strongly Minobe emphasises the existence of an area where state and people can
confront each other as equal "persons," the exercise of discretionary power will tend
to subvert such idealised arrangements. This is particularly so when judicial review
of administrative measures is insufficient.
Yet despite these flaws, and given the amorphous stage of the legal system,
particularly with regard to such practices as elections, Minobe's efforts to define
public authority should be always seen as part of the evolving exercise in national
self-definition of Japanese society. The society in which Minobe lived was in deep
flux. The scale of social and institutional change demanded yet also thwarted the
emergence of a common political community. In such circumstances the "law"
played a central role in both shaping and conceiving the new community from the
very beginning of the Restoration. In such social conditions Minobe knew that
creating an effective superstructure was just as important as creating the economic
base.181
In this sense, Marxist criticism of Minobe's stance as "incompletely
democratic and bourgeois" seems not entirely convincing. For such criticism ignores
the serious efforts made by Minobe and others both to define the "public" sphere,
and to negotiate the divisions of society. Minobe's definition of rights may be
incomplete for those who have lived with the post-war Constitution that endorses
popular sovereignty, legal equality and inalienable rights. And yet Minobe faced an
enormous challenge, confronting the national idea at a time when concepts of state
and people were more than usually inchoate and at odds. The real strength of his
theory remains the claim that "no power is beyond the law", behind which lies the
belief that the people have rights which the state cannot revoke. Minobe's concept of
181
Engels himself warned against simple application of the dichotomy between base and
superstructure. He says, "The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the
superstructure: political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by
the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all
these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories,
religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their influence
upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.
There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of
things and events, whose inner connection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it
as non-existent, as negligible) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary" (Engels,
"Letters on Historical Materialism", in Robert C. Tucker (ed.,), The Marx-Engels Reader, second
edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978, pp. 760-1).
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rights is therefore central to his effort to define a public sphere which will encompass
national unity and free government. Similar efforts are observable in his view of
representation (daihyo), where he directs his attention to political arrangements. In
the next and last section of this chapter we will therefore deal with Minobe's ideas of
valid political representation.
2.6. Minobe's ideas of political representation
One way to approach Minobe's position on representation is to probe once more his
inheritance from Jellinek. Thus in his Nihon Kenpd, Minobe explores the general
182
theory of law and the state based on the methodology provided by his mentor.
Nevertheless he departs from Jellinek at several points, and the relationship between
the state and its organs is one such example.
Minobe criticises Jellinek for claiming that the relationship between the state
and its organs differs from the legal relationship between a person and his proxy.
According to Jellinek, the state and its organs are "organically" united with each
183other. One is indispensable for the other's existence. The "personality" of the state
emerges through its organs. In this sense, the state-organ relationship differs from
any kind of representation, in which representative and represented remain separated.
This view was commonly accepted, but Minobe disagrees. "Despite the common
view, I believe it is fair to assume that the organisation-organ relationship and the
proxy arrangement are basically the same. The only difference is that under normal
182 Miller describes Minobe's Nihon Kenpd as his Allgemeine Staatslehre, referring to Jellinek's major
work (Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 45). "Minobe's statement of the purpose of the juristic method as
clarification of the relationship between law and the objective and subjective phenomena constituting
the concrete life of the state was true to the spirit of the Allgemeine Staatslehre" (ibid., p. 46).
183 Jellinek says: "In order to recognise the legal arrangement of organs of the state, we have to
distinguish its organs and the people that carry them. The organ as such does not possess personality
towards the state... The state and organ are one. The state is only able to exist though its organs. If we
take organs away, the state does not remain, and with the organs carried away, only legal emptiness
remains. By this means, the organ-relationship differs from any kind of representation. Normally the
representative and the represented remain as two individual parties, but the Union and the Organ do
remain as a single person" (Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, reprinted in 1966, Verlag Dr. Max
Gehlen Bad Homburg V.D. Hohe, Berlin, Zurich, pp. 559-60).
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circumstances, organs exist within the organisation and constitute it, while a proxy
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always exists outside the person whom the proxy represents."
Minobe distinguishes representation (daihyd) from "presentation"
0hydgen).185 Some scholars, such as Gierk in Germany and Dr. Kakei in Japan, have
asserted that organs neither represent the organisation nor can be a substitute for it,
because they merely transmit the personality of the organisation. Thus organs are
presentations or depictions (Darstellen) of the organisation, but do not represent it.
Minobe disagrees. People who constitute the organs of an organisation may be called
its representatives, because their will is recognised as the will of the organisation.
Such representation has long existed in Japan, according to Minobe. In
traditional Japanese usage, such people are called sodai, and they act as members of
their respective organisations on behalf of the whole. Thus Article 53 of the civil
code says that a director represents a corporate body with regard to its
administration, while Article 87 of the municipality law stipulates that a mayor
represents his city.
Accordingly Minobe dismisses the concept of presentation in his
interpretation of the relationship between the state and its organs, and defines state
organs as political representatives of the state. If this formulation is applied to his
Emperor-as-Organ theory, the emperor is the country's constitutional representative.
Such a definition of the emperor's status has potent implications. For Minobe,
it was easy to describe the emperor as the state's representative, since following
Jellinek he distinguished between social and legal definitions of the state. However,
Minobe's theoretical arguments met strong resistance, and the view that "the
emperor is not a representative but the state itself' became a major ideological
criticism of the organ theory in the mid-1930s.186
This persistent resistance has a historical dimension. For the "modern"
centralised political authority was created initially by deliberately setting the emperor
184
Minobe, Nihon Kenpd, p. 85.
185 The Japanese word "daihyd'' is a translation of representation in English, according to the
Kaiteizoho Tetsugakujii. The word soon appeared in legislation, including the municipality law (shisei
oyobi chosonsei) of 1889 and the civil code.
186 For instance, criticising Minobc's theory, Yamamoto Teijiro, a member of Seiyukai, told the House
of Representatives on 12 March 1935 that the emperor and the state were inseparable. See Miyazawa
Toshiyoshi, Tenno Kikansetsu Jiken, vol. 1, p. 157. His views reflected and confirmed the new
orthodoxy.
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before the public. Thus the emperor's role as national symbol was central to the
Meiji leaders' state-making. The Meiji leaders knew that they needed not only
military power and an efficient bureaucracy but also symbols capable of creating
"national" sentiments: a genuine indigenous nationalism was absent. Thus as early as
May 1868, Kido Takayoshi proposed that the emperor should travel to various parts
of the country to be seen as the new leader of the country.187 Kido also proposed the
issuance of various imperial orders and the use of the hinomaru flag, as well as the
construction of new warships.188 The creation of new symbols was an urgent task for
the Meiji leaders to unify the country and legitimise their rule.189
At the same time, for the Meiji leaders, the emperor represented an
opportunity to create a new "public" space to be formed in contrast to the predestined
"natural" order.190 In that new space, political power was to be man-made, not given.
Therefore the early Meiji leaders felt no conflict between imperial rule and their
emphasis on kdron (public debate). The emperor became a powerful symbol of the
new country precisely because he was able to consolidate the forces opposing the
Tokugawa shogunate, and was therefore aligned with the opposition.
In this way the emperor was presented as enjoying both symbolic and bona
fide political authority: his position at the heart of the nation was both legally and
metaphorically endorsed. Yet the divided nature of his status soon created serious
difficulties for his sponsors when they tried to devise a constitution in which he
would be a constitutional monarch. For instance Inoue Kowashi opposed the
itemisation of the imperial prerogative since it would weaken the symbolic authority
of the emperor, which he claimed existed regardless of the introduction of a
187 Kido writes in his diary on 20 May 1868: "In the morning I prepared drafts of three proclamations
to be announced before the Imperial return to Kyoto: 1) that his Majesty will travel to various parts of
the country; 2) that after the Imperial return to Kyoto he will move into the Nijo Castle, and 3) that,
hereafter, he will go to Naniwa frequently to govern the realm personally as conditions require." See
The Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Volume I: 1868-1871, translated by Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko
Hirota (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1983), p. 19.
188 See ibid., p. 32.
189 Cf. Carol Gluck: "In the first years after the Restoration, from 1868 to 1881, the new government
invoked the imperial institution as the symbolic center of the unified nation and displayed the young
Meiji emperor as the personal manifestation of the recently wrought political unity" (Gluck, Japan's
Modern Myths, p. 73).
190 Matsumoto Sannosuke likens the post-Restoration creation of imperial absolutism to an assertion
of Hobbesian absolutism. Hobbes had ushered in the modern view of the state as an artificial
community, departing from the scholastic view of natural order. See Matsumoto, "Tennosei Hoshiso"
(parti), KNKH, vol. 10, 1961, p. 6.
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constitution.191 Thus he proposed "presenting the emperor's authority to the public"
in the preamble to the Constitution.192 On the other hand, some writers distinguished
the emperor's official duties and his conduct as a private person, and insisted that the
emperor should be held accountable for civil cases regarding assets.193 The result
was incoherence. In the preamble, Articles 1 and 3, imperial authority is presented to
the public as "unbroken for ages eternal", and no article of the Constitution holds the
emperor accountable for civil cases. Yet the Constitution stipulates that the emperor
represents the people, which means he exercises his rights as sovereign according to
law.
The emperor's role both symbolic and political was thus central to Japan's
nation-making, and was deliberately used to promote nationalist feeling. However,
when the initial aims of state-making shifted from national unification to national
expansion and management of society, this constructed nationalism, embodied in the
person of the emperor, became increasingly problematic. Thus, once the stmctures of
government were in place, the emperor's role modulated inexorably into that of a
figure of authority. This change reflects the metamorphosis of the forces of Japanese
nationalism, fuelled by the desire for modernity and self growth, but becoming
gradually more imperialistic and authoritarian. As we have seen in Chapter 1,
Fukuzawa's "tenko" is a response to such change. For the emperor's symbolic role
increased as government leaders met the difficulties of running the country, and he
was always placed at the centre of national endeavour in an unpredictable period.
Amid deepening social anxiety, he was promoted as a centre of purpose and security.
Thus, by the early 1930s, as political parties, business people, and even the military
were found inefficient and untrustworthy, the people might easily turn to the emperor
11
He says: "In rhetoric, general terms are used to describe the whole. On the other hand, many
specific analytical words are used to describe parts. Enumerating the imperial prerogative means
dividing it, which damages the essence of the prerogative. It will weaken the prerogative through a
composite of descriptions, each of which can sway people's emotions. In this sense, enumerating the
imperial prerogative appears not profitable but damaging" (Inoue, "Koan", in Kenpo Shiryo Kankokai
(ed.), Hisho Hensan Kenpd Shiryo, vol. 1, Tokyo: Gyobunkaku, 1934, pp. 328-9). The Japanese word
Inouc used for "a composite of description" is "isho". "Isho" is one of many words created during the
Meiji period that soon became obsolete. Yet we can speculate on what Inoue means by reversing the
two kanji characters used for "ishd". For "shoi" means a composition of a kanji character by
combining more than one character.
192 See Inada Masatsugu, Meiji Kenpd Seiritsushi, vol. 2, pp. 11, 48-9.
193 Inoue Kowashi, "Otsuan", included in Inada, ibid., pp. 138-9. According to Inada, this passage was
actually written by Ito Miyoji, one oflnoue's colleagues in the drafting of the Constitution.
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as a symbol of the underlying Tightness of their world: the myth helped to underwrite
the status quo.
Furthermore, the emperor's symbolic role is incorporated into the executive
power as taiken in the Meiji Constitution, which simultaneously created Parliament.
And the divided alignments of political power are reflected in two different
manifestations of representation in the Constitution: state ministers as representatives
of the emperor, and Parliament as representative of the electorate. The former signals
the emperor's symbolic power and is aligned with absolutism, while the latter is
inseparable from a communicative Parliament.
When seen from the viewpoint of European constitutional history, in which
absolute authority was gradually contained by representative government, what is
remarkable about the Japanese constitution is that it allows two competing powers,
symbolic and representative, to claim their legitimacy simultaneously. The parallel
presence of symbolic and representative authorities in the constitution encapsulates
Japan's modernisation process in the political and legal structure, ensuring as it does
the survival of absolutism in representative government.
By contrast Habermas explains the process in Europe by which political
authority "presented" to ordinary people was transformed into power that
"represented" them through Parliament and the press. This process signals the
emergence of a civil society where power no longer means domination but rational
authority created through public debate. In feudalism, says Habermas, political
authority is linked with social status, and thus "permeates". Absolutism means the
growing presence of the state as "the sphere of public authority", supported by a
standing army and a permanent bureaucracy. During this period, however, civil
society nonetheless emerges as a new debating public of private people critical of
state authority. State and people compete with each other, but each in the name of the
"public".194
Prompting such transformation was economic change, such as the growth of a
commodity economy, a market and the availability of work, that allowed private
people to gain economic independence and social mobility. But the power of public
debate was decisive. Hence the growth of the press and the institutional
194
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 19.
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strengthening of Parliament (in such things as the elimination of censorship and the
establishment of cabinet government) also accelerated "a new stage in the
development of the public sphere".195 For "public debate was supposed to transform
voluntas into a ratio that in the public competition ofprivate arguments came into
being as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the interest ofall. "I96
Thus the development of capitalism, a free press, and an institutional centre
of capitalism (Parliament) prompted "the public's gradual assumption of the
functions of political power". Through "the critical debate" of an active public,
political parties assumed their function as representatives of competing opinion. In
this way Habermas emphasises the role of communicative institutions, Parliament
and press in particular, as major forces in the transformation of absolutism into
197
representative government.
However when compared with the development of parliament in Europe,
particularly in Britain, Japanese representative government had serious problems.
First, the emperor's ambiguous status tended to promote conflict between patriotism
and rational debate: the distinction between the exercise of "power" and
"responsibility" for action would easily blur. Second, various press laws and laws to
hinder political activities were detrimental to the growth of a communicative public.
Third, rapid social change made it difficult for the people to locate "a common
space" where they could share their political concerns. The early stages of Japan's
capitalist economy, in which the core of society was dispersed and agrarian, were not
conducive to such procedures. At the same time rapid industrial development had
created divisions between cities and the countryside, while the strategic division of
society imposed by government, between "/can", those working for the state,
including bureaucrats and professional soldiers, and "nn'n", those outside that sphere,
also hindered the birth of a common, political community. In a society where change
was both swift and far-reaching the ability to define what was shared was not easy.
Nevertheless, intense debates over the choice between absolutism and
parliamentarianism did take place, transcending constitutional arguments. The




ibid., p. 83. Emphasis by Habermas.
197 ibid., p. 63.
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and the role of the emperor and of the people. Such debates intensified as Japanese
society became more pluralistic, and may be seen in the active social criticism
levelled at government by socialists, anarchists, and communists, and in the growing
demands of workers, tenant farmers, women and other minorities for recognition of
their rights. These continuous debates reveal the resilient aspirations of many
Japanese to create a "rational authority", rather than one dictated by reasons of state.
Such efforts were made with a clear awareness of the constant social changes spurred
by both government and social forces. Minobe's theory of political representation
reflects his attempt to assert "rational authority" against this background of social
ferment.
Minobe's organ theory is thus not an attempt to justify the unity of the state,
but an attempt to define appropriate political representation by giving organs their
own separate identities. Hence the expression hydgen (presentation) is not acceptable
for Minobe, because it would damage the independence of those organs.
This conceptual confusion between presentation and representation as the
fundamental character of political authority is also common among German legal
positivists, such as C. F. von Gerber, one of Laband's contemporaries, who
advocated the monarchy-as-organ theory. Minobe escapes from similar confusion
198
because of his adherence to the idea of political representation.
For Minobe, the idea of representation is crucial, and recurs in his thought.
This is partly because his approach is functionalist. Administrative functions and
their relationships must be explained in concrete and specific terms. Only
"representation", not "presentation", is adequate to do this. Putting aside social and
historical definitions of the state, Minobe preferred to concentrate on the state's
pragmatic purpose. Hence his Emperor-as-Organ theory asserts that state power
exercises its rights through its organs. And the state is "represented" by its organs,
including the emperor. Minobe defines both state and organs as legal persons, and
tries to explain the relationship between them as representation rather than
confluence as advocated by Gierke and Jellinek.199
198 Richard Minear notes that Gerbcr "wanted to give scientific expression to the will of the state, yet
he was not ready to discard the traditional concept of the rights of the monarch. Having spoken of the
monarch as ruling subject, he could hardly escape dealing with the people as ruled objects" (see
Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law, p. 45).
199
Minobe, Nihon Kenpo, p. 85.
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More importantly, Minobe's concept of representative government is closely
related to his interest in the legitimisation of power that involves the will of the
people (min'i). He is interested in the process by which individual opinions are
"transformed" into the will of an organisation, and assumes that law and Parliament
are central to this process. Thus the Emperor-as-Organ theory implies that the
emperor's political functions are legitimate only when he exercises them according to
law, and law is intrinsically linked to Parliament. In his 1905 essay Minobe already
argues that Parliament must represent the people and indicates that legitimate
authority must have the people's mandate. Thus Matsuo Takayoshi asserts that
Minobe was the first person in the country to clarify the legal relationship between
people and Parliament.200
This linkage between legitimacy and popular participation through
parliamentary representation remained the cornerstone of Minobe's liberalism,
setting him apart from the mainstream legal experts of the time both conservative,
901
such as Hozumi, and positivist. Clearly if law is to be understood as a set of
prescribed norms, the claim that parliamentary representation is a concept legally
202valid inevitably has some aspects of speculative argument." " Yet by combining
politics and law, and by recognising value judgments as a valid contribution to law
making, Minobe became more attentive to shifting social values than many of his
contemporaries. Such an attitude sustained his inquiry into the validity of the
political system, including the electoral system, and it also enabled him to modify his
opinions about other democratic values such as legal equality.
His defence of the Hibiya Riots of 1905 evidences how central the will of the
people was to his understanding of legitimate power. Minobe asserts that the riots
200
Matsuo, "Minobe Tatsukichi", p. 176. Matsuo here refers to Minobe's two essays, "Gikai no
Kokuhojo no Seishitsu ni kansuru Ichishinsetsu", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, no. 10, 1903, and "Gikai wa
Kokumin no Daihyokikan nari", Meiji Gakuhd, no. 5, 1905. The latter is included in Minobe's Kenpd
oyobi Kenpdshi Kenkyu, pp. 277-87.
201 Both conservatives and positivists, including Marxists, rejected the claim that parliamentary
representation is a legal concept: the former did so in order to discredit Parliament, while for the latter
Parliament was incapable of representing the genuine opinion of the people. A positivist criticism of
Minobe's concept of popular representation is made by Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, "Kokumin Daihyo no
Gainen", in Miyazawa (ed.), Kdhogaku no Shomondai, vol. 2, pp. 253-6.
202 Thus Minobe resorts to "common sense" understanding of democracy and one's subjective
judgment to endorse parliamentary representation. He says: "Representation is an abstract concept...
Yet all legal concepts are abstract and subjective... All legal issues depend on how you conceive them,
something far removed from their being discussed always objectively" (Minobc, "Gikai wa Kokumin
no Daihyokikan nari" in Kenpd oyobi Kenpdshi Kenkyu, p. 287).
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were triggered by the government's inability to maintain the trust of the people. For
the basis of constitutional government is to respect the will of the people, and the
people should be given enough opportunities to express their opinions. Public
opinion may be erroneous, and politicians may have to refute it. However, if a ruler
uses his power to oppress opinion just because it is antagonistic to his own, that is
tantamount to abuse of power and will weaken the foundation of constitutional
government. Minobe interprets the riots as the people's protests against the abuse of
government power, and sees a resemblance between the immediate local disturbance
and historical events such as the French Revolution, the American War of
Independence, and the conflict between the king and barons that resulted in the
Magna Carta.
Minobe's view echoes the Marxist concept of class struggle, of the evolution
of society by conflict between ruler and ruled, and he warns that if government does
not listen to the people, the very foundations of constitutional government will
collapse. ~ Even as Minobe rejects popular sovereignty and the common ownership
of production, he nonetheless projects a Marxist vision of history: history changes
because of class struggle, and the ruler who tries to suppress the ruled will provoke
only revolution.204 In this respect, Minobe shares with the Marxists the opinion that
the legal system entails artificially installed norms. However, instead of dismissing
Parliament as an insufficiently democratic institution, Minobe takes seriously the
challenge of making it work more justly.
203 Minobe's views are shared by a later generation of historians, including Inoue Kiyoshi, Matsuo
Takayoshi and Miyachi Masato, who also see the Hibiya Riots as a popular protest against an
indifferent government and as a harbinger of the Taisho democratic movement. However, Okamoto
Shumpei challenges "the people's revolution theory", saying that it fails to explain the chauvinistic,
nationalist elements in the Riots, evident in the expressive loyalty to the emperor, abundant displays
of the national flag and singing of the national anthem among the rioters. Okamoto is more interested
in the mass nationalism arising from recent war-time experience in support of the Russo-Japanese
War. See Okamoto Shumpei, "The Emperor and the Crowd: The Historical Significance of the Hibiya
Riots", in Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The
Neglected Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 273.
204
Ienaga interestingly applies Carr's phrase the "sense of direction in history" to explain Minobe's
concept of history. According to Carr, "It is this sense of direction in history which alone enables us
to order and interpret the events of the past - the task of the historian - and to liberate and organize
human energies in the present with a view to the future - the task of the statesman, the economist, and
the social reformer... Our sense of direction, and our interpretation of the past, are subject to constant
modification and evolution as we proceed" (E. H. Carr, What is History?, Penguin Books, 1964, pp.
121-2). See Ienaga, Minobe Tatsukichi, p. 150.
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Thus Minobe's emphasis on the will of the people in constitutional
government was reflected in his support for the expansion of the franchise and the
introduction of proportional representation, when universal male suffrage began to
receive broad public attention in the 1910s. Although his interest in electoral
systems dates back to the earlier days of his career, he now began to formulate his
205views of the national electoral system in response to the nation-wide movement." A
nascent movement had already started in 1897, when a group was formed in
Matsumoto. But in 1911, the House of Representatives passed a universal male
suffrage bill for the first time, which was then rejected by the House of Peers. It was
not until 1925 that Parliament finally passed the bill along with the Peace
Preservation Law.
Minobe's support for universal suffrage does not necessarily stem from a
belief in equality but from a growing conviction that Japanese society is moving
inevitably towards democracy. Thus he was opposed to universal suffrage in 1911,
when the lower house passed the bill, saying that it was not compatible with social
conditions. The major change came in 1919, after he had witnessed the Russian
Revolutions, the collapse of the German Empire, the global trend for democracy, and
the growing democratic demands at home. Now he understands that such a trend is
irreversible.
Hence the universal suffrage movement is "a natural consequence of the
enlightenment and dissemination of culture, and of global communication. The era
when people followed others' rule blindly is already over. These days people are not
satisfied without autonomous rule. Professional politicians still deal with practical
matters. However, they can run government only because they have the mandate of
the people, and it is a prerequisite of modern politics that the people must possess the
2<to From 1904 to 1919, Minobe wrote the following: "Municipal tokyu elections" Hosei Shinpd, vol. 8,
and "Bicameral systems", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 18, in 1904; "Revision of the electoral system,"
Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 19, and "A theory of voting rights", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 19, in 1905;
"Damages of a single-seat constituency system", Hosei Shinshi, vol. 10, and "A by-election within a
year after the first by-election", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 20, in 1906; "Compulsive elections",
Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol.21, 1907; "An outline of the electoral law", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 22, and
"Voting rights and one's residency", Meiji Gakuhd, no. 125, in 1908; "Proportional representation for
the House of Representatives", Hogaku Shinpd, vol. 19, and "Revision of the electoral regulations for
the House of Peers", Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 23, in 1909; "Revision of the electoral law",
Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 26, 1912. Minobe was clearly responding to a topic of great importance to
him. Tokyu means equal distribution of seats among groups of eligible voters who are divided
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right to oversee their action to a certain extent".206 Thus Minobe criticises Prime
207
Minister Hara's electoral reform for it did not give workers the right to vote."
Once he accepted the introduction of universal suffrage, Minobe not only
supported the elimination of tax-based eligibility but also campaigned to extend the
electorate so as to include students, heads of noble households, teachers of primary
schools, Shinto priests, and Buddhist monks. He was also a member of a 25-member
committee appointed by the government to discuss electoral reform. And in a
meeting of the committee held in 1923, he was one of five members who supported
208
giving voting rights to women.
Minobe had no time for those who criticised universal suffrage as a "foreign"
concept. For him Japanese history after the Restoration was a series of upheavals,
testimony to the discontent of a people who had no chance to take part in politics and
which could lead to armed protest. Universal suffrage must be introduced to preserve
constitutional government, since otherwise social discontent will be uncontrollable.
"It is not theory but social change that prompts the expansion of the suffrage."209
Thus his support for the expansion of the franchise is motivated by his
awareness of the growing influence of the working class in society. Here the
criticism that Minobe was less concerned with the expansion of workers' rights than
with the well-being of society may well apply: equipoise rather than strict equality
seems so often to inspire him. Nevertheless, Minobe's support for proportional
representation seems to be genuinely motivated by his desire to introduce fairer
representative government, and by his concern to harness the opinion of the people.
according to the amount of taxes they pay so that high taxpayers can maintain their influence in
municipal assemblies.
206
Minobe, "Futsusenkyo ron", in Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan [A Critique of Present Issues related to
the Constitution] (Tokyo: Flosei Jihosha, 1921), p. 376. The article originally appeared in
Kokkagakkai Zasshi, October 1919. Minobe remains opposed to popular sovereignty, but supports
lifting the asset-based eligibility regulations. Under his proposal, men aged 25 years old or older who
have completed compulsory education, make an independent living, and have lived in one district for
at least six months should be eligible for voting and elections.
207
ibid., p. 381.
20S Matsuo Takayoshi, Futsusenkyo Seido Seiritsushi no Kenkyu, p. 377. Minobe was one of the two
members of the five, who supported suffrage for women aged 25 or older, the same age restriction for
men. The other three insisted on the age of 30 and a requirement of compulsory education.
209 Minobe notes: "the general trend of modern politics is to eliminate the privilege of certain classes.
Thus, if we restrict eligibility requirements and give the right to vote to a certain group of people, it
will be tantamount to the creation of a new class. Therefore, restrictive elections are not acceptable"
(Minobe, "Futsusenkyo ron", pp. 373-4).
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Japan's first electoral system was introduced at the opening of Parliament in
1890, and was based on single-seat constituencies. This was a practical (rather than
ideological) decision, since no political parties were then capable of representing a
"national" interest because of their short history. Also the Meiji leaders were aware
that they could not ignore diverse local interests. The system of single-seat
constituencies was suited to their vision of a structure of local government supported
organically by the local elite (meibdka) rather than by any nation-wide organisation.
However, political parties grew so as to take over government by the end of the
century, and Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi proposed that the single-seat
constituencies be replaced by multi-seat, wider constituencies in 1898. The division
of the country into small constituencies, each represented by a single person, was
now thought detrimental to party politics, since national interests would not be able
to filter into the local level.
Thus the electoral law was revised in 1900 to introduce the new
constituencies, while lowering the minimum tax payment for eligibility to 10 yen. In
the next two decades, the electorate sharply increased, although its ratio to the whole
population remained less than 6 percent until the introduction of universal male
suffrage in 1925.210 However the emergence of Seiyukai, the powerful party capable
of linking local interests to national politics, prompted its leader and Prime Minister
Hara Takashi to push through the re-introduction of single-seat constituencies in
1919.
Minobe was then opposed to the existing multi-seat constituency system,
because he thought it would hinder the growth of parties, since people from one party
had to fight with each other in the same constituency. His preferred alternatives were
the single-seat system and proportional representation. However, when Seiyukai
started to reintroduce single-seat constituencies, Minobe argued that the system
would favour large parties at the expense of the small. So in an essay of 1919, he
urged Seiyukai to revise its plan, and called for both the expansion of the franchise
210 Cities became independent constituencies (urban businesspeople had gained more political voice)
in 1902. The number of eligible voters increased to 1.59 million in 1908 from 0.76 million in 1904,
thanks to the tax increase to finance the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. For the background of the
electoral reforms during the late Meiji and Taisho periods, see Mitani Taichiro, " 'Taisho
Demokurashi jokyo e no Seidoteki Taio: Shosenkyokusei an", Nihon Seitd Seiji no Keisei (Tokyo:
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967), pp. 184-210.
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and for proportional representation.2" Nevertheless, shortly after the article was
published, the single-seat constituency system was re-introduced under the Hara
Cabinet.
Understandably Minobe wrote two articles advocating proportional
representation in 1920 and 1921. As usual, he was in tune with global trends, as the
system had already been introduced in Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, France, and
Germany. Yet the real focus of the articles was the nature of a Japanese democratic
political system.
Minobe's support for universal male suffrage and proportional representation
again results from his understanding that democratic demands are now an
unstoppable force after World War I. Recent events and sacrifices have intensified
the demand for wider political participation. Yet democracy does not depend on
whether or not a country is a monarchy or a republic, but on the state's reduction of
its own coercive power, and on its willingness to encourage broad, public
212 r*
participation in politics. Social change has also increased the importance of
association and therefore people should be given the right to assemble for political
purposes. Ample disclosure of the political decision making process, and also if
necessary resort to referenda, are key features of democratic government. So in this
important article of 1918, Minobe commits himself wholeheartedly to representative
government (those elected by the people, sodai, can engage in political affairs), to
the right to vote, to a bicameral system of government so as to prevent the
concentration of power, to responsible and parliamentary cabinet government, and to
in
the freedom of the people. '
Minobe defends representative government, based on parliament, at a time
when trust in parliament was declining globally.214 As C. Schmitt points out in The
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, published in 1923, parliament as an institution
211
Minobe, "Senkyoho no Kaisei, sono ichi", Taiyd, February 1919, included in "Senkyoho Mondai",
Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan, pp. 335-56.
212 Minobe never accepted popular sovereignty, however. He objects to using the word "minshushugi"
for democracy because he says it connotes popular sovereignty and is against Japan's monarchical
system. See Minobe, "Kindaiseiji no Minshuteki Keiko" Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan, pp. 402-5. The
article initially appeared in Taiyd, 1918 June special issue.
213
ibid., pp.407-17. "Natural trend" (shizen no susei) and "global trend" (sekai no susei) are common
in Minobe's writing, for he is alert to what is happening in other countries, that is, the West.
214 The first edition of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy by C. Schmitt was published in 1923
in Germany.
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may not be able to discuss complex issues effectively, since party politics
subordinates the national interest to party concerns. Yet Minobe defends Parliament,
saying that the problem is not intrinsic, although Parliament has yet to become an
institution fully capable of representing the will of the people. Thus, "There is no
such thing as the will of the people per se that Parliament represents. But people's
mistrust of Parliament does not derive from this; rather it results from Parliament's
inability to overcome the interests of the capitalist class and listen to the
proletariat."215
For Minobe, however, implementing the will of the people (min 7) is a project
just as fraught as that of initiating representative government. For as economic
difficulties grew, public distrust of government was directly converted to criticism of
political parties, which were seen to be socially indifferent and to exploit the public
for the benefit of the business community. This created a dilemma for political
parties, as well as for the disenfranchised public, because reform required
inspirational force, and the parties were incapable of creating the necessary
momentum. Thus, by the mid-1930s, politics was characterised both by a lack of
leadership and by a lack of commitment, signalling a political vacuum to be
exploited, which it was by fascism. Many of Minobe's proposals in the inter-war
period were a means of addressing the prevailing malaise.216
Thus he argued that if proportional representation was introduced, election
campaigns would be less expensive. But more importantly the method would
encourage public debate about issues, not about personalities and ties, for the people
would vote for a party, not for a person. "Under the present system, people tend to
vote for the person rather than for the party. It is quite common that people vote for
candidates who have connections with their relatives or acquaintances without
215
Minobe, "Waga Kensei no Shorai", Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan, pp. 428-9. The article originally
appeared in Tohojiron, January 1921.
216 Thus Minobe proposes several remedies, including various institutional reforms, sanction by public
opinion, universal male suffrage, proportional representation, open election of governors, the ensuring
of Diet members' right to express their own opinions, checks on party funds, more power to
Parliament to investigate policies, and reform of the House of Peers. See Minobc, "Wagakensei no
Shorai", Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan, pp. 438-44. Minobe criticises the House of Peers as "an extremely
antiquated system" (ibid., p. 443).
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knowing to which party they belong. This is meaningless, and does not comply with
the purposes of constitutional government."217
In 1937, after he had been forced to step down as a member of the House of
Peers, Minobe published Senkyo Bassoku no Kenkyu [A Study of Sanctions for
Violations of Electoral Law], in which he criticised the stringent election rules for
the House of Representatives. His criticism is consistent not only with his life-long
concern with the role of law in politics and society, but also with his views of
representative government. For if a law is remote from the common sense of the
people, it will lose their trust. And an excessively strict law alienates people from
elections, and thus from politics in general.218
In this culminating statement, Minobe claims that participation in election
219
campaigns is the inviolable right of the people." He focuses on 1934 when an
election law for the House of Representatives was revised to tighten the restrictions
on campaigns. The revision of the law was prompted by a confrontation between
political parties and the bureaucracy. A nation-wide movement to eliminate election
graft had taken place under the name of "the campaign to clean up elections" (senkyo
shukusei undo), organised by the staff of the Home Affairs Ministry. Before the
220
revision, the law made no provision for pre-election campaigns, although only
those who were officially authorised, such as candidates themselves, or heads and
members of campaign teams, were allowed to engage in campaigning, except for the
making of public speeches and contributions to recommendation leaflets. However,
the revised law now banned all election campaigning before one's candidacy was
reported to the authority. For Minobe the ban put serious obstacles in the way of
public communication. The people, he says, should be allowed to take part in
campaigns even if they are not authorised campaigners. At present the law bans even
door-to-door campaigning. Thus, "Elections are matters that belong to the people
themselves. They are responsible for making their own judgements as to who is the
most suitable candidate. In order to make a right decision, they need to listen to as
217
Minobe, "Senkyoho no Kaisei", Jiji Kenpd Mondai Hihan, p. 354. Here Minobe differs from
Yoshino Sakuzo. Both are critical of the secrecy in government policy making, but Yoshino
emphasises the importance of the personality of candidates in a representative government.
-18
Minobe, Senkyo Bassoku no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Ryosho Fukyukai, 1937), p. 38.
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ibid., p. 38.
220 Official election campaigns would start after candidates reported their candidacy to the authority.
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many candidates as possible. In constitutional government it must be their ensured
221
right to discuss politics."
Minobe then criticises previous rulings by the Supreme Court which interpret
the law so strictly that individual freedom is severely hampered. To punish someone
for violation of law there must be plausible circumstances: the action must clearly
transgress the limits of common sense with regard to socialising and friendship.
Otherwise, individual political activities, even those related to elections, should be
tolerated. The court is wrong to inhibit private activity, for "the Supreme Court
assumes that even when one praises a candidate after listening to his speech and
recommends him to his friends, that constitutes violation of the law. But such
interpretations are tantamount to forcing a detached neutrality onto all voters, which
will result in their indifference to elections. It will damage constitutional government
severely."222 Minobe staunchly assumes that constitutional government results from
public debate, and therefore people are entitled to discuss their own affairs. The
imposition of "detached neutrality" will cause only public apathy towards politics.
The court is also wrong to punish members of a party who visit other
members to discuss their candidacies (as in the ruling of 3 October 1936). Such a
ruling is just as untenable as that which punishes a candidate for visiting the house of
a voter and then another several days apart. Fund-raising for election campaigns is
legal, despite the court's ruling of 9 October 1936. The law should be interpreted in
such a way that people who belong to the same party and share their political views
can act together more freely. For politics is their own affair. Here Minobe clearly
challenges authority's attempt to undermine behaviour which in his view was both
legitimate and politically necessary.
However, Minobe's view of political representation has its own limitations.
This is partly because of his limited acceptance of legal equality. His definition of the
"public" sphere is still restricted to "qualified citizens" of the state. At times Minobe
seems unreceptive to the role of organised labour in bringing about social change.
Hence Ienaga criticises Minobe's view of tenant disputes for his failure to recognise
that such actions of solidarity by the proletariat are also part of the creation of a new




vision of society. Minobe on the other hand justifies police intervention in resolving
such disputes by saying that they directly affect the social order. Ienaga is therefore
223led to criticise him for contradicting his own assertions on the rights of workers.
Indeed, Minobe's view of the relationship between authority and the
individual reflects his period, when many Japanese, particularly the elite,
unquestionably believed in the betterment of the state at the expense of individual
freedom. Reaction and reform were by no means exclusive, and often co-existed.
Thus Minobe might himself be said to possess a degree of social scepticism, as well
as a countervailing sense of social progress underlain by a knowledge of alternative
liberal values. These values generally informed his search for an acceptable balance
between state power and individual liberties. Thus it is entirely characteristic of him
that along with suffrage for women, he called for the elimination of the
224
discriminatory provisions against wives in the civil code in the 1920s," despite his
conceptual separation between rights and the capacity for rights, and his acquiescing
statement in his Kenpd Satsuyd that the fact that women are not given voting rights is
simply an exception to the intention of the Constitution. The same person who had
said in 1907 that women's natural vocation was domestic and therefore incompatible
with politics225 now insisted that such legal discrimination was socially and morally
unacceptable. His adherence to social values had led him to the forefront of the
radical criticism of the legal inequality entrenched in the name of tradition.
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Ienaga, op. cit., p. 70. Banno Junji also criticises Minobe for disregarding political equality. "The
question is why Minobe regarded manhood suffrage as premature. His argument makes no advocacy
of social and economic equality, of course, or even of political equality. Those who put a high value
on 'equality' would probably demand that if 'people in society are in fact very unequal', political
equality should first be attained, and then social and economic inequality could be corrected by this
means. In Minobe's case, the inequality in people's 'character' and in 'ability and knowledge'
provides his base for defending political inequality. Minobe can be excused as affirming not economic
inequality, but inequality in education and ability" (Banno, Democracy in Pre-War Japan: Concepts
ofGovernment, 1871-1937: Collected Essays, translated by Andrew Fraser, London: Routledge, 2001,
j> 97).Under the criminal code introduced in 1880, women were more severely punished than men for
adultery. Reflecting the practice, the civil code also discriminated against women in divorce. Men
could seek a divorce if they had found their wives committing adultery, while husbands' adultery did
not necessarily constitute the grounds for women' seeking a divorce. In a meeting of a governmental
committee debating revision of the civil code in 1925, Minobe proposed a change in the law so that
adultery would become grounds for divorce for both sexes. Minobe's proposal was rejected as
detrimental to the country's family system and "traditions". See Ienaga, op. cit., p. 52-3.
225 Minobe, "Senkyo Taii", Kenpd oyobi Kenpdshi Kenkyu, p. 441. The article originally appeared in
the Yomiuri Shimbun, April and May 1907, and also in Kokkagakkai Zasshi, vol. 22, no. 6.
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In addition Minobe held to his position with great resilience, at a time when
various new practices and institutions were being introduced to reshape the whole
structure of the legal and political system, and when the prevailing pessimism about
the country's political and economic system intensified.
In sum Minobe's views of political representation constitute another facet of
his attempt to promote a civil society, a society where rational authority is created by
its members through open debate. Throughout his career he attempted to bridge the
gap between politics and scholarship by always addressing himself to the institutions
of the newly fledged state. By attempting the ideal of detached assessment (even as
he could never achieve it) his work directly confronted the various misuses and
abuses of power that he encountered in his lifetime.
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Chapter 3
Sakai Toshihiko: Industrialisation, Hierarchy, and
the Rise of Japanese Socialist Thought
In order to restrict discretionary power, Minobe Tatsukichi promoted the creation of
rational authority through legal debate. His adherence to Jellinek's state self-control
theory, his insistence on social rather than administrative law, and his idea of organs
as representative bodies were all meant to further that aim. However, such
proceedings are not enough to fully confront the workings of discretionary power in
a society rapidly industrialised and with an unfolding political system. Now,
therefore, we will examine Sakai Toshihiko's active socialist critique of that system
and his complementary vision of a civil society.
Although his name is frequently linked with major events in the history of
socialism and communism in pre-war Japan, Sakai's role is often described as
supportive of more prominent activists such as Kotoku Shusui (1871-1911) and
Osugi Sakae (1885-1923). Both Kotoku and Osugi were strong advocates of
anarchist thought, and their writings and personal charisma are believed to have had
major influence in determining the general course of the Japanese socialist
movement. Yet Sakai's unfaltering commitment at a time of harsh government
oppression testifies to a highly independent mind and offers a rare example of
consistency among the socialists and communists of his time, for many turned either
to anarchism or embraced a nationalist and imperialistic position in the 1920s and
1930s. The nature and sources of Sakai's consistency in his attachment to socialism
is therefore well worth study.
Furthermore Sakai's political commitment drew him repeatedly to the plight
of the marginalised, to women, anti-imperial Chinese and Korean students, and the
burakumin. Typically his last major involvement was the operation of a farmers'
school in his hometown in Kyushu. Sakai's vision of a classless society was
translated into a lifetime of political activism.
John Crump, defining socialism in contradistinction to the main features of
capitalism, speaks of "a society where production is for the direct satisfaction of
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human needs without the mediation of a process of buying and selling or exchange,
where the means of production are commonly owned and democratically controlled,
where there are neither social classes, the state, nor money". He concludes,
provocatively, that "socialism—either as a body of thought or as an active political
movement—has barely existed" in Japan, "at any period".1
Now if we interpret socialism and communism—for Sakai, they are
interchangeable concepts—as a set of clearly laid-out ideological principles, Sakai's
socialism does indeed appear eclectic and conceptually loose. And his political
alignments were not at all static and dogmatically fixed but essentially fluid. Thus,
despite his close partnership with Kotoku until the latter's execution in 1911, Sakai
was not able to support the former's anarchistic approach whole-heartedly. And
although they were once close allies, Sakai eventually broke away from Osugi, when
the latter's anarcho-syndicalism conflicted with Sakai's support of Bolshevism.
Equally, although he was chairman of the first Japanese Communist Party when it
was illegally formed in 1922, Sakai gradually distanced himself from the party,
which became increasingly under the control of the Communist International
(Comintern). Sakai then became involved in the proletarian movement until his death
in 1933.
Nevertheless the shapes of society and government that Sakai strove to
achieve using the concept of socialism are a record of continuous intellectual probing
and engagement. Products of Sakai's dialogue with self, as well as society, they do
indeed testify to "a body of thought" in as much as they derive from some of the
seminal writings of international socialism, as well as from Sakai's sense of the
relevance of socialist ideals to his country's needs and possible future. Japanese
socialism was never an entirely coherent movement (as Crump demonstrates), but
under the leadership of a man like Sakai thought was always a prelude to action,
even as historical forces meant that such action was rarely successful.
Sakai came to embrace socialism relatively late in his life. At first it was little
more to him than a crude Utopian concept of economic equality. Yet such a simple
message was attractive enough for the 30-year-old, drifting journalist, who had long
searched for a coherent vision capable of linking self realisation and social justice.
' John Crump, "Introduction", The Origins of Socialist Thought in Japan (London: Croom Helm,
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Such heuristic questioning climaxed for him when he encountered the dialectical
materialism of Marx and Engels. Through reading, writing, and debate, Sakai's
materialism was sharpened and internalised, precisely because it was a way for him
to interpret the world where he lived and the relationships between that world and
self.
At the same time, harsh political experience constantly upheld ideology. For
as with many other socialists of his time, Sakai experienced the full operation of
"state power" which could deem his activities and opinions criminal and punish him
accordingly. Yet it was the High Treason Incident of 1911, in which Sakai's closest
collaborator and friend Kotoku was executed, along with 11 others whom the
government deemed anarchists, that developed his thought most fully. For now his
criticism focussed on totalitarian power, power that could overwhelm the individual
in the name of the whole, be it state, society or party. For Sakai, socialism sought
both individual freedom and communal solidarity, and socialism's negotiation
between individual freedom and the common good he took for granted. Once a
private, hermeneutic (or critical) inquiry about the relationship between self and
society, his socialism increasingly became an attempt to envisage a new public
sphere in response to what he saw as the defective political, economic, and social
arrangements of his time. To better perceive this interaction between thought and
society, I will now provide a brief overview of the principal episodes of his life as
they impinge on his socialism.
3.1. Biography: major aspects of Sakai's career
Sakai Toshihiko was bom in 1870 as the third son of a former low-ranking samurai
family in Toyotsu, Fukuoka Prefecture." As he grew up, Sakai experienced at first-
1983). The page is not numbered.
2 See Sakai Toshihiko, "Sakai Toshihikoden [Autobiography of Sakai Toshihiko]", Kawaguchi
Toshihiko (ed.), Sakai Toshihiko Zenshu (STZ hereafter, six volumes, Kyoto: Horitsu Bunkasha,
1970-71), vol. 6, pp. 41-9. The autobiography was originally serialised in Kaizo from December 1924.
It ends, however, with his joining the newspaper Yorozuchdho in 1899, and thus covers only the early
part of his life. A helpful complement to Zenshu is a biography by Kawaguchi, Sakai Toshihiko no
Shogai, 2 vols, Tokyo: Shakaishugi Kyokai Shuppankyoku, 1992 and 1993. A brief and useful
142
hand the violent transition from the old order to the new. After the Meiji Restoration,
the family no longer belonged to the samurai class. And in 1876 the government
ended its previous economic support for former samurai households, introducing a
system of government bonds, with payment in the form of annual interest. The bonds
were so low in value that 95 percent of the relevant households could not live on the
interest alone. They had to find new ways of making a living, in government or in
business. Sakai records various examples of samurai families around him who had
lost their entire assets. He also witnessed the last of the armed rebellions by former
samurai against the government, such as the Akizuki Rebellion in 1876 in his region,
and the Seinan Rebellion in 1877 in Kagoshima, southern Kyushu.
Sakai records the lingering animosity between the samurai and the merchant
and peasant class, including his own prejudice against those held to be inferior,
whose manners and speech were unfamiliar to him. He recalls his school days with
an acute sense of transition. "Children from the declining class [samurai] and those
from the emerging classes [wealthy merchants and farmers] studied in the same
classroom."3 Yet his education developed him socially, and introduced him to
physics, biology, mathematics, drawing, music, and English. Sport too was a
liberating part of the curriculum. Some readers used at the school were direct
translations from English, while Chinese classics continued to be taught, which Sakai
enjoyed. Texts from Japanese history, such as Nihon Gaishi by Rai Sanyo, also
appeared. Thus although Sakai recalls that education had become more conservative
than when his older brothers went to school, political debate being removed from the
formal curriculum, the approved course of study still managed to be remarkably
liberal and diverse.4
Sakai belongs to what Kato Shuichi calls the 1868 generation, bom in the
twenty years around the Meiji Restoration, from 1860 to 1880. Kato summarises the
major characteristics of the generation as follows: they knew both the Chinese
classics and new subjects such as English, they experienced the turmoil of the times,
overview of Sakai is found in George M. Beckmann and Okubo Gcnji, The Japanese Communist
Party 1922-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 8-9 and p. 380. A list of Sakai's
publications is provided by Yamaizumi Susumu et al., Early Japanese Socialism Studies, no. 10,
1997, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, pp. 136-61.




they were influenced by the contemporaneous cultural and enlightenment movement,
and they also witnessed the Jiyuminken Undo, the movement for freedom and
popular rights. Thus they grew up with clear awareness of "the development of Meiji
society" and the Meiji state. Intense interests in politics and ascendancy ambition
were common in this generation, setting them apart from the previous and future
generations: "...,[T]he generation that grew up through this period was interested in
the direction taken in the development of Meiji society as a whole and the historical
significance of the violent social changes. These social changes took the form, firstly
of what was known as 'civilization and enlightenment' and a trial and error
'modernization' on western models."5 Sakai's desire to learn, admiration for the
West as a source of new learning, intense interest in society and politics, and a
sceptical view of government stayed with him throughout his life. After this
generation, the status of society as "the fundamental and all-embracing subject"
waned, with increasing regimentation of state structure and social life, according to
Kato.6
Sakai was also a product of the new social mobility, and of what Maruyama
Masao calls the new ascendancy society.7 A large number of young people, many of
whom were the second, third, and fourth sons, constituted this new society. They had
no heavy obligations to their families as the eldest sons had, and instead they had to
find their own way of making a living. They were part of the new "non-propertied
class" with strong motivation for self-improvement. Sakai was himself free from
family obligations, although he later had to look after his parents after the death of
the family's eldest son. For the aspiring young man, Tokyo was the centre of
learning and opportunity. Sakai, wanting to become a politician and a writer, entered
the prestigious First High School, and yet dropped out because of truancy. Cut off
from the normal routes to prominence, the only available professions were as writer,
teacher, or newspaper reporter. Thus, from 1889 to 1897, Sakai moved from one
newspaper to another, writing novels occasionally. This is his "romantic" period,
5 Kato Shuichi, A History of Japanese Literature, new abridged edition, translated by Don Sanderson
(Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 244-5.
b Kato says: "This generation was in its turn followed by a generation born at the turn of the century
which was clearly divided. Some writers, many of the central figures being Marxists, felt strong social
concern; some felt none at all" (ibid., p. 245).
7
Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso, p. 26, 44-5.
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when he was relatively carefree yet driven by a desire to learn and succeed. A
member of various social organisations, including one for amateur writers, Sakai
portrays himself at this period as a "sentimental royalist".8
Sakai then found himself among the marginalised groups, the declining
former samurai class, and the drop-outs. Also for those coming from the countryside
such as Sakai, national identity was a new and problematical acquisition, for it had to
replace their initial attachment to their respective "kuni" (regions).9 Such peripheral
identity, in his case a combination of strong personal ambition and an uprooted sense
of inadequacy, seems to have prevented him from ever identifying himself with
collective notions of "state" and "public" as dictated by government.
Thus in his study of the left-wing students in the 1920s Henry D. Smith
compares the Shinjinkai (New Man Society), a student group established in 1918,
with the Meiji socialists. In contrast to their predecessors, most students who became
active in helping labour and tenant movements during the Taisho democratic
movement were graduates of the Tokyo Imperial University or were attending the
university, the very institution at the top of the educational pyramid and deeply
attached to the state structure. They lacked the strong "outside spirit" and diverse
personal experiences of the Meiji socialists. "It is perhaps the great paradox of this
generation of left-wing intellectuals that they have tended to accept the prestige and
preferment accorded them as university graduates at the same time they have vowed
to overthrow the very political system which allows them such prestige."10 Thus
their inheritance, and also insecurity about the future, made them more susceptible to
political manipulation. Mass "tenko" (recantation of one's belief) took place among
those students in the 1930s, when the government intensified coercive pressure.
"Thus evolved the peculiar mode of suppression of the student left—and hence of the
left as a whole—which combined the approach of the educator with that of the
8
Sakai, "Sakai Toshihiko den", STZ, vol. 6, p. 12.
q
Sakai recalls his experience of identity shifts, first when he moved to Tokyo for education. His
regional identity was replaced by a "national" identity and he became a passionate "patriot" at the
time of the Sino-Japanese War. But his national identity was eroded and he became more
cosmopolitan, when he absorbed socialism, according to his own account. See Sakai, "Sakura to Chin
to Aikokushin [Cherry Blossom, Dog, and Patriotism]", Kaji to Hansho (Tokyo: Santokusha, 1921),
STZ, vol. 5, pp. 137-40. Chin is a homonym of the word the emperor uses when addressing himself,
and thus implies the emperor.
10
Henry D. Smith, Japan's First Student Radicals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1972), pp. 267-8.
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police. It is doubtful that the policy of tenko would have been pursued as
assiduously—and so successfully—if all those arrested as communists had been
lower-class workers and Meiji-style renegade intellectuals."11
Sakai's status as outsider clearly helped him to maintain his independent
position as a socialist critic of government and society. His conception of socialism
was subject to change, but viewed from the post-war perspective of social
democracy, his thought maintains a strong coherence. Complementing his peripheral
identity and broad experience, his thought was sustained by his writing and by his
study ofMarxism.
Writing remained Sakai's major political activity throughout his life. His
desire to express his own feeling and thought, and his equally strong desire to
connect to society, were demonstrated in his literary preference, even before he
consciously became socialist. For Sakai, writing is a way in which one examines the
relationship between self and the outer world. Thus in 1900 he praises Tokutomi
Roka for his realistic depiction of society in Hototogisu: "Most so-called novelists of
the day ignore historical facts and real social moods, and casually introduce such
characters as a university graduate, a military officer, a government official, and a
wife. They believe that they are able to portray them well. But many of them merely
portray their actions and feelings related only to the plot, not to society or political
realities. They are not interested in social and political concerns. Tokutomi's work
12has escaped such shortcomings."
About a decade later, after he had immersed himself in Marxism, Sakai made
a similar point when he reviewed Nagai Kafu's Wakuraba. He praises the work for
its criticism of passive adherence to traditional human relationships based on
obligation (giri) and feeling (ninjo). At the same time, Nagai does not penetrate deep
enough to unravel the social structure. "After reading this work, I thought that the
nature of present-day literature had become clearer to me. Modern writers do not
understand the foundation of the social structure, that is, the economic structure that
is the base of politics, law, morality, and religion. They are merely worried about the




Sakai, "Hototogisu o yomu", STZ, vol. 1, pp. 32-3. The article originally appeared in the
Yorozuchdho on 6 February 1900.
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activities alone, but finally give up any hope for change, then become disappointed,
try to escape, or indulge themselves in distracting activities."13 Again he criticises the
work for its limited social engagement: the writer's grasp of psychology is less
important to him than his overall social vision.
In this regard Kato Shuichi has already pointed out the tendency of Japanese
authors of this period to detach themselves from social reality.14 Thus when Sakai
talks about social realism, his models are Emile Zola and the European naturalist
writers, and Kafu is not counted a naturalist writer. For him, realism means a
combination of detailed observation of the whole: self and society are inseparable.
Sakai was initiated into socialism when he joined the Yorozuchoho, a popular
daily published by the journalist and novelist Kuroiwa Ruiko, in July 1899. There he
met many reformist journalists, including Kotoku, Uchimura Kanzo, and Kawakami
Kiyoshi. Under their influence, Sakai began to be politicised. In May 1901, a group
of six men, Abe Isoo, Katayama Sen, Kinoshita Naoe, Kawakami, Nishioka Kojiro,
and Kotoku, who were all Christians except Kotoku, founded the first party to carry
the name Social Democrat in Japan. The party was immediately banned. Two months
later, Sakai joined the Risodan, a group of the paper's journalists eager for social
reform, and called himself a socialist.
In 1903, Sakai, Kotoku and Uchimura left the paper when its editor began to
support Japan's military confrontation with Russia. Uchimura, a Christian, opposed
the anticipated war for humanitarian reasons. On the other hand, Sakai and Kotoku
opposed the war out of universal socialism. They wrote in a jointly signed article
which appeared in the Yorozuchoho on the day of their resignation: "If we look at
13 Sakai, "Sunba Tojin", Baibunshu (Tokyo: Heigo Shuppansha, 1912), STZ, vol. 4, p. 64.
14 Kato Shuichi says about "naturalist" writers in Japan: "These writers had taken [Tsubouchi]
Shoyo's idea of 'depicting human feelings as they are' to mean that they should describe unaltered
their own experience, and it was this that they—or at least, some of them—claimed to be naturalistic
writing. The word 'naturalism' (shizenshugi in Japanese) has created a good deal of confusion in
accounts of modern Japanese literature." Zola on the other hand "attempted to demonstrate how
material factors are decisive in the shaping of human thoughts and emotions. Zola's novels have
reference to the methods of biological science, a feature peculiar to naturalism; they took a broad view
of society (and thus could not have a hero identical with the writer), a characteristic already evident in
the work of Balzac, and were concerned with civil society, as had been many novels since the
eighteenth century. None of these features are to be found in the work of the Japanese naturalists.
They have no connection with scientific methods—indeed in the Japan of the time there was no
general interest in science; the world of the novels is extremely small, the range of incident limited to
the immediate vicinity of the hero/author; and the subject is not the internal contradictions of civil
society but the disputes arising from its immaturity" (Kato, op. cit., pp. 270-1).
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international wars from the socialist point of view, they are carried out by private
cliques, such as the aristocracy and the military, and a majority of the people are
made victims."15 Within a month, Sakai and Kotoku had founded the Heimin
Shimbun (Common People's Newspaper), "the most representative organ of the
socialist movement in Japan at that time".16 The paper was disbanded in 1907
because of the government's harassment, financial difficulties, and the growing
tension between Christians and "Marxists".17 Yet Sakai recalls the two years that he
18
worked for the paper as the "most fruitful and intense period" of his life.
It is during this period that Sakai came to understand Marxism through
translating the Communist Manifesto in 1904, and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific
in 1906, and by reading widely, mostly in English. According to Germaine Hoston,
the two translations are "the two most sophisticated presentations of Marxism
available in Japanese on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War".19 The Shakaishugi
Koryo by Sakai and Morichika Umpei published in 1907 is also regarded as "a third
pioneering work".20 The Shakaishugi Kenkyu [Study of Socialism], which Sakai
published monthly for five months in 1906, laid the groundwork for the
dissemination of Marxism in Japan.21 At the same time, Sakai translated a diverse
range of European literature, including Zola's Fecondite [Fruitfulness] and Travail
[Work], and William Morris's News from Nowhere.
Sakai's partnership with Kotoku remained strong until the latter's execution
in 1911. However, their different attitudes to tactics began to emerge in 1906, after
Kotoku returned from the United States, where he had spent about seven months
contacting American anarchists and organising a protest movement among Japanese
15 Sakai and Kotoku, "Taisha no Ji", the Yorozuchoho, 12 October 1903, STZ, vol. 1, p. 289.
16
Crump, op. cit., p. 59. Sakai also recalls the popularity of the Heimin Shimbun. The first 5,000
copies were soon increased to 8,000, a significant number for a daily of the time. Various reading
groups were established in many parts of the country, and the members of the paper were invited to
talk. See Sakai, "Heiminshajidai", in "Shakaishugi Undoshiwa [A Sketch of Past Socialist
Movements]", Chud Koron, January 1931, STZ, vol. 6, pp. 189, 195.
17
Sakai, "Nihon Shakaishugi Undoshoshi [A Brief History of Japanese Socialist Movements]",
leaflets published along with Marukusu Engerusu Zenshu [Collected Works of Marx and Engels]
(Tokyo: Kaizosha, from June 1928), STZ, vol. 6, p. 328.
18
Sakai, "Shakaishugi Undoshiwa", STZ, vol. 6, p. 168.
19 Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 43.
20
ibid., p. 305.
21 See Kawaguchi, Sakai Toshihiko no Shogai, vol. 1, pp. 207-14.
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students." Kotoku's position was now more extreme than previously, although his
93
anarchism entailed general strikes not the violent overthrow of the government."
Also in 1906, Sakai, Kotoku and others founded the Japanese Socialist Party,
when they sensed that the new government led by Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi
was more tolerant towards political activities than had previously been the case. The
party was legal, as its platform pledged that it would conduct its activities "within the
law of the state". Yet within six months it was embroiled in acrimonious internal
debate about its strategy towards Parliament.
In the early days most of the socialists were parliamentarians, following the
footsteps of the German Social Democratic Party. Yet their attitudes were mixed,
since the election system was then discriminatory. How meaningful was it to support
a system when it allowed only wealthy people to participate? The question took a
more concrete form in their debate, when they sensed a shift in the global
revolutionary trend from German social democracy to the anarchism envisaged by
such theorists as Kropotkin and by anarcho-syndicalism in France.
Thus in 1906 Kotoku proposed direct action from workers rather than a
campaign for full parliamentary participation. The party was divided. Although it
adopted Kotoku's strategy in a 22-1 vote at its executive committee in 1907, many of
its leaders, including Sakai, were ambivalent and tried to find a compromise. The
final platform rejected Kotoku's call for direct action, but also said that its members
could engage in a universal suffrage movement voluntarily.
Sakai's divided attitudes to Parliament and to anarchism reveal his life-long
negotiation between personal freedom and social engagement. For him, personal
freedom is the ultimate purpose in life, and yet freedom cannot be separated from the
fact that we are "social beings". To conduct the common life effectively, people need
peaceful means to express "social determination" (shakai no kesshin) and "national
consensus" (kokuminteki shiji).24 The country's representative system is defective
and has to be altered, and yet Parliament ought to be the ultimate organ of
22 See Crump, "Kotoku Shusui and the American Connection", op. cit., pp. 182-211.
23 Sakai, "Nihon Shakaishugi Undo ni okeru Museifushugi no Yakuwari [The Role of Anarchism in
Japanese Socialist Movements]", serialised in Rono from July 1928 (vol. 2, no. 7) to January 1929
(vol. 3, no. 1), STZ, vol. 6, pp. 286-7.
24
Sakai, "Futsusenkyo to Rodokumiai [Universal Suffrage and Labour Movements]", Yuibutsushikan
no Tachibakara (Tokyo: Mitashobo, 1919), STZ, vol. 4, p. 496. The article was originally written in
1918.
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representing the people, and the country has already in existence the necessary
institutions. Thus in 1918, Sakai asserts that universal suffrage and the trade unions
are two props of the common good backed by freedom of speech and association.
His hope is to create a new political power within society, a new decision-making
mechanism, in which common opinions are formed through association and rational
debate, and implemented by an elective executive.
For Sakai compromise between personal freedom and the common life can be
made only through autonomous negotiations within society. This conviction
remained crucial for him, and is reflected in his attitudes towards Parliament. Sakai
appears to have never lost his attachment to Parliament, even when he was regarded
as a member of the "anarchist" camp led by Kotoku in 1906 and 1907, and when he
sided with the Bolshevik strategy during a brief period in the early 1920s. Likewise
Sakai never became an anarchist, although he remained sympathetic, because he
recognised that the anarchists' fierce hostility towards state power was one way to
preserve critical autonomy within the system.
The fact that a choice between direct action and parliamentarianism became
the most contentious issue for the socialists in 1906 also reveals the peculiar
problems of the Japanese political system which Sakai and other socialists had to
face. For in a truly participatory democracy there need be no necessary contradiction
between direct action and broad political participation through Parliament under a
system of popular sovereignty. In fact, Sakai learned through experience and with the
introduction of male universal suffrage in 1925 that direct action and
parliamentarianism could complement each other in the formation of public opinion.
Yet the 1906 debate by the Social Democratic Party not only concerns the political
system as a whole but also reflects a pervasive scepticism about political
participation, focusing on the role of Parliament. The idea of Parliament as the
ultimate organ for political representation remained, although it sometimes raised
unreasonably high expectations for the constitutionally weak and practically
ineffective national assembly. On the other hand, in the absence of full public
participation, Parliament could never become an integral part of public
consciousness. Thus, the Japanese leadership was unable to launch a national unity
party, akin to Hitler's National Socialist Party or Mussolini's Fascist Party, when the
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country intensified its war efforts in the late 1930s, because Parliament did not have
the requisite authority and influence over the people. Sakai's both cautious and
optimistic assessments of parliamentarian politics are a record of Parliament's mixed
appeal.
At the same time the fluctuating fortunes of the Japanese Socialist Party in its
early years serve as an index of governmental security. Tolerance and repression
complement the general atmosphere of society, and the party operated largely
25unhindered in the more liberal years immediately after the Russo-Japanese War."
However in 1907, when the party dropped its previous adherence to "within the
limits of the law", the government promptly banned it.
When Katsura replaced Saionji as prime minister in 1908, the government
intensified its suppression of socialist activities. Sakai was sentenced to two years in
prison for obstructing the police in the Red Flag Incident in June, and two months for
violating the Press Law, after having already spent one and half months in prison
earlier in the year. The government's tighter measures coincided with the growing
pressure of financial and domestic crises. Thus the Russo-Japanese War had left the
government with deep financial shortfalls. At the same time the public had become
more impatient with what they saw as governmental exploitation, as seen in the
Hibiya Riots of 1905. Yet international co-operation, a euphemism for continued
military spending, had to be maintained. New taxes were levied on such basic
commodities as alcohol, sugar, and kerosene in 1908, triggering wide-spread
protests. Hence the years 1907 and 1908 saw a sharp increase in the number of
labour disputes. Typically the government issued the Boshin Shosho, in the form of a
message from the emperor urging the people to save and be frugal, a transparent
attempt to alleviate post-war problems by creating a public-spirited populace firmly
linked to the state, to local government, and to the family. The issuance of the
imperial message coincided with the launching of the Local Improvement
Movement, a programme initiated by the Home Affairs Ministry to "improve" the
regions. Accordingly the ministry instructed the text to be read at various public
25 Yamakawa Kikue recalls this period as representing "the peak of liberalism and naturalism, and
growing calls for forward change, disclosure of truth, and no icon worship" quoted by Kawaguchi,
Sakai Toshihiko no Shogai, vol. 2, p. 99.
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meetings through prefectural governors and regional leaders.26 The movement was
intended to reorganise the state structure by co-opting the people to local
communities, and aligning local communities with the central government. Thus, if
the Boshin Shosho asserts that "further expansion is necessary in various areas of
government", it also requires an "efficient" local government structure. Within this
rhetoric of public service the bureaucrats are clearly present.27 And in a directly
related way the increasing harassment of socialists also reflects the beleaguered
government's efforts to reinforce its authority.
That harassment reached its climax in 1911, when the government executed
the 12 "anarchists", including Kotoku, for attempting to assassinate Emperor Meiji.
The incident, which became known as Taigyaku Jiken (High Treason Incident),
marked the beginning of the "winter" period, during which time socialists were
banned from all political activities. Sakai continued to make a living through his
writing. This was also a period of intensive reading, and Sakai's political
understanding deepened significantly as I hope to show later. The loss of close
friends and the demonstration of state power seemed to mark him permanently.
Afterwards his logic sharpened, and his writing became more pointed and
unsentimental. His previous carefree attitude was now replaced by a persistent
preoccupation with simplicity of statement, as if clarity was a form of self-defence
and self-assertion. Persistent censorship forced him to be cautious, yet his inquiry
into authority became much deeper than before. Sakai's reading and writing during
the winter period were diverse and intensive, and his commitment to Marxism (and
his knowledge of it) increased.
26 Kinbara Samon, "Ie to Mura to Kokka no Aideorojii [Ideologies of the Family, the Village and the
State]", in Rekishigaku Kenkyukai and Nihonshi Kenkyukai (eds.), Koza Nihon Rekishi 8, Kindai 2
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985), p. 283. The administrative programme included the
classification of the assets of traditional communities, such as common forests, as the properties of
municipal governments, and the abolition of community shrines (the one-shrine-per-village or town
policy). The consolidation of shrines (jinja gdshi) around 1906 is part of the Local Improvement
Movement, but the degree of consolidation varied because of opposition from local residents (see pp.
301-4). The first measure was intended to improve local government finances, and the second to
create the "spiritual unity" of the municipality.
27 Kenneth Pyle describes the Local Improvement Movement as "the first organised and sustained
effort of the Japanese government to deal with social problems created by industrialism and
imperialism". The movement was not uniformly successful, but it reorganised local groups into "a
national hierarchy", "under bureaucratic guidance", and it instilled "nationalism" in local leaders. See
Kenneth Pyle, "The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900-
1918", Journal ofAsian Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, 1973, pp. 51-65.
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The outbreak of World War I in 1914, however, reinforced the spread of
socialism, nationally and internationally. In September 1915, Sakai began to publish
the monthly magazine Shinshakai [New Society], "the first organ to be published for
socialist activities after a long break".28 The aim as before was to disseminate
Marxism. In 1916, Takabatake Motoyuki (1886-1928) and Yamakawa Hitoshi
(1880-1958) joined Sakai to run Baibunsha, a miscellaneous publishing house he
had set up after his release from prison in 1910. Socialist supporters began to gather
around Sakai, and in 1917 he ran for the general election in a Tokyo constituency,
although he received only 25 votes. But in March he sent a congratulatory message
to the Russian leaders, representing Japanese socialists, and in October, he
introduced Lenin's writings to the general public when he published a translation of
Lenin's Russian Revolution.
The Russian Revolution and growing democratic movements abroad also
encouraged Japanese domestic movements. In 1917, the number of labour disputes
more than tripled compared with a year earlier. In the summer of 1918, housewives
in a small fishing village in Toyama Prefecture initiated a riot protesting against the
high price of rice: the riots spread across the country in a month, and involved nearly
1 million protesters. The government of Prime Minister Terauchi Masataka deployed
the Army to quell the riots; his action met strong public criticism, and Terauchi was
forced to resign and was replaced by Hara Takashi. Hara was the first prime minister
to be chosen based on his party's parliamentary strength, marking the beginning of
party politics in the country. In the same year Sakai was able to abandon his practice
of publishing anonymously.
Sakai described the year 1919 as a time of great confusion in Japanese society
in terms of political thought and activities. Marxism had begun to attract intense
interest among intellectuals, and in late 1918, intellectuals and students guided by
Yoshino Sakuzo formed their own societies Reimeikai (Dawn Society) and
Shinjinkai (New Man Society) to promote political reform. Universal suffrage and
labour and tenant movements began to have momentum. Nationalist movements also
began to emerge. By contrast, Kita Ikki, "the ideological father of Japanese fascism",
launched at the same time Yuzonsha [the Society of Those who Yet Remain], Its
~8
Sakai, "Nihon Shakaishugi Undo ni okeru Museifushugi no Yakuwari", STZ, vol. 6, p. 308.
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platform included "the construction of a revolutionised Japan", "the co-ordination of
reform movements", and "the emancipation of the Asian peoples". As Maruyama
Masao remarks, "it was not simply an anti-Bolshevist movement like the previous
groups, but displayed a truly fascist ideology that combined domestic reforms and
international demands". Maruyama sees the year 1919 as the start of "a clear growth
79
in right-wing activity".
This new atmosphere also influenced the socialists around Sakai. Takabatake,
the first Japanese to translate Marx's Capital, began to advocate state socialism
(kokka shakaishugi) centring on the imperial family, while Sakai insisted on
Marxism. Drifting apart, they dissolved Baibunsha.
Nevertheless the major impact of the Russian Revolution and of growing
domestic democratic movements on Sakai is perhaps best to be seen in his increasing
recognition of the masses as real political agents. The establishment of the Soviet
Union reinforced this process, which in turn fostered the formation of a political
party. For until then Sakai had shared the alienation from the masses of the early
socialists.
Crump points to the elitism of the Meiji socialists, and in Sakai's case says it
stemmed from his samurai background and "Confucian training". Crump quotes
Sakai as saying in 1902, "Right-minded young gentlemen must sternly control their
desire for food, clothing and shelter and admonish all thoughts of idleness and
luxury. But one certainly should not hope to see such attitudes emerge among the
majority of ordinary people, on a scale wider than among what I call 'right-minded'
people."30
Another reason for the Meiji socialists' detachment from the masses was
Japan's low level of capitalist development and the small number of factory workers,
according to Crump. Yet it remains true that Sakai's socialism was not prompted by
proletarian class consciousness, and in his early career socialism was to be practised
for self improvement rather than as an instrument of orchestrated social change. With
29
Maruyama Masao, "The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism", Thought and Behaviour in
Modern Japanese Politics, p. 28.
30
Crump, op. cit., p. 130. Sakai's article appeared in the Yorozuchoho on 24 December 1902, STZ,
vol. 1, pp. 240-41. According to Crump, "In the true elitist Confucian style, society was to be
reformed for the 'ordinary people'. Until this had been done for 'them,' 'they' could hardly be
considered responsible for their actions—let alone for their own emancipation" (Crump, op. cit., p.
131).
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socialism intensely linked for him to personal venality, some key concepts of mass
movements, such as association based on individual spontaneity and spontaneous
practical leadership, were absent.31 However the concept of the masses is already
inherent in his view of the ideal, and Sakai's shift from socialism as personal moral
belief to socialism as a guiding principle for mass movements was less problematic
than for some of his contemporaries.
The new tendencies were especially apparent in 1922, when Yamakawa
published a now famous essay entitled "Musankaikyu Undo no Hokotenkan [Change
of Direction of Proletariat Movements]" in the Zenei. Inspired by the establishment
of the Soviet Union, Yamakawa asserts that Japanese socialists hitherto had been
engaged in activities detached from the masses, and they should now align
themselves with the people and move them in a new direction. This message was in
tune with Sakai's own reappraisal, and in an essay of 1928 he would say, "The past
20 years of the socialist movement have been largely a matter of private quests for
clarification of individual positions, away from the masses. But such an unpolluted
(keppeki) attitude has its limits."32 Now, "a small circle of friends" chattering about
imaginary revolution or venting their frustrations about police harassment would
never change the world. Fifty-two years old, Sakai now readily admitted previous
shortcomings: he and his friends had failed to connect with ordinary people.
Thus his recognition of the need for a new direction motivated him to join
other socialists and communists to form the Shakaishugi Domei (Socialist League) in
1920. Here socialists and labour activists joined forces for the first time. As Sakai
puts it, the organisation was "an attempt to transform the growing labour movement
into a political entity", and "the first effort of the emerging proletariat to consolidate
itself as a political force".33 The organisation was banned in the following year. At
the same time, a serious rift between "Bolshevism" and anarcho-syndicalism became
clear.
In 1922, Sakai and others founded the Japan Communist Party illegally and
he became the first chairman. He was imprisoned in 1923 for seven months in the
31 For a general criticism of such a tendency, see Matsuzawa Hiroaki, Nihon Shakaishugi no Shisd
(Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1973), pp. 39-41.
32
Sakai, "Nihon Shakaishugi Undoshoshi", STZ, vol. 6, p. 354-5.
33 ibid., p. 355.
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first large-scale crackdown on communists, and he did not join the party when it was
reestablished in 1926. Instead, he joined the Rono-ha, a group of socialists critical of
the Comintern, and he inclined towards various proletariat movements. Sakai's
withdrawal was regarded as a betrayal by die-hard supporters of the party.34 Yet it
also reflects his lifelong search for a practical, peaceful and spontaneous transition to
socialism.
Thus Sakai helped organise the Nihon Taishuto (Japan Mass Party), a
coalition of seven proletarian parties in 1928, and as its candidate won a seat in the
Tokyo Metropolitan assembly in 1929. The party was short-lived, as with many other
small non-affiliated organisations. Personal animosities are often cited as the major
reason for the repeated splits, but behind such confrontation lie fundamental
differences of opinion about the role of a political party in the operation of the state.
Furthermore for a political party to function effectively, it requires a group of
genuine supporters, or a political class with shared interests and political views.
Japan's modernisation and the way in which industry was built did not encourage the
spontaneous growth of such groups.
A representative example is the Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Japan General
Federation of Labour) established in 1921, a national organisation deriving from
Yuaikai, a friendly society of workers established in 1912. In 1919, Yuaikai became
a full-fledged labour organisation whose platform included full respect for workers'
rights, freedom of trade unions, and an eight-hour workday. In 1921, however, its
Tokyo branch collapsed shortly before the launch of the Sodomei. The movement
had attracted large numbers of people with diverse backgrounds, including socialists,
anarchists, communists and democrats, and it constantly faced difficulties in
maintaining its unity. The gradualists' attempts to co-operate with employers to
ensure better working conditions met with strong resistance from more radical
members. In the Tokyo area, those working for big metal factories were more
inclined to support collective strategies, while those working at smaller and
miscellaneous factories found it difficult to find common ground. Workers'
14
Kawaguchi, Sakai Toshihiko no Shogai, vol. 2, pp. 241-2.
35 Tanahashi Kotora, leader of the Tokyo branch, quoted by Hanaka Minoru, "Nihon Rodo Gakko o
meguru Jakkan no Mondai [A Few Questions over the Japan Labour School]", Bulletin of the Faculty
of Letters, Hosei University, no. 28, 1982, pp. 75-6.
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mistrust of the university-educated leaders was also strong. Beset with such tensions
the Sodomei split in 1925 after confrontation between its moderate and radical
factions.
Despite such difficulties, Sakai sided with non-affiliated groups seeking
improvement of their lives. In 1931, he helped organise the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto
(National Labour-Farmer Masses Party). He criticised the Manchurian Incident as
imperialistic aggression, and became chairman of the party's anti-war campaign
committee. And he resolutely resumed his parliamentary position, because he
believed in ordinary people's ability to decide their own affairs through debate at
national and local assemblies.36
Sakai's career, from "sentimental" royalist to idealist reformist, from Marxist
socialist to a leader of the non-affiliated proletariat, reflects the shifting progress of
his own political thought. At the same time it is a record of the metamorphosis of
Japanese society. For Sakai witnessed the emergence of an industrial society and the
social changes that accompanied that transformation: as with many of his supporters
radical social change was itself the catalyst of his alternative vision. Crucially,
however, Sakai's career also mirrors the process by which the Japanese "state"
became increasingly capable of confronting its own citizens. Sakai was imprisoned
for the first time in 1904 for violating the press regulations. His imprisonment
attracted much public attention as the first such punishment of socialists.37 Sakai was
sent to the Sugamo Prison, built on Western models and which housed more than
-io
2,000 prisoners.' As yet however the state was without a powerful apparatus for
suppressing the socialists, and it was less nervous about dissenting opinion: Sakai
was free to read at will while in prison.
This tolerant atmosphere changed in 1907. The year began with a big fall on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the beginning of a recession after the war. Strikes and
labour disputes were recurrent. A military force was deployed to quell a riot at the
Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi Prefecture in February, a labour dispute at the
Satsunai Coal Mine in Hokkaido in April and again a riot at the Besshi Copper Mine
36 For his renewed confidence in elective representation, see "Shikai o Kaikyutoso no Shinsenjo
tarashimeyo", Rono, February 1929, STZ, vol. 6, pp. 501-7.
37
Sakai, "Shakaishugi Undoshiwa", STZ, vol. 6, p. 198.
38 A
Sakai, "Gokuchu Seikatsu [A Prison Diary]", serialised in the weekly Heimin Shimbun from 3 July
(no. 34) to 14 August (no. 40) in 1904, STZ, vol. 3, pp. 46-63.
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in Shikoku in June. The government was caught between its expansion policy and
domestic protests. Shortly before the government issued the Boshin Shdsho in
October 1908, Sakai was imprisoned for one and a half months for ignoring a police
order not to speak in public, in violation of the Peace Police Law. In June, he was
arrested, along with Osugi Sakae and 11 other socialists, for causing a minor
disturbance in the Red Flag Incident. Sakai was sentenced to two years for resisting
the police, and another two months for violation of the press regulations. Sakai
recorded that around this time police detectives began to shadow socialists in their
everyday activities. And after the High Treason Incident, Tokko were established in
another attempt at surveillance.
Although it was a minor case—a scuffle between the socialists who were
waving a red flag and police officers who tried to stop them, with Sakai not even
among the flag wavers—the Red Flag Incident signalled the increasing powers of
incrimination of authority. Thus, a year earlier, the criminal code had been revised so
that judges could have broader discretion in determining sentences. Already a group
of legal experts warned that with so much flexibility punishment would become
much heavier under the new code. Although the suspension of sentences was
39
introduced, the new code changed the fundamental definition of crime. Under the
old code, punishment was determined based on how much damage the crime
inflicted on society. Now the new code would attribute a crime to the personal
defects of the individual rather than to the attendant circumstances and social
conditions, or to how much damage the act had caused. Many legal experts found the
change persuasive. However, when such a flexible philosophy of crime is combined
with insubstantial measures to protect the suspect, law can become so "flexible" that
it can be used not only to punish law-breakers but also to define law-breakers at the
volition of those who invoke it.40
A relevant example is seen in Sakai's arrest in 1923 in the first large-scale
crackdown on communists. Along with more than 20 others, Sakai was imprisoned
for seven months as a pre-trial suspect. The code of criminal procedure allowed pre-
39 For an examination of the changes of the criminal code in pre-war Japan, see Saeki Chihiro and
Kobayashi Yoshinobu, "Keihogakushi [A Historical Study of the Criminal Code]", KNKH, vol. 11,
1967, pp. 207-89.
40 For contemporary criticism of the criminal code made by such lawyers as Oba Shigema, see ibid.,
pp. 259-62, and also Matsuo, Tciisho Demokurashi, p. 129.
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trial judges to detain the suspect for questioning without evidence. This pre-trial
questioning system (yoshin seido) was first introduced in the Chizaiho of 1882, the
first modern regulations for criminal procedure, and passed into the code of criminal
procedure of 1890. Sakai was imprisoned for another six months in 1926 after the
court finally ruled on his case. This pattern of flexible incrimination had already been
observable in the Japanese legal system in such practices as "summary prosecution"
(ikeizai sokketsu)A{ However, the tendency increased as authority felt the difficulty
of containing social protests. Thus in 1924 the code of criminal procedure was
revised to reinforce prosecution powers, and the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 was
revised again in 1941 to allow the police further power of preventive detention (yobo
kokin).
This increasing flexibility in authority's ability to incriminate was
accompanied by harsher treatment of prisoners. When Sakai was imprisoned in 1926,
in contrast to what had happened to him earlier, his reading and letters were
censored. Thus state power was taking a more concrete shape in the form of legal
empowerment and oppression, at precisely the time when a new civil force became a
possibility with the extension of the male franchise. This confrontation, between state
power and the forces of civil society, was most clearly demonstrated in the
simultaneous enactment of the franchise and the Peace Preservation Law, a law that
made "denying the private property system" a punishable offence. And the state's
harsher treatment of political prisoners echoes further this polarisation of Japanese
society. Thus Sakai's career demonstrates the intensifying confrontation between
authority and the individual. And as resistance grew, authority assumed ever
increasing powers to incriminate individuals arbitrarily.
Nevertheless Sakai's socialism is always creative, not dogmatic. Ideology
provided him with the tools of social analysis, but he was never a formalist, tending
rather to appropriate Marxist notions in the service of his own moral intuitions. Like
the two other subjects of this study he was a child of the Meiji Enlightenment, and
like them, his strong sense of the historical moment moved him to action. At the
41 The former criminal code (1880-1908) lists a range of conduct to be regarded as the "minor" crime
of violating policing regulations. In 1885, the Dajokan issued the edict called ikeizai sokketsurei
allowing heads of police stations to administer summary punishment for these cases, thereby
circumventing the courts. The regulation was kept until the new judicial law (Saibansho Ho) was
introduced in 1947.
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same time, Sakai's romantic idealism always prompted him to ask fundamental
questions about the nature of a future society. In this he is again representative, for
all three men were intensely social in outlook, thus political. In Sakai's case however
Marxism provided him not only with a vision of society but also with a methodology
for its critical assessment.
Sakai's career and his critique of government is a useful gauge of the
transformation of the Japanese state and society. For Sakai, socialism is inseparable
from economic equality; economic equality is the central theme of almost all the
articles he wrote explaining socialism to the general public. His work in this area
nonetheless provides penetrating criticism of the whole structure of government and
the economic system. Thus in the first section that follows, I will examine how Sakai
came to understand Marxism with close attention to the origins of socialism in Japan.
In the second section, I will focus on Sakai's gradual rejection of the Communist
Party, and his move towards non-affiliated proletarian movements. In the third
section, I will discuss Japan's industrialisation and the various forms of "alienation"
that followed, which, along with government harassment, hampered the movement
towards solidarity. And in the last section of the chapter, I will relate Sakai's
reformist views to the condition of women and of those in the farming community: in
each case previously disadvantaged sectors of society were further victimised by
government policy and the drive to modernisation. In all of these areas Sakai applies
his Marxist inheritance to changing Japanese circumstances.
3.2. Sakai's socialism: from Jiyuminken Undo to Marxism
Robert C. Tucker summarises the key features of the thought of Marx and Engels
which are often referred to as early Marxism: "a spirit of radical negation of social
reality", "the idea of Kritik" (criticism or critique), "positive humanism", "unity of
theory and practice", and a materialistic conception of history.42 All these features
are prominent in Sakai's socialism, although he responded to materialism more as a
42 Robert C. Tucker, "Introduction", in Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader.
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dialectical method than as a theory of history. The critical and humanistic emphases
in Sakai's socialism, rather than economic analysis, are partly due to the social and
economic conditions of his time and background. For where Marx and Engels
emphasised the intrinsically dehumanising nature of wage labour prevalent in
industrial Western Europe, in Japan this was not yet felt widely as a major cause of
fundamental social change, although various problems associated with a capitalist
economy, such as working conditions, industrial pollution, and urban poverty had
just begun to attract public attention by the turn of the century. Sakai's samurai
background may also have deterred him from serious analysis of the economy, for
the orthodox neo-Confucian creed, which became the principal ideology of the ruling
class of Tokugawa feudalism, had belittled the accumulation of wealth by
individuals.43
However, dialectical materialism and "positive" humanism, absorbed by
Sakai through reading key essays by Marx and Engels (notably The Communist
Manifesto and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific) constitute the core of his socialism
and sustained him as a critic of society and government. This section will therefore
examine Sakai's socialist thought by focusing on his Marxist inheritance.
On 28 June 1912, about 40 people gathered at a Tokyo restaurant to celebrate
the 200th birthday of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The participants included socialists
such as Sakai who were prohibited from engaging in "political" activities in the wake
of the High Treason Incident, and also the old guard of the Jiyuminken Undo.
Miyake Setsurei, who had criticised the government for its relentless Westernisation
and advocated indigenous patriotism and national values, was the chief organiser.
Sakai likened the connection between the Jiyuminken Undo and the rise of socialism
in Japan to the ideological and historical link between the early French social
philosophers, such as Rousseau, and the modern social reformers, such as Saint-
Simon, Fourier and Owen (as Engels had explained it in his Socialism: Utopian and
Scientific). Further, Rousseau's Social Contract had been translated into Japanese by
Nakae Chomin in 1882 and became a best seller, thereby inspiring those involved in
the Jiyuminken Undo. Thus the five-article manifesto of the Heimin Shimbun, which
43 See Cho Yukio, "Tokugawa Hokenseika no Keizai Shiso", in Sugihara Shiro and Cho Yukio (eds.),
Nihon Keizai Shisdshi Dokuhon (Tokyo: Tokyo Keizai Shinposha, 1979), pp. 3-7.
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was first published in 1903, begins with its adherence to "freedom, equality, and
fraternity".44 And the paper's fifth issue includes an article commemorating the third
anniversary of Chomin's death and written by Kotoku, who was one of the former's
proteges. Accordingly Sakai asserts that the Japanese socialist movement sprang
from the left-wing camp of the Jiyuminken Undo.45
As with the case of Chomin, "the most influential leader of the Jiyuminken
Undo", Confucianism undoubtedly contributed to Sakai's "positive" humanism.
"Chomin's was an extremely idealistic view of mankind", according to Matsumoto
Sannosuke, referring to the influence of Mencius on him. "It held, in essence, that
mankind, having received its nature from heaven, possessed something (at least
latently or potentially) equivalent to an inherent capacity to establish norms for itself
and to construct order by itself so as to achieve satisfaction in life."46 According to
Chomin, "it was necessary for men to discover the 'truth' (shin'ri) and to advance
the cause of 'humanity', for these would never be realised merely through individual
[sic], 'complacent self-cultivation' (dokuzen jiyd). Rather it was only though the
'intercourse' (kosai) of many persons serving as the bearers 'respectively of all
thought' that truth and 'humanity' might best be fulfilled".47 Sakai often borrows
Confucian terms to explain his vision, and his closeness to Kotoku is partly
explained by the fact that they were both steeped in Confucian precepts, even as the
dominating force in their early socialist circle was Christian.
However, as Crump suggests, their joint Confucian background was less
significant than their exposure to various other ideas disseminated by the Jiyuminken
activists, such as the concept of inalienable rights. Thus "Sakai was said in 1903 still
to be 'someone who regularly loves to read the Analects of Confucius and
Mencius..." And "to the extent they were saying that an important area of their
thought remained rooted in Confucianism, these assertions of Kotoku's and Sakai's
were perfectly correct". Yet "their claims that they had followed a Confucian path to
'socialism'... need to be treated with a considerable amount of scepticism"48 In
44
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46 Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Nakae Chomin and Confucianism", in Peter Nosco (ed.), Confucianism
and Tokugawa Culture, p. 258.
47 ibid., p.260. Relevant here also is Ito Jinsai, who says "nature, originally, does not move and is set
into motion by material force" (ibid., p. 263).
48 John Crump, op. cit., p. 124.
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Sakai's case, however, we can at least say that Confucianism was by no means an
obstacle, but served as an exemplary link to socialism.
The ideas underpinning socialism and communism were introduced into
Japan as part of the whole-sale importation of Western ideas in the early Meiji
period. At first the relevant ideas had no practical impact, as only a small number of
intellectuals knew about them. Yet the insatiable interest in the development of
Western society, particularly its problems, meant that socialism and communism
could not go unnoticed. Thus, according to Shibahara Takuji, one of the earliest
records in Japanese in which the words communist and socialist appear is Kato
Hiroyuki's Shinsei Taii. This book, published in 1870, aimed at introducing the
French concept of inalienable rights. Yet for the promoters of bunmei kaika
(civilisation and enlightenment), including Kato and Nishi Amane, socialism and
communism constituted a "harmful economic theory" for they advocated "the control
of agriculture, industry and commerce by the state at the expense of civil rights".49
Kato himself was to recant his previous exclusive endorsement of inalienable rights
in the early 1880s when the Jiyuminken Undo was gaining momentum. But for some
jiyuminken activists, socialism and communism as they understood them were
always an attractive alternative to what they saw as an oppressive government
indifferent to the plight of the people. Thus in May 1882, a political party calling
itself Toyo Shakaito (Oriental Socialist Party) was established in Nagasaki Prefecture
by Tarui Tokichi (1850-1922). And the Choya Shimbun newspaper, critical of the
government and sympathetic to the Jiyuminken Undo, carried "the first
comprehensive introduction of communism and socialism"50 in a series of 11 articles
entitled "Oshu Shakaito o ronzu [About European Socialist Parties]" between June
and August.51 These articles mention Marx's historical materialism, the exploitation
of the proletariat by capital, and workers' movements such as the First International.
Yet general understanding of socialism and communism was thin, and even many
49 Shibahara Takuji, "Minkenha no Shakaito Kyomutoron [Popular Activists' Views towards Socialist
and Nihilist Parties]", Keizai Kagaku, Department of Economics, Nagoya University, vol. 34, no. 4,
March 1987, p. 152.
50 ibid., pp. 159-65.
51 Sakai was then around 12 years old and does not mention the articles in his biography. However he
does say that he was then regularly receiving the Choya Shimbun from one of his brothers in Tokyo,
and that the paper drew him to the Jiyuminken Undo. See "Sakai Toshihikoden", STZ, vol. 6., p. 60.
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jiyuminken activists regarded socialism (which they vaguely understood as the
common sharing of wealth) as "unrealistic" and "heretical".
A deeper understanding of socialism and its potential for society occurred at
the turn of the century when Japan's industrialisation and urbanisation began to
cause social distress. In 1896, Shakaiseisaku Gakkai (Association for the Study of
Social Policy) with a strong reformist position was established by Kuwata Kumazo
and Kanai Noboru, who were students of German historicism and critical of laissez-
faire and socialism also. The society also included reformist bureaucrats among its
members. Shakaishugi Kenkyukai (Socialism Study Club), Japan's first study group
of socialism, was also established in 1898 mainly by Christians, although Kotoku,
who was not Christian, was a member. A study of the poor, apparently influenced by
the works of the English social reformers, such as William "General" Booth and
Charles Booth, Yokoyama Gennosuke's Nihon no Kasd Shakai [Japan's Lower
Classes], was published in 1899. Sakai's interest in socialism therefore flourished at
a time when "shakai mondai" (social problems) had begun to attract wide public
attention.
Sakai himself explains why he became a socialist. Two influences were
essential: Confucian teaching based on Mencius, and jiyuminkensetsu (freedom and
c?
popular rights) deriving from the French Revolution. Despite the introduction of
Parliament in 1890, neither social justice nor popular freedoms had been fully
implemented. His disappointment was aggravated by intellectual confusion, for he
glosses his intellectual background as a typical mishmash of Meiji thought, youthful
patriotism, Christianity, British utilitarianism, and Social Darwinism. "I was
extremely confused", he says. But when he encountered socialism, it became clear
why the French Revolution failed to achieve its goals and why modern socialism
developed in its wake. Socialism provided him with a coherent way of understanding
society, his own as well as that of others.
However, as with many of his socialist friends, socialism for Sakai was by no
means a matter of inflexible doctrine. Rather it combined the dream of millennial
For an analysis of the articles in connection with the Jiyuminken Undo, see Shibahara Takuji,
"Minkenha no Shakaito Kyomutoron", pp. 159-65.
52 Sakai, "Yowa ikanishite shakaishugisha to narishika [Why I became a Socialist]", in "Shakaishugi
Undoshiwa", STZ, vol. 6., pp. 191-2.
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reform with a strong desire to connect to international movements. Sakai and his
friends closely followed the development of the Second International (1889-1941),
which brought together representatives of socialist organisations and trade unions in
various countries. Thus as major Western sources for the socialist thought entering
Japan before the Russo-Japanese War, Crump cites Russian populism, the German
Social-Democratic Party (SPD), which dominated the International, and a diverse
range of popularised doctrines associated with socialism in the English-speaking
countries, including "the ideas of American social-gospellers, of British Fabians and
even of New Zealand's Lib-Labs".53 Reflecting such eclectic influences, Sakai and
his colleagues of Heiminsha commemorated their first anniversary by publishing a
set of six postcards carrying the pictures of Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Babel, Tolstoy,
and Kropotkin. Sakai himself acknowledges the ideological pot-pourri, and names
R.T. Ely's French and German Socialism in Modern Times as the first book that he
read about socialism and "the virtual bible of those starting to call themselves
socialists in Japan".54
Always supplementing the influence of German social democracy was the
anti-authoritarian legacy of Jiyuminken Undo. This in turn drew him to the writings
of the Western Utopian tradition, and in 1904 he translated Edward Bellamy's
Looking Backward and William Morris's News from Nowhere. He was especially
impressed by Morris's reconciliation of community and individual freedom, and
more than 20 years later he would remember a passage from News from Nowhere
while in prison.55 Bernard Shaw also became one of his favourite authors: Sakai was
deeply sympathetic to Shaw's insistence on the "life force" and to his distaste for
hypocrisy in the name of religion. Sakai translated many of Shaw's works, including
53 John Crump, op. cit., p. 31.
'4
ibid., p.58. Crump asserts that other books read widely among the early socialists are Schaffle's
Quintessenz des Sozialismus, Thomas Kirkup's An Inquiry into Socialism, W. H. Dawson's German
Socialism and Ferdinand Lassalle and his Bismarck and State Socialism.
55 See Sakai, "Nyugoku Zengo", Keizaidrai, February 1927, STZ, vol. 6, pp. 426-8. The passage is
about the protagonist visiting a shop to buy tobacco and a pipe. He has arrived in a future society
where buying and selling no longer exist. He is offered a pipe, "something like the best kind of
Japanese work", but hesitates to take it because he is afraid of losing it. " 'Don't you like it,
neighbour?' " asks the shop assistant. " 'Oh yes', I said, 'of course I like it'. 'Well, then take it,' said
she, 'don't trouble about losing it. What will it matter if you do? Somebody is sure to find it, and he
will use it, and you can get another' " (William Morris, News from Nowhere and Other Writings,
Penguin Classics, 1998 edition, pp. 73-4).
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Man and Superman, Arms and the Man, and Fanny's First Play, during the "winter"
period when he was unable to engage in open political activities.
However, it is the writings of Marx and Engels that shaped Sakai's thought
most firmly. He translated The Communist Manifesto and Socialism: Utopian and
Scientific as early as 1904, and read Kautsky's Ethics and the Materialist Conception
of History in 1908. But it was not until after the execution of Kotoku and other
anarchists in 1911 that Sakai began to write about historical materialism with
conviction.
Two essays of 1912, "Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan" and "Yuibutsuteki
Rekishikan Kenkyu", testify to his mature understanding of a materialistic
conception of history.56 The articles appeared in the political magazine Kokumin
Zasshi published by Sakai's friend and journalist Yamaji Aizan in response to the
latter's criticisms of Marxism.
Here Sakai defined materialism by quoting from The Communist Manifesto,
Marx's Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859 (the
same short essay that caused a stir in the academy through Kawakami Hajime's
commentary a decade later), Engels's Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, and The
Origin ofFamily, Private Property, and State. Sakai was then at least a decade ahead
of mainstream academic awareness.
In the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx
challenges the seemingly immutable dominance of existing political, legal, and social
arrangements, saying that they are in fact determined by "the material conditions of
life". Our consciousness too is determined by our "social existence", because we are
social beings and our existence is intertwined with the relations of production.
Marx's stress on society and his subjugation of the state to it through his insistence
on "the material conditions of life" had immediate appeal for Sakai, for whom
society is always "the fundamental and embracing subject".
Hence, he found, changes in the economic foundation lead to the
transformation of the whole superstructure, which Marx calls "ideological" forms
that encompass law, politics, religion, arts and philosophy. That is, at some stage of
56
Sakai, "Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan [Materialist Conception of History]", Kokumin Zasshi, 15 January
1912, STZ, vol. 4., pp. 9-14, and "Yuibutsutcki Rekishikan Kenkyu [A Study of Materialist
Conceptions of History]", Kokumin Zasshi, 15 February 1912, ibid., pp. 14-24.
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development, the "material productive forces of society" come in conflict with "the
existing relations of production", leading to social revolution. If social revolution is
to succeed, people must be aware of "the contradictions of material life". And if the
system begins to produce contradictions, it ought to be challenged. This assertion
became one plank of Sakai's Marxism, and he duly translates the famous passage
from the preface: "In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter
into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of
production. The theory of these relations of production constitutes the economic
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness."
That our social existence determines our consciousness was a powerful
presupposition for Sakai, providing him not only with a theory of historical progress
but also with an empirical method linking our cognitive ability and the outer world.
CO
"[M]aterialism conceives nature as the sole reality", says Engels, who
insists on the superiority of this "reality" to metaphysics. This does not mean that
empirical reality is absolute. On the contrary, it must be subjected to our reasoning
powers, which are also challenged by it. In this logic, reality and reasoning are both
subject to continuous examination and modification. Thus nature or the outer world
is "the objective nature of the things perceived", and the world is no longer assumed
to be "a complex of ready-made things" but "a complex of processes, in which the
87 Marx, "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in Lawrence H. Simon
(ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), p.
211. The passage is translated into Japanese by Sakai, "Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan", p.12. Sakai also
translates the following: "No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for
which it is sufficient have been developed, and new super relations of production never replace older
ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old
society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer
examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its
solution are always present or at least in the course of formation." (Marx, ibid., p. 211, and Sakai,
"Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan", p. 13)
58
Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels: Selected Works, 2 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing Flouse, 1962),
vol. 2, p. 367. Sakai quotes from the article in his "Kanto ni Kaeru no Shin'igi [True Significance of
'Back to Kant']", Shinshakai, vol. 4, no. 3, December 1916, STZ, vol. 4, pp. 273-82.
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things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go
through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which...
a progressive development asserts itself in the end".59 Behind such an assertion is a
strong confidence in reason, recognition of the complexity of social life, and the
acceptance of our cognitive limitations. We do not know the outer world as "things-
in-themselves", but we know "the objective nature of things perceived". That is the
only way to comprehend the outer world and connect self to it. Dialectical
materialism boldly asserts relativism for the sake of unity of knowing and being, a
relativism that relies both on our sense-perceptions and on reason.
Thus what initially attracts Sakai to materialism is that it severs the existing
order from the status of fixed and insurmountable social norms. For him, society is
no longer a complex of ready-made things, but a shifting construct of sense-
perception and reason. And man is an active agent in this construction. Thus, as in
the case of Minobe who also accepted change in the existing norms by endorsing
common law, Sakai has secured an approach to social change which can contest the
status of morality, religion, and social custom. Materialism frees him from the
confinement of existing norms, and his dissatisfaction with the way in which
government is run and society operates is now legitimate: debilitating compromise is
no longer inevitable, and critique is a defining act for a social being.
Sakai's defence of materialism epitomises the various psychological
difficulties that many Japanese faced in building the common life. Shared by all was
the perceived force of change. Change, whether contrived or seemingly fortuitous,
was everywhere apparent, and appeared unstoppable.60 But how could they connect
themselves as autonomous beings to something in such powerful flux? This problem
of connection took a variety of forms. Yet for many, the challenge was to resolve the
conflict between familiar forms of behaviour and the new ideas that they had begun
to cherish.
Thus, according to Irokawa Daikichi, many jiyuminken activists were caught
between the new values and the familiar Confucian norms to which they still
59
Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", p. 387.
60 Such perceptions are recognisable in the common usage of the word "tokC' (time) and its association
with force. The words and phrases that combine the two, such as "jisei" and "jidai no susei", both of
which can be translated as "force of time", recur in many polemics written during this period,
including Sakai's. Many political and social changes are thus attributed to "force of time".
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adhered. For them, their ideal shishi lifestyle was no longer confined to the
traditional master-servant relationship, or to the model of the samurai fighting for
sonno joi. Shishi are now comrades fighting against oppression and trying to
establish "free government". They value the French and American revolutions. Their
heroes are those trying to realise "what many people desire", and who are concerned
with realising "the welfare of the public (shakai taishu no hengi)", in the phrase
popular around 1885. In this sense, they are pursuing new values. At the same time,
they adhere to the familiar Confucian norms, not because they feel comfortable with
them but because they do not know how to integrate the new values and the old
norms. For them, the norms of behaviour are already given. "What is good or bad is
already determined by the traditional norms of behaviour. It is up to your conscience
whether you subscribe to good or evil... Thus inner conflict would deepen if one's
desire and the perceived norms of behaviour contradict."61 In such circumstances the
easiest way-out was the negation of self as a social being and the adoption of an
unquestioning spirituality. Even as Irokawa is careful not to generalise excessively
from individual cases, he assumes that such conflict only deepened among those who
took part in the Jiyuminken Undo when government harassment intensified and their
sense of personal failure grew. Irokawa speculates that if the Jiyuminken Undo had
survived long enough, its participants might have been able to develop new norms
69
that would match their newly acquired values. Yet reconciliation between the new
values and perceived norms became a serious personal problem for many Japanese
precisely because they had assumed those norms were fixed.
Sakai too faced such a dilemma in the intellectual upheaval of the early Meiji
years. However, dialectical materialism helped him to a new vision of cultural
relativism and historical process. And this provided him with the freedom to explore
not only society but also the self. From here on, matters of objectivity and
subjectivity, self and other, private and public, became not less pressing but less
problematic.
From 1912 onward, Sakai explicated the new creed in a number of articles.
Attacking religion, state, social customs that keep women as "second-class" citizens,
61 Irokawa Daikichi, Shinpen Meijishi, p. 50.
62 ibid., p. 52.
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and education as a mere moulding of minds for the national purpose, these polemics
are a natural outgrowth of Sakai's understanding of Marxism as a critique of existing
political, economic and social arrangements. Yet the core of Sakai's materialism was
dialectic, and remained so, even as many supporters of socialism and communism
began to interpret historical materialism as an inevitable "economism", in as much as
society must evolve naturally within the economic process, regardless of individual
effort.63
At the same time Sakai's polemical defence of historical and dialectical
materialism is conducted in the face of persistent hostility. To many of his critics the
idea of historical progress as "the development of material forces" is antithetical to
their mythic notions of the national past and their adherence to the idea of never-
changing "truth" and ideals. Thus Yamaji criticises the vision of class struggle as
cruel, and historical materialism as "a cold view of history". He feels an "intuitive
animosity" against it, for it ignores the presence of heroic individuals in history, and
undermines humane philosophy. Sakai responds that historical materialism, like
Darwinian evolution, is severe, not cruel, and each corresponds to the law of nature
(riho).
According to Sakai, he and Yamaji have fundamentally different views of the
state. Yamaji sees the state as the outgrowth of the communal spirit inherent in man.
Sakai does not dismiss the importance of the spirit of community in history, but he
regards Yamaji's views as naive, because they ignore the presence of social conflicts.
For him the state is the projection of the power relations of society, although it has a
most dominant presence. Sakai quotes Engels to the effect that "the state is... a
product of society at a certain stage of development". Thus, "a power seemingly
standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict,
of keeping it within the bounds of 'order': and this power, arisen out of society, but
placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state".64 Thus,
for Sakai, it is legitimate to criticise the state, and patriotism cannot paper over the
cracks in the existing social fabric.
63 Arahata Kanson, "Tohisha" in Seikatsu to Geijutsu, quoted by Sakai, "Gomashio Atama [Grey and
Black Head]", Kindaishiso, from October 1913 (vol. 2, no. 1) to September 1914 (last issue), STZ,
vol. 4, p. 91.
64
Engels, "The Origin of Family, Private Property, and State", The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 752.
Sakai includes his translation of the passage in "Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan Kenkyu", STZ, vol. 4, p. 22.
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In this way Sakai's acceptance of historical materialism entails a view of
himself as the victim of the existing system as manifested in the state. Such self-
identification is essential to determining how one sees not only the state but also
social relationships. For if our opinions are shaped by our perceptions of "social"
problems, so are our perceptions a reflection of how we identify ourselves in society.
Sakai is very much aware of his position in such relativist terms. Thus, in 1921 he
criticises Yoshino Sakuzo (1878-1933), one of the most influential critics of the
political system during the Taisho period, an advocate of "government based on the
people" (minponshugi), and an occasional collaborator of Sakai's, for his "neutrality"
in the labour movement. According to Yoshino, workers deserve our sympathy
because of their poor working conditions, but this does not mean we should endorse
every action workers take. In direct repudiation of materialism, Yoshino claims that
people should act according to "righteousness", not group affiliation. For Sakai,
righteousness is relative. It must be qualified by attending to the specific interests of
the parties involved and the expected effects of their actions. Otherwise,
righteousness becomes a mere chameleon of discourse that imposes private values on
others.65 Around the same time Sakai lodges a similar criticism against Kawakami
Hajime (1879-1946), a professor of economics at Kyoto Imperial University and
"one of the founders of Japanese Marxism",66 for the latter's insistence on universals:
67such attitudes diminish man's critical engagement with history and society.
Relativism, however, does not by any means imply the rejection of all social
values. On the contrary Sakai, adhering to his principles, believes that if moral forces
are to be capable of directing the people as a whole, they must be rooted in the
present, and be equally shared. For his political sensibility ideals imply "a mind that
65 Sakai, "Tare no koshieta Dorika [Who Makes Justice?]", Shakaishugi, March 1921, STZ, vol. 5, pp.
84-8. As for Yoshino's position, Tetsuo Najita says: "He conceived of democracy as a pure
metaphysical ideal, and it was idealism that led him, toward the end of his life, to deny in sweeping
fashion the democratic potential of organized political activity—a denial which a supporter of liberal
or social democracy in the West at that time would have found difficult indeed to uphold" (Najita,
"Some Reflections on Idealism in the Political Thought of Yoshino Sakuzo", in B.S. Silberman and H.
D. Harootunian (eds.), Japan in Crisis, Essays on Taisho Democracy, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974, p. 31).
66 Gail Lee Bernstein, Japanese Marxist: A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946) (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. vii.
67 Sakai, "Kawakami Hajime kun o hyosu", in Kyofu, Toso, Kanki (Tokyo: Shueikaku, 1920), STZ,
vol. 4, p. 425.
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recognises its dissatisfaction with the present and seeks fulfilment".68 A belief in
socialism therefore entails a belief in society's transformative power, politics and
vision alike generated by social forces.
Yet always for Sakai materialism is primarily a means of connecting self and
society. Thus a key theme of his articles in the 1910s is the common practice of
separating ideal and reality. Accordingly a series of essays appeared in Kindaishiso
from October 1913 to September 1914, which reflect the strong influence of Karl
Kautsky. Kautsky, a major interpreter of Marxism and a leading theorist of the
Second International who lived with Engels for several years until the latter's death,
had reinforced Marxism's criticism of the Kantian dichotomy between the world of
phenomenal appearance and "noumena" .69
This series includes an article revealingly entitled "Jiyu to Hitsuzen [Freedom
and Necessity]". Although the title is a direct quote from one section of Kautsky's
book, the article is Sakai's own meditation on ideal and reality, theory and practice.
Sakai wrote the article when he was banned from overt political activity in the wake
of the High Treason Incident. Yet at that time young socialists such as Osugi and
Arahata Kanson remained eager to act promptly. Sakai was not so sure. Idealism
alone seemed no longer viable, and caught between his socialist ideals and the
realisation that the present situation did not allow him to act as he wished, Sakai
concludes that necessity does not contradict freedom as long as we maintain our
ability to judge and decide.
In his Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, Kautsky had dealt
with fundamental questions inherent in historical materialism and determinism. Why
68 Sakai, "Yuibutsushikan to Risoshugi [Materialist Conception of History and Idealism]", Kaizo,
February 1920, STZ, vol. 4, p. 443. The passage echoes the following from Karl Kautsky: "The
constitution of nature external to us and of my own body produce necessities which force on me a
certain willing and acting which being given according to experience can be reckoned with in
advance" (Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, translated by John B. Askew,
fourth edition, revised, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1918, p. 63).
69
Kautsky says: "Certainly this latter [the noumena] is for us unknowable, it lies outside of our
experience, so that there is no need to deal with it; one might simply take it as a method of designating
the fact that our knowledge of the world is always limited by the nature of our intellectual faculties, is
always relative, that for us there can only be relative and no absolute truths, not a final and complete
knowledge, but an endless process of knowing" (ibid., pp. 40-1). Kautsky criticises Kant for his
failure to recognise the real world. Even if we cannot recognise a thing itself, we can recognise the
real differences between things, according to Kautsky. As for morality, he says, "The moral law
already includes conditions which belong to the world of the senses. It is not a law of the 'pure will' in
itself, but a law of the control of my will when brought in contact with my fellow men. It assumes
this; for me, however, these appearances are from the world of the senses" (ibid., p. 53).
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do men, who are supposed to be free, feel a certain action necessary? If history has a
direction, how can we assert our freedom? Kautsky's answer is that we choose our
own aims as "active agents". Necessity belongs to the past, "the world of
experience", and freedom to the future. But standing on "the boundary," we make
our own judgements. In this sense, necessity and freedom both facilitate our action.
Sakai is aware that in his case such choice is limited. Yet necessity complements
freedom, because it is still he who decides. Materialism was then for him an assertion
of the resilience of autonomy at a time of severely restricted freedom. "Idea cannot
match necessity completely. But we should try to reconcile them as much as
70
possible. Otherwise, we will be left only with disappointment."
Sakai at this time was deeply aware of what he felt was a growing preference
for the ineffable, incompatible with the need to unify necessity and ideal through
continuous self-examination. "People often say that the human intellect is only
partial, compared to the wholeness of intuition. Science based on intellect, thus, has
only a partial function... To follow our intuition is the right way to act. Intellect
71
should be subjected to the senses and intuition." Sakai challenges such a view,
saying that intellect and intuition are inseparable.72
Sakai's objection is a Marxist's response to what he sees as the "assault on
thought" by intuition, in the forms of popular "spiritualism", the emphasis on
"morality" by government and some intellectuals, and the rise of a prevalent pseudo-
philosophy, in which half-baked thought is presented to the public in language not
clearly expressed. All these trends, which themselves reflect the fluid yet capricious
mood of post-Meiji society, are accepted or benignly overlooked on the assumption
that intuition and spirit belong to a higher realm.




Thus, following Kautsky's footsteps, Sakai criticises the neo-Kantian call for "Back to Kant",
which was understood in Japan as a criticism of naturalism in literature and of materialism and
socialism in general. In 1917, Sakai, not unlike Minobe, asserts that sein (is) and sollen (ought) cannot
be separated from each other. See Sakai, "Kanto ni kaeru no Shin'igi", STZ, vol. 4, pp. 273-82.
Sollen and sein are linked with each other by a dialectical method, according to Sakai. Likewise,
"intuition" and "the will" are not contradictory with each other. He criticises the writer Morita Sohei
for claiming that socialism has come to a standstill and what we need is "sollen". According to
Morita, human beings possess what machines cannot explain, that is, the human will, the will to
improve self, and the admiration of ideals. For him, the will is synonymous with ethics. For Sakai,
however, ethics is a kind of "constructed" institution that has been nurtured by society and is deeply
ingrained in it.
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Sakai's objection to this seeming disparagement of thought and language is
part of his social vision. For Sakai thought must be expressed clearly if it is to
communicate with others. Asserting something that transcends mutual understanding
is mere mystification, or worse distortion. His linking of comprehension with
expression reflects Sakai's belief in a communicative community. Socialism is firmly
associated with new ways of conducting the common life. Thought ought to be
social, in the sense that it ought to be understood by others. So in the 1912 articles,
Sakai translates Marx's vision of a civil society (biirgerliche Gesellschaft), "the
totality of the material conditions of life", into "shiteki shakai" and "minkan shakai"
(a society of private people).73 For Sakai understands that historical materialism
concerns such a society, and advocates its transformation into a communicative, and
thus truly civil society.74 "Human knowledge", he says, "is still limited, and social
and personal matters are full of the unknown. That is why we communicate with
7c
others, trying to let others know what we have already learned." In this way the
political health of a society will always depend on the quality of discourse active
within it.
For Sakai then socialism is intensely humanistic, in that it concerns common
needs and seeks rational ways of addressing social problems. It constitutes one's
moral stance towards the outer world, intensely critical of it, but at the same time
attempting to connect oneself to it in a meaningful way. Socialism is a process in
which one interacts with society without presupposing any absolute truth that can
dictate this relationship.
In his determinism, Sakai maintains his Utopian view of society and a belief
that human history is a history of progress. Historical materialism does not promise
the final stage of justice: the abolition of the present capitalist system merely means
73 Marx's vision of civil society is more restricted: "My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither
legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a
so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the
material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French
thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term 'civil society'; that the anatomy of this
civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy" (Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., pp. 210-1).
74 Umemori Naoki reaches a similar conclusion based on his study of Sakai's advocacy of vernacular
usage. See Umemori Naoki, "Nijuseiki no Shonen yori Ojisan e [A Letter from a Boy in the 20th
Century to His Uncle: "Vernacular Revolution', 'Household' and 'Socialism' in the Thought of Sakai
Toshihiko]", Early Japanese Socialist Studies, No. 10, 1997, pp. 39-56.
75 Sakai, "Gomashio Atama", p. 93.
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the beginning of a new era when people will be free from subjugation and can
explore that freedom. "You might think that such a view is extremely optimistic. But
at the bottom of our hearts we socialists all have such a hope. Our messiah is not a
76
traditional hero but the working class itself."
Serious problems remained, however. Were there appropriate conditions for
the Japanese to form such a life? Were they autonomous enough to direct their own
affairs? Habermas, as we know, asserts that open and unobstructed debate is essential
to consensus making.77 Pre-war conditions in Japan by no means appeared to assure
that debate. Maruyama Masao, pointing out "problems" of modernisation which
made it difficult for the Japanese to voluntarily form their own associations,
describes two periods, one the years from around 1900 to 1910, and the other the
years immediately following the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, as two of the most
78obvious turning points when transformation in Japanese society became apparent.
He speaks of the forces of "rationalization, mechanization, and bureaucratization",
and he describes the two periods as points when individuation assumes sharp focus.
By individuation he means representative reactions to "modernization", disruptive
and emancipating simultaneously. Yet these periods see a growing number of
atomised people unwilling to establish solidarity with their fellow citizens
voluntarily. Several factors contribute to this trend: government harassment, the
increasing regimentation of society and government, separation between cities and
the country in both materialistic conditions and the popular imagination, and the
unstable economy, which made many white-collar workers feel hapless. This
problem of association is particularly discernible among the youth, for "the Japan in
which the younger generation lived was a country where a fundamental constmction
of the national state had almost been completed and social life had begun to be
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Sakai, "Yuibutsuteki Rekishikan Kenkyu", STZ, vol. 4, p. 24.
77 Habermas notes: "Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the outset be justified theoretically
and then be carried out organizationally. The sole possible justification at this level is consensus,
aimed at in practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the consciousness of their common
interests and their knowledge of the circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary
consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what
expectations" (Jtirgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, translated by John Viertel, London:
Heinemann, 1974, p. 33).
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Maruyama, "Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme", in Marius B.
Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1965), pp. 489-531.
175
managed by routine".79 Ishikawa Takuboku clearly fits the diagnosis. The "over¬
sensitive response, on the part of the government, to every show of marked
individuation" also worked to perpetuate "traditional conformism and the attitude of
silent obedience".80
Maruyama continues: "Nor do political oppression or social pressure tell the
whole story. As long as the ideologies of 'individualism' or 'democracy' are
associated with what is urban, and as long as the reality of the mammoth city,
represented by Tokyo, makes alien to the people the idea that there does also exist an
ASSOCIATIVE form of individuation, then there will always be the psychological
tendency to identify political and social chaos as well as lack of solidarity with
individuation per se\ the attraction to the 'aseptic' will continue to frustrate efforts to
81
strengthen, by exposure, the body's resistance to, or toleration of certain germs."
Thus Maruyama defines the widespread antipathy to the new social forces,
and the common assumption that "individuation" is socially suspect. What then of
the significance of Sakai's Marxism in such a society? After World War I, Marxism
had swept through the academy, and explaining why so many intellectuals were
attracted to it, Maruyama cites the attraction of structural analysis and the assertion
of the new subjectivity in learning. Yet the early Meiji tradition, when Comte,
Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Thomas Buckle, were widely read, was now
replaced by a growing specialisation of disciplines as well as the consolidation of the
state. Nevertheless Sakai's socialism emerges out of the new alignments of power
and learning, even though for some, it is profoundly alien.
79 ibid., p. 511.
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Maruyama says: " 'You may as well contend against the authorities as reason with a crying child'
was the attitude that prevails especially in the rural sectors where the individuation process had not
penetrated. That is to say, the prevalence of the PA type did not mean that the privatized and/or
atomized individuals has become the majority in Japanese society. Furthermore, the behavior pattern
fostered in the ie (family) or buraku (hamlets) continued to influence the people living in large cities"
(ibid., p. 528). Yet if definitely government's "overbearing" attitudes hindered the formation of
spontaneous associations, the people were not mere passive recipients of government policy, and the
government also had to respond to their opinions. "Over-sensitive" response was very often directed
at a specific movement which those in power saw as most harmful to their ruling. In my view I think
we need to look more closely at interactions between government and people, and the operation of
certain institutions, such as law, to understand the interaction, before we conclude that the ruling
oligarchy "could perpetuate its own rule by encouraging the traditional conformism and the attitude of
silent obedience".
81 ibid., p. 531.
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At this stage, however, Sakai's socialism is seriously indifferent to the
masses. Such weakness becomes clear if we compare his writings to such things as
the more concrete criticism of the impact of industrialisation on Japanese society
addressed by Yokoyama Gennosuke in his "Nihon no Shakaiundo" of 1898.82 Here
Marxism and other economic theories are discussed within the context of immediate
social problems, with concern for rising inflation, labour disputes, and various tax
increases. Furthermore in December 1897, the Iron Workers' Union, widely regarded
as the first trade union in Japan, was organised in Tokyo with over one thousand
members.83 Increasingly aware of the limitations of his thought, and of the examples
of Yokoyama and his followers, Sakai late in his life began to replace shakaishugi
(socialism) with shakaiundo (social movements). In the next section I will therefore
examine this shift in his thought in response to immediate social and political
change.
3.3. Sakai's socialism: from visionary Marxism to proletarian
engagement
The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent establishment of the Soviet
Union in 1922, the collapse of the German Empire in 1918, and the growing
domestic demands for broader political participation exposed Sakai's socialism to
new challenges. Until then, his socialism was a privately cherished personal belief.
With the absence of a self-assertive working class in Japan, Sakai knew that his
political beliefs were founded upon Utopian ideals. The post-war international and
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Yokoyama included the essay as an appendix in his Nihon no Kasdshakai, an acute observation of
the urban poor, factory workers, and tenant farmers. See Yokoyama, Nihon no Kasdshakai, Iwanami
Bunko, 1985 edition, pp. 341-89. He modelled his reportage on the writings of English social
reformers such as Charles Booth's Life and Labour of the People in London (1891 — 1903) and the
founder of the Salvation Army William "General" Booth's In Darkest England, and the Way Out
(1890). For an account of Yokoyama's life, see Tachibana Yuichi, "Yokoyama Gennosuke shoden",
ibid., pp. 397-407.
83 See Katayama Sen, The Labor Movement in Japan (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company Co¬
operative, 1918), p. 38. For an account of early labour movements, see also Takano Fusataro, Meiji
Nihon Rodo Tsushin, Iwanami Bunko, 1997.
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domestic developments changed such a "reclusive" view. Cautiously, but also
euphorically, Sakai moved to "collective" political activities.
It is difficult to give a clear-cut assessment of Sakai's view of the newly
fledged Soviet Union. Like many other socialists, he rejoiced in the birth of the first
worker's state. And yet the dominance of a single party contradicted his egalitarian
views, unless present arrangements were considered transitional. This dilemma is
reflected in his involvement in the establishment of the illegal Japanese Communist
Party in 1922, and then in his departure from the party in 1924, when it became more
and more under the influence of the Soviet-led Comintern. During this brief period,
Sakai appears to have abandoned his parliamentarian position, hoping to see a
Soviet-style proletarian revolution occur in Japan.
On his departure from the party, Sakai became increasingly involved in
proletarian movements. Both national and local assemblies were at the centre of his
political activities.84 His admiration for Lenin and for the idea of a worker's state
remained, but he appears to have adhered no longer to the idea of a "vanguard" party,
and instead envisaged a "united front" of different social classes in a capitalist
society. None of the movements lasted long enough to steer the masses because of
government harassment and internal disagreement. However such an emphasis on
"solidarity" was a bold attempt to affirm society rather than state. This section will
examine that phase of Sakai's socialism when popular participation in politics
appeared to him a possibility.
The year 1919 witnessed "the most drastic progress" in people's attitudes
towards politics in general in Japan, according to Sakai. Amid the global changes,
domestic unrest, evident in the growing number of labour disputes and the Rice Riots
of 1918, was causing considerable upheaval. The Rice Riots symbolised the people's
protest at the human costs of the government policy of national expansion. The mood
of change excited many, as seen in the formation in late 1918 of various groups
calling for political reform such as the Reimeikai and Shinjinkai. The government
was obliged to promise that it would not prevent the dissemination of "foreign" ideas
as long as they respected the spirit of the nation and did not trigger drastic social
84 These activities will be documented in my next section.
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change. And it had to state that the law did not ban trade unions.86 These moves all
encouraged domestic pro-democracy movements.
This more assertive public encountered renewed urgency in a bureaucracy
keen to align the populace within its perceived goals for the national good. Thus in
1919, the Home Affairs Ministry launched a nation-wide campaign to "foster
national strength" (Minryoku Kanyo Undo) so as to overcome the post-war
"slackening of social order" by promoting savings and frugality. Recognising a
pattern in pre-war government public policy, Sheldon Garon notes: "Following both
the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, the public was warned again and again of
Japan's 'coming peacetime economic war' with the Western powers and the need to
work hard, make sacrifices, and rally behind the state."87 It was clearly felt that the
relationship between state and society, and the state and the individual, required
reshaping.
At the same time reactionary movements also sprang up, including the
establishment of new nationalist groups. Polarisation of opinion over the new
national policy was also discernible within government. Thus while the Cabinet of
Prime Minister Hara Takashi was signalling its willingness to co-operate on U.S.-led
international efforts for post-war disarmament, a unit of the Japanese Army stationed
in Manchuria was reinforced, thereby becoming the Kwantung Army, and enhancing
the military's autonomy in the region. Maruyama therefore finds in the year 1919 the
first signs of the fascist period. Nevertheless democratic and reactionary trends
flourished simultaneously, and are perhaps discernible in the demise of Sakai's own
publishing house, Baibunsha, which broke up in March 1919, when Takabatake, a
88
key member of the house, and others began to advocate state nationalism.
Against this background, debate about social problems (shakai mondai) grew
apace. In the wake of the Russian Revolutions and the growing interest in social
change, Marxism became popular among academics, writers and students.
Kawakami Hajime's Shakai Mondai Kenkyu. sold tens of thousands of copies.
Takabatake and Yamakawa both published their respective commentaries on Marx's
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87 Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 13.
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Capital. The government still prohibited socialist propaganda, but allowed these
publications in the name of academic research.
Sakai himself embraced the sense of a new era. In such a chaotic period,
thought of all kinds was undoing the old attempts at synthesis. Yet he would stick
with Marxism. He acknowledges that it is now prone to division, and that he cannot
say at this moment to which school he belongs. But loyal to the old determinism, he
89
proclaims the abiding importance of material circumstances. "A certain period has
a certain trend, and each country has its own peculiar features. The combination of
the two will determine what kind of political movement gains force in each
country... Now it is difficult to tell where the general trend of time will go, given the
chaos and new developments in Europe and the United States after the war, and how
national features will take shape... It is better to prepare for the future, help promote
the general trend, and wait."90 Clearly his Marxism faces new challenges in the face
of accelerated social change.
Socialism for Sakai always seeks both individual freedom and communal
solidarity. Yet until the mid-1910s, his socialism remained relatively aloof and
Utopian. The short-lived Socialist Party of Japan, which he had helped to establish in
1906, for instance, remained far more an ideological group than a party with any real
prospect of participating in mainstream politics.
That climate changed for good in the late 1910s. Sakai ran for the general
election in 1917. Although he and his supporters were not able to mount an effective
campaign because of police harassment, a diverse range of people rallied round him,
including the writers Baba Kocho, Ikuta Choko, and Abe Isoo. A new civil
movement was emerging,91 and during this period Sakai actively sought out new
alignments and made contact with those seeking new political and social
92
arrangements, such as Yoshino Sakuzo, and with the labour activists. In his
89 Sakai, "Marukusushugi no Hatajirushi [A Motto for Marxism]", Shinshakai, vol. 6, no. 1, May
1919, STZ, vol. 4, pp. 321-4.
90 ibid., pp. 323-4.
91 See Matsuo, Futsusenkyo Seido Seiritsushi no Kenkyu, pp. 110-1. Co-operation between liberal
writers and socialists in suffrage movements started during the "winter" period. Sakai supported
Baba's candidacy in the general election in 1915 behind the scenes. Yasunari Sadao, a Baibunsha
associate, became chief of Baba's election campaign. Many writers supported Baba's candidacy, and
Natsume Soseki was one of many contributors to the 1,127-page collection of essays published to
raise funds for Baba's campaign. See ibid., p. 109.
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writings he probed the old separation between politics and society, and made social
problems his central focus.
This was also the period when Kawakami Hajime articulated the key
distinction between social problems (shakai mondai) and social policy (shakai
seisaku).93 According to Kawakami, social policy is widely used to refer to policies
about production. That is why it is discussed frequently within government and in the
academy. However, he claims, social policy should also concern itself with the more
equal distribution of wealth so as to alleviate social distress. Sakai supports
Kawakami's claim, despite his criticism of the latter's rejection of historical and
dialectical materialism.94
Thus, in an article of 1919, Sakai attempts to explain why social problems
and political problems have become detached from each other.95 In Japan, political
movements began as protests against government, as in the case of the Jiyuminken
Undo. However, since the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, activists have
become either members of Parliament or government sympathisers. Capitalist
pressures have facilitated such fusions with the ruling class, and political movements
have lost their original role. Through this process "political movements are no longer
respected nor feared. They may be despised or rejected as much as before, but their
meaning has completely changed".96 Politics itself has little time for the crucial task
of winning popular trust.
On the other hand, social movements, which were once considered apolitical,
including charity and relief work, the elimination of prostitution, campaigns against
alcohol and smoking, and the literary movement in favour of the vernacular, all of
these are political, because they are related to the gap between rich and poor and so
concern the whole society. Thus, says Sakai, if the political movements of the past
have been absorbed into the status quo, social movements have now replaced them as
critiques of government and of the economically privileged class.
93 Kawakami Hajime in Shakai Mondai Kanken [Current Views on Social Problems] (Kyoto:
Kobundo, 1918), quoted by Sakai, "Kawakami Hajimekun o hyosu [Private Opinions of Kawakami
Hajime]", Shinshakai, March 1919, STZ, vol. 4, pp. 417-28.
94 For their debate, see Gail Lee Bernstein, Japanese Marxist: A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime, pp.
113-5. For the introduction of the concept of social policy in Japan, see ibid., pp. 52-5.
93 Sakai, "Seijiundo, Shakaiundo, and Rodoundo [Political, Social and Labour Movements]", Kyofu,
Toso, Kanki, STZ, vol. 4, pp. 500-9. The article was originally written in 1919.
96 ibid., p. 502.
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In this way "the new political social movements have become the No.l
enemy of government and of the ruling class in general, and they have tried to
suppress them. That is why such thought is labelled dangerous. Attempts to suppress
it, various confrontations, oppressions and explosions have begun to take place."97
Clearly, for Sakai, the distinction between social and political has begun to
blur because ordinary people have begun to express their opinions directly. These
activities are still unconscious, lacking a clear sense of class identity or political
direction. Nevertheless such movements are taking place against a background of
more assertive individuals and workers. These new social and political movements
have so far failed to develop as conscious acts, mainly because the government has
acted before they began to develop as broader civil movements. However, the new
forces, "led or exploited by disenchanted politicians, have become an unconscious
(or semi-conscious) harbinger movement. The Rice Riots in 1918 were such a
98movement."
So in 1915, Sakai rebuked the masses for their lack of consciousness as the
exploited class.99 In fact, many activities in Japan appear to be taking place without
clear consciousness, according to Sakai.100 Japanese society appears to be a vortex of
merely personal desires and intentions. Yet for Sakai, consciousness means class
consciousness, and many Japanese are found wanting.
No essay in the Zenshu, the six-volume collection of Sakai's writings,
addresses this question directly. However, an article he wrote in 1919 for Shinshakai,
apparently based on Marx and Engels, and especially on Marx's "The Civil War in
97 ibid., p. 503.
98 ibid., p. 504. Sakai learned this view of unconscious social movements from Engels or Marx. For
instance, Engels says, "In the history of society... the actors are all endowed with unconsciousness,
are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without
a conscious purpose, without an intended aim... But when on the surface accident holds sway, there
actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws"
(Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", p. 391).
99 Sakai says: "The capitalist camp, although unconsciously, knows how to exploit the people based
on its selfish logic. However, many people, who are supposed to challenge it, lack such [class]
consciousness utterly" (Sakai, "Zansho to Shinryo [Staying Heat and New Coolness]" in the first issue
of Shinshakai, quoted by Kawaguchi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 74).
100 Sakai classifies such unconscious or semi-conscious activities into four types: those which seek
accumulation of wealth, those which protest against such economic activities, those which try to
escape from the new social trends, and those trying to reconcile them. See Sakai, "Yonshu no
Hanmuishiki Katsudo [Four Kinds of Half-Unconscious Activities]", Shinshakai, vol. 2, no. 2,
February 1916, STZ, vol. 4, pp. 190-202. According to Sakai, he wrote the original essay in 1913.
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France" and "The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution", implicitly links the
absence of consciousness to Japan's post-Restoration history.
In his article, Sakai interprets the Meiji Restoration as a bourgeois revolution,
and explains that the relatively smooth transition from the feudal society of the
Tokugawa shogunate into a new capitalist society was due to the features of the
existing structure, including the significant political autonomy of the "han" domains,
which facilitated its dissolution from within, and the keen social insight of the
political actors involved. These forces had worked as preparatory instigators of major
change. Now there is no such institution capable of leading society into a new stage.
"Political parties or companies may have equivalent functions, but they have not yet
grown to include elements of the newly emerging class and thus they cannot serve as
preparatory organisations."101 Sakai points out the peculiar stage Japanese society
has reached; a society which has lost its previous framework, but has not yet found a
valid replacement. For peaceful revolution to occur, Parliament will have to accept
new parties that represent the newly emerging class, and companies must allow
workers to influence their operations. A Socialist Party or a Labour Party will be
necessary, and trade unions must be encouraged. Thus Sakai points to the absence of
institutions capable of representing a new class, and identifies major weaknesses of
the present political system.
Another problem affecting social change identified by Sakai is that authority
acts as a ruling class, which creates antagonisms among the public and thus creates
an imperfectly radical class critical of it. "People who engage in the social movement
and the emerging class in general decide their strategy, attitude, and policy in
response to the attitudes of the ruling class." But "no one is willing to take the risk of
creating a great many sacrifices when peaceful revolution appears to be possible,
because making such sacrifices is painful personally and also entails great loss for
1 00
society as a whole". " Nevertheless even if no true working class has yet emerged,
if there is a ruling class, its behaviour will create groups that are not well disposed
towards it. Thus a class may be created by the ruling class, but as yet it is without
consciousness, cohesion, or political intent.
101
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In this way, Sakai asserts that class antagonisms exist even if there is no
working class, and they are the creation of the ruling class itself. But in Japanese
society there is no institution that represents the emerging class and which can
transmit its opinions in the formal decision making process. Without such
institutions, class antagonisms erupt as irrational momentary outbursts of personal
grievance. Thus Sakai now moves to interpret the absence of co-ordinated behaviour
among the masses not as reflecting a settled and self-defeating "lack of
consciousness" but as rooted in the problems of institutions. For only institutions can
give coherence to what is otherwise irrational, unrelated, sporadic behaviour.
Freedom of speech, freedom of association, and universal suffrage are all
indispensable, and thus the absence of conscious behaviour and the separation among
political, labour and social movements are all to be explained historically and
attributed to the absence of a linkage institution. This for Sakai means Parliament,
defective though that may be.
"Hence the labour movement is a social movement, and they are both
political movements. However, the labour movement has elements not directly
linked to politics, and some aspects of the social movement are not directly linked
with the labour movement... the immediate means to link them together is universal
suffrage."103
Thus Sakai's criticism of the separation between society and politics stems
from his own observations reinforced by his understanding of Marx and Engels: their
emphasis on the origins of capitalist revolution, the nature of resultant bourgeois
government, and the need for proletarian revolution. Yet for him, the transition from
a feudal system to a capitalist system during the Meiji Restoration is real because it is
"lived experience". He has nurtured his critical views of government policy as a
witness and as a socialist, and these issues are relatively easy for him to deal with.
However, questions for the future such as how to realise a proletarian
revolution and exactly what a proletarian revolution might mean for Japanese
society, are more difficult. In fact, Japanese Marxists were without agreement on
these issues, to say nothing of the disruptive influence of intensifying government
intervention in the wake of the Russian Revolution.
103
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The impact of the Russian Revolution, fascination with Lenin's thought, and
the survival of the Soviet Union deeply influenced Sakai's views about the role of a
political party in such a revolution and the shape of proletarian government.
Nevertheless until 1921, Sakai remained a strong advocate of universal suffrage, and
an implicit Parliamentarian. Yet according to Matsuo Takayoshi, Sakai's adherence
to Parliament then waned and he began to call for direct action, as did his close allies
Yamakawa and Arahata.104
However, Sakai's views about the role of a single party and of party-led
revolution were highly ambivalent. He recognises the need for such a party in the
transitional period pointed out by Marx and Engels, but the idea of a single party
leading the masses indefinitely was incompatible with his egalitarian view of society.
Even at the peak of his fascination with the world's first worker's state, he was
strongly aware of the need to reconcile majority rule and minority opinions.
Sakai first engaged with these topics in three short essays of 1918. In the first
essay, entitled "Tasuketsu to Zen no Igi [Majority Rule and the Significance of
Goodness]", Sakai repudiates his daughter's objections to majority rule. "I
immediately sensed a kind of obnoxious view in her words, which is similar to that
of tetsugaku-shugi (philosophical elitism) as taken by some scholars and writers who
rebuke 'the stupid masses' and regard themselves above them, also zenseishugi (self-
righteousness thinking) and senseishugi (authoritarianism). So I asked her how we
could know that a 'good' person was really a good person, or that a 'good' decision
was really a good decision."105 For a materialist, in other words, the concept of the
good is not absolute but relative. Yet this does not mean that it is exempt from any
definition. On the contrary, concepts of the "good" must be examined by referring to
their impact on the masses. Thus his exposition of a theory of majority rule which
104 After the Russian Revolution, socialists such as Yamakawa became enamoured of the idea of an
immediate proletarian revolution and were reluctant to take part in the growing universal suffrage
movement. Sakai was an exception in advocating the formation of proletarian parties. "It is significant
for Sakai to have recognised an opportunity for the formation of proletarian parties in the universal
suffrage movement... But no other socialist took up the issue seriously, and Sakai himself failed to
come up with a concrete strategy" (Matsuo, Taisho Demokurashi, pp. 228-9). As a result, the
dominant position of the socialists shortly after the Russian Revolution became a call for proletarian
revolution.
1 Sakai, Neko no Kubitsuri [A Hanging of A Cat] (Tokyo: Matsumoto Shokai Shuppanbu, 1918),
STZ, vol. 5, p. 196.
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will not exclude minority opinion leads on to his advocacy of communicative
democracy:
I think that the fairest and solidest way [of making decisions] is a process by which wise
opinions addressed by a minority are chosen or rejected by a majority in terms of their merits.
Sometimes authoritarian rule by a small number of wise people and a majority's blind loyalty
to their decision may be the most effective and quickest way [of getting results]. But if we take
into consideration that the combination of authoritarian rule and blind loyalty can produce
enormous damage, the time expended on a one-time detour or wasteful labour is a much
smaller loss.106
Democracy then, a process by which government policy is monitored and checked by
the general public, may be inefficient, but ignoring it would cost society a high price.
At the same time Sakai is also alert to the manipulation of majority opinion by a
minority: ",...[I]n a society where class difference prevails, if a powerful minority
trains and manipulates majority opinion through direct and indirect strategies, what
appears as majority opinion is in fact that of the minority."107 He also says:
"Sometimes, if a person with strong charisma and authority and with a strong ego
insists on his opinions passionately, even minority opinion may take the form of
unanimous agreement. Therefore, unanimous agreement is not so sacred, because it
108
may coincide with authoritarian rule." Sakai's view of an ideal political
community seems therefore to combine respect for egalitarianism with an optimistic
trust in the "common sense" of the masses. Yet it is also accompanied by a strong
degree of caution towards the exercise of power.
Nevertheless in 1922 Sakai was close to accepting the Bolshevik "vanguard"
party strategy. Yet even during this period, he would call for the creation of social
forces by every means available, including freedom of speech, freedom of
association, the universal suffrage movement, and parliamentary tactics, even as a
sense of desperation strengthened the appeal of direct action.109 Sakai at this time
106 ibid., p. 197.
107 ibid., p. 197.
108 ibid., p. 198.
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seems deeply divided between the need to accelerate the historical process and the
means thought necessary to bring it about.
In 1922 Sakai was chairman of the Japan Communist Party when it was
illegally established. However, after his imprisonment in the first large-scale
crackdown on communists in 1923, Sakai's doubts about the Comintern's strategy
grew. When the party, which was dissolved in 1924, was re-established in 1926 by
Sano Manabu, Tokuda Kyuichi and others, Sakai, along with Yamakawa and
Arahata, did not join. Instead they established a break-away group, later signalled by
the publication of the journal Rono in 1927. The group continued to criticise the
party for alienating the masses, and became closer to the growing number of non¬
partisan organisations.
Sakai never explained the actions he took during this period."0 Yet his
position is implicit in the much publicised debate between the two Marxist camps in
pre-war Japan, the Koza-ha which is close to the Comintern and its 1931 and 1932
theses, and the Rono-ha which is critical. Their debate focuses on Japanese
capitalism and the character of the needed social revolution. For the Rono-ha,
Japanese capitalism has matured to reach the state of imperialism. The next
revolution should be a proletarian revolution, which means solidarity among workers
and farmers against capitalist domination, and promotion of trade union movements.
On the other hand, the Koza-ha emphasises what they see as the remnants of
feudalism. To realise a proletarian revolution, Japan needs two revolutions, first the
abolition of feudal landownership and the emperor system, and then finally a real
proletarian revolution.111
Hoston points out that the Rono-ha is "instrumentalist" and the Koza-ha
"structuralist". And undoubtedly Koza-ha's structuralist approach has strength, as
seen in Maruyama's analysis of Japanese militarism and fascism. The concept of the
emperor system, for instance, is useful to locate structural and symptomatic problems
churches that produce 'public opinions' suitable for capitalists, and also because of the ignorance of
the proletariat. However, after he decided not to rejoin the Communist Party in 1924, he dropped such
a view and returned to parliamentarianism.
110 For Sakai's thought during this period, see Kawaguchi, Sakai Toshihiko no Shogai, vol. 2, pp. 231 -
2.
111 For recent criticism of Koza-ha, see for instance, Saito Seizaburo, "Meiji Ishin no Saikento", in
Nakamura Takafusa and Ito Takashi (eds.), Kindai Nihon Kenkyu Nyumon (Tokyo; Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, expanded edition, 1983), pp. 24-5.
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of the Japanese political system, such as the operation of taiken (imperial ordinance
power). However, the Koza-ha approach is less attentive to the actual terms of
political debate, for as Hoston says "the Koza-ha left the dynamics of contemporary
politics to inference".112
Raymond Williams also usefully notes how structuralist approaches "can
shift attention from the real location of all practice and practical consciousness: 'the
practical activity... the practical process of development of men'. Any categorical
objectification of determined or overdetermined structures is a repetition of the basic
error of 'economism' at a more serious level, since it now offers to subsume (at times
with a certain arrogance) all lived, practical and unevenly formed and formative
experience".113 This can be applied to the Koza-ha in terms of its inadequately
examined notions of feudalism or social backwardness, items of ideological "grand
design" which neglect the actual dynamics of power and relationship. If therefore,
for Sakai, structural analysis was a powerful method, manifested in Marx's and
Engels's emphasis on the totality of things, he also knew, as an active agent in
society deeply aware of the practical process of human development, that he could
never be content with grappling with structure alone.
In addition, unlike the Koza-ha, Sakai was always aware of the superiority of
society to state. For as Engels had argued, the state is a mere projection of temporal
power relations. It is "by no means a power forced on society from without; just as
little is it 'the reality of the ethical idea', 'the image and reality of reason,' as Hegel
maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the
admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with
itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to
dispel."114 Thus, as though confronting his own version of such an entanglement,
Sakai in January 1931 published a pamphlet entitled "Kyodo Sensento" (a united
front party). The pamphlet was written at a time when various proletarian parties
were coming into existence, fusing, and separating again. Thus Sakai's unified
proletarian party will not be class based in a strict sense, nor will it be either social
democrat or communist, because it will not have any insistent and inflexible guiding
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principle: "The envisaged single proletarian party may be described as a united front
of different classes (or social classes) in the capitalist society. It may also be
described as a unified front of different stages of consciousness (between different
ways of thinking, or between different attitudes about one's social conditions). That
is, the front will cover all kinds of stages of consciousness, commitment and
character, ranging from the most mature, clearly defined consciousness of resistance
of the proletariat to more elementary, ambiguous, or weak anti-bourgeoisie
consciousness."115
Here, in a passage of mingled strength and weakness, Sakai reveals his
Marxist Utopian vision of society: his millennial trust in the collective human ability
to organise and run society without one group exploiting another. Here too he
recognises the plurality of society, searching for a way to unite it for political
purposes. Precisely because of the scale of social difference, even within the
proletariat, politics has its role for mediation. Politics becomes an affair embracing
all members of society, an instrument of social integration.
As a social theory, Sakai's ideas on the united front may appear insubstantial,
crude, and not especially practical. Yet as support for a theory of political movement,
they have significant implications. For they are meant not only to criticise state
power but also to create a social force for self government, a new kind of state power
arising out of society, an attempt to make the "social" assume the "political." Politics
now becomes a matter of conscious intercourse among members of the community,
and Japanese government becomes representative in unprecedented ways. By
attempting to return politics to society, Sakai's ideas signal a new assertiveness of
society over state.
They also represent an attempt to create a system for the creation of shared
opinion. And this task does not seem to have been completed even in our time.
Ideological absolutism as represented by the emperor system may have gone. But a
credible opposition has yet to emerge. The problems of institutions, of the electoral
system, of Parliament, and of finding a viable mechanism for public debate, still
remain. Sakai's Marxist vision, especially in its later "unworldly" manifestations,
remains immensely relevant to present problems.
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3.4. Problems of unity: State, industrialisation and Sakai's vision of
solidarity
Late in life then, Sakai began to work for the formation of a "united" front against
the "bourgeoisie".116 Following Lenin's assertion that imperialism is the highest
stage of capitalism, Sakai uses the term "bourgeoisie" to describe the conjuncture of
state power and capitalism that is attempting to further exploit workers and farmers
to overcome the global recession. At the same time he rejects a Soviet-style
revolution led by an elite party. For Sakai, what makes people act together is not
party guidance, but their own agreement. However, the predominant role of the state,
i.e., government, in shaping "superstructure" and "base" is a major hindrance to
spontaneous solidarity movements. In the last two sections of this chapter I will
therefore examine the historical significance of such solidarity movements, and
Sakai's attitudes to them, against the background of the country's political, social
and economic arrangements.
According to Sakai, the potential members of the envisaged front are factory
workers, who are the proletariat in a strict sense, tenant farmers, white-collar
workers, independent farmers (whose economic conditions are more dire than those
of tenant farmers) and property-less self-employed people. Their immediate interests
may differ from each other, but they can share their basic goals as they are all
exploited by the bourgeoisie. For instance, factory workers' demands for an eight-
hour workday and tenant farmers' demands for land cultivation rights may appear to
be connected only remotely. But they can relate their interests "as long as those
interests contradict those of the bourgeoisie". This degree of common cause should
allow factory workers and farmers to act together, according to Sakai.117
Sakai's emphasis on shared interest, rather than party guidance, is in direct
opposition to the organisational principle of the Communist Party as stated in the
1931 Theses. Both are critical of state power, but disagree about the components of
Kawaguchi, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 273-4.
116 Sakai's position conforms with that of the Rono-ha, which was criticised by those loyal to the
Communist Party. See Hoston, op. cit., p. 95. For further analysis of the Rono-ha's position, see ibid.,
pp. 237-8.
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Sakai, Musanto Zengodo, p. 28.
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revolutionary force and its sources. The theses emphasise the role of the urban
proletariat and its vanguard role in leading the masses. Sakai disagrees. The
proletariat is not the only component of revolutionary force against the bourgeoisie
in a capitalist society. The vanguard cannot be formed instantaneously, as it too is a
product of environment. Thus the vanguard cannot rule the masses unilaterally, as
they interact with each other. The people need "a broader, bigger, and more solid"
118
framework that transcends such labels as communism or social democracy. In
effect Sakai's views reveal the presence of that die-hard liberalism, which the 1931
Theses condemn as "a tendency toward right-wing opportunism" that has failed to
understand the role of the Party.119
Nevertheless when he called for such a solidarity movement in late 1931 in
his last political pamphlet, Sakai was trying to hold together the fragile proletarian
cause as a leader of the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto (National Labour-Farmer Masses
Party), one of several defiant proletarian organisations.
The party's antecedents began in 1923 with the establishment of the Seiji
Kenkyukai group a year after the illegal formation of the Japanese Communist Party.
In 1925, the country's first proletarian party, the Nomin-Rodoto (Farmer-Labour
Party), was established but banned immediately on a charge that its members
included "extreme radicals". Yet various proletarian groups sprang up undeterred. In
1928, these non-affiliated parties won eight seats in the first general election under
universal male suffrage. The period between the emergence of these parliamentarians
with a proletarian background and the so-called Popular Front Incident shortly after
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 saw high tension between the
proletarian movements and government, and the Communist Party was by then
severely suppressed. These proletarian movements represented a new form of
popular political action in the era immediately after male universal suffrage.
Fearing signs of the growing influence of communists after the general
election, the government intensified its anticommunist repression. Large-scale
crackdowns commenced, notably on 15 March in 1928, and then on 16 April.
Against this background, Sakai helped organise the Nihon Taishuto (Japan Mass
118 ibid., p. 37.
119 The 1931 Theses, in English, can be found in George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The
Japanese Communist Party 1922-1946, p. 318.
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Party), a coalition of small proletariat parties, in 1928, and as its candidate won a seat
in the Tokyo metropolitan assembly in 1929. After the party was dissolved because
of an internal rift, Sakai and others formed a Tokyo-based successor, and Sakai
became chairman of a nation-wide federation of similar local groups in March 1930.
In July he became an advisor to the newly formed Zenkoku Taishuto (National
Masses Party), which merged with the Ronoto to become the Zenkoku Rono
Taishuto in July 1931.
When the 1931 pamphlet was written, the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto was trying
to link up with another major, non-communist group Shakai Minshuto (Socialist
People's Party). Sakai's optimistic hopes for the alliance were quickly betrayed. In
September, the Kwantung Army launched an attack on the Chinese Army to cement
its control of Manchuria, an action that paralysed the civilian government in Tokyo.
Later in the year, Sakai suffered a stroke, which left him severely disabled. The
Taishuto itself lost momentum, with its members divided over its policy regarding
the Manchurian Incident. Amid the increasing war efforts, the proletarian solidarity
movements began to flounder. The Zenkoku Rono Taishuto and the Shakai
Minshuto, having managed to merge in 1932 to become the Shakai Taishuto
(Socialist Masses Party), gradually accepted the government's expansion policy and
the military's initiatives. The death knell for the pre-war proletarian movements
came when nearly 450 labour activists and socialists, including Yamakawa, and then
dozens of Marxist academics critical of what they saw as the government's
imperialistic and fascist measures, were arrested in late 1937 and early 1938 in the
so-called Popular Front Incident. With the elimination of these "dissidents" by the
government, and "voluntary" ejection of some members, the pre-war solidarity
movements ended. As early as 1932, Oyama Ikuo, a liberal leader of the Shakai
Taishuto, had gone into exile in America. Yoshino, another liberal leader, and Sakai
both died in 1933. The Shakai Taishuto survived as the only legal proletarian party
until it dissolved itself to join Konoe Fumimaro's new unity movement in 1940.
Thus the solidarity movement envisaged by Sakai ended without mobilising
the masses. Like many other spontaneous activities, it could not survive the growing
moves towards totalitarianism, after the Manchurian Incident. However, Sakai's
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criticisms of government and society provide us with strong clues for an
understanding of Japan's internal problems at this stage.
What Sakai calls the bourgeoisie is really the entire political, economic and
social structure. Thus the solidarity movement means a movement seeking the
expansion of political freedom as well as the levelling of prevailing inequalities.
Sakai's vision of the movement is echoed in the Taishuto's platform, which includes
60 demands for reform: in politics (6 demands), diplomacy (4), administration (4),
military reform (4), the judicial system (6), taxes (9), education (6), labour (11),
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agriculture (7), and general issues (13). Some of these seek socialist measures such
as the abolition of consumption taxes, full progressive taxation, workers' rights to
organise, bargain, and act collectively, minimum wages, unemployment insurance, a
legal cap on tenant fees, full legal and social equality between men and women,
abolition of the peerage system, a ban on the monopoly of transport, electricity, and
gas, and free health care. But others call for measures to establish free and
responsible government, specifying full universal suffrage, freedom of speech and
association, abolition of the Peace Preservation Law, open diplomacy (disclosure of
diplomatic affairs), public elections of governors and other heads of municipalities,
empowerment of local assemblies, appointment of civilian ministers of the Army and
Navy, termination of textbook screening and military education at school, and the
open operation of funds kept by the Finance Ministry's Deposit Department.
Accompanied by denunciation of Japan's immediate expansion policy, these
proposals project Sakai's own view of an alternative form of government based on
egalitarianism, free and responsible government, and universal solidarity.
Thus the proposals challenge many practices and institutions on which
government stood: taxation, restrictions on popular participation in politics,
bureaucratic secrecy, and the expansion policy. Sakai's strategy is to not only engage
in political struggle to change those institutions but also encourage change from
within society. However, the society Sakai believes is capable of inner
transformation is also under severe restraint by the state.
In Japan's modernisation and industrialisation, the exercise of state power
was central to introducing a capitalist economy and implementing other far-reaching
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reforms. Such state presence resulted in several features, including exacerbated
social division. At the same time, the prominent role that government played in
shaping not only the political and economic structure but also the everyday pattern of
life complicated people's attitudes towards state authority. And even those critical of
government could not agree on the exact role and meaning of the state, as in the case
of disagreement between the two Marxist schools, the Koza-ha and Rono-ha, in the
late 1920s and early 1930s.
In addition the far-reaching role of government was inevitably caught up with
the formation of a modern Japanese identity, and again acted to inhibit class
solidarity. Many identified with the state, as the state was perceived as the primary
projection of their existence. Therefore the degree of one's identification with the
state often determined how far one was willing to criticise government. That is one
reason why even among those engaged in non-affiliated movements, ideological
differences—how right or left their groups should go—became a key issue. Many
non-affiliated groups had to be disbanded, because their differences over government
policy widened as war efforts intensified, nationalistic sentiments grew, and
emphasis on national unity increased. As Minobe complains in 1935, nationalistic
propaganda is dividing the public. For a "new" nation, nationalism can both promote
and disrupt popular unity.
Furthermore farmers seeking the social recognition of their rights to cultivate
land, and workers seeking an eight-hour workday, needed distinct forums to meet
and agree that their interests were indeed mutual. Sakai and like-minded people
attempted to create such by advocating the formation of a united front. However,
given the increasing government harassment, autonomous exchange of opinion
among the citizens became difficult, once they had been labelled as critics of
government. Sakai's own career demonstrates the severity of government repression.
These problems of definition and assembly were intertwined with ideological
obstacles to hamper spontaneous civil movements.
In order to understand more fully the difficulties that the solidarity
movements encountered, I now propose to examine the kind of state power that arose
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along with the development of Japanese industry. Once again Marx's descriptions of
the origin and characteristics of the state are useful in order to examine the
connections between the failure of the solidarity movements and the country's
industrialisation.
Marx's analysis of capitalism is inseparable from his deep concern with the
plight of the worker which he believes results from the commodification of labour.
Thus alienation, both at the personal and social level, became the leitmotiv of his
analysis of capitalism, particularly in his early writings. Similarly Marx's definitions
of the state accommodate an overall humanistic critique of capitalism.
Marx provides two different definitions of the state, historical and
sociological. The historical definition constitutes part of his material conception of
history. The course of history is determined by the dominating productive forces of
each period, and the state has emerged "historically" from the division of labour. The
rise of the modern state thus coincides with the growth of manufacturing, trade, and
commerce.
In his "sociological" definition, Marx sees man as a social being: we live in a
community and accept its interests "naturally". State power arises from this general
interest. However, this general endorsement is illusory, as long as the division of
labour exists, for it merely represents the interest of the dominating economic power,
which is "the power of disposing of the labour-power of others". Thus Marx defines
state power as "the social power, i.e., the multiplied productive power", which arises
from the necessities of the community but has grown to become "an alien force"
121
existing outside people and which they cannot control.
In this definition Marx articulates the permanent conflict between general and
particular interests. Marx's answer to resolving this conflict is communism, that is,
the abolition of the division of labour and private property. Sakai's answer is social
democracy, parliamentary politics, and accountable government, as we have already
seen. However, both see state power as the socio-economic forces that divide people
and stifle civil society (what Marx calls "the true source and theatre of all history"122)
and both criticise capitalism and its operators for exerting such powers.
121 Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology", The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 160-1.
122 ibid., p. 163.
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Sakai's final vision of the state and society is clearly different from Marx's
vision of a communist society where private property—and thus the division of
labour—is abolished. Nevertheless Sakai shares with Marx the latter's concern for
human conditions in a deeply divided society. It is this humanistic analysis by Marx
of "social" power, power which stifles human nature and thwarts civil society, that is
relevant to Sakai's criticism of state forces then in operation in Japan. And to
understand the general failure of voluntary association in pre-war Japan, we need to
examine the nature of this state power, especially in its socio-economic
manifestations as these affected the course of the country's industrialisation.
However it is fair to say that a capitalist economy powerful enough to
transform social relationships did not exist in Japan even at the outset of the Meiji
Restoration. Sakai and the more recent modernisation theorists claim that
recognisable potential for such change emerges in the late Tokugawa period, and is
discernible in the growing influence of merchants. However, that essence of a
capitalist economy, involving the domination of commodities and their circulation as
dictated by the modes of production, exchange and distribution, and affecting the
whole social structure, was absent even in the early Meiji period when Sakai grew
up. The necessary extrication from "feudal" arrangements was carried out by the new
government. In this sense, Marx's insistence on the state's auxiliary role in
facilitating capitalism does not really apply to Japan's industrialisation. And this
historical role of the state was well understood by the Meiji leaders in their reform
programmes.
Nevertheless the combined effect of economic and social forces that Marx
describes in his early writings can be still validly applied to Japanese society,
because here Marx is concerned with the functioning of power in an industrial
society, power which alienates the individual from self, from others, and from power
itself. Japan's modernisation, when seen as a joint process of state-making and
industrialisation, is also a process of alienation, and the calculated division of society
was integral to Japan's modern nation-making, making national unity an inherent
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problem, and frustrating the Marxist vision of ultimate class convergence. Thus
123 A different viewpoint is provided by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow: "Commonly
modernization begins under autocracy or oligarchy and proceeds toward some form of mass society—
democratic or authoritarian. Under whatever regime, the hallmarks of the modern state are a vastly
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Sakai's socialism is his response to various forms of alienation in a rapidly
industrialised society. Hence the need to examine more closely key aspects of the
new industrial economy and the state's role in sponsoring it as they provoke and
energise his thought.
Japan's Industrial Revolution is believed to have started around 1886, when a
number of companies were established (kigyd bokko) in the wake of Matsukata
Masayoshi's fiscal and monetary policy. The relevant industries gained momentum
after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
The revolution was "completed" around 1907, when the technology used in the steel
and machine-tool industries had reached global standards and self-sufficiency had
been more or less achieved.124
Such a description tallies with the commonly-held assessment among
economic historians that the development of a capitalist economy in the country had
several of the characteristics of "late development" and was thus significantly
different from that of Britain. Yet Japan's Industrial Revolution did not cover the
expanded set of functions and demands. Public services come to include education, social security,
and public works while civic duties involve new forms of loyalty [and] tax payment... The tendency,
moreover, is for services and obligations to become universal: schooling for all children, a road into
every village, conscription for all men, and a tax out of every pay envelope. Hence political
modernization clearly has egalitarian tendencies" ("Introduction", in Ward and Rustow (eds.),
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964, p.
5). These "egalitarian tendencies" notwithstanding, I hope to show in the rest of the chapter that
Japan's modernisation, industrialisation in particular, created and relied on various social divisions.
Ward and Rustow also acknowledge that their definition of modernisation does not necessarily imply
democracy or representative government. See ibid., pp. 5-7.
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My overall analysis of the pre-war Japanese economy here is based on previous work by Japanese
economic historians, including Oishi Kaichiro (ed.), Nihon Sangyd Kakumei no Kenkyu [A Study of
Japan's Industrial Revolution], 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975). Debate about the
timing of Japan's Industrial Revolution depends on the definition of an Industrial Revolution and how
to take into account Japan's "peculiarities" as a "late developer". Major theories are provided by:
Yamada Moritaro, who asserts that industrial capital was established between 1897 and 1907 based on
his analysis of the development of the textile industry and of the steel industry, Furushima Toshio,
who asserts that an Industrial Revolution did not take place until much later because most industry
that had developed earlier was supported by government and independent industrial activities did not
take place yet, and Ouchi Tsutomu, who asserts that an Industrial Revolution took place from around
1887 to 1889, when machine production was established in the textile industry. Yamada's theory,
which was formulated in the 1930s, is now widely accepted and further developed by others, such as
Oishi. Oishi has moved the start of the Industrial Revolution a decade earlier than Yamada. His
justification is that Japan's "late" conditions, such as its economy's prompt linkage with global trade,
must be taken into account to determine when the reproduction of capital, a repeated process that
encompasses production and sales of commodities, and acquisition of the means of production and
labour-power, was established in the country. Thus Oishi sees the start of the Revolution around 1886,
when large-scale cotton mills began to operate commercially, thanks to available capital and the latest
technology and machines imported from abroad. See Oishi, ibid., p. 18. For a more compact
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whole society. The farming community, which represented nearly 50 percent of the
total workforce during the pre-war period, was left behind, with its total production
1 9S
remaining stagnant. "A class of free labourers", which Marx saw as a major
prerequisite for the accumulation of surplus value and thus for the "emergence of
capital", did not appear on the same scale as in Britain.126 In Japan's case, capital had
to be created by government.
Pointing out the role of state power in the development of a capitalist
economy, Marx cites four distinctive practices in the development of Western
capitalism: the establishment of colonies, the national debt (i.e., the system of public
credit), the modern tax system, and the system of protection. Marx says: "These
methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all
employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to
hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of
production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the
midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an
127economic power."
More recently Perry Anderson has further explored the role of state power in
128
the development of a capitalist economy. Anderson concludes that a major reason
why capitalism developed first in Western Europe and nowhere else is the operation
of absolutist power. He too sees the exercise of centralised power as a prerequisite
for the progress of a capitalist economy at its initial stage.
Thus, at the outset of forming a capitalist economy, Japan resorted to all the
classic methods, with the exception of a system of colonies: public credit, taxation,
explanation of the same theory, see Nagahara Keiji, Nihon Keizaishi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1970), 1987
impression, pp. 221-3.
125 For a useful survey of pre-war Japanese agriculture, see Penelope Francks, "The Features of
Japanese Agriculture", Technology and Agricultural Development in Pre-war Japan (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1984), ch. 2.
126 Marx says: "The historical conditions of its [capital's] existence are by no means given with the
mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life, only when the owner of the means
of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free labourer selling his labour-power"
(Marx, Capital, Volume One, Chapter 6, in Tucker (ed.). The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 339).
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Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 915-6.
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and protection, although colonies would occur later. Out of this combination of
methods, the new capitalist economy took shape, and state power solidified.
Without a stable financial base or a currency, the government had still to
support industry. Direct taxes were thus crucial to secure national finances, credit
was amply used to compensate for a barely workable monetary system129, and a
flexible accounting system was necessary to meet its priorities. These measures were
for practical reasons, and yet they collectively helped to shape state authority.
The stable monetary policy introduced under Matsukata's leadership helped
to develop the capitalist economy. Combined with the benefits of the government's
various support programmes, a number of companies were established in such
industries as railways, spinning, and mining during 1886-89, the period of the first
surge of business enterprises. The credit system began to operate, the spinning
industry began to receive capital both from silk wholesalers in Yokohama and from
130
local banks and the Bank of Japan in 1887, and capitalist manufacturing was
131
established soon in the spinning industry. In this way Japan's Industrial
Revolution got under way.
Although Matsukata's fiscal and monetary policy contributed to the
development of the capitalist economy, it was during his regime that a large number
of land-less people, including both former samurai and farmers, were created.
Matsukata's monetary and fiscal policy is seen as a break from that of his
predecessor, Okuma Shigenobu, whose strategy was to issue government bonds in
order to finance various programmes and encourage industrial growth. However, if
we observe their policies as a sequence, their combined effects produced significant
129 Government had to rely heavily on loans from seisho (wealthy domestic merchants), the issuance
of Dajokansatsu (inconvertible paper notes), and loans from foreign merchants in the form of
government bonds, to finance its programmes. A representative instance of its reliance on credit was
the establishment of Kawase gaisha (banks) in 1869. The government provided the investors in those
firms, who were wealthy merchants, with Dajdkansatsu (inconvertible paper notes) and allowed them
to issue currencies, which were convertible. It was not the government but the merchants who were
then capable of issuing money (convertible paper notes) because of their reputation. Thus the
government used their credit to circulate money. For Kawase gaisha, see Nakamura Satoru,
"Ryoshusei no Kaitai to Tochikaikau", in Rekishigaku Kenkyukai and Nihonshi Kenkyukai (eds.),
Koza Nihon Rekishi 7, Kindai 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985), pp. 130-2.
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Yamaguchi Kazuo, Nihon Keizaishi (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1968), p. 127.
131 Domestic production of cotton thread exceeded imported cotton thread, after which imports
gradually declined. Domestic production by manual spinning is also believed to have dropped below
30 percent of the previous level. Based on those statistics, Yamaguchi Kazuo concludes that capitalist
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amounts of destitution among the small farmers and within the cities, in effect a
proletariat, as well as the simultaneous accumulation of capital.132 But as yet the new
proletariat was without definition or political momentum.
It was the members of low-ranking samurai households who suffered first. In
1876, the government had ended its economic support for the samurai class, with
payment of government bonds. Because of inflation, many sold off the bonds, and in
1882 and 1883, only 17.8 percent of all bonds that had been issued for this purpose
were held by their original holders.133 Many samurai became urban labourers, and
the bonds went to wealthy merchants and land-owners, and thus became capital.
In this way the strategic use of national debt is one aspect of Japan's
"coerced" modernisation, and is closely related to the discretionary nature of the
government's fiscal and monetary policy. It was thought necessary and justified in
order to allow a government with little fiscal resources to bring in western style
manufacturing and to finance various modernisation programmes.
Farmers followed samurai households. In 1873, the year when the land tax
reform was introduced, about 27.4 percent of cultivated land was under tenancy.
Matsukata's policy was to keep or increase the tax level. With a drastic reduction in
the circulation of paper notes, severe deflation set in and prices of agricultural
products, including rice, dropped. Many farmers sold their land and became tenant
farmers. Tenancy rates continued to grow, and in 1887, the rate rose to 35.9 percent.
In 1903, the rate was 43.2 percent, while that in Tohoku was 36.5 percent compared
with 14.6 percent 30 years earlier.134
Yet the period 1881-1900 when Matsukata presided over monetary and fiscal
policy (excluding 92-96 when he was out of office) saw a growth in business
production was established in the cotton spinning industry around 1890 and 1891. Yamaguchi, ibid.,
p. 126.
132 Oishi Kaichiro sees continuity in policy between Okuma and Matsukata. Both had to face financial
difficulties due to high inflation and deprivation of gold and silver, the possession of which was
necessary to purchase goods from abroad. The former saw the main cause of the problems in the
country's trade balances, and the latter in the rampant issuance of currency and he thus took more
drastic measures to reduce circulation. Yet Matsukata continued to pursue national priorities,
including military spending. Oishi concludes that the Matsukata policy facilitated the accumulation of
capital peculiar to the formation of Japan's "militaristic, semi-feudalistic" capitalism. See Oishi
Kaichiro, "Matsukata Zaisei to Jiyuminken Undoka no Zaiseiron", Shogakuronshu, vol. 30, no. 2,
January 1962, pp. 380-442.
133 Nakamura Satoru, "Ryoshusei no Kaitai to Tochi Kaikaku," p. 152.
134 ibid., p. 16.
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enterprise. The government began to sell off unprofitable operations, including mines
and other model factories at a cheap price in 1884, which also helped the emergence
of the large business zaibatsu. Accumulation of capital became possible, thanks to
these measures. But it was during this same period that farmers' protests against high
taxes became fierce.
After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, large factories were created and
Japanese silk began to dominate the U.S. market around 1900. Cotton spinning was
another locomotive of Japan's industrialisation. Relying on imported state-of-the-art
machines, cheaper imported cottons, cheap labour, and the state credit system, the
country became an exporter of cotton yarn in 1897. On the other hand the
development of heavy industry in Japan was more challenging than for light industry
because of gaps in technology. Thus the role of government was more pronounced
than in cotton spinning and silk production, and the sociological and political
problems attendant upon the operations of state power were more acutely exposed.
In this regard the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was especially important for
it encouraged expansionist nationalism and collaboration between the military and
heavy industry through government financing. Enomoto Takeaki, then agricultural
and commerce minister, recommended that the government build large-scale steel
mills shortly after Japan had acquired an indemnity from China. "The urgent task for
the country is to strengthen the foundation of Fukoku Kyohei, and to ensure perpetual
management of the national economy through extending national rights externally
and developing industry internally. Strengthening military capacity means building
warships and munitions, and at the same time extending the railways so that dispatch
and distribution of troops and weapons can be improved. Armaments will be more
complete if guns and other weapons are domestically manufactured."135 Here the
original emphasis on commerce in the Fukoku Kyohei policy gives way to an
emphasis on military expansion. The war and the country's victory produced a
powerful creed of nationalism that conflated beliefs in social progress and military
might, which even Sakai in his youth was subject to.136
135 Enomoto Takeaki, "Tekko Setsuritsu Iken", in Ando Yoshio et al. (eds.), Kindai Nihon Keizaishi
Yoran (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975), p. 68.
136 Sakai, "Sakai Toshiko den", STZ, vol. 6, pp. 1 11-2.
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This new military-industry alliance had to be furthered by the government,
since no private company was financially capable of building the necessary industry.
Thus the government decided to build the Yawata Iron and Steel Works, using the
indemnity and funds coming from public bonds and taxes. China became an
important supplier of iron ore. The drive for colonies, military ambition, and
government funding, were now intertwined. This aggregated force was always there
to counter solidarity movements.
However, it was not until after the Russo-Japanese War that the military and
private capital begun to close ranks to produce weapons. This coincided with the
moment when the military established its legal autonomy through the establishment
of gunrei (direct imperial command for the Army and the Navy).137 Eventually the
military's claim for autonomy, based on its own interpretation of the Constitution,
became a serious threat to political unity for civilian governments in the 1930s after
disarmament in the 1920s. The fact that some economic historians regard Japan's
Industrial Revolution as by then complete underlines the close connection between
state authority and heavy industry.
Nonetheless close co-operation between the two did not mean the absence of
I ^8
private initiatives. However, the latter were small compared to those taken by
government, and government was deeply involved in the operation of heavy industry
as both financier and customer. In addition the persistent cycle of boom and bust
made small private companies vulnerable to bankruptcy. Monopoly increased.
Within the closed circulation of capital and production, capital had to come from
outside.
This siphoning structure, in which the nation's revenue from taxes, the
issuance of government bonds and other forms of loan, were diverted to "strategic"
areas, continued to be prominent throughout the pre-war period. The pattern, which
was largely helped by the government accounting system, was responsible for the
137 Some historians claim that in 1907 the military backed by the emperor system was established
politically. See Sato Shoichiro, "Kokka Shihon", Nihon Sangyo Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 1, p. 361.
I3S Private initiatives contributed to the establishment of mechanical manufacturing in heavy industry,
one major yardstick for the completion of the Industrial Revolution. Those private initiatives include
the establishment of the Ikegai Tekkojo, which began to produce exportable lathes around 1905, and
that of the Nippon Kokan in 1912, the country's first private steelmaker.
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runaway spending after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, thus
eventually causing the national economy as a whole to collapse.
Very evidently the accounting system reveals another example of the
operation of discretionary power. Initial and inevitable flexibility in the exercise of
government authority was reinforced by new demands for industrialisation, social
management and colonial expansion. The Deposit Department, as Sakai reminded his
reader in his final pamphlet, epitomises the siphoning structure, in which funds
collected from the general public were converted to capital by the means of
government bonds and this capital was at the disposal of unaccountable government.
Such government monetary and fiscal practices were potentially a breach of the rule
of law.
When the government had to spearhead the growth of industry, such
discretionary power may have been necessary. However, the progress of a capitalist
economy created a new situation in which state power could intervene in the
economy more directly. This development would have had a doubled-edged effect,
as is observable in the revision of the accounting law in 1921. The Bank of Japan
was no longer the treasury of government, and the government now had to write
promissory notes when it needed to pay from its deposit just like an ordinary
1
depositor. " Yet along with such "progressive" measures, government could now act
more like a private capitalist. Thus Article 31 of the new law undermines the
principle of open competition in government contracts. It says that if government
assumes that open competition is disadvantageous to its interests, it can resort to
bidding only among its designated contractors or even can choose a contractor "at its
discretion", except for contracts involving real estate.'40
Thus, according to Yamamura Katsuro and Kato Mutsuo, the development of
a capitalist economy had changed fundamentally the role of government in the
country's economy. Before the capitalist economy took off, government was outside
economic activities and promoted industry through various orders. But now
government had entered into the economic sphere as an active agent, as buyer and
financier. Meanwhile, administrative jobs dealing with industry also increased.




Accordingly a conspicuous trend during this period is the establishment of
many special accounts detached from the general account. These accounts could be
used to nurture specific businesses, to run various services, such as
telecommunications, and also to deal with urgent welfare programmes, such as
pensions, workers' injury insurance, and support for financially troubled farmers.
This meant that those programmes were detached from the normal budget, and
therefore from any long-term and comprehensive plan that government had to
explain to Parliament.141
In this way such financial "mobility" spared government from being fully
accountable for its spending. Yamamura and Kato point out problems in the account
system even after its revision: the government maintained its authority to spend
funds outside a Budget as long as it sought Parliament's retrospective permission,
and the House of Representatives was no more authoritative than the House of
Councillors in debating a Budget, which undermined parliamentary authority as a
whole. In fact, various practices that allowed "flexible" spending to continue were
intact, such as the continuation of multiple-year spending programmes, the
increasing role and volume of supplementary budgets, growing demands for interest
payments on government bonds, and more special accounts. These budgetary
conditions worked to weaken Parliament's authority and autonomy in deciding a
Budget.142
When such use of special accounts was combined with the government's
ability to print as much money as it required, national spending could become
uncontrollable. These conditions were achieved when Japan withdrew from the gold
standard in 1931, and more importantly when it changed the Bank of Japan
regulations in 1941 so that it could print as much money as the finance minister
requested.143 Flexible monetary policy was initially introduced by a civilian
government to boost the ailing economy. However, when the military assumed
power, these measures were now aimed at financing war.
Nevertheless, Japanese capitalism was no different from any other forms in
terms of its exploitation of workers, particularly of young women. Here Marx's




Yamaguchi Kazuo, op. cit., p. 282, and Nagahara Keiji, Nihon Keizaishi, p. 314.
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observation that surplus value is accumulated firstly by exploiting surplus labour is
applicable. Japanese workers both men and women in the spinning industry had to
work on wages much lower than those of even their Indian counterparts.144 The
importance of female workers increased as the spinning industry grew, but various
measures were introduced to maximise their labour, not by government but by the
employers. Those measures included piece-work, a dormitory system, and
145 ^ •
recruitment of workers from distant areas. " Oishi Kaichiro asserts that one of the
major reasons why workers' class consciousness did not develop was because the
major part of the workforce was women and they had to work in a divisive way.
Networks for solidarity were very hard to develop. And the government's role here
was not to protect the workers but to support business. Such a position was
considered necessary within "late development". Thus the government resisted
implementing a Factory Law until 1916, and the new law continued to permit a 14-
hour workday in silk production and night work in the textile industry.
The state-guided economy also hindered economic activities in general. For
instance, the growth of the spinning industry did not stimulate other industries, partly
because "efficient" circulation of capital helped by the government did not create
enough surplus capital that could go to other industries.146 This can also be said of
heavy industry. Government-supported and military-inclined industry only produced
non-machine goods, and did not stimulate other industries. On the other hand, heavy
taxes prevented the rise of purchasing power among ordinary people for the creation
144 In 1880 the average monthly salary for Japanese male workers in the spinning industry was 4.8 yen
and for Japanese female workers 2.32 yen. The yen-converted monthly salary for Indian male workers
was 4.5 to 9 yen, and Indian female workers 2.7-4.5 yen. In 1887, Indian workers received 8 to 10
yen, while Japanese male workers received 6.45 yen and female workers 3.9 yen. See Oishi Kaichiro,
"Rodoryokugun no Kosei", in Oishi (ed.), Nihon Sangyo Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 2, p. 160. In the
spinning industry in India, 64 percent of the workforce was men over 20 in 1897. In Japan, 65 percent
were women under 20, and women under 14 made up 17 percent of the entire workforce.
14:1 See Nishimura Hatsu, "Sangyo Shihon (1): Mengyo", Nihon Sangyd Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 1,
pp. 130-1. The conditions were the same for the overwhelming number of female workers in silk
production. See Ishii Kanji, "Sangyo Shihon (2): Kengyo", ibid., pp. 186-8. Also see Oishi,
"Rodoryokugun no Kosei", Nihon Sangyd Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 2, pp. 129-83. When Beatrice
Webb visited Japan with her husband Sidney in 1911, she was dismayed to see the working conditions
at various spinning factories, particularly the common use of dormitories for female workers. They
observed that Japan reminded them of Britain 100 or 150 years earlier. Their observation matches that
of Marx about British industry in the early nineteenth century. See Miyamoto Moritaro, Rainichishita
Igirisujin (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1988), p. 75.
146
Nishimura, op. cit., pp. 128-9. The circulation of capital in the industry relied on promissory notes,
for which the Bank of Japan was the "ultimate" underwriter. As a result, their circulation depended on
the government's fiscal and monetary policy.
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of a domestic consumer market. A capitalist economy with strong involvement of the
state doubly prohibited the growth of a domestic market. In an economy in which
credit backed by government, such as promissory notes and bonds, played a key role
in the circulation of capital, state power would be expected to serve as the "ultimate
underwriter", on which people had to rely both materialistically and
psychologically.147
This close relationship between the state and a capitalist economy worked to
consolidate each. A capitalist economy by nature divides society, between capitalists
and workers, and within capital. Yet the "anarchy" that capitalism creates enters into
people's lives after it is amplified by government policy. This aggravates social
division. Marx is aware of the difficulties in unifying individuals in such a society,
and says, "Competition separates individuals from one another, not only the
bourgeois but still more the workers, in spite of the fact that it brings them together.
Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite, apart from the fact that for
the purposes of this union—if it is not to be merely local—the necessary means, the
great industrial cities and cheap and quick communications, have first to be produced
by big industry. Hence every organised power standing over against these isolated
individuals, who live in relationships daily reproducing this isolation, can only be
148
overcome after long struggle." Thus when economic power was quickly absorbed
into the state through an expansionist ideology, government spending policy, and the
general practices of business, communications suffered and solidarity movements
were severely disadvantaged. Ill-equipped to comprehend and discuss the new social
and economic structures which appeared to be sponsored by government, the people
became even more atomised than before, and exposed to the various forms of
alienation Marx had described. These developments were inseparable from the many
challenges encountered by Japanese socialism: Sakai's thought is always an
application ofMarxist concepts to indigenous Japanese conditions.
147 Nakamura Masanori explains how capital was circulated in the sale of raw cotton from the Mitsui
Bussan trading firm to cotton spinning companies. Companies issued promissory notes to buy cotton.
Bussan took the notes to the Mitsui Bank, which then took the notes to the Bank of Japan. "The sales
based on credit were only possible because it was supported by the pyramid of institutions for credit
circulation with the central bank on top" (Nakamura, "Nihon Burujoajt no Kosei", Nihon Sangyo
Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 2, p. 97).
148
Marx, a footnote, "The German Ideology", The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 186.
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Commonly then Japan's industrialisation is characterised by its promptness
and "unique partnership between public and private entrepreneurship".149 However,
its benefits notwithstanding, it also created highly unfavourable conditions for
solidarity movements. Nevertheless the idea of a "civil society" was most definitely
present, as Sakai's career testifies. Undeterred by the extreme solutions of right and
left, or by the largely unaccountable policies of government, Sakai continued his
quest for a middle way inspired by his commitment to Parliament and the liberal
tradition.
In the next section we will examine two social groups with whom he
particularly identified, Japanese working women and the rural poor.
3.5. Obstacles to egalitarian society: the condition of women and
farmers
For Sakai, socialism means the emancipation of the individual from the material
conditions that prevent him from achieving his fullest development. Yet although as
a socialist Sakai endorses the "common" ownership of production, socialism is not
the ultimate aim for him. He writes in 1904: "The role of socialism is to eliminate
classes and to ensure economic freedom for all members of society."150 That
sentiment stayed with him throughout his life. He constantly writes about the
relevance of socialism for ordinary people, and he constantly proposes the same
creative aim: economic equality. Such egalitarianism, however, was antithetical to
the genesis and operation of state authority, to the progress of a "capitalist" economy,
to the then general perceptions of national advance, all of which promoted and rested
on social divisions. This section will therefore focus on two of those divisions, those
involving the status of women and the conditions of farmers, in an attempt to further
define some of the key sources of Sakai's commitment to social change.
I4<) Janet Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan: An Introductory History Since 1853 (London:
Longman, 1989), p. I 13.
150 Sakai, "Jiyurenai to Shakaishugi [Free Love and Socialism]", the Heimin Shimbun, no. 47, 2
October 1904, STZ, vol. 3, p. 75.
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In Sakai's Japan women and farmers were conspicuous for their lagging
behind in the general process of industrialisation. For instance, in manufacturing
industry, the ratio of men's average wages to women's was 1.7 in 1882. The figure
failed to improve during the pre-war period: instead the gap steadily increased to 2.1
in 1930, 2.8 in 1935, and 2.9 in 1939, excepting minor fluctuations.151 On the other
hand, the ratio of male factory workers' wages to male farm workers' was 1.2 in
1882, 1.5 in 1925, 2.1 in 1930, and then went down to 1.4 in 1935.152
An obvious reason for these disparities may be found in the development of
heavy industry, which employed more male workers and realised more value. Indeed
production in the heavy and chemical industries, which began to grow rapidly during
World War I, grew in value from 2,450 million yen in 1929 to 4,061 million in
1
1934. " On the other hand production in the textile industry, which employed most
female factory workers, remained stagnant, going from 2,998 million yen to 2,918
million yen during the same period. The ratio of agricultural and fishery production
to the net national product dropped from 30.2 percent in 1920, to 17.6 percent in
1930 to 18.1 percent in 1935, while the corresponding figures for the mining and
manufacturing industries rose from 24.1 percent in 1920 to 30.3 percent in 1935.154
These statistics clearly signal a structural shift of the Japanese economy from
terrestrial sectors (farming, fishing and forestry) to heavy manufacturing in terms of
production.
However, the growth in production of heavy industry appears not to be
complemented by other statistics of the same period. For instance, it is still the textile
industry, including silk production, and cotton spinning and weaving, that earned
more yen in foreign trade than any other industry in the pre-war period.155 Thus in
1929 the textile industry exported goods worth 1,474 million yen, compared with the
chemical and heavy industries' 148 million. In 1934 the figures were 1,117 million
151 Ando Yoshio et al. (eds.), Kindai Nihon Keizaishi Ydran, p. 12.
152 ibid., p. 12.
153
ibid., p. 119.
154 ibid., p. 8.
155 Cotton yarn, cotton textiles, silk and silk cloth still made up 48.1 percent of Japan's total exports in
yen value for the period 1930 to 1934, compared with the 1900-4 average of 51.5 percent and the
1915-10 average of 48.2 percent. See, ibid., p. 118.
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yen, and 345 million yen.156 Also in 1929, the number of workers in the textile
industry was twice as large as that in the chemical and heavy industries, although the
ratio dropped to 1.25 in 1934. Thus the textile industry remained a key industry, and
female workers were a major workforce, even during the supposed development of
heavy industry.
As for terrestrial production, its decline does not need to correspond to the
growth of heavy industry, unless a large workforce shifted from the terrestrial
sectors. Indeed, when industry made its first leap during World War I, agricultural
and fishing production also jumped. However, when industry grew again in the first
half of the 1930s, agriculture and fisheries did not follow. Their production remained
stagnant, far below the peak of around 1925. Meanwhile, a large workforce remained
within the farming communities: the proportion of the workforce engaged in farming
was 51 percent in 1920, 47 percent in 1930, and 42 percent in 1940.157 Female
workers' declining salaries and farmers' declining incomes cannot be discussed in
the same vein, yet these statistics reveal problems of income distribution amid
158
supposed "industrial expansion". These divisions characterise Japan's
industrialisation and state-making in general. For this reason economists' responses
at the time remain highly instructive, especially those of the left.
Thus possible causes for Japan's "uneven" development were long debated
by the Japanese Marxists. The most celebrated debate took place between the Koza-
ha and Rono-ha in the 1920s, when the economy appeared in deep trouble. The
economy, which had entered into serious recession after the boom during World War
I, worsened in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. In 1927, the
government of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro was forced to resign after it had
failed to stop widespread bankruptcies among the financial institutions. Against this
156 Oishi Kaichiro, Nihon Shihonshugi no Kozo to Tenkai [Structure and Evolution of Japanese
Capitalism] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1998), p. 225.
157
Ando, op. cit., p.6. The figures here have been adjusted in order to focus on the farming
population.
158 For an instructive analysis of the "dual structure" of the pre-war Japanese economy, see Kozo
Yamamura, "The Japanese Economy, 1911-1930: Concentration, Conflicts, and Crises", in Bernard
Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (eds.), Japan in Crisis, Essays on Taisho Democracy, pp. 299-328.
See also Tsuneo Watanabe, "Industrialization, Technological Progress, and Dual Structure", in
Lawrence Klein and Kazushi Ohkawa (eds.), Economic Growth, The Japanese Experience since the
Meiji Era (Illinois: Richard Irwin, 1968), pp. 110-34. Hugh Patrick also points out the problem of
income distribution amid a continuous growth in manufacturing and services in the 1920s. See
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background, debate centred on the underlying causes, which were clearly structural.
Thus the Koza-ha tended to look to feudalism, backwardness and other "traditional"
aspects of Japanese society, while the Rono-ha emphasised the inherent problems of
capitalism.
Their different interpretations of the root causes of the country's economic
problems notwithstanding, the Koza-ha and Rono-ha were united in their criticisms
of state power, which to them appeared to be a major culprit rather than a mitigator.
Thus Yamada Moritaro, a leading economic theorist of Koza-ha, insisting that state
power not based on the common interests of the people is not legitimate differs little
from Sakai, when he asserts that state power monopolised by the bourgeoisie is
incapable of running a civil society.159 Both are tackling what appears to be
intractable authority operating in the name of the state. Where they differ is in how to
describe such power, either as a single entity attributed to "absolutism" or as a more
complex expression of the "bourgeoisie".
Thus, some Koza-ha historians attributed the genesis of absolutism to
indigenous Japanese "traditions". For them the Restoration was an incomplete
revolution with basic feudal elements intact, including landownership and the
emperor system. They assumed that Japan had not experienced a "bourgeois
revolution" that "aimed at freeing producers from the system of constraints (feudal
land property and guild regulations)" as in Britain and France.160 In Japan the
introduction of a capitalist economy did not destroy "feudal absolutism". Instead it
created an amalgamation of feudalism and capitalism, that is, an Absolutist state,
which they describe as emerging from "the close alliance between the mercantile
capital of the zaibatsu, encouraged by the state, and the feudal forces in the
countryside".161 The Restoration had ensured "the unification and reinforcement of
Patrick, "The Economic Muddle in the 1920's", in James William Morley (ed.), Dilemmas of Growth
in Prewar Japan (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 216.
159 Yamada Moritaro, Nikon Shihonshugi Bunseki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1934), pp. 207-8.
160 Takahashi Kohachiro, quoted by Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar
Japan, p. 289.
161 ibid., p. 289.
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feudalistic force in order to contain farmers' revolutionary power".162 Hence the next
revolution must oust the Absolute State.
The Rono-ha disagreed. For them what may appear a single force of
absolutism is in fact a collection of different elements present in the various
institutions, such as the Sumitsuin, the House of Peers, the Army General Staff
Office, together with the survival of obsolete practices such as the military's
customary privilege of petitioning the emperor directly (iakujoso). According to
Inomata Tsunao, a leading economist associated with the school, the proletariat
■ zro
should fight against this "modern absolutism with its various discrete elements".
Sakai's own position, as seen in his advocacy of solidarity, is close to such a view.
In order to characterise Japanese absolutism, I have already invoked various
forms of the concept of discretionary power, including the legal concept "taiken" (the
imperial prerogative) as stipulated in the Constitution, the constitutional immunity of
the military and the bureaucracy, and irregular spending practices. In the remainder
of the chapter, I hope to show, based on Rono-ha argument with which Sakai was in
sympathy, that "strategic social hierarchies" form another principle of Japanese
absolutism. For as with discretionary power, these divisions were found necessary
for the country to pursue simultaneously national unity and substantive reform,
including the introduction of a capitalist economy. However, these hierarchies
weakened the political and economic system from within. For they not only created
an unequal distribution of income, inviting persistent public criticism, they also
prevented genuine national integration. Women and farmers were among the most
prominent victims of this absolutist hierarchy.
Perry Anderson has outlined how absolutism was a prerequisite for capitalism
in the West: it encouraged the rise of the urban bourgeoisie, and also the primitive
accumulation of capital. As a transitional stage from feudalism to capitalism, the
period of absolutism witnessed a concurrence of disparate changes, some of which
162
Toyama Shigeki, Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000, initial publication in 1951), pp. 32-3.
The Rono-ha, on the other hand, insisted that the Restoration eliminated the feudal, and Japan became
a capitalist state run by the bourgeoisie.
163 Inomata Tsunao, "Gendai Nihon Burujoaj? no Seijitekiichi [The Political Position of the Modern
Japanese Bourgeoisie]", Taiyd, November 1927, reprinted in Odan Sayokuron to Nihon Jinmin Sensen
[The Inclusive Left and the Japanese Popular Front] (Tokyo: Jiritsu Shobo, 1974), pp. 3-35. The
differences between the Rono-ha and Koza-ha concerning the definition of Japanese absolutism
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were attributable to feudalism and others to a more liberal society. Capitalism, he
says, also bears its own assertive logic, which is potentially antagonistic to a rigid
hierarchical structure. Its drive for profit is so self-sustaining that it can undermine
the absolutist structure. Thus an absolutist period can be described as a period of
growing tension between feudal forces and the new, private, commercial sphere.164
However it is questionable whether the Meiji leaders had the same apparent
intention as those who built the Absolutist state in Europe. Japanese "absolutism" is
a relatively fortuitous product. Its roots lie in a peculiar combination of feudalism
and the capitalism that the Meiji leaders introduced from the West, partly
intentionally and partly unwittingly. It was also a product of their responses to what
they saw as immediate social, political and economic problems. What interests us
here is the political construct of such expedient absolutism, and its consequences for
the disadvantaged.
Nevertheless, Anderson's presentation of European Absolutism as an
indispensable stage before the full operation of capitalism can still provide us with
various comparative perspectives. This is not surprising, since the Japanese leaders
adopted various key institutions for centralisation which derived from European
Absolutism, such as "standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a
codified law, and the beginning of a unified market". Anderson also notes the
contribution made by the revival of Roman Law,165 which is also relevant to post-
Restoration Japan.
And yet this new Japanese state power was by no means absolutist in a
European sense, as we have seen in the first chapter. It was indeed "an emergency
dictatorship of the new ruling bloc".166 Yet none of the three emperors who reigned
between the Restoration and the end of World War II was an absolutist ruler in the
European definition. Their authority was not only rivalled by the newly created
Parliament but they also fell short of the overwhelming private wealth of comparable
European monarchs. Hence the genesis of the emperor system in Japan was more
ideological than material. However, despite these fundamental differences, state
become clear if this essay is compared with Noro Eitaro, Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsushi (1930),
reprinted in Noro Eitard Zenshu, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shin'nihon Shuppan, 1994), especially pp. 303-37.16
Anderson, op. cit., passim, especially pp. 40-2, 428-31.
165 ibid., pp. 24-9.
166 ibid., p. 461.
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power as exercised in post-Restoration Japan does have some resemblance to the
European Absolutism Anderson defines. For the Absolutist periods tend to see
growing tensions between feudal and commercial forces. And in Europe this conflict
sponsored new expressions of discretionary power. Accordingly, "the enhancement
of private property from below was matched by the increase in public authority from
above, embodied in the discretionary power of the royal ruler".167 Thus the shift from
absolutism to a civil society based on a capitalist economy is often signalled by the
elimination (or at least the emasculation) of the royal ruler, after a period of
contested power.
In Japan's case, a similar conflict took place, not because an absolute ruler
emerged to secure personal wealth, but because Japan's state-making required both
the centralisation of political power and the introduction of a capitalist economy. The
creation of centralised government required a hierarchical system of administration,
while the other strands of modernisation, including the introduction of a capitalist
economy, necessitated a more fluid society. To preside over the two goals
simultaneously, government had to rely on discretionary power, even after the
constitutional framework was put in place. In Japan's case, that power was held not
by the royal ruler, but by government.
Centralisation and unity were the crucial aims that the Meiji leaders set out to
achieve when they launched their state-making efforts. The very nature of
absolutism, the creation of centripetal power, was apparent in this process. The
creation of a centralised state without an absolutist ruler involved the selective
exploitation and modification of traditions and customs so as to create a new,
flexible, hierarchical network. They strove for the creation of that network by
creating various hierarchical orders. Thus, as we will see, Max Weber's
"rationalisation of power" in the analysis of the bureaucracy, and Michel Foucault's
"subjectification", the process by which "a human being turns him- or herself into a
subject"168, are relevant to Japan's state-making. Such a process was by no means
167 ibid., p. 28.
I6S Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p.
208.
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straightforward, as Carol Gluck's work demonstrates. Nevertheless, new and old
hierarchies played a key role in the creation of the modern state in Japan.
This combination of strategically installed hierarchies and the exercise of
discretionary power were the key mechanisms of government. Thus, as demand for
unity grew, the strategic social divisions had to be reinforced. Sakai's socialist
critique targeted this process of political and economic "modernisation", which he
believed was depriving people of personal autonomy. And this operation of hierarchy
made the socialist concept of egalitarianism persistently antithetical to received
views of the state and of society as a whole. These contextual forces made the
socialism of Sakai and others genuinely combative.
Thus the genesis and evolution of expedient hierarchy is clearly recognisable
in the family system and the treatment of private property. At the bottom of these
newly intensified divisions were women and farmers.169 Here inequality was a
necessary means to carry out the country's modernisation, for economic development
was also accompanied by the calculated reinforcement of existing social
arrangements.
Especially relevant to the pre-war family system was the all-inclusive
authority of the head of the family. This familial authority was endorsed in the civil
1 70
code of 1898. The head of the family alone was entitled to inherit family assets,
and only the head could decide where the other family members lived and whom
they married.171 The code also deemed the wife as legally incapable of carrying out
16,5 Here I side with the Rono-ha in emphasising the modern genesis of the plight of the farming
community. Although traditional practices must have played a role in determining some social and
economic conditions of farmers, such as the relationship between tenants and their landowners, their
immediate plight derives from more immediate causes. Also close analysis will reveal that some
"feudal" aspects are newly created with the introduction of a capitalist economy. For such an example
in the tenant-landowner relationship, see Inomata Tsunao, Kyubo no Noson [Strained Farming
Communities] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1934), pp. 91-2.
170 Efforts were made to introduce a civil code as early as 1870. The law dealing with assets, drafted
by the French jurist Boissonade, and the law dealing with the family, were promulgated in 1890. But
fierce opposition forced the government to rewrite the law dealing with the family so that it would
comply with "traditions". The property law section of the new civil code—consisting of General
Provisions, Rights in Rem and Obligations—was enforced in 1896. The family law section of the
code—consisting of Domestic Relations and Inheritance—was enforced in 1898. It is in the latter that
the authority of the head of the family was strengthened. This code survived more or less intact until
the end of World War II.
171 Article 749 stipulates that the head of the family can decide where the rest of the family live.
Article 750 also says that the head of the family can sanction whom other family members can marry.
However, these "privileges" were accompanied by his obligations of protection to the rest of the
family.
214
public duties, such as the management not only of family assets but also her own.172
In this way the civil code both perpetuated and reinforced inequalities already
173
existing.
Such discrimination may not be unusual. The German civil code on which the
Japanese civil code was modelled was also discriminatory.174 However, the family
system that gives the head of family such all-inclusive power is peculiar to Japanese
law.175
Such inequality within the family is often described as contributing to the
weak liberal tradition of Japanese society. For instance, based on the works of
Japanese anthropologists and social scientists, Robert Scalapino concludes not only
that primogeniture resulted in the creation of the absolute, paternal power of the head
of family, but also that such power is at the centre of the system of fixed unilateral
rights and duties within the family, as its relationships are governed by Confucian
on-giri (indebtedness and obligations). In turn such hierarchical relations would not
nurture a modem sense of personal responsibility, since people are connected with
each other through on-giri, not through their own will.176 His analysis echoes Koza-
ha criticism of the feudal aspects of Japanese society.
There seems to be no denying that traditions associated with the Japanese
family tended to circumscribe individual freedom, and therefore were detrimental to
172 Article 14 of the civil code stipulates that the wife requires the husband's permission to take
actions, which include: to receive loans, become a guarantor, to deal with real estate and movable
assets (such as cash, shares, and bonds), and to bring lawsuits.
177
However, this strategic hierarchy contradicts the Meiji Constitution, which guaranteed "Japanese
subjects" various freedoms, including "the liberty of abode and of changing the same within limits of
law" (Article 22), "the right of property" (Article 27), and "the liberty of speech, writing, public
meetings and associations" (Article 29). "Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications
determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public offices equally"
(Article 19).
174 Rudolf Huebner says: "The Prussian 'Landrecht', it is true, left standing in certain cases a
curatorship over adult married women, and a legal adviser for adult unmarried women (11.18, p. 51);
but it laid down, nevertheless, the general principle of the equal rights of both sexes, so far as
exceptions did not exist by virtue of special statutes or regulations having the force of law (I. 1, p.
24)" (Huebner, A History of Germanic Private Law, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968. First
edition published in 1908).
177 For an analysis of the Japanese family system, see Harada Keikichi, Nihonminpo no Shiteki Sobyo
(Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1954), especially pp. 135-6.
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Scalapino extends the diagnosis to society as a whole, following Koza-ha structural analysis.
Written in 1956, Scalapino's book reflects his time. Thus he says, "The growth and nature of Japanese
capitalism was certain to be the determinant factor in the development of liberalism and of the liberal
party movement of the new era. The central question was whether Japanese capitalism could create an
economy of sufficiency and a philosophy of the liberal creed" (Scalapino, Democracy and The Party
Movement in Prewar Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, p. 93).
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the "development of liberalism". Thus before the Meiji Restoration, a rigid status
system was in place. Most people had to engage in work determined by birth. Among
samurai families, women's status was especially subject to the authority of the head
of the family. These traditions clearly shaped the installation of the newly endorsed
"hierarchical" structures. However, the family system that the civil code came to
embody was also affected by many factors contingent on the priorities of the new
government. For instance, primogeniture had been by no means the most popular
form of inheritance among the commoners, who made up more than 90 percent of the
177
population, at the time of the Meiji Restoration. And Commodore Perry, after his
arrival in 1853, observed that farmers' wives were on a more equal footing with their
husbands than the wives of the samurai, because of their full participation in work.178
Clearly, the institutionalised Meiji family system is a political construct to a
significant degree.
Under the new civil code the head of the family did not need to be a man. Yet
the traditionally low status of women was now "legally" confirmed by the
combination of primogeniture and the wife's subordinate role (Article 801 assumes
that the husband manages the assets of the wife), and by other discriminatory clauses.
In effect many women could not own their own property, partly because they were
rarely the heads of household, but also because their work opportunities were
limited. No financial independence meant subordination was perpetuated, and this
subordination was justified by the constraints on the family embodied in the civil
code.
Clearly therefore, at a time when globally women's rights were expanding
after World War I, and when domestically some women were gaining political rights,
the status of Japanese women as a whole was regressing. This too is a mirror of the
evolving relationship between state and society, and of the genesis and evolution of
the family system in conjunction with state power.
Hence the creation of a centralised network of administration is a central part
of the Meiji leaders' state-making. The introduction of the register system in 1871,
177 Kawashima Takeyoshi and Toshitani Nobuyoshi, "Minpo" (part I), KNKH, vol. 5, 1958, pp. 15-6.
178
Quoted by Kitajima Masamoto, "Kazoku Seido", Nihon Kokushijiten, vol. 3, 1983, p. 334. See also
Anne Walthall, "The Life Cycle of Farm Women in Tokugawa Japan", in Gail Lee Bernstein (ed.),
Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 42-70.
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which shaped the modern family system, is a most decisive measure in this direction.
It worked as a census, and at the same time introduced the family as the new unit of
administration. The heads of family were given special responsibilities for
administering the rest of the family. This was necessary for the nascent central
government, which could not control the whole population. That role was
"delegated" to the heads of families via municipal leaders who were chosen from
family heads. This "delegation" was part of the creation of a hierarchical network of
political power. Thus the new government anticipated that the chain of orders, from
municipal leaders, to family heads, and to individuals would be at the centre of
administration, when it introduced the first comprehensive system for local
administration, Sanshinpd (three new laws), in 187 8.179 Families were linked to
administrative local communities, municipalities and prefectures, then to central
government. Various new programmes initiated by the government were
implemented through this network, such as land tax reform, conscription, new local
and national taxes, the educational system, and health programmes. At the same
time, the modern concept of the family was disseminated through those programmes
via the network. "... [At first] commoners would have had difficulty in accepting the
new family system... However, when they were told that the heads of households
were exempt from conscription, it taught them the role of the family as the basic unit
180of reproduction." State power entered the people's consciousness when they
accepted their new "status" within the system.
Relevant here is Michel Foucault's emphasis on the inseparability of power
from knowledge. For power does not come from "outside", but is capable of creating
knowledge that convinces the individual what should be done. "Power is not caught
in the alternative: force or ideology. In fact every point in the exercise of power is at
the same time a site of where knowledge is formed... there is no opposition between
what is done and what is said."181 Thus the exercise of power synchronises with our
subjecting ourselves to that power. The dual role that family heads were expected to
179 Fukushima Masao, Nihon Shihonshugi to le Seido [Japanese Capitalism and the Family System]
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967), pp. 182-3. The three laws consist of a law for recognising
the traditional villages and towns as formal administrative units, a law for establishing elected
prefectural assemblies, and a law dealing with local taxation.
180
Kumagai Kaisaku, "Kazokuho", KNKH, vol. 3, 1958, p. 35.
181 Michel Foucault, "Power and Norm: Notes", translated by W. Suchting, in Meaghan Morris and
Paul Patton (eds.), Power, Truth, Strategy (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), p. 62.
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play demonstrates such "subjectification", as well as the process by which a
hierarchical network of powers was created. For within the network heads of family
had to be both subordinate and superior. Thus, as Fukushima Masao points out, the
head of the family was "the subject of registry compilation [for the government], and
at the same time he would subject other family members to his order. In the latter
role, which was linked to the role of municipal leaders, he too would turn himself
I 89
into a subject." Thus state power arises "out of society", when the people begin to
identify with the new "imagined" network.
The incapability clauses regarding wives, and the subordinate roles of women
in the civil code, are a reflection of this new hierarchical network of administration.
For this network to function, the traditionally weak status of women had to be
reinforced. Thus the formation of the administrative structure coincides with what
183
Sheldon Garon calls the government's efforts to isolate women from "politics". "
For the government, which was initially indifferent to women's political activities,
now banned women from attending public debate, when it revised the shukai jorei in
1890.
The basic tenets of this method and ideology had a lasting effect, even as the
initial administrative network began to change in response to the evolution of the
family. More families were moving to cities, the number of nuclear families grew,
and also women began to engage in professional jobs. Thus in 1918, nearly 30
percent of teachers at primary schools across the country were women: women were
184
beginning to assert their own identity away from family.
Social change also encouraged women's defensive political activities.
Already in 1911 (as we have seen) a group of women began to publish their own
journal Seito with clear awareness that they were equal with men in their creativity.
On 20 April 1922, the Peace Police Law was revised to allow women to participate
in political meetings. By then the government had started to revise the civil code.
The drafted revision, adopted by the government's ad hoc council of legal reform in
1925, proposed the elimination of the wife's incapability clauses and the elimination
182 Fukushima Masao, op. cit., p. 183.
183 Sheldon Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches to Political
Integration, 1890-1945", Journal ofJapanese Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, 1993, p. 10.
184 Susan Newell, "Women Primary School Teachers and the State in Interwar Japan", in Elise K.
Tipton (ed.), Society and the State in Interwar Japan (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 27.
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18^of the husband's rights to manage his wife's assets. " On 17 May 1927, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was a violation of the husband's chastity obligation to his wife for
him to leave home and enter into a common law marriage with another woman. Also
on May 30, female workers at the Toyo Muslin factory in Kameido, Tokyo won the
right to leave their dormitory on holidays, through a strike. On 1 July 1929, the
Factory Law was revised to ban night work for women and minors.
At the same time, the family increasingly became an ideological symbol of
social order for administrators and "ideologues", when economic and social changes
began to break down what they saw as the traditional lifestyle of the family.186 "The
home, the home (katei katei), everywhere in the country people are paying attention
to it now", commented a magazine article in 1906. "Whether one talks of state or
society, the foundation is the home, where social reform must organise." Quoting this
Carol Gluck points out that "the argument continued that the 'spirit of love and duty'
was the essence of the authentic meaning of family. Indeed, as the absolute
patriarchal authority of the household head ebbed, this appeal to sentiment as the
187
wellspring of obedience was heard more frequently." This emphasis on the family
coincided with the educators' growing call that women should be "good wives and
wise mothers" (rydsaikenbo).
Sakai observed such increasing social and political pressure on women with
considerable alarm and sympathy. In his earlier Utopian vision, the home was the
archetype of communal living, where its members would engage in labour according
to their own ability, where profits would be shared evenly, and where care and
support would be mutual. He believed that socialism could be better realised if each
188home anticipated it. At this stage, however, he still assumed that women were
"natural" managers of the home and men should work outside it. Yet once again the
reading of Marxist classics, including Engels's The Origin of Family and August
Bebel's Women and Socialism, changed the way in which he saw existing social
arrangements. He quickly identified rydsaikenbo as the "ideology" of a male-
185 For the proposed revision, see Wagatsuma Sakae et al. (cds.), Kyuhoreishu, pp. 728-30.
186 See Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, pp. 187-9.
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ibid., p. 189.
188 For Sakai's views of the role of the home in relation to his socialist vision, see Mitani Taichiro,
Taisho Demokurashiron: Yoshino Sakuzo no Jidai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), pp.
260-6.
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dominant society. So in 1906 he wrote, "It is widely believed that the aim of
educating women is to create rydsaikenbo... which is nothing but propaganda for
keeping women within the home and perpetuating their 'slave' status."189 Clearly he
was persuaded by his reading to abandon his former views. "Hitherto, every form of
society has been based on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But
in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it
can, at least, continue its slavish existence."190 So says The Communist Manifesto.
Sakai recognises such a mechanism of oppression in the rydsaikenbo campaign.
More essential to his socialist thought, however, was his attachment to the
personal freedom that would allow the individual to pursue his legitimate private
activities. Thus Sakai says in this same article that human activities transcend both
production and reproduction. The division of labour between men and women will
remain, but free cultural activities are essential regardless of sex. "Both men and
women should be able to engage in higher levels of activity than the quest for food,
clothing and shelter according to their own talent."191 His sympathy towards those
who could not control their own lives remained throughout his life, and made him
highly sensitive towards any coercive pressure on the individual.
After World War I the government began new attempts to incorporate women
even more closely into the network of administration. Thus, as part of the Campaign
to Foster National Strength (Minryoku Kanyo Undo), it encouraged wives to form
their local associations (fujinkai) and to play an active role in the Daily Life
Improvement Campaign (Seikatsu Kaizen Undo). So in 1919, Sakai observes the
plight of young women "caught between two contradicting trends, the emphasis on
maternal responsibilities and femininity on the one hand, and more vocational
19?
responsibilities and the need to assert their rights on the other". Sakai clearly
sympathises with the women's moves towards greater autonomy, for the family was
always at the centre of debate about administration, and women's supposedly
subordinate role was thought to be indispensable for this second pillar of social
order.
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190 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, with an introduction and notes by A. J.P. Taylor,
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However, women's subordinate role was not only required for administration
but was also exploited economically. It is this combination of state and economic
power which exploited the most vulnerable. Hence divisions continued to exist not
only between men and women, but increasingly among women.
Thus Sakai criticised Hiratsuka Raicho, a leading writer about women's
status, for the latter's emphasis on maternal love and duties.193 Sakai was not denying
motherhood, but was concerned about the possible failure of women's rights
movements in connecting to workers' movements generally and to the larger
problems of capitalism. "Clearly Ms. Hiratsuka highlights the need for women to
protest against a male-dominant society... But she does not mention the relationship
between women's protest movements and protest movements of the working class as
a whole."194 For Sakai, without such a link women's movements could not play any
fundamental role in bringing about a fairer, freer society. For women's conditions
were inevitably linked to the whole capitalist structure, and their full emancipation
would not be possible unless the conditions preventing their economic independence
were removed.195
Sakai was well aware that the nominal "improvements" in women's status
coincided with the further falling behind of some women workers. For the impact of
legal restrictions and recession were overcome by further exploitation of their
cheaper labour. So after night work was banned, the ratio of female workers in the
spinning industry increased to 87 percent in 1937 from 78 percent in 1929.196 And
the 1929 Stock Market Crash resulted in sharp salary falls from 1 yen per day in
1929, to 0.81 yen in 1931, and 0.68 yen in 1933.197 Mechanisation and stricter
193 In 1918 debate about motherhood took place between the poet Yosano Akiko and Hiratsuka. While
the latter emphasised women's maternal role and called for state protection of motherhood, Yosano
insisted on women's economic independence as a prerequisite to the realisation of gender equality.
Here Sakai was clearly aware of the debate. For the maternity debate, see Yoneda Sayoko,
"Boseishugi no Rekishiteki Igi", in Joseishi Sogo Kenkyukai (ed.), Nihon Joseishi, vol. 5, Gendai
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), pp. 115-48. See also Barbara Molony, "Equality versus
Difference: the Japanese Debate over 'Motherhood Protection' 1915-50", in Janet Hunter (ed.),
Japanese Women Working (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 122-48.
194
Sakai, "Hiratsukashi no Shinpo to Taiho", in Onna no Sekai (2), STZ, vol. 5, p. 327.
195 For Sakai's emphasis on the need for women's economic independence, see, for instance,
"Rodoteki no Atarashii Onna", in Neko no Kubitsuri, STZ, vol. 5, p. 202, and "Kawakamikun o
hyosu", Yuibutsushikan no Tachibakara, STZ, vol. 4, p. 423.
196 Oshima Eiko, "Ryotaisenkan no Joshi Rodo [Interwar Female Labour]", in Joseishi Sogo




quality control measures also worked to cheapen women's labour. This pattern of
exploitation is most prominent among those working in silk production, who had to
endure worse working conditions than those working in the cotton spinning industry,
and whose factories were often located in provincial areas. Those working in large
factories in big cities could move to a new factory seeking better pay and working
conditions, and participate in labour movements. However, those who worked in
198
small factories in the countrywide were isolated. In effect they could not
participate in the capitalist system as autonomous actors, but were tied to it as
providers of surplus labour.
Furthermore legally reinforced inequality and family poverty made the status
of unmarried women especially vulnerable. Sakai repudiated the commonly held
prejudice against women "entertainers" who had no choice but to take up any job
available in order to support their families. According to Sakai, they were no
different from women "reporters, telephone switchboard operators, and teachers who
had to work on very low wages". All were both victims and survivors within the new
,. . 199
capitalist society.
As Engels points out in his Origin of Family, Private Property, and State,
from which Sakai understood the structure of women's subordinate status in Japan,
the combination of economic structure and state power made those at the bottom of
these hierarchies most vulnerable to economic and political exploitation. Thus,
women's low wages were concurrent with the emergence of the "dual structure" of
the Japanese economy as the result of "rationalisation" and the concentration of
capital in the small number of zaibatsu in the late 1920s. Yet the planned revision of
the civil code became impossible (perhaps unsurprisingly) when the persistent
financial troubles and problems of farming communities began to shake the
credibility of government in the late 1920s. Fearing that state authority was being
198 For example leading factory owners in the Sawa region, Nagano Prefecture, introduced a
registration system for their employees in 1903, aimed at preventing workers from moving to a new
place so that the owners could ensure a stable workforce. An employment contract was signed
between the employer and the head of the family, normally the worker's father or husband. When the
head of the household changed, the contract would become ineffective. Thus some girls were
"married" or "divorced" so that they could work at a different factory. Growing public criticism about
the treatment of those workers forced the prefectural government to order the employers to terminate
the industry-wide agreement in 1929. See ibid., pp. 19-20.
199
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eroded, government leaders and "ideologues" once again began to strengthen the
family system and the authority of family heads.200
Furthermore the nascent women's movements melted away after the outbreak
of the Manchurian Incident, when "national" endurance began to be called for again.
The bill intended to give women voting rights at the local level was also abandoned
when party politics ended with the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi
201
by radical navy officers in 1932. In this way the very evolution of the Japanese
absolutist state did not allow for the growth of egalitarianism, and women suffered
accordingly. The inherited inequalities of status were encouraged rather than
diminished, and radical disadvantage continued. For women in particular the new
"improvements" did not bring about any significant legal change, in sharp contrast to
the circumstances surrounding the introduction of male universal suffrage, which
was prompt given the country's late creation of Parliament. Women's status in pre¬
war Japan is therefore another feature of the absolutism of the Japanese state that
tried to nip in the bud the growth of egalitarianism.
A similar pattern can be found in the status of farmers. In both cases, women
and farmers were incorporated into the hierarchical structure of administration and
also forced to participate in the operation of a "capitalist" system but not as its
beneficiaries. In the case of the agricultural sector, the role of government fiscal and
monetary policy was crucial. It is his sympathy towards those who were trapped in
the system and could not control their own lives that sustained Sakai's social
engagement.
Compared with his analysis of the situation of women, Sakai's grasp of
farming conditions is sketchy. In fact, the petit bourgeois that he envisaged, in his
earlier Utopian vision, as the social class that would promote socialism did not
202include farmers." At the same time even at this early stage his humanism responded
200 Isono Seiichi, "Minpo Kaisei", KNKH, vol. 2, 1958, p. 304.
201 Politicians were clearly aware of the need to engage women in local politics, but not national
politics. Thus, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would allow women to take part in local
elections in 1930 and 1931. Garon quotes one politician who supported the bill as telling Parliament
"cities, towns, and villages are to a certain degree extensions of the household when it comes to, say,
schools, sewers, or public toilets". Thus, women's limited franchise was acceptable, or even
necessary, as long as the basic hierarchical network of administration was intact. See Garon,
"Women's Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches to Political Integration, 1890-
1945", p. 32.
202 See Mitani, Taisho Demokurashiron, p. 266.
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to the common deprivation of cultural life among "women busy with rearing children
and farmers with growing rice".203
Sakai had to alter his initial neglect of agrarian problems in the light of
worsening conditions in the countryside. The plight of the farming communities,
responsible for nearly 50 percent of the total workforce, began to receive wide
attention in the 1930s, when the price of two major products, silk and rice, plunged
after the Crash in 1929, deepening the general indebtedness. These financial
difficulties persisted, even while manufacturing was making swift recovery thanks to
the devaluation of the yen.204 Thus "after 1931, Japan's industrial production and
205
exports recovered perhaps more rapidly than those of any other industrial nation"."
But "rural indebtedness, which had been increasing during the 1920s, rose in 1932 to
an average of 846 yen per household, a figure roughly equivalent to the annual
income of many farmers".206 It is this acute and growing disparity that alarmed
many Marxist economists. Those hardest hit were the tenant farmers, and how to
assess their plight in the context of Japanese capitalism engaged the economists
particularly.
The plight of these tenant farmers reveals the problematic concept of
landownership that contributed to the formation of "strategic inequality" and
"discriminatory" capitalism.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, Japan adopted various concepts that derived
from Roman Law, such as that of the legal person and the notion of contracts, to help
introduce a capitalist economy. Individuals now could sell and buy land. Yet this
move had to be accompanied by the other goal of creating administrative unity.
Hence the family law in the civil code, which ensured the dominant role of the head
of family, was necessary for the creation of "Japanese subjects". Financially,
203
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204 Cocoon prices on the Yokohama Exchange dropped nearly 47 percent in the spring of 1930 from
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Economy in Crisis", in Ian Brown (ed.), The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war
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however, the government now needed to turn to land as the only reliable source of
tax revenue. Thus one of the earliest government measures was land tax reform.
Farmers' conventional ownership of land was legally recognised, and about 70
percent of the arable land was cultivated by independent farmers as of 1873.
However, those farmers had to pay a fixed rate of tax in cash, regardless of
how much profit they made from their crops, so that the government could ensure a
stable inflow of revenue.207 This tax system made the financial base of most farmers
extremely fragile. Rice prices would fluctuate violently not only because of
unpredictable harvests but also because of government monetary and fiscal policy, as
in the case of policies pursued by Finance Minister Matsukata. As a result, their
income would also fluctuate,208 and they were tied to state finances as tax payers by
the very fact that their ownership was recognised by the state. Hence the land tax
system was a major contradiction within Japanese capitalism. For given the
smallness of individual plots the conditions for profitable farming were very slim
from the start, and it might almost be said that the tax system destined independent
farmers to fail.
In fact, many farmers had to sell their land, unable to pay the taxes. Big
landowners faced similar problems, but they could transfer their losses to their
tenants. In each case they consolidated their landholdings by buying out plots owned
by smaller-scale farmers. Thus tenancy increased to 45 percent in 1908 from 27.4
percent in 1873. Thanks to the economic booms accompanying the Russo-Japanese
War and World War I, those landowners invested in stocks, and became
capitalists.209
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During the Tokugawa period, farmers paid taxes in kind, rice. Although the rate was high, the
amount depended on the harvest. After the Restoration, the rate was fixed at 3 percent of the value of
land which was calculated beforehand based on government estimation of the harvest. Yamaguchi
estimates that farmers had to pay about 34 percent of their profits from their harvests, almost equal to
the pre-Restoration level, even when the harvest was normal. See Yamaguchi, Nihon Keizaishi, p. 99.
208 Yamada Moritaro has calculated the fluctuation between 188land 1883. During the period, both
market and selling prices of rice almost halved. The income of one landlord dropped from 7.19 yen to
2.97 yen. The income of an independent farmer dropped from 9.92 yen to 0.34 yen. The decline was
sharper for the independent farmer, because the landlord could transfer the loss to his tenants by
raising the rent. See Yamada, Nihon Shihonshugi Bunseki, pp. 205-6.
209 Nakamura Masanori, "Jinushishikin no Unyokeitai", in Nagahara Kciji, Nakamura et al (eds.),
Nihon Jinushisei no Kosei to Dankai [Formation and Evolution of Japan's Landlordship] (Tokyo:
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972), p. 483.
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The nature and genesis of the high rents tenants had to pay to the landowners
9 1 0
was intensely debated between the Koza-ha and Rono-ha. As Hoston says, their
debate reflects the difficulties that Japanese Marxists faced in interpreting the
211
country's economic structure." For it clearly diverged from the capitalism Marx
described in his observation of the British economy. As ever the Koza-ha emphasised
the remains of the past, and Noro Eitaro, a leading Koza-ha economist, noted, "Our
country's land taxes, both in their traditional conception and in reality, could not be
212
essentially different from the form of ground rent [i.e. feudal rent]."
From this perspective the tax system remained feudal, because it taxed land,
not products. Flowever, the taxpayers themselves were also embedded into a nascent
capitalist economy, and this concurrence of "feudalism" and "capitalism" is reflected
in the farmer's insecure position as a producer which is characteristic of Japanese
capitalism. In these convergences the operations of the "absolutist" state can again be
located. Thus Yamada Moritaro recognises the relevant role of state power
(.koryoku), and describes Japanese capitalism as "a militarist, semi-serf' variant. He
also sees "extra-economic coercion" as responsible for the creation of an exploitative
system, and cites the government's opposition to any measure to create large-scale
213farmers."
The legal status of tenants as stipulated in the civil code is clearly another
such "politico-juridical apparatus". Here the landownership recognised by the civil
code enhanced the rights of the landowner but by the same token weakened the
customary cultivation rights of tenants. From now on tenancy became associated not
so much with the right to cultivate land, but with the incurrence of debt, for the civil
code stipulated that it was the tenants who had to pay land taxes, not the landowners.
Also rents continued to be paid in kind (rice), which meant tenants did not have the
freedom to decide on the kind of crops to grow or in trading their products. In this
way tenancy bore the brunt of the system of national financial burdens.
~10 For the debate, see Hoston, op. cit., Chapter 8, "The Agrarian Problem: The Dual Economy and the
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Accordingly, until 1917, land taxes made up the largest source of government
revenue, and revealingly the government was slow to introduce tax on interest gained
from bonds. It was not until 1920 that the tax law was changed so that such interest
became taxable. Nakamura Masanori concludes that this tax system was
discriminatory, since it treated favourably those who could invest in bonds (so that
capital could be secured to build strategic industry), while keeping land tax intact.214
In these and other ways agriculture was deliberately neglected under government
policy.
Yet not only the tax system but also the whole economic system made the
position of farmers insecure. Most small-scale farmers concentrated on the
production of only a few items, silk cocoons and rice, and thus they were exposed to
the macroeconomy. In the cultivation of cocoons, capital was controlled by
wholesalers. Thus in 1934 Inomata Tsunao remarked that "a large number of
silkworm producers are exhausted. They are away from the market, and vulnerable to
volatility. They cannot compensate for the decline in price by improving quality nor
can they turn to new products, because they do not possess enough capital,
215
technology, and expertise to find an alternative." Based on his field studies in
various parts of the country, Inomata likened Japanese villages to colonies because of
the way capital circulated.216 For farmers were incorporated into capitalism as
taxpayers and consumers, and yet were also victims of what Inomata calls "an
economic boom induced by inflation". They had no control over either the
circulation of commodities or of capital. This lop-sided economic system also began
to hit landowners, when the farm prices plunged, which were already low, after the
Crash in 1929. Many landowners also went under. The government could no longer
ignore the farm problems, and introduced measures to control price fluctuation and
also public works projects. However, the situation was so intractable that Inomata
found such measures ineffectual.
As a result, the way in which capitalism was nurtured in general did not
produce independent producers and consumers, and a self-sustaining domestic
214 Nakamura, "Jinushisei no Choraku", Jinushisei no Kdsei to Dankai, p. 536.
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market. The self-sustaining process of capitalism that Marx described, in which
capital is returned to producers so that they can continue production, did not emerge.
Instead, there flourished the prompt formation of monopoly and the separation
between large capital and small companies. And large capital began to link up with
the military in the 1930s, since the latter was the only provider of capital at a time of
recession. This growing collusion between large capital and the military coincided
with the growing gap between agricultural production and industrial production. The
plight of the agricultural sector increased. When manufacturing production increased
sharply during World War I, agricultural production also increased. But when
manufacturing production sharply increased again during the 1930s, agricultural
production no longer did so. In fact, it dropped sharply away from its previous
217
performance.~
Despite such negative conditions, both farmers and women began to assert
their rights in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In both cases, Sakai's role was that of
dissident and defender, who understood not only their political and economic
disadvantages but also their need for freedom and knowledge.
The 60-point platform of the Taishuto, which Sakai endorsed, includes full
gender equality, encompassing law, political rights, and social customs, and also
measures to help working mothers, such as free nursery care. These ideas were
originally propagated by Marxist women, such as Yamakawa Kikue, who in 1925
advocated the abolition of discriminatory clauses in the civil code against women
(including the regulations defining the rights of family heads and the "incapability"
clauses). Yet most Marxists were indifferent to these demands, since they assumed
that gender consciousness was a matter for the bourgeoisie and was thus a hindrance
to class struggle. Accordingly Inumaru Giichi sees in their attitude "an odd mixture
218of dogmatic adherence to class struggle and prejudice". Sakai, however, was one
of the very few Marxists who saw women's issues as an essential part of the
solidarity movement, and for him sexual equality and individual need were
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Ando, op. cit., p. 8. In the late 1930s agricultural production also showed a temporary increase
thanks to price rises due to high inflation (Yamaguchi, op. cit., p. 273). However it dropped sharply
towards the end of World War II (see tables of production shifts, Nagahara, Nihon Keizaishi, p. 325).
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Inumaru Giichi, "Nihon ni okeru Marukusushugi Fujinron no Ayumi", in Joseishi Sogo Kenkyukai
(ed.), Nihon Joseishi, vol. 5, Gendai, pp. 162-3.
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indispensable components of socialism. Understanding that free decision-making
activities are essential to human existence, he was able to transcend narrow social
divisions and connect to a wide range of "the under privileged".
However, in contrast to his attention to women's issues, Sakai wrote few
articles exclusively about farmers. Rather he tended to conflate their condition with
that of other kinds of workers in the proletariat. For him, poor farmers were no
different from factory workers, in that both were exploited by capital. Although such
a position may seem unsophisticated compared to that of many Koza-ha economists,
Sakai understood the plight of the farmers as that of persons trapped in a system
which made it impossible to control the terms of the individual life. Sakai understood
very well the attendant need for autonomy, and it is in this context that he helped to
run a farmers' "school" in his hometown at the very end of his career.
The school was established by local supporters of farmers' movements at the
peak of the proletarian solidarity movement: Sakai's efforts to bring together various
proletarian groups into a single party had been partially realised with the
establishment of the Taishuto in July 1931. At this time the residents of Toyotsu,
northern Kyushu, who were politically close to Sakai, began to organise a series of
public lectures known as the Sakai Toshihiko Nomin Rodo Gakko (Sakai Toshihiko
Farmers-Labour School). The "school" was one of many similar groups then
established, designed to promote learning outside the formal educational system for
workers and farmers. The first two-week term was held in February 1931 in three
six-mat rooms above a rice-polishing factory owned by one of the group's
supporters. There were more than 100 "students," including graduates of middle
school (the local elite), ordinary citizens, miners from the neighbouring Chikuho
mines, and small-scale independent farmers. One fifth were "very poor tenant
farmers from burakumin communities". The school offered a meeting place for
"people who lived so closely but had never had a chance of communicating with
? 1 Q
each other". Sakai gave a lecture about socialism and the socialist movement in
2,l)
Koshoji Toshiyasu, "Sakai Toshihiko Nomin Rodo Gakko", Shikdbunrin, vol. 39, March 1991, pp.
I 1-12.
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Japan each night before returning to Tokyo a week later. Most of his lectures,
99Q
however, were interrupted or suspended by policemen present in the meetings."
Nevertheless, the public mood began to change. After the Manchurian
Incident, various local associations began to organise public meetings to support the
government's expansion policy, such as the Reservists Association, the patriotic
women's associations "fujinkai", and some local newspapers and municipal
governments. In Toyotsu, a public campaign began for seeking reduction of the
sentence of one of the accused in the May 15th Incident, who happened to have been
born in the town. In 1934 also, a number of communists publicly announced their
"recantation". Sakai, who participated in the first two terms of the school named for
him, passed away in January 1933. When the school held its fourth and last term in
September of that year, it attracted only 12 students. The Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai,
which gave ideological and strategic support to local farmers, was also disbanded
following increasing government opposition to "social" movements after the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. These developments were symptomatic.
Thus it was not the direct impact of the country's economic difficulties but changes
in government policy, and the related change in public mood, that eventually
terminated spontaneous movements among farmers and workers. In a country at war,
or on the brink of it, such domestic "discord" was no longer acceptable.
All in all Sakai's socialism was founded not just on a belief in equality but on
an international vision. His egalitarianism respects individual aspiration and freedom,
but his confidence in humanity addresses a broader public that transcends the nation-
state. This outlook helps to give his thought consistency despite his sometime crude
application of Marx's dichotomy between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Sakai's
emphasis on personal freedom could never be made to sit comfortably with any
political dogma. So in his thought, as with the other two subjects of this study, the
early Meiji emphasis on personal freedom clearly survived. Hence the platform of
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ibid., p. 12. A similar initiative was taken by female workers in silk production factories in Nagano
Prefecture, who took part in gatherings organised by a local branch of the Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai
[National Federation of Farmers Co-operatives] in January 1931. The local economy was in tatters
after sharp drops the preceding years in the prices of the two main products, silkworm cocoons and
rice. Some workers had been fired or remained unpaid. The get-together meetings were held in a
village called Besshomura for those workers who had returned from the factories for a winter break.
Of 73 such workers, 23 participated. The meetings gave them new confidence with better
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Taishuto (with which he clearly identified) provides a comprehensive, social
democratic vision of a civil society, despite the limits of Japanese society at that
particular moment. It enshrines Sakai's characteristic search for a balance between
individual rights and the common good, and the still-relevant insights into the future
221of a pioneer of modern Japanese social thought."
Through Sakai's egalitarian vision the various shortcomings of strategic
hierarchy were exposed and implicitly assessed. As with the operations of
discretionary power, such hierarchies weakened the system from within. In his work
the failure to improve the rights of women and tenants was subjected to a moral
alternative designed to reveal the nation's failings in creating a viable self-sustaining
social and economic system.
Japanese experience shows that a successful society requires a mechanism
that allows its members to make their own rules and to modify them according to
their needs and circumstances. This capacity for self-renewal requires a process by
which consensus can be created. For this process to function properly, the
recognition of a fundamental equality is essential, as well as freedom of speech, since
consensus will emerge only through negotiation between notions of individual
freedom and the public good. The absence of a suitable mechanism in modem Japan
derives not only from the weak juridical system and the operation of discretionary
power, but also from strategic inequality. In the following and last chapter before I
conclude this study, I will discuss this problematic process of decision-making, and
the equally problematic concept of mini (popular will), through a consideration of
the thought and career of Saito Takao.
understanding of their situation. Thus they learned that the unpaid salary was not their fault but the
result of the recession, and that they were not alone in this respect. See Oshima, op. cit., p. 34.
221 The leading Marxist historian Toyama Shigeki says that objective study of post-Restoration history
was started by Sakai (Toyama, op. cit., p. 7). Inumaru Giichi also says that the study of women's
issues based on Marxism was initiated by Sakai (Inumaru, op. cit., p. 151). Kawaguchi, a Marxist
economist and a biographer of Sakai, also calls him "the source of Japanese Marxism" (Kawaguchi,
Sakai Toshihiko no Shogai, vol. 1, p. 16).
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Chapter 4
Saito Takao: Party Politics, Regimentation, and
Resistance
As my final study in the politics of dissent, I will examine the thought of Saito Takao in
terms of an active, pre-war politician's attempts to confront the exercise of governmental
power. Saito was a conservative politician who criticised government war policy, and
who, in an incident which coincided with the "voluntary" disbandment of all political
parties, was expelled from Parliament in 1940. Saito was neither an anti-war pacifist nor
a socialist sympathiser, but his criticism of government policy derives from his sceptical
rationalism and his adherence to ideas of liberty, which he inherited from the Meiji
Enlightenment. However, when seen against the background of the growing support
both for the drastic reform of the domestic political system (an end to proper
parliamentary politics) and for a new Asian order (under Japan's hegemony), such an
individualistic liberal position as Saito's articulated a plea for a more rational policy.
In dealing with the lives of politicians we are inevitably involved with
methodological problems, for they act within a complex dynamic of power, based on
calculation and expediency. Saito is no exception. However, there is no denying that
Saito defended the principles of constitutional and representative government throughout
his life, as Minobe did. In this sense, Saito, along with Minobe and Sakai, provides (to
use a phrase of Raymond Williams) "indicative features" of what the Japanese
hegemonic process "has in practice had to work to control"1. But unlike the other two,
Saito made his points more publicly and on immediate and particular issues as a member
of the House of Representatives. In Saito's case, therefore, the tension between national
goals and free government was more publicly manifested. Nevertheless Saito was a
relatively minor politician whose professional pinnacle was to become head of the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau in 1931. At the same time he took his parliamentary duties
1
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, p. 113.
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seriously, and even if he is now remembered chiefly for his parliamentary speech of
1940, I propose to focus my inquiry on his political philosophy observable in his public
speeches, memoirs, and published writings, paying attention to the relevant political
circumstances.
In this chapter I will be concerned with party politics and the role of Parliament
between 1910 and 1940, a period when party politics gained momentum and then was
sidelined by the military bureaucracy (this period coincides with Saitd's political career
before his expulsion). Carol Gluck finds that after the 1880s Japanese government was
"the most deliberate agent of the devaluation of politics". Nevertheless, party politics
and opposition parties most definitely emerged. Hence I will discuss why at this time
institutional politics became an enemy of government, why despite that opposition
parties were born, and why they failed to lead social and liberal movements. These
questions are also related to the ambiguous character of the pre-war Parliament as a
representative organ of the body politic. The concept of liberty will be also examined to
further clarify Saito's position. I hope to answer questions about the origin of Saito's
pragmatic political realism, and why his views were able to expose the problems of
government of the time.
4.1. Introduction: biography and intellectual formation
Saito Takao was born in 1870 as the last of six children of a small village farmer in
Hyogo Prefecture.3 The family owned a small plot of land, but the soil was poor, and the
climate harsh. Customarily many men in the region would go to the cities for work
2 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, p. 239.
3 The biographical information provided in this section is based on the following: Saito Takao, Kaiko 70-
nen (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1987), Kusayanagi Daizo, Saito Takao kaku tatakaeri (Tokyo: Bungei
Shunju, 1981), Matsumoto Ken'ichi, Hydden Saito Takao (Tokyo: Toyokeizai Shinposha, 2002), and Earl
H. Kinmonth, "The Mouse that Roared: Saito Takao", Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 1999,
pp. 331-60. Kinmonth's is the only essay in English exclusively on Saito and his speech of 1940.
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during the winter. Yet given the economic conditions of the region, the family was
relatively well off.
Saito seems to have had a happy and carefree childhood. Strong-willed and
restless, he entered a local primary school at the age of 8. At 12, he decided to study at a
school run by Buddhist monks in Kyoto, about 120 kilometers away, when he heard one
of his classmates planned to go there. Soon bored, he returned home in a year. An
attempt to learn the Chinese classics with a local teacher also did not last. Meanwhile,
his hatred of the idea of becoming a farmer continued to grow, and while helping with
the family farm, he began to plot his future away from the village.
Thus at the age of 16, he left home for Kyoto without telling anyone. He lived
precariously, delivering box lunches to police stations and helping in a bakery. Yet with
no possibility of receiving further education in the city, he returned to the village three
months later. Still dissatisfied, he continued to long for the life of the city and a non-
manual occupation.
As we have seen, Maruyama Masao cites the strong desire for social ascendancy
of post-Restoration Japanese youth.4 Saito too was driven by restlessness in a society
conducive to social mobility. After farming for three years, he decided to go to Tokyo in
1889 at the age of 20. To save cash, he walked all the way to Tokyo. Train services then
partially connected Tokyo and Osaka, and horse carriages and jinrikisha services were
also available. Late in his life Saito recalls that it would have taken him just five or six
days to get to Tokyo if he had used conventional transport. Instead the journey took him
18 days. On his way he was robbed, but he also remembers the generosity of strangers,
such as a toll-bridge attendant who did not charge him and an employee of a ward office
in Tokyo who found him a job. Forty-five years later Saito, then a vice home affairs
minister, was driven in a government car on an inspection visit parallel to his old route.
Tokyo and Osaka, the country's two largest cities, had long been linked entirely, and
observing the new roads and bridges, Saito connects his own rise from penny-less
4
Maruyama Masao, Nihon no Shiso, p. 34.
234
traveller to a member of the House of Representatives with the country's transformation
to modernity.5
In Tokyo, Saito became a shosei (live-in student helper) at the house of a
bureaucrat who came from the same county as he, taking a typical route to further
education for ambitious but poor young men. In 1891, he entered the Waseda Senmon
Gakko, a school for advanced study, which later became Waseda University. The school
was founded by Okuma Shigenobu in 1882, a year after his dismissal from government.
The decision to enter Waseda was decisive for his political affiliation, as in his career he
would always side with a party which had personal and historical ties with the Rikken
Kaishinto founded by Okuma in the same year. Saito had to spend every weekend
visiting his acquaintances to collect money to cover his fees and living expenses. Yet in
1894, he graduated from the school, and took the annual bar examination for future
judges and prosecutors. He failed, but in the following year, he sat for an examination
for lawyers and became one of 33 successful candidates from more than 1,500
applicants.
Saito then became a trainee lawyer at the office of Hatoyama Kazuo, soon to be
prominent in politics. In 1898, Saito set up his own office after Hatoyama joined the
Okuma Cabinet as vice foreign minister. Compared to judges and prosecutors, who were
employed by the government, the status of lawyers, as "min" (private) professionals, was
then low. Saito again became restless, and assumed that chances for further social
advancement and a more challenging career would be limited for graduates of a private
school like himself. He decided to study abroad, and in 1901, following Hatoyama's
footsteps, he entered Yale University's law department. His tuberculosis worsened, and
he returned home in 1904, without finishing his degree.
Nevertheless, his two-and-half-year stay in the United States provided him with
crucial formative experience. Relatively free from the nationalistic sentiments to which
many of his fellow countrymen succumbed after encountering racial discrimination,
Saito witnessed at first-hand how the American legal system functioned on a daily basis.
5
Saito, Kaiko 70-nert, pp. 108-9.
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With support from one of his teachers at Yale who happened to be a judge of the state
supreme court, he sued the hospital which had operated on him for insufficient care.6
In 1905 Saito married, and he began to aspire to become a politician. His
political career began in earnest in 1912 when he was elected to Parliament for the first
time, at precisely the time of the rise of parties. He won his seat as a candidate of
Kokuminto, an offshoot party of Okuma's Kaishinto. He joined the newly formed
Doshikai in 1913, and when the party merged with other smaller parties to become
Kenseikai in 1916, he joined the new party. In 1920, Saito lost his seat in the first
general election held under single-seat constituencies since 1900. He was reelected in
1924, and his party, Kenseikai, became the ruling party from 1924-27. Kenseikai
merged with another non-Seiyukai party Seiyu Honto in 1927 to become Minseito. Saito
belonged to Minseito until 1940, when he was expelled from Parliament by a majority
vote, which included votes by members of his own party.
The years between 1927 and 1932 are widely regarded as a period when a
normal two-party system functioned in Japan, in which Seiyukai and Minseito took
power alternately. This brief period is also characterised by a drastic oscillation in
Japan's foreign policy between expansionism and international co-operation. Thus in
1927 the Seiyukai government led by the Army general Tanaka Giichi sent troops to
Shandong to support the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, who was fighting against
the Army of the Chinese Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek. As Chiang appeared
to be succeeding in unifying China, Japanese political leaders began to differ in their
sense of the national interest. The sense of crisis over the possible loss of influence in
China, particularly in Manchuria, was acute among military personnel, while civilian
elements of government sought international co-operation. Thus the Minseito
government led by Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi signed the London Naval
Limitation Treaty despite strong criticism of the Navy in 1930.
Generally Seiyukai was the party of expansion, while Minseito advocated
international co-operation. Yet the conflict between the two policies reflects the
persistent battle between the military and civilian government, whichever party was in
6
Matsumoto Ken'ichi, Hydden Saito Talcao, p. 79.
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power. At the same time the military was by no means monolithic. However, as an
organisation with its own internal hierarchy, agendas and crucial autonomy, the military
as a whole was able to impose a kind of a "second" state, which tended to undermine the
forms of constitutional government, including Parliament, as Saito pointed out in some
of his parliamentary speeches. In fact the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai
Tsuyoshi in 1932, which followed the Manchurian Incident, marked the end of
parliamentary control of policy.
Saito's own career echoes this battle between the military and civilian
government. While Minseito was in power from 1929-31, Saito was a vice home affairs
minister, assuming his first "bureaucratic" post. In November he was appointed head of
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, a key office responsible for drafting laws, and whose 13
official advisors included Minobe Tatsukichi.7 However, Saito had barely been in office
for a month, when the Minseito government headed by Prime Minister Wakatsuki
Reijiro was forced to step down, unable to stop the escalating military confrontation in
China after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.
Minseito then supported the Cabinet led by Admiral Saito Makoto, a national
unity cabinet created after the assassination of Inukai, which aimed to restore
constitutional government. Saito was again a vice home affairs minister. Yet the battle
between the military and parliamentarians continued both within and outside
government. Thus when the Saito Cabinet collapsed in 1934, Saito again lost his post
and resumed his role as an opponent of government.
In his lifetime Saito repeatedly spoke in Parliament criticising government policy
and defending party politics. His life-long stance reached its climax when he delivered
his 1940 speech criticising the government's China policy. The speech was made with
urgency, against the background of the outbreak of World War II on the European front
and Japan's worsening relationship with the United States, which had just informed
Japan of its intended termination of the bilateral commerce treaty.
7 Umori Masanori et al., Naikaku Hoseikyoku 100-nenshi (Tokyo: Naikaku Hoseikyoku, 1985), p. 486.
Minobe held the post from 1911-34 (ibid., p. 16).
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Two and a half years after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Saito's
confrontation with the government, now led by Navy Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, was
remorseless. He criticised the government's haphazard pursuit of the war and its "holy
war" propaganda to justify an increasingly incomprehensible conflict. The war, which
had begun on 7 July 1937, with a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops on the
outskirts of Beijing, dragged on with no end in sight. The Japanese government's
attitude towards the war was highly inconsistent as is demonstrated by a sequence of
policy statements issued by the then Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945) in
1938. First after German mediation for a peace settlement failed, the government made a
belligerent demand in January to the Chinese Nationalist Government led by Chiang
Kai-shek to recognise Manchukuo as an independent state. When the demand was
rejected, the government issued a non-recognition statement of the Nationalist
Government in less than a week. Then on 3 November, the government revamped its
war effort, declaring that the aim of the war was to create a New Asian Order
eliminating Western imperial powers from Asia. Yet this statement was followed the
following month by a reconciliatory statement emphasising "neighbouring amity,
common defence against communism and economic co-operation" between Japan,
Manchukuo and China. The last statement reflected Wang Ching-wei's defection from
Chiang's Nationalist Government earlier in the month and the Japanese government's
ambition that Wang might establish a pro-Japanese regime replacing Chiang. Saito
questioned the soundness of the judgement to support Wang. Given the growing anti-
Japanese sentiments in China, Saito asserted that Wang was unlikely to succeed in
unifying China, as the government claimed. For Saito, what emerges through these
statements is a flawed war policy based on wishful-thinking.
Thus Saito's one and half hour speech reflects his frustration over a policy which
he saw as lacking in both substance and credibility. His persistent references to the "law
of the jungle" (yushd-reppai, tekisha-seizon) were meant to remind his listeners that any
plan that omits objective assessments of power relations is destined to fail. Saito
criticises Konoe's "New Asian Order" as "vague and incomprehensible". He sees this
vagueness both as a symptom of political malaise and as a strategy to override critical
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debate. Saito here is less opposing war than expressing his instinctive fear that a policy
that required such incomplete rhetoric, and which had already resulted in a sequence of
inconsistent actions, was simply unachievable. More importantly, behind the
inconsistency and flawed rhetoric, he saw the presence of forces within the military
determined to take the country into further aggression at any cost.
In retrospect, Saito's diagnosis of the war was well-founded and close to that
now provided by many historians of our time. Thus Iriye Akira speculates that Konoe's
confused way of handling Japan's confrontation with China was largely responsible for
the country's eventual entry into the Pacific War. The New Asian Order declaration of
1938 was Japan's "formal rejection of the Washington system" and "the bridge of no
Q
return". Yet Saito's view was undoubtedly that of a minority and had no effect on
government policy. In this sense, his stance was that of isolated dissent ignored in a
political world increasingly bent on military aggression and encouraged by calls for
national unity. And in terms of the political developments that followed, Saito's speech
merely facilitated the disbandment of all political parties in Parliament and gave further
momentum to military aggression. Saito was expelled from Parliament by his fellow
members a month later. But his career did not end there, and it testifies to continuing
grass-roots defiance of government orthodoxy. Saito received nearly 600 letters and
postcards from the public shortly after the speech, most of which were overwhelmingly
sympathetic to his position9, despite the fact that the government deleted two-thirds of
the speech from the official transcript. And in 1942, his rural constituency elected him
back to Parliament. In 1946, Saito joined the first Cabinet to be formed after the first
post-war general election by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru as a state minister. He
retired from politics in 1948, and died a year later at the age of 80.
As a subject of academic inquiry, Saito remains a neglected figure. Ito Takashi
attributes this neglect to two main reasons. One is that access to primary sources is
* Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987), p.
68.
9 For an analysis of the public response to Saito's speech, see Kawahara Hiroshi, "Saito Takao no Hangun
Enzetsu to sono Hankyo", Shakai Kagaku Tokyu, vol. 27, no. 1, 1981, pp. 37-74, and also Earl H.
Kinmonth, "The Mouse that Roared: Saito Takao", pp. 343-6.
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relatively difficult.1 The other more important reason is the prevailing uncertainty
among historians as to how to define Saito's position. Although Saito is seen as a liberal
critic of the military bureaucracy in the 1930s, his speeches also project an image of a
"conservative" critical of "reformers", a bourgeois politician indifferent to the plight of
ordinary workers,11 and a passionate patriot and imperial loyalist who despised the
12
naivety of pacifism . How to integrate these various images remains a challenge for
historians, according to Ito.13
Earl Kinmonth on the other hand attributes the neglect of Saito and his
parliamentary speech of 1940 to inadequate assessment of Japan's military expansion.
He criticises Ienaga Saburo and Maruyama Masao, "two of Japan's best-known
academics", for dubious and undiscriminating characterisation of Japanese fascism. In
his view they pay scant attention to Saito's presence or the speech, because the relative
freedom that the parliamentarians clearly enjoyed, as evidenced in Saito's delivery of the
speech, and also the public support that he received afterwards, did not fit their
characterisation of Japanese fascism as a matter of state repression and popular
obedience. For Kinmonth, the prime motor of Japan's expansion policy was the civilian
and military elite, because such state enterprise provided them with better opportunities
to demonstrate their talents, better job prospects, and better salaries.14 Saito is therefore a
test case for any revision of prevailing assessments of Japanese fascism.
However, Ienaga's and Maruyama's assessments of certain trends or social
mores are, I think, still valid, albeit subject to modification, because such approaches
allow us to define an overview. While Kinmonth is interested in specific contemporary
forces responsible for Japanese fascism, the academics he challenges attempted to
10 Saito published 10 books in his lifetime, some of them privately. But most are not easily available,
except in a few selected libraries. The diary, which he kept from 1906 until his death in 1949, has not yet
been made public, with a few exceptions.
"
Banno Junji, Democracy in Pre-War Japan, Concepts of Government, 1871-1937: Collected Essays, pp.
150-60.
12
Matsumoto Ken'ichi, op. cit., p. 405.
13 Ito Takashi, "Kaisetsu", in Saito Takao, Kaiko 70-nen, p. 308.
14
"Examining the background to Saito's concern about those losing their livelihood because of the war in
China shows that while these years were a 'dark valley' for Japan's petty bourgeoisie, they were a period
of expanding opportunity and influence for its new middle class and especially for the intelligentsia" (Earl
H. Kinmonth, "The Mouse that Roared: Saito Takao", p. 360).
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identify certain modes of behaviour that facilitated it. Their assessments and Saito's
arguments complement each other, as I hope to show. Also I find it difficult to assume
that Saito's presence alone can overturn such cultural assessments. Saito's intervention
was in fact subtler than Kinmonth implies, and it allows us to examine the overview
provided by Ienaga, Maruyama and others from a different angle. The challenge is how
to integrate the presence of non-conforming individuals such as Saito into a general
picture.
Thus Kusayanagi Daizo, Saito's biographer, characterises Saito as a "seironka"
(common-sense critic).15 By seironka, Kusayanagi means that Saito was a "mirror",
reflecting in his criticism the problems of governmental decision. He was a
representative of parliamentary resistance, and he clearly played that role intentionally.
My own interest in Saito is as a dissenting voice, one which allows us to link historical
events into a coherent picture, and to understand more clearly how hegemonic power
operated.
Saito's primary commitment was to parliamentary politics. This was not an easy
task in his time, partly because of contextual pressures but also because parliamentary
politics, by nature, is disorderly. It assumes that common opinion is formed, not found,
in open debate. Parliamentary politics rejects the assumption that the common life can
be dictated to by any absolute authority, either in the form of personal rule or
metaphysical principle. It is a learnt and self-consciously made compromise between
private forces and the public good. Debate itself is a stage in the making of power that
members of society are willing to accept. Saito clearly assumed such a role for
Parliament, and was aware of the historical mission of his generation to make Parliament
the centre of power.
Saito adhered to such principles of parliamentary debate. In this sense, he was a
liberal polemicist. Various conditions hindered that debate, and one aim of this chapter
is to examine Saito's criticism of specific institutions and policies. Some factors may
have been insurmountable, but others were clearly rectifiable, as he tells us. Saito
15
Kusayanagi Daizo, Saito Takao kaku tatakaeri, pp. 10-11.
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reveals the limits and potential of Japanese parliamentary politics at his particular
moment.
Much of Saito's criticism of existing institutions and practices derives from his
training as a lawyer and his knowledge of the British parliamentary system. Yet his
initial propensities already embrace such principles as the rule of law and equality under
the law, and he owes his general worldview to the early Meiji Enlightenment. Of the
Enlightenment thinkers, he was most conscious of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834—1901) and
Kato Hiroyuki (1836-1916). Repeatedly he would refer to them as a source of
confirmation or as a frame of reference. Thus although its influence is subtle compared
to his more specific exposition of constitutionalism and party politics, the Meiji
Enlightenment is largely responsible for shaping Saito's thought.
As I have already mentioned, the Meiji Restoration was not the mere
replacement of one political system by another. It was a cultural "revolution" spurred
from the outside, a time of reorientation of society as a whole. The historical
significance of the period was well understood by late Edo and early Meiji intellectuals
such as Fukuzawa and Kato. They understood that mere importation of new technology
and institutions from the West was not enough to advance their country. They took it as
their mission to change the modes of thought of the Japanese. As Carmen Blacker puts
it, "Like the philosophes of the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, they set
out to educate their countrymen to an entirely new kind of learning, a new view of man
and his place in nature".16 They favoured science against Confucianism, freedom against
submission, and parliamentary politics against the bakufu system.
Many of these intellectuals were western scholars who had gained first-hand
experience of Western societies and political systems through their visits to Europe and
the United States as members of the bakufu missions or as students. When the
introduction of Western thought became urgent, they produced a series of books
intended to disseminate the new knowledge and to educate the public. Fukuzawa wrote
Seiydjijo (1866-1870) aimed at introducing Western political systems and culture to the
16 Carmen Blacker, The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. xi-xii.
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Japanese, based on Chambers' Educational course, Political Economy for Use in Schools
of 1856, and also on his own experience of staying in England.17 He also published the
equally influential Gakumon no Susume (1872-76), whose opening sentence, "ten wa
hito no ueni hito o tsukurazu, hito no shitani hito o tsukurazucelebrates freedom and
equality. He also wrote Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (1875), the aim of which was to
introduce Western history and the genealogy of civilisations based on the writings of
Buckle and Guizot, and also to criticise feudal traditions embedded in Confucian
teaching. Fukuzawa was not alone. Kato Hiroyuki wrote Rikken Seitairyaku (1868) and
Shinsei Taii (1870) to introduce Western constitutional systems. Nakamura Masanao's
translations of Smiles's Self-Help and of Mill's On Liberty became best sellers in the
early 1870s. The Western thought introduced into Japan by these keimo intellectuals in
the early Meiji period was overwhelmingly Anglo-American and French, emphasising
liberty, equality and laisser-faire, rather than the German Staatslehre. Japan's modern
liberalism found its first voice among these intellectuals, and among them Fukuzawa
was a leading figure.
Through his observation of British and American societies, Fukuzawa
understood the strength of a nation to reside in the spontaneous activities of independent
individuals. Thus his primary concern was to change people's attitudes towards the
prevailing social order. To break the pattern in which people followed the established
norms, Fukuzawa analysed and criticised those aspects of society he thought hindered
the successful path to modernity.
1 X
He articulated his critical assessments most fully in Bunmeiron no Gairyaku.
As Guizot had used the German word Eineitigkeit to criticise "the fault of only seeing
one side of a thing",19 Fukuzawa used the Japanese word wakudeki to criticise inertia in
Japanese society, evident to him even in the samurai's adherence to the habit of carrying
17
Maruyama Masao, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 1, Iwanami Shinsho, 1986, p. 240.
18 l • "For how Fukuzawa incorporated Guizot and Buckle into his own thought, see Maruyama Masao,
Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu. 3 vols, especially vol. 3, pp. 1-76 (Guizot) and vol. 2, pp. 4-48 (Buckle).
19
Stanley Mellon, "Editor's Introduction" in Mellon (ed.), Francois Guizot, Historical Essays and
Lectures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. xxviii. Eineitigkeit was the German word
Guizot used to criticise "a partisan approach" in legitimistes or republicans in post-Revolution France. Sec
ibid., p. xxviii.
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swords with no practical purpose during the Edo period. In more general terms, the
ruler's claim to divine right irrespective of ability also reveals wakudeki, the habit of
thought that can attribute value "to things in themselves irrespective of the way in which
they function".20
For Guizot, intransigent adherence to "any single principle or any particular
organisation" is the antithesis of freedom, the major driving force of progress, that
separated European civilisation from the past and from other civilisations. Guizot says,
"While in other civilisations the exclusive, or at least the excessively preponderating
domain of a single principle, of a single form, has been the cause of tyranny, in modern
Europe the diversity of elements which constitute the social order, ... have given birth to
21the freedom which prevails in the present day."
Inspired by such an analysis, Fukuzawa launched his inquiry into the exercise of
power in everyday life. His emphasis reflects the influence of the European
Enlightenment, of Romanticism, and of nineteenth century English utilitarianism and
liberalism as manifested in authors such as Mill. Thus in Japan Fukuzawa saw the
operations of power that stifled individual freedom in a hierarchical social order justified
by the meibunron discourse of Confucianism.
In meibunron, people are expected to act not on reason but on others'
anticipation and one's prescribed role. For Fukuzawa, the social order built on such
principles is incompatible with a society where people act spontaneously and rationally.
If the meibunron principle is maintained, "we have to accept that the emperor is superior
to court nobles and therefore he can order them to do certain things freely... that court
nobles are superior to han lords and thus can manipulate them at their will, and the lords
can manipulate their subordinates... and the lowest ranks of samurai can exploit
22
peasants". Fukuzawa rejects this system, where one is controlled by those above and at
the same time controls others below.
211
Blacker, op. cit., p. 177.
21
Guizot, "The History of Civilisation in Europe", lecture 2, included in Historical Essays and Lectures,
p. 164.
*
Quoted by Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku oyomu, vol. 1, pp. 109-10.
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Here Fukuzawa's analysis of power suggests Foucault. For Foucault, power
should be understood as "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in
which they operate and which constitute their own organization". Fukuzawa
recognised such "a grid of intelligibility of the social order" in Japanese society justified
by the meibunron discourse which perpetuated inequalities. But where Foucault saw
such "enmeshed" power as modern, for Fukuzawa the similar forces of Japanese
disciplinary power were feudal.
Hence Fukuzawa says: "Indeed, the evils of meibunron and its corollary of
'preponderance of power' were just as marked in the relation of ruler and subject as they
were in the more intimate family relations of parent and child and husband and wife.
Rulers, just as much as parents and husbands, were thought to be justified in wielding
virtually unconditional power over their subjects."24 Such criticisms of the
"preponderance of power" provided powerful arguments against the norms of behaviour
prevalent among the Tokugawa elite. Hence for Maruyama Masao, Fukuzawa is the first
person to analyse the "pathology" of power in Japanese society.2S
Fukuzawa envisages a radically new society where people can pursue their goals
as freely as possible. In such a society, the role of government is to protect people's
rights rather than dictating to them.26 He is interested in the formation of spontaneous
social force, a new public sphere capable of steering its own course. Thus he emphasised
the role of public opinion, of freedom of assembly and of political parties in shaping
23
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, volume I: Introduction (Penguin Books, 1978/81), p. 92. Foucault
says: "Power's condition of possibility... must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in
a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the
moving substrate of force relations, which by virtue of their quality, constantly engender states of power,
but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of
consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the
next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (ibid., p. 93). Foucault is
interested in social mechanisms that discipline individuals. Those mechanisms include such institutions as
hospitals, schools, prisons, and the family. Foucault is discussed by Sheldon Garon in his study of "social
control" in Japan. See Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, p. 4.
24
Blacker, op. cit., p.101.
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Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 3, p. 81.
26
"If protecting people's rights was its sole task and function, it followed that the government's legitimate
sphere of authority was strictly circumscribed. It did not possess the limitless scope of power of the




such a public. For a political system to function, common rules, which are agreed by
98
the members of society, not morality, are necessary. Thus Fukuzawa is vitally
concerned with how to encourage exchange of opinion (kosai). Kaigi (conference,
meeting, assembly) and enzetsu (a speech) were among many words that Fukuzawa
29introduced into Japanese and which became part of the Japanese vocabulary. In this
way a new public was to be formed of freely acting communicating individuals.
Fukuzawa saw such a public as a valid alternative to the absolute power that
characterised the feudal system, and believed that any form of government should play
an auxiliary role.
In consequence a critical view of the power that stifled individual freedom,
which derived from the Meiji Enlightenment, survived in Saito's thought, although the
state structure was firmly in place by the time he began his political career. Thus he says
in 1906: "Because the state is composed of the people... the interest of the state is their
own interest. Therefore, when they are involved in politics, they are involved in their
30
own affairs. This is a necessary condition for them to fulfil their lives."" Fukuzawa's
efforts to transform the principles governing social organisation clearly continue in
Saito's case.
As for the role of government, Saito says, "the ultimate aim of constitutional
government is to make the common awareness of the people the engine of politics... a
Constitution and Parliament are merely 'machines' intended to realise this goal. It is
31
public opinion that reveals the common awareness of the people." Of course an exact
process by which both Parliament and political parties can be linked to public opinion is
another matter, and we will investigate later, through his defence of such principles, the
~7
Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 2, pp. 113-36.
Thus Fukuzawa criticised Confucianism for confusing politics and morality. Maruyama quotes
Fukuzawa as saying, "Morality may be very useful for the individual to act on his own, but virtue exists
inside the person, and thus does not affect external objects. In a natural and chaotic society where people
are not involved in each other's affairs very much, morality may be convenient to consolidate the people.
But it must lose its power as society becomes more civilised" (Maruyama, ibid., p. 63).
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Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 1, p. 82.
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Saito, Hikaku Kokkairon (Tokyo: Keinan Shoin, 1906), p. 12.
31 ibid., p. 1.
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difficulties of implementing such a process. Yet Saito's views of a "civil" society and a
suitable political system for it again link him to the traditions ofMeiji liberalism.
Nevertheless adherence to concepts of progress and freedom do not guarantee
one's rejection of imperialism. While Guizot used the term Eineitigkeit to criticise
extreme radicalism either in the legitimistes or the republicans in post-Revolutionary
France, Fukuzawa used the equivalent term wakudeki to promote social change. This
emphasis on progress led him to start supporting an expansion policy in the 1880s.
Maruyama attempts to explain Fukuzawa's "apostasy" as a classic example of a
dilemma faced by intellectuals of a developing country, the conflict between
universalism and particularism.32 Here they are exposed to new ideas from a world
beyond their immediate circumstances, while at the same time they are expected to
communicate these ideas to their fellow countrymen. Placing themselves within a
perceived hierarchy of knowledge and power, they are obliged to juggle with
nationalism and internationalism simultaneously. Fukuzawa felt this dilemma acutely,
and his concern for the future of his country eventually overwhelmed his initial detached
assessment of state power. Saito was relatively free from such nationalistic sentiments,
because, I think, he remained an outsider by nature and by circumstance. I will return to
this question of the change in the early Meiji Enlightenment tradition when I discuss
Saito's criticism of Japanese fascism in the 1930s.
However from the strand of the Meiji Enlightenment represented by Fukuzawa,
Saito inherited the spirit of sceptical independence. From Kato Hiroyuki, Saito absorbed
the scientific approaches of "evolutionary materialism," of which Kato was "the most
systematic and influential keimo advocate". "This creed sought to solve the problem
[reconciliation between man and Nature] by denying the existence of moral principles
altogether", arguing "that not only external Nature but human nature and conduct as well
were governed entirely by mechanical and regular law."
It was Kato who also introduced into Japan the concept of the modern state
articulated by Hobbes. Following Hobbes' justification of the state, Kato distinguished a
32
Maruyama, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku o yomu, vol. 3, pp. 239-40, and vol. 1, p. 47.
33 Blacker, op. cit., pp. 58-9.
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political unity from a state of nature. In nature, people are savage and fight for survival.
Yet they also have inalienable rights, and to preserve those rights they should agree to
form an artificial association, which is the state.34 Thus Saito retained acute awareness of
the "fictional" state, although Kato himself abandoned his support for inalienable rights
late in life. In Saito's case, however, his staunch royalist position never subsumed
completely his attention to the tension between political authority and individual
freedom, and this awareness allowed him to remain critical of any force attempting to
impose unity on society.
Also Saito was not entirely persuaded by evolutionary materialism and
positivism, although those ideas clearly influenced him. Nevertheless he used the phrase
"yushd-reppai, tekisha-seizon" in his writing and speeches throughout his life. The
phrase is a Japanese translation of the "the survival of the fittest" first used by Herbert
Spencer. It was Kato himself who introduced the phrase in the late 1870s and made it
popular among Japanese intellectuals. Kato's embrace of Social Darwinism, however,
marked his departure from his initial adherence to the concept of inalienable rights. For
him, social evolution meant that "All organic beings were endowed with an energy
which, obeying fixed causal laws, sought for its possessor's preservation and advantage,
but which manifested itself in different forms according to the stage of evolution of its
35
possessor. Reason, conscience and will... were simply evolved forms of this energy."
Like his conservative counterparts in England, Kato understood Spencer's theory as "a
mechanism by which a social and natural hierarchy was preserved by the distribution to
places in it of the 'fittest' ",36 Thus around this period, Kato began to criticise those
minken (popular rights) activists who called for representative government on the
grounds that they were legitimately entitled to participate, finding the concept
unscientific and mistaken. Kato's "apostasy" came shortly after the government's
dismissal of Okuma in 1881 after he had submitted his private opinion calling for the
34
Quoted by Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Tennosei Hoshiso" (part II), p. 22.
35
Blacker, op. cit., p. 60.
36 Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 8. "The idea of
fitness tended to be imbued with conventional notions of the desirable and valuable. Change and evolution
became the means by which ultimate order and the realisation of these 'ideal' faculties and types was
achieved" (ibid., p. 8).
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early establishment of Parliament. Kato, who had become the first president of Tokyo
University in 1877, publicly retracted his previous publications in which he had
advocated the concept of inalienable rights.37
On the other hand, Saito used the phrase "the survival of the fittest" not for
justifying government policy but for questioning its compatibility with reality. He also
used the phrase to emphasise his Hobbesian worldview ("helium omnium contra
omnes") and his complementary view of human nature ("homo homini lupus").
However, while these viewpoints had prompted Hobbes to call for the establishment of a
strong state that could provide security and yet demand the submission of individuals to
that power, Saito used the term to emphasise the temporary, expedient nature of
government. Like Walter Bagehot, Saito used the concept to support parliamentarianism,
saying that that system was the most suitable form of government for social evolution.
Thus when the original aim to dismantle what they saw as feudalism was
superseded by the perception that the country had succeeded in building a state, keimo
advocates, most prominently Kato, changed their positions to protect the fledgling state
institutions and the accompanying ideology. Yet in a clear sign of rebellion, Saito in
1908 wrote an essay, criticising Kato for his attack on the emperor-as-organ theory."
For Saito, the country's sovereignty did not belong to the emperor alone. As in Britain
and other constitutional monarchies, it should be exercised jointly by him and
Parliament. Saito adhered to this principle throughout his life, as we will find in his
parliamentary speeches.
The rationality Saito tried to emphasise using the term "the survival of the fittest"
is a clear antithesis to the holistic views of the state, which had become increasingly
orthodox. For him, political power was temporary and thus could not be absolute, a view
shared by Minobe and Sakai. More importantly, the spirit of intellectual and political
independence propagated by Fukuzawa was central to his worldview. That spirit had
become increasingly threatened not only by the formation of the bureaucratic state but
37 For Kato's tenko, see Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Kato Hiroyuki", pp. 34-9.
38 The article appeared in the magazine of his alma mater, Waseda Gakuho, October 1908, and is quoted
by Matsumoto Ken'ichi, op. cit., p. 138.
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also by the regimentation of society. Yet the vulnerability of the spirit of independence
is inherent in any debate between the whole and parts, unity and freedom, or between
deductive and inductive norms. This perpetual divide was already apparent in
Fukuzawa's and Kato's different views about how social order was to be achieved. Kato
had abandoned his adherence to inalienable rights while joining government. Fukuzawa
continued to emphasise them while refusing to do so, although he was later consumed by
another kind of holism, nationalism.
As with Minobe and Sakai, Saito inherited this mixed legacy of the Meiji
Enlightenment and of nineteenth century thought in general. In Saito's case, the
influence is most recognisable. His detestation of bureaucrats came straight from
Fukuzawa's writings, although his experiences outside the state education system clearly
moved him in that direction. For an ambitious outsider, an enlightenment concept of
progress that celebrated both individual ability and a common social good provided him
with a most attractive and comforting intellectual foundation. His recurring references to
the concept of the survival of the fittest, seen not as acquiescence in "the hegemonic
process" but as a critique of it, reflect this lasting influence of the Meiji Enlightenment.
Such a legacy is in sharp contrast to the later generations' perceptions of state power, for
39whom such unbridled individualism as Saito's became increasingly remote.
Saito's speech of 1940 was therefore a criticism of imposed holism in the name
of nationalism. Eighty years after the Restoration, Saito repudiated the forces that were
stifling freedom. Criticising the irrationality of policy, he also questioned its legitimacy.
For him, if policy required such a high degree of coercion, it could not be rational both
in theory and practice. Following Fukuzawa's efforts to free the individual from the
"preponderance" of power, he opposed the new forms of hierarchy and the false unity
that was being imposed on the people. We will now examine more fully the genesis and
evolution of these forces as they relate to Saito's dissenting views.
39 Saito's individualism is thus in sharp contrast with the views of the so-called "1905" generation who
matured between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. These include: Kita Ikki, Nagai Ryutaro
(1881—1944), and Nakano Seigo (1886—1943). For Nagai's nationalism, see Peter Duus, "Nagai Ryutaro,
and the 'White Peril,' 1905-1944", The Journal ofAsian Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, November 1971, pp. 41-8.
In the last section of this chapter, I will compare Saito's nationalism with that of Kita and Nakano.
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4.2. Pre-war party politics: the challenge to government and
institutional power
The main props of Saito's political career involve the defence of Parliament and of party
politics. If we follow Habermas's formulation of the nature of a civil society, the key
function of politics (or Parliament) is to mediate between conflicting interests, and the
role of Parliament is to select and legitimise such initially private opinions so that they
become "common". Saito's understanding of the role of Parliament and the functions of
politics, based on his knowledge of the British parliamentary system, points at such
mediatory arrangements.
However, Japan's state-making clearly involved various factors that hampered
such a process, including the inhibiting of a self-regulating mechanism for both politics
and Parliament. Thus before analysing the strengths and weaknesses of Saito's thought, I
will survey pre-war party politics in order to address why politics became an enemy of
government. In this section I will follow the birth of opposition parties, the ensuing
antagonism between them and government, the establishment of the quasi-party Cabinet,
and its demise. The formation of the state bureaucracy will also be examined as a
counter force to politics.
Full-fledged political parties did not emerge in Japan until Parliament had
become a reality. Nevertheless, modern political awareness was formed through early
nationalist movements, hostile to aspects of Meiji reform, which became known as the
Jiyuminken Undo.
The first decade of the Meiji era was far from tranquil. Local former samurai,
whose livelihoods were severely curtailed by the new government, took up arms on
various occasions as in the Saga Rebellion of 1874, the Akizuki Rebellion of 1876, and
the Seinan Rebellion of 1878. All were suppressed by the newly formed national Army.
Farmers also rioted in various parts of the country, protesting against the new policies of
conscription, compulsory primary education, and high taxes. The Jiyuminken Undo
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harnessed such popular discontent, and the transformation of amorphous popular
sentiment was reinforced by newly emerging political societies.
Discontented former samurai took the initiative. In 1874, those who had left
office in protest against the government's reversal of its plan to attack Korea, formed a
small society called Aikokukoto (Patriotic Public Party). The main members of the
group were Itagaki Taisuke, Goto Shojiro, Soejima Taneomi and Eto Shinpei. Their
platform proclaimed that the "party" aimed to protect common justice and inalienable
rights, and to ensure people's freedom, independence, and self-determination.40 To be
free meant in effect to be free from the country's feudal past. For those ex-samurai,
therefore, patriotism and freedom were mutually complementary. Although they
emphasised national unity under the emperor's leadership, they proclaimed that the true
purpose of government was to protect the people's autonomy. Invoking the Charter
Oath's emphasis on kogi koron (public opinion and public debate), the group demanded
the introduction of Parliament, and wrote a petition to this effect, with the help of young
intellectuals who had returned from Britain. Shortly before the formal launching of
Aikokukoto, they submitted the petition to the government. When this appeared in the
Nisshin Shinjishi, a major national newspaper, its publication initiated the nation-wide
"Freedom and People's Rights" movement, Jiyuminken. Soon Aikokusha (Patriotic
Society), which was formed by Itagaki in 1875 and which grew to have a dozen local
branches across the country in a few years' time, became a driving force in 1880 for the
formation of the Kokkai Kisei Domei, a nation-wide association exclusively working
towards the opening of Parliament.
The government's initial response to those movements was hostile. The Five
Board Notices already banned collective action, reflecting the emergency dictatorial
government's fear of organised opposition. As the Jiyuminken Undo grew, the
government responded with various press laws and restrictions on political activities.
Yet when its leaders realised they could not quell the movement entirely, they chose to
compromise, agreeing on the introduction of Parliament in the near future. Nevertheless
40
Toyama Shigeki and Sato Shigero (eds.), Jiyutoshi, vol. 1, Iwanami Bunko, 1957, pp. 87-8.
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in 1881, at the peak of the Jiyuminken Undo, Okuma, who had advocated the
introduction of a British-style Cabinet, was ousted from government. At the same time,
the authorities promised that Parliament would be introduced along with a written
constitution and popular elections in ten years' time.
At this point the Jiyuminken Undo split into several strands. In the same year,
Jiyuto, "Japan's first political party which had a manifesto and organisation",41 was
established under Itagaki's leadership. In the following year, Rikken Kaishinto, whose
aim was also to introduce a British-style parliamentary system, was established, and
around the same time, the more nationalistic Genyosha. Nakae Chomin, who Sakai
regarded as one of the founding fathers of the Japanese socialist movement, also began
to publish his own propaganda newspaper.
Jiyuto, a party which was more loyal to the tradition of the Jiyuminken Undo
than Kaishinto, consisted of "passionate property-less" people attracted to the ideas of
"freedom and rights" and also local leaders who were strongly dissatisfied with the
government.42 The party advocated freedom and equality, radical reform, a single-house
Parliament, and universal suffrage, and attracted grass-roots support. On the other hand,
Kaishinto was gradualist, and supported a bicameral Parliament, restricted elections, and
a British-style responsible Cabinet run by political parties. Jiyuto after various mergers
developed into Seiyukai, and Kaishinto into Minseito. Thus the two main parties in the
pre-war period could both trace their origins in the Jiyuminken Undo.
As a political movement, however, the Jiyuminken Undo lost its momentum by
the end of the 1880s. Its radical members, among whom Jiyuto members were
prominent, had helped local farmers to stage violent protests against local banks and
money lenders, and also against heavy taxes, as in Fukushima and Chichibu. Yet the
government's intensifying oppression and the gradual debilitation of independent
farmers, who were the mainstay of the Jiyuminken Undo along with former samurai, as
the result of the government's fiscal measures (Matsukata's fiscal policy), weakened the
41
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movement as a whole. Its leaders, such as Itagaki and Okuma, also faced the dilemma of
whether to rejoin government or stay outside it to effectively influence government
policy, and they began to distance themselves from more radical members. Their gradual
withdrawal from the forefront of the protest movement also began to unravel the
movement as a whole.
Although these factors contributed to the general decline of the protest
movement, clearly the Jiyuminken Undo was destined to cease as a popular force at this
stage, when it became clear that the centre of political debate was to be shifted to the
newly created national assembly. When Parliament was introduced in 1890, Jiyuto and
Kaishinto constituted the opposition. Other opposition forces, such as radical
nationalists, liberals and socialists, were left outside Parliament, evolving into
fragmented yet persistent forces of social resistance.
Nevertheless, the eclectic Jiyuminken Undo was essential for the creation of
modern political awareness among the Japanese. Although the new government was
desperate to instil national sentiments, it was not through its programmes but through
spontaneous movements such as the Jiyuminken Undo that the Japanese gained real
opportunities to define their own political community.
In his study of the Jiyuminken Undo, the historian Irokawa Daikichi traces the
activities of several young men who were involved in the movement in their respective
communities. Their activities included intense debate about the form of government that
they wanted to have, readings of keimo publications, and writing their own draft
constitutions. Irokawa concludes that the Jiyuminken Undo was a grass-roots movement
of undeniable influence in shaping national consciousness. What motivated the young
men was their desire to participate in a new political community. They nurtured their
critical views of the status quo with an awareness of their own nation.44 In this respect, it
seems to be appropriate to call the Jiyuminken Undo the first national movement.
Anthony Smith in this regard defines nationalism as "an ideological movement
for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population",45 and he
44
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emphasises a people's desire to form a common community as a main feature of
nationalism. Thus in his definition nationalism is more a matter of one's engagement
with a community that one believes to belong to rather than one's identification with
given "national" symbols. Dismissing definitions solely based on objective factors such
as "language, religion and customs, territory and institutions", he proposes to combine
them with "subjective factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments".46 In this
sense, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, even as the role of nationalism is
immensely relevant to the process of nation-building. "As a process of 'nation-building'
and as an ideology and movement, nationalism and its ideals of national autonomy, unity
and identity, are relatively modern phenomena, which have placed at the centre of the
political stage the sovereign, united and unique nation, and have made over the world in
their image."47
Typically therefore, modern Japanese nationalism entails acute political
awareness, with the role of intellectuals essential to its emergence. The Enlightenment
movement led by Fukuzawa and others is thus the direct sponsor of the Jiyuminken
Undo.48 At the same time, the fact that the initial political movements coincided with a
national awakening had complex effects. The emphasis on the nation as ultimate value is
a major characteristic of modern Japanese nationalism, and even opposition parties
could not distance themselves from it: invariably their platforms contained an emphasis
on national growth and expansion, even when they were discussing political liberties.
Irokawa thus points out the diverse consequences of the Japanese national awareness
stimulated by the Jiyuminken Undo, which ranged from an increased awareness of civil
liberties, to a nationalism that supported the emperor system, and even fascism. One aim
of this study of Saito is to see how and when one can extricate oneself from notions of
46 ibid., p. 11.
47 ibid., p. 46.
48
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the nation at a time when the nation is not only the prime authority but also a source of
aspiration and inspiration.
Despite such an incipient inclination to embrace national well-being at the
expense of the individual, the Jiyuminken Undo also paved the way for
constitutionalism. Undoubtedly the movement provided the catalyst for the formation of
a new political system based on Parliament and elections. "Strictly speaking, the politics
that began in 1890 was not parliamentarian. It did not lay down a clear path towards
party politics."49 Nevertheless, it signalled the definite beginnings of constitutionalism, a
departure from "inclusive oligarchy", that ensured the principle that even the ruler had to
obey agreed rules. Without this "take-off', neither party politics nor parliamentarianism
was possible. "Without the Jiyuminken Undo, there would have been no such take-off in
Japan."50
Although the opening of Parliament in 1890 ushered in a new political structure,
party politics was handicapped from the very beginning. In the long run, the
discriminatory election system introduced with the Constitution alienated the masses.
Because of the tax-based eligibility restrictions, only 1.1 percent of the population could
vote. From now on the general perception of party politics would be associated more
with the operations of power than with the needs of ordinary people. Admittedly this
was at a time when very few countries in the world had introduced universal suffrage.51
Restrictive qualifications, based on landownership and tax payments, or educational
achievements, were common. Nevertheless, in Japan this restricted popular
representation created a serious handicap for Parliament in establishing its "worthiness"
as a representative of "mm(popular will).
More immediate obstacles were soon erected by the government to block the
advancement of parties into power. In course of time these obstacles became
responsible, directly and indirectly, for the demise of party politics and constitutionalism
in the 1930s.
49 Baba Yasuo and Banno Junji, "Seiji Hendo to shiteno Meiji Ishin", in Banno and Miyachi Masato
(eds.), Nihon Kindaishi ni okeru Tenkanki no Kenkyu, p. 17.
50 ibid., p. 18.
51 See, for instance, Andrew M. Carstairs, A Short History ofElectoral Systems in Western Europe.
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Thus in anticipation of the new parliamentary politics, Ito Hirobumi's
government introduced what Takahashi Susumu and Miyazaki Ryuji call "non-elective
c?
bodies" which had strong political influence. This involved the creation of the peerage
system for the envisaged House of Peers (thereby creating a favourable stronghold in the
envisaged Parliamentary system), creating a well-designed employment structure for
bureaucrats, and introducing the Sumitsuin (Privy Council). Both the House of Peers and
the Sumitsuin came to represent a serious problem for the operation of parliamentary
politics, not only because they meddled in government but also because their presence
obscured the centres of power.
Ito, explaining the aim of the Sumitsuin in 1889, told Inoue Kowashi: "If
government and Parliament disagree, only one of two steps will be possible, the
resignation of ministers or the dissolution of Parliament by an imperial order. In such a
case, we need advisers who can discern the general trend of the state and the sentiments
of the people and can make good judgement [on which step to be taken]... This role
53
should be played by none other than the Sumitsuin."
Ito here envisages a political structure which is inherently fragile. He was aware
that some procedure was necessary to justify government action, since it could no longer
claim legitimacy automatically. However, he was unable to foresee that the Sumitsuin
could not provide such justification. For it would never be seen as a neutral judge,
because its members were appointed by government. In fact, the Sumitsuin came under
severe criticism as "a meddling force" manipulated by government, when parties were
gaining strength.54 When political parties actually began to govern (1924-32), they often
clashed with the Sumitsuin, as in the cases of the latter's refusal to endorse the
government's plan to rescue the financially strained semi-governmental Bank of Taiwan
in 1927, and to ratify the London Naval Treaty.
52 Takahashi Susumu and Miyazaki Ryuji, "Seitoseiji no Teichaku to Hokai", in Banno and Miyachi
(eds.), Nihon Kindaishi ni okeru Tenkanki no Kenkyu, p. 227.
53 In a letter, quoted by Tsuji Kiyoaki, Shinpan Nihon Kanrydsei no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1965), reprinted 1992, p. 109.
54 Article 56 says: "The Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of
the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the
Emperor."
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Equally the House of Peers, which was given a constitutionally equal status with
the elective lower house, often blocked the latter's bills, thus becoming a serious internal
obstacle to the implementation of parliamentary decision.33 In this respect, the
Constitution's omission of Cabinet's joint responsibility aggravated the weakness of
government by depriving it of the ability to safeguard leadership and policy-co¬
ordination.
In fact, those running government, including ltd, keenly felt the need for their
Cabinet to have strong leadership and co-ordinating powers in order to carry out
administrative reform, including reductions in military spending. They made serious
efforts to introduce a Cabinet led by a prime minister who had strong authority, after Ito
had returned from negotiations with China over the Treaty of Tianjin in April 1885.36
Thus the new Cabinet system of 1885, which was modelled after Prussia's state
councillor system of 1810, gave strong authority to the prime minister. Article 1 of the
new decree concerning the prime minister's jurisdiction says: "The prime minister
advises on policy [to the emperor] as chief minister and outlines general policy and
supervises each office of government." And Article 5 stipulates: "Laws, imperial
ordinances and imperial rescripts require the countersignature of the prime minister and
of a state minister in charge of the affair." Under the system the Navy and Army were
also under the prime minister's general supervision. Thus Article 7 says: "Each minister
has to report to the prime minister. Even military affairs assigned to the head of the
General Staff Office (sanbo-honbu) in order to report to the emperor directly must also
C-7
be reported to the prime minister via army and navy ministers."
However, the Constitution, which came into force five years later, dropped such
references to Cabinet and prime minister, and practically substituted the emperor for
"the prime minister" in the above provisions.38
55 Of the 53 bills proposed and passed by the lower house between the first and sixth sessions (1890-94),
only 13 were passed by the House of Peers. See Banno, Meiji Kenpd Taisei no Kakuritsu (Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), reprint 1986, p. 62. Banno attributes the weakening of the early
parliamentary opposition to the influence of the House of Peers, see ibid., p. 63.
6
Inada, Meiji Kenpd Seiritsushi, vol. 1, p. 731.
57 The decree is reprinted in ibid., p. 746.
58 Government leaders debated over the inclusion of joint responsibility during the final stage of writing
the Constitution, but it was dropped as non-essential. See Inada, op. cit., vol. 2., pp. 705-9. Thus Article 7
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Thus the Constitution undid the initial aim of a Cabinet, which was to ensure
policy co-ordination and leadership. Instead power was dispersed, embracing the
military, the bureaucracy, the Cabinet, and also the newly introduced Parliament. The
omission of joint responsibility resulted in a weak Cabinet incapable of holding together
political power. At the same time it created a procedural framework whereby any one
governmental body could claim its ultimate authority. Continuous bickering over the
meaning of sovereign power ensued, as witnessed in the precarious treatment of
Minobe's Emperor-as-Organ theory. As a result, the inherent instability surfaced each
time government leaders had to formulate a national policy either in the case of war or
of signing a treaty with other countries. Budgetary considerations, diplomatic relations
and other non-military demands required that a civilian government assume precedence
over the military, which the latter resented.59
In 1907, however, Ito and other civilian leaders successfully reversed the
previous regulations concerning the issuance of imperial orders. Now all such orders,
including military ones which hitherto had been issued unilaterally by the Army or the
Navy, required a countersignature of the prime minister. Behind the move was again the
need for a Cabinet to be able to exercise leadership in policy making, including military
spending and deployment.60 However, the military quickly introduced its own decree
(,gunrei) that excluded military orders from the new rules, thanks to the emperor's
intervention. This strengthening of military autonomy coincides with what one historian
calls the emergence of the military side of the emperor system (tenndsei)61, where an
authoritarian state run by "non-elective" bodies relies on the presence of the emperor as
both institutional and ideological leader.62 A major victim of this defective structure
of the decree became "The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy" (Article 11), "The
Emperor determines the organisation and peace standing of the Army and Navy" (Article 12), and "The
respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All laws,
Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require
the countersignature of a Minister of State" (Article 55).
59
For such conflict between the Cabinet led by Ito and the military during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
95, see Masuda, Tenndsei to Kokka, p. 62.
60 For the content and the background of the new regulations (koshikirei), see ibid., pp. 49-72.
61 Sato Shoichiro, "Kokka Shihon", in Oishi (ed.), Nihon Sangyd Kakumei no Kenkyu, vol. 1, p. 361.
62
Tenndsei, which is normally translated as the emperor system in English, is a Japanese translation of
"absolute monarchy" as used in the Comintern's 1932 Theses, which also say: "The monarchy is the main
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was parliamentary politics, for civilian control could never be achieved under such
dispersed arrangements.
The diffuse spheres of jurisdiction in the bureaucratic structure also made it
difficult for party government to function effectively, according to Tsuji Kiyoaki. State
ministers, he points out, ran their ministries directly, and were constitutionally
independent of the prime minister. This arrangement gave the bureaucracy a significant
amount of autonomy and of influence on cabinet decisions. "Thus, even if a party
Cabinet emerged, it would not be possible for it to totally rely on parliamentary politics
in order to function effectively, because it would constantly need bureaucrats' support
and endorsement."63 This structure effectively prevented a Cabinet from developing into
an independent decision-making body, and seriously inhibited the spontaneous growth
of party politics.
Bernard Silberman also relates the operation of the bureaucratic state at the
expense of party politics to historical causes. Applying Max Weber's definition of
bureaucracy as "a legal-rational" form of domination, Silberman asserts that the Meiji
government as a revolutionary authority lacked firm grounds for justifying its rule.
Accordingly the Meiji leaders had to create legitimacy and authority. They had to rely
on bureaucratic expertise and form, because the bureaucrats could produce "neutrality",
"predictability", and an "authority" that could be seen as serving for the good of the
whole.64
"In short, where unrestricted development of legal-rational norms occurs in the
bureaucratic role it tends to produce a structure which claims autonomy and primacy
because of its efficiency, universalistic values, and commitment to national rather than
special interests. When this occurs, as in the case of Japan, political parties cannot
confront the bureaucracy directly without leaving themselves open to the charge of
selfishness and self-seeking. The parties are thus forced to remain subordinate, and from
pillar of political reaction and of the relics of feudalism in the country" (See 1932 Theses, in Beckmann
and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945, p. 336).
63
Tsuji, op. cit., p. 111.
64
Silberman, "The Bureaucratic State in Japan: The Problem of Authority and Legitimacy", in Najita and
Koschmann (eds.), Conflict in Modern Japanese History, p. 251.
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this lack of equilibrium evolves the pattern of politics exemplified by the Japanese
case."65 Here the absence of legitimacy of the initial Meiji government, and the real and
perceived demands of a form of state-making that emphasised efficiency and
expediency, created a hostile environment for party politics.
However, such a structure based on "rationality" is inherently fragile, because it
cannot cope with forces outside its sphere of influence, such as labour and tenant
movements, as in Taisho Japan. Also this structure promotes not only dependency but
also autonomy among the organisations under its wing. Thus Karl Mannheim
distinguishes between "substantial" and "functional" rationality. Substantial rationality
entails "acts of thought which reveal intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events
in a given situation".66 Functional rationality means "a series of actions organized in
such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of
actions receiving a functional position and role". Yet functional rationality cannot
substitute for substantial rationality in providing the authority that can deal with the
whole structure.
Thus in a bureaucratic state, unity and central authority become constant
problems, since the bureaucracy cannot provide them. "It was precisely this flaw—the
absence of authoritativeness in the basis of legitimacy—that was, I would suggest, the
source of the crisis of authority that accompanied the new century in Japan."67 Weak
parliamentary politics was both a symptom and a cause of the absence of authority that
could claim a "common" legitimacy.
"Common" legitimacy became a fundamental problem of the pre-war political
system precisely because the system had undermined the procedural framework of
decision making. Habermas defines the legitimation of political action as a two-stage
process. First, people have to agree on the meaning of legitimacy, and then based on that
common understanding, they have to agree on "the worthiness" of political action.
Therefore, "the procedures and presuppositions of justification are themselves now the
65
Silberman, "The Bureaucratic Role in Japan, 1900-1945: The Bureaucrat as Politician", in Silberman
and Harootunian (eds.), Japan in Crisis (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 215-16.





legitimating grounds on which the validity of legitimation is based". Thus Habermas
asserts that without procedural guarantees no real common legitimacy can be assured for
political action. Here Habermas is discussing the general democratic decision-making
process, not exclusively parliamentary politics. Nevertheless, this two-stage process of
justification is applicable to parliamentary politics, because it underlines the importance
of appropriate forms, or "procedures and presuppositions", for justifying political action.
For politicians to assert that they are indeed legitimate policy makers, they need a
procedural framework to work in. Saito's contribution as a parliamentarian stemmed
from his awareness that effective politics needs such endorsement.
Relevant here is Dicey's crucial description of discretionary power, which I have
examined in Chapter 1. Discretionary power has no form, being free from "legal
constraints", and Dicey shows how it can undermine the normal operations of
parliamentary government. Here even the bureaucratic role needs to be restricted. Thus,
as Silberman puts it, "high levels of political development can be reached in the long run
only when there are limitations placed on the development of legal-rational norms in the
bureaucratic role and structure".69 In the absence of appropriate form, party politics
became the victim of a system incapable of substantial rationality.
Maruyama's well-known trinity of the Japanese totalitarian political structure
during World War II again highlights the absence of appropriate procedure. The trinity
consists of "the Portable Shrine, the Official, and the Outlaw".70 The Portable Shrine
refers to the emperor, an ideological leader, the Official to both civilian and military
bureaucrats, and the Outlaw to those who were outside the normal political institutions
and who tried to influence the top echelon's decision through various means, including
violence. Maruyama's portrayal captures the working of a "formless" cluster of non-
accountable powers. Hence Saito's ostracism signals not only the rejection of
hS Hahermas "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State", in William Outhwaite (ed.), The Habermas
Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), reprint 2000, p. 251.
69
Silberman, "The Bureaucratic Role in Japan, 1900-1945", p. 216.
70
Maruyama, "Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders", Thought and Behaviour in
Modern Japanese Politics, p. 128.
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"substantial" rationality from politics, but also the demise of fragile formal
arrangements.
Despite such inherent handicaps, party politics did begin to function in Japan
immediately after the opening of Parliament. As expected, the government's immediate
reaction was to prevent parties from gaining power. Shortly before the opening of
Parliament Prime Minister Kuroda Kiyotaka told a group of prefectural governors that
the government was determined to stand outside parties in order to ensure its own course
and fairness. Ito Hirobumi also issued a statement that the country would not adopt party
71
politics. Nevertheless, opposition parties (minto) vigorously fought against government
over the reduction of taxes, and often succeeded in forcing the government to change its
policy. The parties were able to exercise such influence because the Constitution also
72
recognised the parliamentary veto in such key areas as the annual budget.
Japan's first party government appeared in 1898, led by Kenseito, which was
formed through a merger between Itagaki's Jiyuto and Okuma's Shinpoto, although the
merger ended in four months because of policy difference. In 1900, Ito Hirobumi chose
to establish his own political party, absorbing the Jiyuto. Parties steadily grew, and in
7"3
1912a popular magazine was able to hail the party era.
Mitani Taichiro attributes the rise of political parties in pre-war Japan to both
domestic and international forces. Domestic change meant that people had begun to
express their desire to participate in decision making. The two wars that Japan fought
and won, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, had increased such
popular desire. The government had sought the people's sacrifice through higher taxes
and conscription, and in this way the state entered into people's lives more significantly.
This closer tie between the state and the people not only strengthened their national
71
According to Banno, behind its insistence on secular "transcendentalism" was the government's need
for a bureaucratic state, a state structure that could co-ordinate and execute policy unilaterally. Party
politics, which was associated with local interests, were now regarded as detrimental to "unified" politics.
See Banno, Meiji Kenpo Taisei no Kakuritsu, pp. 29-37.
7"
The Constitution stipulates that law is necessary to raise taxes (Article 63). This requirement became all
the more serious a shackle for government in its parliamentary tactics when it required tax increases to
finance increasing expenditures to support industrial and military expansion after the Sino-Japanese War.
See Banno, ibid., pp. 119-20.
73 Mitani Taichiro, Nihon Seito Seiji no Keisei, p. 211.
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identity but also their demand that they play a more prominent role in determining
government policy. Thus the local universal suffrage movements began shortly after the
Sino-Japanese War. Industrialisation also meant the emergence of private entrepreneurs
and thus diverse private and local interests. Policy co-ordination became all the more
necessary. Also, the increasing prominence of Japan's regional position after the
victories of the two wars necessitated unified diplomatic policy. In other words, Japan
now required a policy based on substantial inter-relatedness rather than on functional
direction.
This situation was now significantly different from the post-Restoration setting,
which was much simpler in terms of policy formulation. Although they too had to fight
against opposition to implement their policy, even in the absence of real popular and
diplomatic pressures, the Meiji leaders could work single-mindedly, setting and pursuing
their national goals. The government was still small, forces against it were unorganised,
and it was able to focus on domestic policy alone. As a result the early leaders managed
to maintain a certain consistency in their policy.
When the country began to see the emergence of diverse private interests, and
also became a regional power, the need for policy co-ordination became all the more
necessary. The country now needed "modern" politicians for the first time. This was the
role to be played by the generation, to which Saito belonged, which had grown up with
the Jiyuminken Undo and witnessed the first opening of Parliament.
Mitani's study focuses on Hara Takashi (1856-1921) who for him symbolises
this shift in the role of politicians in government. Hara became president of Seiyukai in
1914, and four years later was the first prime minister to be chosen based on his party's
strength in Parliament. Possessed of a flexible vision and the bureaucratic skills needed
to organise and run a party, Hara, a Machiavellian, appreciated the transience of political
power, and was free from imperialist ideology. Unafraid of compromise, he emphasised
"jisei", force of time, as an indispensable factor to determine policy. At the same time he
took Parliament and the role of parties seriously. Such flexibility and fundamental
adherence to parliamentary politics were common among his generation. Thus party
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politics was born and grew as a generation which had known the Jiyuminken Undo
responded to the new political realities.
Nevertheless, Japan's era of pre-war party politics was short-lived. Its symbolic
ending came in 1932, when the civilian Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated by
military officers. This end of party politics coincided with the departure of this
generation either by retirement or by force.
Party politics had also their internal problems that facilitated their demise, along
with their constitutionally weak position. Although parties gained momentum in the
early 1910s, they soon appear to have lost public confidence, because they could not
align politics with the populist domain. Most importantly they could not shift policy
priorities sufficiently away from expansion and national unity. Thus the demise of party
politics was in part the inevitable consequence of politicians' failure to create a vision of
an alternative future.
As a major cause of stifling party organisation, Mitani also cites undeveloped
social organisations outside Parliament.74 There are two major reasons for this. One
reason of course is government's constant attempts to check social movements through
various measures, such as the press laws and police regulations. This pattern is
recognisable throughout the pre-war period. Thus when the electoral law was changed in
1900 to expand the electorate, it was accompanied by the Peace Police Law, which
targeted growing labour movements. Hara himself resisted the introduction of universal
male suffrage. When it was finally introduced in 1925, it came with the Peace
Preservation Law. Government, then run by a political party, had refused to modify the
country's policy priorities.
Extra-parliamentary organisation may also have been affected by the speed of
Japan's social regimentation, as Maruyama explores. A capitalist economy had quickly
penetrated into people's everyday lives, intensifying alienation. Due to the recession
after World War I, many regional banks that supported local businessmen and thus local




turn on big companies for their funds.75 Monopolies developed within the media, and
mass manipulation became a possibility. There was little opportunity for grass-roots
politics to grow.
In this general development politicians were more and more detached from
ordinary people. Instead, they were aligned with political power in general. The
suppression of socialist and communist movements demonstrated how government, led
by parties, could resist the growing demands for public participation in government
decision making. In all of these ways the classic tension between "development" and
"democratisation" is apparent, with party politics consumed by either its institutional
weakness or its own inertia. All of this acted on Saito as a kind of provocation, and we
will now examine his attempts to bring parties to the centre of politics.
4.3. Saito and the containment of power
"The absence of authoritativeness in the basis of legitimacy"—the unsettled question
about who had ultimate authority in decision-making—was keenly felt by members of
Parliament, including Saito. They had not only to discuss immediate issues but also to
grope for a source of legitimacy that could justify their arguments. Exposed to the
British parliamentary system and in the face of the embryonic stage of his own country's
political structure, Saito also felt the need for such definition. For this project, he took up
the term "kokumin seiji" as his conceptual tool.
The phrase kokumin seiji (national or popular politics) recurs in his writings and
speeches throughout his life. In one sense it means parliamentary politics based on the
British two-party system, to which he adhered. In a broader sense it echoes Saito's life¬
long concern about the nature of political power permissible in a society where people
remain free and independent. Saito's visions, however, were not always compatible with
liberal universalism. On some occasions he was a staunch partisan, and defended the
75 Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon Seijishi, vol. 3, Seitd no Choraku (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
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expansion policy, including the ill-fated Twenty-one Demands for China in 1916.
Nevertheless, his intellectual and temperamental opposition to the power that
encroached on the liberty of the individual remained steady, and this stance provides his
thought with recognisable integrity.
In this section, we will therefore examine two themes that Saito understood as
key principles of parliamentary government: the limitation of power and political
accountability. We will trace these principles in his support for a two-party system, for
universal male suffrage, and also in his criticism of the discretionary powers of the
Sumitsuin, of the genrd, of the powerful House of Peers, and in the use of imperial
prerogatives (taiken).
For the cultivation of his political views, Saito is clearly indebted to nineteenth
century British liberal thinkers and constitutional scholars, in particular to John Stuart
Mill, Walter Bagehot, and A.V. Dicey. The Kokkai Hikakuron, which he published in
1906 privately, echoes his reading of their works, particularly Mill's On Liberty and
Dicey's classical study of English constitutionalism An Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution. From Mill Saito absorbed the justifications for representative
government, and from Dicey how it could be achieved. In the opening page of his
Kokkai Hikakuron Saito defines the common awareness of the people as "the engine of
politics". Thus any political force that does not command common awareness is
illegitimate, because it does not have authority over the people. "... Authority that
produces power does not occur accidentally... It is based on the will of the people...
Any authority not based on the will of the people will eventually dissolve, however
strong it may look."76 At this stage, however, Saito by no means endorses the principle
of equality or universal suffrage. On the contrary he accepts inequality in talent and
motivation. Yet he understands that the will of the people is a legitimate concept to
assert a form of government that defends personal freedoms.
The liberty of the individual is central to Mill's thought. He believes that social
progress is possible only if people are free to engage in their own activities. Mill also
1988), p. 106.
76
Saito, Kokkai Hikakuron, p. 11.
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believes that men are capable of "rational choice" in the collective attempt to conduct
their own affairs. Representative government is better than despotism, because the
former provides the people with a chance to develop their own abilities, while the latter
stifles such development.
According to Mill, there are two schools of thought concerning the origins of
political institutions. One school insists that government is "strictly a practical art,
giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end".77 The other school thinks
that forms of government are not a matter of choice, but "a product" of a people's
"habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate
purposes".78 Mill is opposed to both schools. He wants to see the participation of self-
conscious individuals in the deliberate formation of a nation's political institutions.
"Let us remember", Mill claims, "that political institutions (however the
proposition may be at times ignored) are the work of men; owe their origin and their
whole existence to human will... In every stage of their existence they are made what
they are by human voluntary agency... On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind
that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked,
by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their
active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as
are available."7 For the active participation of a people, three conditions are necessary:
their acceptance of the form of government, willingness to accept change, and practical
or\
commitment. Representative government is the most acceptable form, if not the best,
to realise these conditions.
Directly echoing Mill, Saito says, "Human thought and activity must be actually
used. They can be developed only when they are used. They will not grow otherwise...
Under despotism, the people's freedom of speech and activity will be prevented, and
there will be no chance that they will develop." 1 With this end in mind, Saito approves
77
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the British-style parliamentary system wholeheartedly. The influence of Jiyuminken
Undo and Fukuzawa notwithstanding, his reading of Mill and others made his vision of
an ideal political system more specific and focused.
From Dicey, Saito learned the working principles and mechanism of a
constitutional system. The aim of a constitutional system is to limit monarchical
authority so as to safeguard personal liberties. This principle, which he had no difficulty
in accepting because of his individualistic outlook, made a lasting impression on him.
Saito imagined political power as the expression of a fictional agreement of a people so
as not to stifle their liberties in any fundamental way. This understanding provided him
with a firm theoretical ground for asserting and examining political action based on
legitimacy.
Saito also learned, from Dicey, the evolution of the English constitutional
system. It has evolved and is still evolving based on the principle of liberty. The fact that
constitutional conventions are as important as law for its operation testifies to the
indispensability of common understanding of that principle. Fie quickly applies Dicey's
claim to his own country's Constitution, and concludes that straightforward application
of the Constitution results in despotism. Saito says,
Without the help of conventions, a constitutional system cannot function. It becomes apparent if we
think of the Japanese case. Under the Constitution, the emperor can dissolve the House of
Representatives as many times as he likes. He can reject a bill passed by Parliament. If Parliament
refuses to pass a law, the emperor can avert the crisis by issuing an emergency order or an
independent order. If Parliament refuses to pass a budget, he can implement the previous year's
budget, and also spend irrelevantly to a national budget. The emperor can appoint state ministers
freely. They are responsible to the emperor alone, and not to Parliament. This means [theoretically]
that those ministers will keep their posts even if they act against the will of Parliament. If we
actually apply these principles and assume that that is the way of conducting constitutional politics,
82




Thus in Japan restraining conventions are essential in order to ensure constitutional
politics, precisely because the Constitution does not guarantee their continued existence.
Clearly the idea of political evolution encouraged Saito. The English system is
most advanced, and his own country's system is still in its infancy. But there is no
reason why the country cannot reach that stage, but only if progress is made based on the
principle of limiting unqualified discretionary power. Thus Saito expounds his own
emperor-as-organ theory: "The monarch, who may be called normally absolutist, is in
o->
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fact a mere organ of the people." What he means by "organ" here is that any political
power exercised by the monarch is subject to an agreement, either by law or through
convention.
Here Saito shares with Minobe the challenge of how to create a political creed in
tune with such constitutional principles. In Saito's case, the challenge was more
immediate as it was combined with everyday politics. The above theme recurs in his
parliamentary speeches and writings, and the attempt not only to discuss immediate
issues but also to create enabling political conventions became his major task as a
parliamentarian.
Saito's support for a two-party system exemplifies his efforts to combine a
political creed with everyday politics. Thus in early 1914, as a member of the opposition
Doshikai, he urged his colleagues to work towards joining other parties so as to create a
single party strong enough to compete against the ruling Seiyukai, which held 203 seats,
compared with Doshikai's 93 seats. During a speech he delivered soon after, at a party
meeting, Saito proclaimed that Japan was most highly suited to two party rule. Quoting
Lawrence Lowell's Governments and Parties in Continental Europe of 1896, in which
the Harvard political scientist analysed why a two-party system failed in many European
countries, Saito cited several conditions detrimental to the system: a multiracial society,
strong socialist parties, diverse regional differences, religious conflicts, and persistent
differences about national polity as in the confrontation between monarchists and




simple but forceful manner Saito told his colleagues that Japan had none of these
problems, and was suited to a two-party system.
Yet the real aim of the speech was to criticise other members of Parliament for
their inability to work together based on shared opinions. According to Lowell, "Such a
consensus is the foundation of all political authority, of all law and order; and it is easy
to see that if it were seriously questioned, the position of the government would be
shaken, that if it were destroyed, the country would be plunged into a state of
84
anarchy." Those who do not accept "the consensus on which the political authority of
the day is based are termed in France Irreconcilables". Saito blames Japanese
Irreconcilables for blocking the prompt formation of a two-party system in Japan. He
further criticises the politicians' inability to formulate policy based on a thorough
examination of the issues as well as on shared political belief. Such articulation is
86essential for the active exchange of opinion that sustains a two-party system.
Saito also sees the two-party system as a "mode of limitation", affecting the
individual and the community, and as a self-regulating mechanism whereby power is
transferred from one party to another based on public support. He understands and
affirms Mill's distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power vis-a-vis the liberty
of the individual. No power is permanent and absolute, and the rulers must be "elective
87
and temporary". Saito's support for a two-party system springs from his understanding
of authority and legitimacy, in which Mill's influence is palpable. Saito went on to
develop these arguments in his Kenpd oyobi Seijironshu of 1915, his meditation and
inquiry into Japan's party politics with reference to the British system.
Here he emphasises the role of opposition, not just that of an opposition party but
also of public protest. Both are indispensable parts of the self-regulating mechanism. "If
Parliament does not represent the popular will (min'i), popular movements are
84
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inevitable. By so doing they are merely exercising their political rights." The more
politically aware the people become, the more vocal they will become, and this trend is
positive rather than negative for the sake of social progress. "If such movements did not
take place, popular morality would have been destroyed, plunging politics into an
abyss."89 Apparently at this time Saito as a lawyer was defending those who took part in
the mass demonstration in Hibiya Park against the Yamamoto Cabinet over a bribery
scandal involving naval officers and the German firm of Siemens and the British firm of
Vickers.90
Similarly, as a member of the oppositional Doshikai, it was easy for Saito to
attack the Cabinet. Yet he maintained his tolerance of different opinion, because he
believed in the freedoms that promote social progress. He never accepted communism,
and his patriotism, on more than one occasion, made him sound a conservative who was
uncomfortable with the radical views of both right and left. However, he always
remained alert to any force that tried to reduce personal freedom.
As with Minobe and Sakai, Saito was attentive to social change and ready to
modify his position accordingly. Hence the post-war moves towards democracy led him
to revise his views about acceptable government. One such change is seen in his support
for universal suffrage in place of the two-party system.
Until 1919 Saito had been opposed to universal suffrage. Yet in a speech on 26
February 1920 he explained why he and others submitted a bill supporting it. The post¬
war world was embracing democracy, and universal suffrage was fast becoming a
common practice in the West.91 He saw the victory of Britain and its allies as a victory
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of democracy. Germany and Italy, the losers of the war, epitomised "bureaucratic,
military government" where constitutional representation was merely nominal, and
which was now defeated by the "democracies". The results of the war thus reinforced
Saito's adherence to "kokumin seiji". In his speech, Saito reiterated the principle that
only a government that had popular support was capable of the authority necessary for
national politics. Universal suffrage was now essential to the reinforcement of that
channel between the popular will (min'i) and national decision-making. "Without
universal suffrage, it will be impossible to... help the people demonstrate their political
abilities, and prompt popular, national unity, and it is impossible to solve the country's
domestic problems."92 Equally, without such genuine national unity, it will be
impossible for the country to cope with recent global changes and to maintain its
regional leadership. Saito reiterates his point that government which is not based on
popular support is weak, and sees the strengths of Britain and its allies in the form of
governments based on popular support. He criticises the Hara Cabinet, saying that it
cannot solve the problems confronting it because it is influenced by "invisible" forces
that derive from the present restrictive elections. If it wants to tackle inflation or solve
labour and other social issues, "the capitalist and propertied class will oppose it". "In
short the government is weak because it is not based on the masses but based on a
minority. This weakness hurts the government, and eventually hurts the people as a
whole."93
Later that year, in the general election that took place under the first single-seat
constituencies system, Saito lost his seat. In 1924 he regained it, and in March 1925, he
delivered a speech supporting male universal suffrage as a member of the ruling party.
In this two-hour speech, he surveyed the past attempts to extend the suffrage. In 1903, a
bill for introducing universal male suffrage was submitted to the House of
Representatives for the first time, and in 1911 it was passed by that house, but rejected
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by the House of Peers. Saito asserted that "It is an unarguable fact that the present
constitutional countries have passed the stages of oligarchy and bureaucracy, and moved
to democracy (tasu seiji) and kokumin seiji. The ideal of universal suffrage stems from
the principle of political equality: asset-based privileges should be no longer recognised.
The state should be removed from the monopoly of a minority and made into something
common among the people, thus making state and people identical, and their interests
also."94 Here Saito's adherence to kokumin seiji echoes Mill: "... [T]he rulers should be
identified with the people... Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated,
and in a form convenient for exercise."95
Saito summarises two main sources of opposition to the introduction of male
universal suffrage. One is that universal suffrage is incompatible with the country's
constitutional principles. To defend his position, he invokes the Constitution and also the
Charter Oath, whose first article called for public debate on policy decisions. As we
have seen already, "public opinion" in the Charter Oath did not necessarily mean bona
fide popular opinion. Yet Saito uses the article, as other political reformers do, to
promote wider political participation, thus reinterpreting the very meaning of "public"
(kd) to justify his position. He was able to do so because both the Charter Oath and the
Constitution touched upon the question of legitimate authority: in the very phrase
"public opinion" in the former, and in the legislative role of Parliament ensured by the
latter. Saito, as a member of the ruling party, confidently claims that universal suffrage
reflects the basic principles of the country's constitutional system.
Another major criticism of universal suffrage is that it is linked to "dangerous"
thought, and such radical change will disturb the social order. When Saito counters such
criticism, his background as an advocate of liberal individualism reveals itself. After the
Russian Revolution and the global trend of democracy, all kinds of thought were
introduced into Japan, Saito confirms. Thus when Morito Tatsuo, a junior professor of
Tokyo Imperial University, introduced Kropotkin's theories in an academic journal in
late 1919, he came under fierce criticism from the nationalist student organisation
94TGSGS, vol. 46, p. 478.
95 Mill, op. cit., p. 7.
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Kokoku Doshikai as an advocacy of anarchism.96 The university authorities yielded to
such pressure, and suspended Morito and Ouchi Hyoe, editor of the journal, from the
university. They were prosecuted for violation of the Press Law. In 1920 the Supreme
Court ruled they were guilty.
Implicitly referring to such cases, Saito repudiates what he sees as extreme
sensitivity on the part of the authorities. Echoing Mill's endorsement of diversity and
plurality of thought, Saito proclaims that there is no such thing as dangerous thought
when people are allowed to express their opinions freely. "Dangerous thought begins to
grow only when the popular will is oppressed and rights are threatened."97
Furthermore Saito has to defend universal suffrage against the fear of change,
which Saito asserts is irrational. Some also reject universal suffrage as a foreign import.
Yet according to Saito, Japanese history is full of such imports, and its political system
will not function if some aspects of it are rejected as "foreign". The use of such concepts
98reduces necessary debate, and politicians should not exploit Japanese particularism.
Similarly Saito attacks a proposal made by one of the opposition parties, Seiyu
Honto, for giving voting rights only to family heads. "The basic unit of the state is the
individual", Saito says, echoing Fukuzawa. "National progress will be possible only
when the individual can act spontaneously and exercise his political abilities as much as
possible."99
When Saito made his speech of 1925, male universal suffrage was widely
supported, even among nationalists such as Uesugi. For them, extending the suffrage
will allow the people and the emperor to become closer and thus national unity will be
reinforced. However, for Saito, national unity derives from individuals who act freely
and spontaneously. Unity should not and cannot be imposed on the people. People need
to be persuaded rationally before they support a policy, and politicians are responsible
for such explanation, and only universal suffrage allows this process of rational
'6 Doshikai was one of several organisations formed around this time to counter such reformist
organisations as Reimeikai (See Saito, Oshu Shokoku no.... p. 23, and Kenpo oyobi Seijironshu, p. 94).
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persuasion to develop. Thus Saito says, "to direct a people, factual and logical substance
is necessary. Any attempt to create the opinion of the people by abusing radical
language, without presenting objective facts and logical substance, is destined to fail."1 0
Saito therefore supports universal suffrage as a step towards creating an "agreed"
national unity. For this purpose open discussion is essential. Countering the criticism
that universal suffrage would damage family unity, Saito would say: discussion should
be encouraged even between father and son. The very aim of Parliament is discussion,
and difference of opinion does not damage the system.
However, in this 1925 speech Saito dropped his previous support for a two-party
system. Again global trends provide the mainstay of his claim. "Given social progress
and the complexity of society, politics based on confrontation between two parties is
impractical and unachievable."101 He supports proportional representation, but thinks
that its introduction requires more study. For the present we should be content with
multi-seat constituencies because they offer a kind of proportional system. So during this
session, in addition to the passage of male universal suffrage, the single-seat
constituency system introduced by the Hara Cabinet was replaced by the new
constituencies.
Kamizawa Soichiro regards this 1924-25 parliamentary session as an "epoch-
making moment" in Japan's parliamentary history with regard to the depth and breadth
of debate.102 In this regard, Saito made a strong contribution, adding his voice to a
movement well under way. Thus calls for universal suffrage had grown after World War
I. The Rice Riots in 1918 were also a catalyst for an outburst of public grievance against
restricted political rights: already in early 1919 students and workers were demonstrating
103
at various parts of the country seeking universal suffrage. Kenseikai, to which Saito
belonged, also began to discuss a possible suffrage bill in that year. In February 1920,
public meetings calling for universal suffrage were common, attracting a large number
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period".104 Saito's 1920 speech was made in such an atmosphere. Yet he was clearly
listening to people outside Parliament, since his party's formal proposal included a
clause that only men who were economically independent could vote. Saito was one of
the few radicals who advocated male universal suffrage without such a clause.105 Saito at
this time was sharpening his position in response to people's growing demands.
After Saito's defeat in the 1920 general election, local youth gathered around
him to support his return to Parliament. From now on, his main supporters were
voluntary and local. All were influenced by socialist thought more or less. One
organised a reading group of socialist literature, while one had attended a labour school
run by Kagawa Toyohiko, a socialist reformer and Sakai's contemporary. They became
Saito's lasting support base in the constituency, even after his expulsion from
Parliament.106
It6 Yukio attributes Saito's 1924 victory to the dissemination of liberal thought
during the Taisho period. The people had become more aware of their rights because of
better education and the growing circulation of socialist and liberal magazines, as well
as the general discontent with Seiyukai's economic policy amid the post-war
recession.107 On returning to Parliament, Saito pushed through the introduction of male
universal suffrage as the leader of the supra-party parliamentary committee that drafted
the bill.108
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However, Saito had to be content with a significant watering down of the bill
because of power relations. When the government finally adopted the bill in December
1924, it included a clause that eliminated those who received public financial support
from eligibility. Matsuo speculates that the government caved in under pressure from the
Sumitsuin.109 More damagingly, the passage of the bill was accompanied by the
introduction of the Peace Preservation Law. Saito had supported a two-party system and
then universal suffrage because he believed that they would lead to a strong and solid
government without sacrificing the liberty of the individual. He was partially successful,
with more people brought into the process of decision making than ever before.
However, the introduction of another oppressive law also expanded the domain of
discretionary power, which he had to confront from now on.
Saito had long understood that along with the limitation of power, political
responsibility can also help to ensure the liberty of the individual. Thus if power is
exercised by a person over others, that person is responsible for its exercise. The
exercise of power and responsibility are thus inseparable. In 1915, Saito says, "As long
as they take the whole responsibility politically, state ministers must be allowed to
exercise their expertise freely."11
Out of this power-responsibility linkage, Saito quickly criticises the Sumitsuin
and genrd for being unaccountable, and thus unconstitutional. "State ministers'
responsibility may be questioned by Parliament, but no one questions that of the
Sumitsuin.... In reality the Sumitsuin is not a constitutional advisory organ, but an
institution that prevents the normal operation of constitutional politics."111 Genrd is also
a body that is above the Cabinet and is unaccountable for its own decisions. But Saito
concedes that genrd will play the important role of choosing the next prime minister as
112
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The House of Peers is also the chief source of Parliament's disunity, thus of
1 1 T
political anarchy, and therefore is an obstacle to national politics. But Saito also
concedes that the problem stems from the weaknesses of the House of Representatives,
and that the public does not see it as its true representative.
We have seen that in his speech of 1920, Saito severely criticised the country's
political system for lacking a solid framework in which party politics could function. He
told Parliament: "Our government does not have central force. But that is not the only
problem. There are various kinds of forces, which are unconstitutional and unjust, which
operate here and there, and which compete with each other both openly and secretly.
There is no national power that can overcome and unify these disparate forces. This is
one major defect of this country's politics."114 Saito hoped that the introduction of
universal male suffrage would solve this problem: a solid platform on which government
could claim both authority and legitimacy.
The application of universal male suffrage in 1928 did not solve the problem
instantaneously. On the contrary, the Home Affairs Ministry responded to the first
general election to be held under universal male suffrage with a large-scale crackdown
on communists. Meanwhile, the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in China and the
move led by the Nationalist Party to unify the country threatened the military
establishment. In May 1927 Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi sent troops to Shandong to
support the pro-Japanese warlord Zhang Zuolin. Throughout 1928, Japanese and
Chinese troops clashed on various occasions. It is this beleaguered government,
aggressive both towards its own people and the country's interests abroad that Saito sees
as deliberately undermining parliamentary politics. By acting in this way, the
government was abandoning a key prerequisite for the operation of government: the
need to assert its authority through the demonstration of its legitimacy, through the trust
of the people, and adherence to parliamentary procedures. He is particularly concerned
with the government's use of "crisis" to push through unpopular policy. For a
113 ibid., p. 36.
114TGSGS, vol. 36, p. 317.
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government incapable of claiming legitimacy except through "expediency" is inherently
weak, and unable to steer the country.
Saito articulated his concern about the misuse of ideology and the deliberate
undermining of constitutional conventions in a parliamentary interpellation targeting
Prime Minister Tanaka, made on 22 January 1929.
In his speech Saito frequently invoked the theme of accountability in order to
criticise Tanaka. Saito dealt with accountability in the following areas: government's
intervention in election campaigns, Tanaka's decision to appoint a controversial
businessman-turned-politician to be home affairs minister, government's spending
practices without parliamentary sanction, and the use of an imperial ordinance to revise
the Peace Preservation Law. It is this last issue where Saito's arguments were most
convincing. For "expediency" must be objectively explained, and the use of an
emergency imperial ordinance (chokurei) is only acceptable in order to maintain the
public safety, to cope with a truly urgent situation, or when Parliament is in recess.
In fact the government had submitted its bill to amend the law on only the fifth
day of the previous two-week extraordinary session, leaving little time for debate. Saito
alleged that the government could have extended the session so that Parliament could
discuss the bill, but it had decided not to do so because "it was concerned with the
widespread opposition that encompassed the public (kokuron), some members of the
government and the ruling party [Seiyukai], and also the Privy Council". The
government then dithered for two months, before finally invoking chokurei to revise the
law. "Given the circumstances", said Saito, "it is hard to believe there is an urgent
situation."115
Saito was not convinced by the government's explanation that a tighter law was
necessary in order to prevent communists from gaining power, because he did not
believe in such a danger. Certainly communists did not have the influence to overturn
the fabric of society: "Observing the country's situation now, we cannot agree with the
government's propagandistic statement warning us against the arrival of an era of terror
"5TGSGS, vol. 56, p. 28.
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because of the unstoppable dissemination of communism..."116 Instead by invoking an
imperial ordinance to tighten the law, the government is causing far greater damage,
undermining the very foundation of constitutional government. Knowing that Parliament
would oppose the bill if it was normally presented, "the government has ignored public
opinion and Parliament, and enacted a law that allows it to charge people with the death
117
penalty. This is nothing but autocracy in the guise of constitutional government".
Saito warns that such a law will promote neither a complaisant people nor the public
peace. On the contrary oppressive government will alienate the people, and germinate
radical resistance. Here Saito is again touching on authority and legitimacy, and linking
them with public opinion, min'i. Nevertheless, despite his and others' criticisms, the
Seiyukai-dominated Parliament approved the revision retrospectively when the
government sought its approval as required by the Constitution.
This use of an imperial ordinance to tighten the Peace Preservation Law reflected
the government's loss of authority on all fronts. Frustrated by Tanaka's reconciliatory
policy, the Japanese Kwantung Army had assassinated the Manchurian warlord Zhang
Zuolin in June 1928. Saionji, a former prime minister and one of the genrd, told Prime
Minister Tanaka that it was necessary to mete out severe punishments on the military
staff in order to maintain international trust in Japan, to remind the military that its
undisciplined behaviour would be punished, and to improve the country's relationship
1 1 8
with China. Persuaded by Saionji, Tanaka demanded stronger punishments for those
involved in killing Zhang, but those supporting the military, including even some
members of his own party, resisted strongly. Confronted by a hostile Parliament, Tanaka
was helpless to assert his authority."9
Thus, without clarifying the question of responsibility, Tanaka was forced to
resign because neither the military nor Parliament supported him. Masuda Tomoko
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speculates that if Tanaka had brought the issue to Parliament and the latter had
supported the prime minister's position, the practice of subjecting the supreme military
I 20
command to the Cabinet's jurisdiction might have taken root. With Tanaka's
resignation, his demand that those involved in the killing of Zhang be tried at court
martial was ignored. Thus a crucial opportunity for government to assert authority based
on the backing of Parliament was lost.
Party government survived when Saionji appointed Minseito's Hamaguchi
Osachi as the next prime minister. However, the problem of divided government merely
continued to grow, and Japan's position in Manchuria became all the more fragile in the
face of growing Chinese nationalism. The Hamaguchi government managed to sign the
London Naval Treaty in 1930 despite fierce opposition from the military, but the degree
of manoeuvring to which the government had to resort in order to counter opposition—
even invoking the emperor's discretionary power (taiken)—reveals the further
crumbling of constitutional government. The Cabinet was no longer able to contain the
competing forces unless it invoked the emperor's all-inclusive higher authority. Masuda
asserts that such manoeuvring exacerbated the ideological and institutional divisions of
government, prompting calls for the termination of constitutional and parliamentary
1 21
government altogether.
Thus pre-war party politics in Japan could not survive the ideological and
institutional divide of government, which both shaped and relied on the discretionary
nature of executive power. Yet the parties themselves were also partly responsible for
this decline.
The Japanese parties bickered with each other constantly. Saito was not immune
to such temptation. Thus in a speech of 22 March 1932, Saito censured Prime Minister
Inukai for staying in power despite the Sakurada Gate Incident earlier in the year, a
failed attempt to assassinate the emperor by a Korean resident resentful of
122discrimination. Inukai had tendered a letter of resignation, which was rejected by the
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emperor's aides concerned with the discipline of the military. ~ Saito was strongly
partisan, and unusually emotive. He criticises Inukai for failing in his responsibility to
support the emperor. The speech was intended to oust Inukai, whose government was
already facing serious internal problems. Yet Inukai's immediate aim was to end the
escalation of the Manchurian Incident, as he explains in his reply to Saito.124 His Cabinet
had decided not to recognise the Manchukuo based on international law 10 days earlier,
although a major faction of his party was calling for its approval and also for the
125
country's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Saito in his speech inadvertently
contributed to the undermining of Inukai's efforts to contain the runaway military and to
resume civilian control. The assassination of Inukai two months later marked the end of
party politics in pre-war Japan. Although Saito was critical of the "non-elective forces"
that tried to bring down the Cabinet, Saito appears to have been too little aware of his
own party's role in the undoing of party politics as a whole.
According to Takahashi Susumu and Miyazaki Ryuji, the elimination of
Parliament and thus the electorate from the procedures by which new prime ministers
were appointed was responsible for the eventual fall of parties. It was extremely rare in
pre-war politics for a new prime minister to be selected as the result of a general
election. Normally, most general elections were held several months after a new Cabinet
was formed. After the formation of a Cabinet, its leaders would replace many local
governors with their supporters in preparation for an election, and the new governors
would interfere in election campaigns. As a result, it was very difficult for an opposition
party to take power through elections. Thus for the opposition it was important not only
to exaggerate any blunder that the ruling party had made but also to collude with those
non-elective bodies hostile towards it. This practice continued even during the time of
the two-party system of Seiyukai and Minseito. Once again the biggest casualty of such
arrangements was the loss of public trust: "Both Seiyukai and Minseito attacked the
other party for any error that it had made to the extent that such an attack would appear
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to be a total denial of the other's governing ability. In the eyes of the public, such mutual
in-fighting created the impression that both parties were incapable of governing... thus
alienating the electorate."126 In addition, even during the two-party system, parties failed
to compete against each other over policy. "This failure prepared for the decline of party
politics. It may not have been linked directly to the rise of an anti-party force, but it
diluted public support."
Furthermore, the rapidly expanding role of government also hindered party
politics. As we have seen, political parties were handicapped from the very start. When
the state was expanding as an ideological and material force, as the planner and financier
of various local projects, parties as a spontaneous unity of individuals who shared a
political creed found it difficult to develop. With "no great organised parties" as in
France, candidates had to secure "local influence and personal interests" in order to be
elected.128 They had to act "as a kind of universal business agent" for their
constituencies. This situation tended to prevent them forming a party based on a shared
political creed.
In 1915, Saito had already complained of the split between national and local
politics in the electoral districts.129 Thus people tended to support a candidate or a party
out of personal connection or in the belief that a party will bring local benefits, such as a
new railway, port, or similar improved infrastructure. "Because people are elected to the
House of Representatives from such constituencies, a general election is not connected
to national politics. Even if government dissolves Parliament seeking the electorate's
130
verdict, campaign debates will not be focused." This problem of party unity was
compounded by government's interference in campaigns, regardless of which party was
in power. Saito concedes that in view of those problems, and without the guarantee of
free elections, it is difficult for elections to connect with the popular will.
126 Takahashi Susumu and Miyazaki Ryuji, "Seito Seiji no Teichaku to Hokai", in Banno and Miyachi
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In this way parties were both culprits and victims of the political climate. Saito,
131
however, refused to take up specific local interests, unlike other politicians. " Instead,
he discussed national issues such as electoral laws, protection of human rights, and
constitutional procedures. His constituency clearly supported their academic
representative, but not for the local interests that he might promote.
Hence "kokumin seiji" always constituted Saito's political creed. It is this vision
that survived throughout his life, and prompted him to confront the government in his
crucial speech of 1940. In 1941, when he was out of Parliament, he returned to the same
theme: "The most natural and safest way of conducting politics to ensure social and
intellectual progress is to allow the people to take part. It is an undeniable fact that
human history is moving in that direction, and no force can stop it. In time of war or
when rapid deployment of national force is necessary, a political system antithetical to
that direction may emerge, but it is merely temporary. Anyone who aims at becoming a
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politician should not forget this fact." His vision was far-sighted and based on a
fundamental trust in human reason. Yet when he wrote this passage, he had witnessed
the transformation of government into an enormous system of administration with
extensive power over people's lives. Now the government was reinforcing its war-time
measures: the National Mobilisation Law, which was introduced in 1938, was revised to
increase government autocracy, the Peace Preservation Law was also revised to allow
the authorities to detain civilians in "preventing crime" (yobo kokin), and the National
Defence and Security Law (kokubo hoanhd) was newly introduced. Parliament was still
in operation, but the parties were defunct. Saito had witnessed the annihilation of the
constitutional framework, which he had tried to build throughout his life.
Nevertheless pre-war parliamentary politics in Japan owes its growth to members
of Parliament such as Saito who clearly understood the tension between national goals
and individual liberties and the role of Parliament in negotiating that tension. Saito's
political behaviour was sometimes blinkered, yet precisely because the Japanese
131 Sec Kusayanagi, Saito Takao, p. 76.
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Saito, "Hijoji ni shosuru Gikai Seiji no Tokushitsu", Saito Takao Seijironshu (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu
Oraisha, 1994), p. 119. He wrote the article in May 1941, but it was published only posthumously.
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parliamentary system was in process of formation, a creed such as his became
indispensable in the search for acceptable representative government.
4.4. Saito and totalitarianism: the defence of constitutionalism
In 1940, the German legal expert Ernst Fraenkel attempted to explain how the German
totalitarian regime grew out of the constitutional arrangements of the Weimar Republic.
He observed the gradual and systematic abolition of the rule of law in various court
rulings and legal procedures, a process whereby the Rechtsstaat (legal state) was
subverted by political expediency. Traditional "rational" Natural Law and idees
generates were denied. Instead, "people's" law and ethnicity became the central
principles of legal order, thus subjugating that order to particularist German interests.
Law became a "measure", applied for immediate political purposes rather than for
protecting people's rights, which were no longer regarded as universal. "There are no
legal rules governing the political sphere. It is regulated by arbitrary measures
(Massnabmen), in which the dominant officials exercise their discretionary
1 W
prerogatives". Fraenkel calls such a system the "Prerogative State". In National-
Socialist Germany, the "Prerogative State" co-existed with the "Normative State", which
was "an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal
order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative
agencies". In this dual structure the "Prerogative State" subverted the "Normative State",
facilitating the rise of Nazi dictatorship.
Saito observed a similar development in Japan, the incremental collapse of the
state structure. The driving force of this development was the military, whose
expansionist ambitions received a significant boost from the Manchurian Incident. The
military was by no means united, yet its ideological and organisational outlook was
133
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superimposed on the existing state through various steps. This process also involved the
demise of party politics.
In Japan the practice by which the largest party in Parliament formed
government came to an abrupt end in 1932 when Inukai was assassinated. A party
Cabinet did not re-emerge until the end of World War II. During the nine-year period
between the assassination of Inukai and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in December
1941, nine men became prime minister, six of them being army generals or navy
admirals. The Cabinets led by those men were all weak, and they were ousted or forced
to resign when they failed to rein in the military's ever-radicalising assertiveness.134 The
frequent turnover of leadership implies both the disappearance of a firm locus of power
and increasing incoherence in policy, which Saito exposed in Parliament.
Saito's decades-old warning that government not based on popular support was
ill-founded and unable to command the necessary authority had become clear to many
critics. Thus in January 1935 Minobe Tatsukichi, just a month before his Emperor-as-
Organ theory was attacked in the House of Peers, had observed the absence of
centripetal power capable of commanding authority as a fatal weakness of the political
system of the day. The decisive event was the Manchurian Incident, for it had
precipitated the new forces, led by the military and the "new" bureaucrats, that denied
1 ^5
party politics.
Recognising decline, Saito made several important speeches during this period,
warning against the consequences of destroying the political system that he and others
had striven to build and preserve. None of the speeches altered the general course of the
country's expansion policy. Nevertheless, they record the steady growth of a totalitarian
system eclipsing the constitutional framework.
According to Saito, the first clear move to destroy the structure came from the
outright rejection of a party Cabinet by the military after the assassination of Prime
134 Even Tojo Hideki, the last of these men who took the country to war, was unable to harness conflicting
opinions. He stepped down when Japan began to lose the war, but his resignation came a year before
Japan's surrender in 1945.
13 Minobe, "Gendai Seikyoku no Tenbo", the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 3 and 4 January 1935 (part one and
two).
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Minister Inukai. In a speech of January 1935 Saito criticised the military's policy
statement issued three months earlier as militaristic "propaganda".
This 57-page pamphlet criticised many aspects of everyday life, including the
destructive aspects of capitalism. Capitalism, it argued, was the root cause of the plight
of the farming communities, which were exploited by the cities, capitalism's
embodiment. The gap between rich and poor was caused by the laissez-faire economy,
and the people's selfish pursuit of material profits undermined the commonweal.
Echoing national socialism, which was then gaining support in Japan, the pamphlet
called for the state's further intervention in economic affairs and for civic education in
order to rectify social malaise. It appeared when the plight of the farming communities
had become hotly debated in Parliament. Poor harvests caused by a succession of natural
disasters had aggravated the strains of the communities which had not recovered from
the impact of the global recession.
Yet what angered and alarmed old guard liberals such as Saito and Minobe was
the military's implication that military force was more effective than any other means to
solve such flaws in society. The pamphlet portrays military expansion as the final
panacea of all those social ills, both material and spiritual, and elevates the role of the
military to that of the chief guardian of such necessary national endeavour.
Thus in his speech, Saito attempts to contradict the military's demands for a
militarily expedient state with his formulation of three threats that the people now face: a
threat to their economic well-being, a threat to their freedoms, and a threat of war.
He acknowledges that the present economic system has created various forms of
inequality and misery in society. Poverty is inevitable under a free economy, but
government has obligations to support those who fall into it because of unavoidable
circumstances. Yet he is opposed to the pamphlet's call for drastic reform of the
economic system, which he finds untenable. Like any other aspect of society, the
economic system is complex. Policy ought to be practical and achievable. "It is a pipe
dream to think that a better system can be implemented quickly", Saito says.
His alternative measures include the reduction of military spending, as well as
tax reform so that wealth will be more fairly distributed. It is a contradiction to call for a
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fairer economic system and more military spending simultaneously. In fact, government
revenues allocated to the Army and Navy go to a small number of manufacturers,
leaving small-scale independent entrepreneurs short of funds and work. Attacking this
military-sponsored "siphoning" structure, Saito says, "We cannot deny that at least
several millions of yen each year are spent on manufacturing warships, weapons and
ammunition. Where does the cash go? It goes to a very small number of businessmen
and manufacturers although the majority of the people share the burden of military
spending... That is, a very small minority is making huge profits, which does not help
to alleviate the widespread poverty at all."136
For Saito, military leadership is unacceptable, because his vision of government
entails active interaction between the people and government. He sees the source of
national stability to exist in the people's trust in government, their sense of security in
everyday life, and spontaneous feelings of solidarity. A change in government policy, or
any forced ideology, cannot produce such fundamental components of national unity.
Thus, "No nation is stable without a people feeling secure in their daily living... It is a
mere dream to try to mould national morale without providing the people with food,
clothing, and housing."137 Any attempt to produce national sentiment through artificial
means is destined to fail.
Accordingly Saito sees the emergence of authoritarian government in the
military's new assertiveness. And in two months' time (March 1935), Japan's
withdrawal from the League of Nations would become valid. The government was about
to take part in multilateral talks about the London Naval Treaty, hoping that the treaty
would be revised to ensure Japan's equal share of armaments. With the anticipation of
the termination of the treaty, some military leaders were desperate to secure government
favour and realise a sharp increase in military spending. Such demands met strong
I ^8
resistance from the Finance Ministry as well as from members of Parliament. Thus the
136
TGSGS, vol. 64, p. 68.
137 ibid., pp. 68-9.
138 Rikken Minseitdshi, vol. 2, pp. 953-7.
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pamphlet appeared when the military was propagating the idea of an "imminent crisis"
with a clear political motive.
The new military assertiveness came with a new assertiveness in the
bureaucracy. Just a day before Saito's speech, Minobe, a member of the House of Peers,
139had questioned the government about the treatment of suspects in the Teijin Incident.
Echoing such an attack, Saito also mentions the case and says: "Dictatorship is a
primitive form of government, not a civilised one. If it abuses its authority and
suppresses people's freedom, government is uncivilised."140
Saito concludes his speech with his defence of a party Cabinet, warning the
government about the impossibility of its exercising real authority because it is not based
on genuine public support: "The Cabinet is the central institution of politics, and the
highest organ. It may not be so under despotism, but it is so under constitutionalism. In
other words, only the Cabinet that enjoys the support of the largest party in Parliament,
which represents the people, can conduct politics... In our time political opinion has no
credibility if it does not have the support of the people and has no engagement with the
people. Such an opinion is merely noise."141 Saito sees the pamphlet as noise also. In
real politics, such "noise" may have strong influence. Yet Saito is concerned with the
negation of the governmental forms underlain by the Constitution and by the increasing
intervention of the "non-elective" bodies.
Saito's concern with the preservation of the country's constitutional system
intensified with the attempted coup by young officers on 26 February 1936, which
involved 1,400 soldiers. Thus he questioned the military's self-discipline in an
extraordinary parliamentary session in May. He blamed the dissemination of radical
thought, especially of the right, among those officers, and also the military leaders'
139 Historians believe that the case was most likely fabricated by government prosecutors instructed by the
pro-military former Justice Minister Hiranuma Kiichiro, although they have not found clear evidence to
support the claim. In December 1937 the Tokyo District Court found all 16 defendants not guilty, because
of "no evidence whatsoever". The prosecution did not appeal. See Sasaki Takashi, "Saito Naikaku kara
Okada Naikaku e", in Inoue Mitsusada et al. (eds.), Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 5, Kindai 2, pp. 486-7.
140




failure to punish those involved in similar incidents in the past as catalysts for the
escalation of violence.
Since the Manchurian Incident, Saito says, young officers have begun to
advocate radical reform of the country's political system. They honestly believe in the
urgent need for change. But they are ignorant of the complexity of society. Their
thoughts are simple, and therefore dangerous.
Saito believes that the country's constitutional system is sound. What the country
needs is not radical change in the system itself, but in the way people operate it.
Although he carefully avoids straightforward repudiation, Saito is implying that party
politics needs to be restored in place of military leadership. Furthermore, under the
present system, the Cabinet should be able to command authority, but only if it
possesses a unified, coherent policy. In this respect, the government's policy is revealing
clear contradictions. For it is calling for peaceful settlement of the international disputes,
while it continues to increase military spending exorbitantly. As a result, more pressing
and basic domestic issues, such as educational reforms, are neglected. Saito identifies
the assertive military as the source of such imbalance. Linking inconsistency and the
neglect of domestic problems, Saito is now dissecting the emerging totalitarian regime,
which he sees as taking politics away from society.
Such disengagement is also taking place in the application of the law, thus
undermining the judicature as a whole, according to Saito. Along with the destructive
influence of radicalism on young officers, some leaders' tacit support for their activities
is responsible for their subversions of the law. The country has experienced a series of
attempted coups or assassinations by officers, including the March Incident and October
Incident in 1931, and the assassination of Inukai on 15 May 1932. The military's failure
to mete out heavy punishment in the original case has resulted in the outbreak of others,
perpetuating the cycle of violence. Thus the military as a whole is responsible for
accelerating the demise of normal constitutional procedures by treating itself as above
the law.
Saito points out that after the assassination of Inukai, a public prosecutor had
demanded the death penalty for the three main culprits, who were all military officers.
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They were tried at a military court, and sentenced to a maximum of 15 years in prison,
although military law demands the heaviest punishment if it is recognised as treason. On
the other hand, a civilian collaborator, who was involved in a failed attempt to blow up a
power station as part of the group's concerted attempt to unseat the present government,
was given a life sentence. "They were all involved in the same plot... Some were given
light sentences because they were military officers and tried at a military court, although
they had assassinated the prime minister. Others were given heavier sentences because
they were civilians and tried at an ordinary court, although their crime is that they had
helped to place a bomb which never exploded."142
Thus military and ordinary courts may be governed by different laws. But both
are under state laws, which define treason as one of the most serious of crimes,
punishable with the death penalty. Handing down such lenient punishment to its own
members, the military is rejecting general law and subverting the existing legal order.
"Trials, which are carried out in the name of the emperor, must be independent, sacred,
and fair... If the ruling depends on the status of the defendant and the court, can the state
exercise its judicature properly?"143
Saito is also concerned with the discipline of the military as a whole. He asks,
"Are there any military leaders who psychologically supported those rebellious officers?
At least the public suspect such involvement."144 Indeed the military promptly removed
from active duty seven generals thought to be close to the young officers.145
Nevertheless, the February 26th Incident exposed the serious disunity of the military and
encouraged the rise of a group seeking a "legal" revolution in co-operation with the
bureaucrats.
Studying the emergence of Nazi dictatorship within the framework of the
Weimar Constitution, Fraenkel says that there are only two ways for non-elective groups
to take power in a constitutional system: "Either (a) to establish praeter legem a political
142 TGSGS, vol. 66, p. 46.
143 ibid., p. 46.
144
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145 Kato Yoko, "2.26 Jiken to Hirota, Hayashi Naikaku", in Inouc Mitsusada et al. (cds.), Nihon Rekishi
Taikei, vol. 5, Kindai 2, p. 500. These generals included Mazaki Jinzaburo and Araki Sadao.
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power outside the legal order and to revise the constitution with the aim of establishing
the authoritarian Machtstaat, or (b) to substitute contra legem a dictatorial state for the
rational constitution of the Rechtsstaat. This dictatorship would have to be detached
from the traditional limits of the monarchy and from the rational limits of the
republic."146 Nazi Germany took the second way. In Japan, when Saito made his speech,
hegemonic power was also emerging in a similar fashion.
In this respect, the February 26th Incident was a watershed. The failed coup was
staged by a radical faction of the military, the Kodoha (Imperial Way Faction), which
tried to realise military leadership through direct action. After their failure, the Toseiha
(Control Faction), which favoured military leadership through "legitimate" control of the
existing institutions, gained power.147 The Hirota Cabinet backed by the Tosei Faction
quickly executed those involved in the February 26th Incident, after a swift court ruling.
This trial was conducted behind closed doors, unlike the previous military courts, which
had been open to the public and which had allowed Saito to quote the prosecution
statements amply during his speech. After the February 26th Incident, interventions by
Parliament became all the more difficult.
Thus when Saito delivered his speech in May 1936, political parties were clearly
in retreat. The February 26th Incident had taken place shortly after Minseito, to which
Saito belonged, became the largest party in Parliament after a general election. But the
Okada Cabinet was a hotchpotch of various members from the two main parties and the
House of Peers, bureaucrats, and business representatives, which the genro hoped could
check the military. The incident forced the cabinet to resign en masse. Saionji and other
genro appointed the diplomat Hirota Koki as prime minister, and once again the election
results were ignored, further sidelining the parties.
Military intervention now increased in government, thus further weakening the
Cabinet's ability to command authority and to maintain policy coherence. To maintain
unity, the Hirota Cabinet had to comply with the military's demands that Japan's vested
interests overseas, particularly those in North China and Manchuria, be preserved. Yet to
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do so became increasingly difficult in the face of Chinese unification and rising anti-
Japanese sentiment. Dealing with the Soviet Union was another problem. The
government was expected to take measures to prevent the spread of communism and
also preserve the country's interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, as Japanese and Soviet
armies began to clash in areas where the borders between the Soviet Union and
Mongolia were not clear. On the other hand, Japan's exports were booming, thanks to
the depreciation of the yen, but the boom was also causing friction with other industrial
countries. At the very moment when the country needed skilled diplomacy, the Cabinet
could not demonstrate it because of its rigid adherence to expansionist principles, and its
subjection to the military. The Cabinet resigned in January 1937, when the Army, which
had demanded an immediate dissolution of Parliament, was at loggerheads with the
Navy, which had wanted to see a budget passed to boost military spending. Hirota may
have tried to check the military, yet his regime was also responsible for its further
advance.
In this way the rise of the military coincided with the steady undermining of
party politics. Bureaucrats played a central role in this development. In May 1935 the
Home Affairs Ministry launched a nation-wide campaign for "clean" elections (senkyo
shukusei), issuing an ordinance that stipulated that each prefecture set up a committee to
supervise them. Such a trend was already discernible when the election law was revised
for the House of Representatives in 1934 to tighten the restrictions on campaigns. The
revision was criticised not only by professional politicians but also by liberal
intellectuals such as Minobe as discouraging public participation in politics. Although he
had to compromise with the bureaucrats as vice home minister when the law was
148
revised, Saito resisted open intervention in campaigns by prefectural governors. Yet
the ordinance of 1935 strengthened the bureaucrats' involvement,149 and politicians
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strongly resisted the intervention.150 Now Saito joins his parliamentary colleagues in
criticising what he sees as overtly rigid application of the electoral law. "The law is now
used to produce criminals rather than to defend people's freedoms",151 he says.
The dominance of the military in government and further weakening of
parliamentary control culminated in the introduction of the National Mobilisation Law in
1938. This allowed government, by the means of issuing an ordinance (chokurei), to
control not only the production of weapons and ammunition, but also a wide range of
civilian issues, including prices, exports, imports, and the right to private property, in
order to "maximise national mobilisation of personal and material resources" during a
war or an equivalent situation. For a country which had launched a full-fledged war
against China several months earlier, such mobilisation was thought necessary. The bill
was drafted by the Planning Agency, a newly created inter-ministerial bureau directly
attached to the Cabinet now headed by Konoe Fumimaro.152
Saito was angered by the attempt to bypass the constitution's fundamental
mechanism for negotiation between collective goals and individual freedoms. Article 31
of the Constitution encapsulates such a fundamental balance, and for him, the law, if
passed, would effectively alter the Constitution by rejecting the balance altogether.
Thus he launched a lengthy constitutional exposition during a parliamentary
debate on the proposed law of 24 February 1938. Article 31 of the Constitution says that
civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution can be curtailed in the case of emergency
153
by the means of imperial ordinances. ' Yet this does not mean that civil liberties can
always be restricted by an ordinance, according to Saito. It merely means that in the case
of a national emergency ordinances, instead of law (ho), can be used to curtail civil
150 The two main parties, Seiyukai and Minseito, jointly complained to the justice minister in a letter
concerning the "unreasonably strict" control of elections in May 1936 (see, ibid., pp. 214-5).
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liberties, whose restriction is only possible by law in a normal situation. Thus the article
defines "a shared area of jurisdiction" by law and ordinance. The bill, however, is
intended to eliminate law, thus Parliament's intervention, from this shared jurisdiction. It
demands that Parliament give "a blank letter delegating its legislative power" to
government. Such a step is tantamount to suspending the Constitution. Saito warns that
the degree of discretion the bill accords to government will dissolve the whole
constitutional framework. "The bill is intended to curtail civil liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution which only law can restrict, at the government's discretion and thus
bypasses the relevant constitutional organs, Parliament and the Sumitsuin."154
Saito also challenges the bill's claims for efficiency. According to the
government, "it is necessary to introduce a single law in order to mobilise the people
when necessary, and total control of the populace and materials remains ineffective if
government has to ask Parliament to enact a law each time it is necessary, thereby
preventing the government from dealing with a national crisis". But Saito thinks that the
total control envisaged by the bill is impossible. On the contrary the bill, if passed, will
aggravate disunity in government, further obscuring the centre of power. According to
Saito, it will also require a number of new ordinances to actually carry out national
mobilisation as stipulated by the bill. "This bill is without the benefits of a single law. It
will create an uncontrollable and complex legal muddle."155
Behind such criticisms are Saito's views of law and order, which are
antagonistic to those of the hegemonic forces agitated and ready to act after the outbreak
of the war, and which now include the military, bureaucrats, some politicians, and also
certain sections of the public. Saito is unfazed. He is more perturbed by the acceleration
of such collective zeal which is self-propagating. "What is convenient for the
government is not necessarily convenient for the people and the country as a whole."156
guarantees without the declaration of a state of siege" (Nakano, The Ordinance Power of the Japanese
Emperor, p. 18).
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Efficiency is a relative quality. If it is imposed on the people, it can become coercion.
Saito dissents unequivocally from the government's orthodoxies.
Furthermore "imposed" patriotism does not work. Law cannot nurture patriotism.
Many people are already sacrificing their lives for their country, not because law has
forced them to do so, but because they believe such a contribution is necessary for their
country. It is a sign of bad government, if it has to use "law" to exploit such attachment.
In a way that reveals the forces at work, Saito's views were then described as "liberal"
and "conservative", as opposed to the "progressive" and "modern" policies of Konoe.
Saito made his speech at a time when constitutional debate had become all the
more difficult after the Minobe Affair. He clearly avoids Minobe's name, and instead
mentions the late Hozumi, the former's arch-rival, as a leading constitutional expert who
was opposed to the delegation of legislative power, although he must have known that
Hozumi's motive in doing so was to preserve the unity of imperial authority, not to
1 57
defend the legislative power of Parliament. Saito's passing remark on Hozumi's
theory is in line with the prevailing strategy of invoking imperial authority among the
politicians who tried to defend Parliament against the encroachment of the military-
bureaucratic government. Although one historian regards such logic as feeble—invoking
1 58
imperial authority so as to defend parliamentary politics ~ —Saito was motivated by his
liberal vision of a nation in which people would conduct their affairs spontaneously. His
opposition to any force that denies private property, which had previously targeted
communists, is now focused on the governmental "reformers".159
The full delegation of legislative power to government that the National
Mobilisation Law now secures signals a clear departure from the country's constitutional
agreements. According to Nakano, writing in 1923, such delegation is necessary in any
government because "the complexity and lack of uniformity and regularity among social
phenomena render it impossible for the legislature to foresee all future contingencies",
157 For Hozumi's views on the delegation of legislative power, see Masuda, Tenndsei to Kokka, especially
p. 35 and p. 135.
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and also "... the lack of administrative and technical knowledge on the part of
parliament, ... and the increase of governmental functions... make it more difficult for
parliament to enact detailed and equitable laws".160 However, such delegation cannot
suspend legislative power, and also it must be justified by practical necessity. Therefore,
"general, legislative delegation" is unconstitutional. "If a statute delegates a power to
issue ordinances without designating a particular organ, that organ which generally has
charge of the matters regulated by the statute is to be considered as the empowered
authority. This construction has been followed by the [Japanese] government."161 By
1938, what Nakano calls "general, legislative delegation" had become a reality. Saito
had long denounced the arbitrariness of power, as in the case of his criticisms of Prime
Minister Tanaka Giichi's use of an emergency ordinance to revise the Peace
Preservation Law in 1929. Yet with the introduction of the National Mobilisation Law,
Saito saw the demise of constitutionalism, as it terminated, at least legally, the contest
between imperial ordinances (chokurei) and law (ho), which had sustained constitutional
debate both inside and outside Parliament since the introduction of Parliament. By so
doing, Saito articulated the rise of a Japanese totalitarian system, as Fraenkel was to do
for National-Socialist Germany.
In fact Saito sees explicit similarities between the National Mobilisation Law and
the Enabling Law that the Nazi party introduced in March 1933, shortly after Hitler was
appointed Chancellor. "Since the Nazi government secured this law, it has enacted many
laws at will. As a result, the German constitution has been effectively revised... In a
similar fashion, [The National Mobilisation Law] will revise or suspend our
constitution", says Saito.
According to Fraenkel, who was forced to flee from Germany in 1940, the
systematic growth of the National-Socialist dictatorship began with the Emergency
Decree for the Defence against Communism of 28 February 1933, issued a day after the
Reichstag fire, which the authorities used to persecute communists. In the following
month, the Enabling Law was passed by an emasculated Parliament, giving National-
160 Nakano, The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor, p. 121.
161 ibid., p. 129.
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Socialism unlimited legislative power. "By the 'Enabling' Law Hitler became
Germany's absolute ruler after he had previously (by the Decree of February 28, 1933)
1 f\9
acquired the power of despot."
This does not mean that Hitler actually had absolute power. Present-day
historians agree that the government of Nazi Germany was "chaotic in structure".
Hitler's power was limited by his own fear of losing his image and prestige. His
decisions were often ignored or not properly implemented by his subordinates. His
actions also had to accommodate factors outside his control, such as "the demands of the
economy or fear of social unrest".163
However, such governmental disunity does not imply that Nazi Germany was not
a dictatorial state. Thus Michael Burleigh says: "Democratic governments are riven with
factional intrigues and personal rivalries; suffer duplication of functions; rely on
outsiders to galvanise sluggish bureaucrats; and are constrained by innumerable external
factors... what has been increasingly elevated into the explanatory master-key of Nazi
rule, namely the mutually radicalising effects of competing agencies, may be both
insufficient, and less remarkable, as an explanation for the single-mindedness with
which the Nazis went about realising their ideological goals."164 These "mutually
radicalising effects of competing agencies"165 do not explain either "a regime of rare
destructiveness", or why a modern state with a republican constitution became
dictatorial.
Hence if "incoherence" and "disunity" are symptoms of a modern state,
democratic or non-democratic arbitrariness may be a sign of a dictatorial state operating
within it. Thus, Fraenkel distinguishes the authority of medieval kings from that of
Hitler. "The medieval king was considered to be absolute and practically irresponsible
but his power was not an arbitrary one... There existed definite limitations for the will of
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the medieval prince which were usually expressed by the formula: 'The king is bound by
the Law of God and the Law of Nature.' "166 Fraenkel therefore identifies "arbitrariness"
and "efficiency" as two major characteristics of the National-Socialist dictatorship.
Following this line of thought, Burleigh insists on the need to examine "the supercession
[sic] of the rule of law by arbitrary police terror" in order to explain why a modern state
became dictatorial.167
Saito's criticism records a similar process in Japan; how weak government with
incoherent policy was able to steer the whole country into war. As with Nazi Germany,
an all-consuming arbitrariness and a commitment to efficiency appear to be basic
features of the regime.
Thus, according to Fraenkel, the "Prerogative State" is a "governmental system
which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal
i z: o
guarantees". Fraenkel observes the destruction of the rule of law in various court
rulings after Flitler's National-Socialist Party took power. The persecution of dissenters
is one such example. He quotes a National-Socialist theorist as saying: "it is necessary to
provide a 'general clause' which will allow sufficient discretionary power to determine
whether a breach of faith is treason."169 Thus courts frequently gave maximum sentences
for "the preparation of treasonable actions although the acts themselves involved no
violence whatever".170 A large amount of discretion for incrimination is one
characteristic of pre-war Japanese law as we have already seen. However, the war-time
system expanded such flexibility, and the 1941 Peace Preservation Law was the key act
of legislation. Such use of law became possible with the assistance of an efficient
bureaucracy.
In his study of Japan's pre-war "bureaucrat-intellectuals", Kenneth Pyle provides
a mixed assessment of their roles in the country's modernisation. He finds that they were
diverse in their political inclinations, and some were genuinely concerned with the well-
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being of society in the face of unprecedented industrialisation and social change and
believed in the need for strong governmental intervention. At the same time such
attitudes were detrimental to the growth of civil society. "In Japan, too, propagation of
the collective ethic, which was devised to ease the tensions in society, tended to weaken
support for parliamentary politics and for open confrontation of competing interests."171
In the 1930s, "revisionist" bureaucrats devised "a totalitarian solution to the social
problem", thus tendering support for the country's war efforts, willingly or
inadvertently. The National Mobilisation Law demonstrates this link between war and
the bureaucracy very clearly.
At the same time the delay in implementing such a law, which came after a
period of violence, may be explained by the relatively short history of the Japanese
Parliament. Hitler became leader by securing a majority in Parliament, and the Enabling
Law was a springboard for the Nazi government to build its power. In Japan's case, the
role of non-elective bodies, particularly the military, was more prominent in the
totalitarian process. This development may show that constitutional forms, such as
Parliament, were still not fully established in Japan. At the same time, Parliament was
not entirely powerless, and the military-bureaucrat government could not ignore it
entirely. As for the populace, the government also felt it necessary to persuade them to
co-operate with its war efforts. As well as massive governmental propaganda as seen in
the publication of the Kokutai no Hongi of 1937, the National Mobilisation Law
demonstrates such a need. Parliament, business, and a critical public, entailed "orderly"
and "legal" mobilisation. To this extent Japan was then a modern state, in that no power
would have been capable of mobilising it without "proper" procedure and justification.
Saito spoke on behalf of this modernity.
Yet Saito also witnessed the transformation of the political system into the
dictatorial. Earlier discretionary power had been essential for the new Meiji government
and used amply as ordinances. The Meiji Constitution and the introduction of Parliament
changed this situation. Imperial ordinances and legislative power now had to negotiate
171 Kenneth B. Pyle, "Advantages of Followership: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890-
1925", Journal ofJapanese Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, autumn 1974, p. 163.
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with each other. When ordinances were again about to overtake the law, Saito resisted
and defended the constitutional evolution that the country had achieved so far.
Saito understood that any power has to claim its legitimacy if it is to exert
authority. This means that those who exercise power must be able to explain their
conduct and policy and convince others to obey their orders. A political system requires
that basic ground where this process of legitimisation takes place. Without such a
structure, power, no matter how benevolent it may be, is illegitimate. As a member of
the old guard of British-inspired party politics, Saito adhered to this principle of
constitutional agreements. The will of the people (min'i) is the corner-stone, both
conceptual and practical, on which this structure must rely.
Saito saw weakening government as a sign of a totalitarian structure and
ideology, which prompted and was prompted by the decline of liberal thought,
diminishing universalism, and the rise of nationalistic expansionism.
4.5. Saito and nationalism
As we have seen, the core of Saito's pragmatic social and political realism is his
adherence to the liberty of the individual, and his awareness that the tension between
authority and the individual is an essential aspect of a civil society. Such an
individualistic and societal stance contrasts sharply with the totalitarian tendency of the
1930s. The differences become clear if we compare Saito's liberalism with the concept
of liberty prevalent among a number of Japanese "fascist" ideologues, which I will
analyse based on Isaiah Berlin's two concepts of liberty. Because of his adherence to
liberty, Saito was capable of identifying the contradictions in the totalitarian logic of the
"reformers". However, his "imperialist" position requires further examination, for in it
we can find the possible limitations of his view.
Some historians have argued for Saito's colonialist position. According to Ito
Takashi, Saito in his 1940 speech voiced a minority opinion in Parliament opposed to
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the "reform" policy promoted under Konoe Fumimaro's premiership. That policy
consisted of support for Wang Ching-wei, who was fighting against Chiang Kai-shek,
endorsement of a new Asian Order under Japan's hegemony, and of the new national
unity movement. Yet, in Ito's view, the small number of parliamentarians who were
opposed to the Konoe policy, including Saito, were not necessarily anti-military and thus
172
not against Japan's war against China.
Such a view is further elaborated by Arima Manabu. Based on criticisms, made
at the time by "reformers," Arima concludes that Saito's view is also colonialist.
According to one such "reformist", "the gist of the speech is that Japanese troops should
be stationed in the occupied areas, intervene in Chinese sovereignty and preserve
Japanese vested territorial rights... His opinion is no different from those promoting
1 7T
colonial war in the West". Saito merely opposes "holy war" ideas only, and his view
is that of an old-fashioned colonialist based on primitive Social Darwinism. Arima also
finds that Saito holds a nineteenth century elitist view of the masses. Here the masses
need politicians to "guide" them. Thus Saito's political philosophy is backward,
compared with those "reformers" who had begun to search for a more "democratic"
form of government, different from Parliament, which in their view was ineffective in
creating common opinion. However, the "reformers" had not yet found the logic to
justify their hegemonic policy, and their insistence on holy war was a fig leaf to cover
such conceptual deficiency. Saito's speech is significant in so far as it reveals this
incompleteness in the "reform" policy, but no more.174
There is no denying that Saito's worldview is based on the nineteenth century
utilitarian liberalism that also prompted the Western powers to engage in colonialist
exploitation. Nevertheless, his adherence to the liberty of the individual, which led him
to see the contradictions of Japan's expansion policy, are part of a larger liberal creed,
which began with the Meiji Enlightenment and sustained the Japanese political system
172 Ito Takashi, "Ugaki Kazushige no Gaiko Seisakuron", Shigaku Zasshi, vol. 94, no. 1, 1985, pp. 140-1,
150.
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in its early years. Its demise in the 1930s is part of a process by which this creed was
replaced by a more totalitarian ideology. By contrasting Saito's liberalism with that of
other representative figures, we will be able to shed further light on his colonial position,
to evaluate it more fully.
Saito lived in a period when ordinary Japanese began to demand that they too
take part in government and the decision-making process, while their sense of national
belonging was awakened by the country's involvement in wars, first with China, then
with Russia. This simultaneous rise of civil society and of aggressive nationalism has
already been pointed out by historians. Thus Matsuo Takayoshi asserts that the series of
popular protests and democratic movements, which is often associated with the Taisho
period (1912-26), began with the Hibiya Riots in 1905. According to Matsuo,
demonstrators were protesting both against the government's concession to Russia when
175
the two countries concluded the war and also against its oppressive policy. Thus
Matsuo characterises Taisho "democracy" as a period of domestic liberation and of
rising Japanese nationalism.
The period seems to correspond to what Immanuel Wallerstein has called a time
176"after formal independence but before... national integration". The Japanese were still
searching for a common political community, and in such a process, civic demands and
nationalistic sentiments appeared to be essential. Saito's liberalism is a product of such a
period. It could not escape from the nationalistic tendency of the time, and yet it
maintained its defence of civil liberties. The tension between such collective
identification and private needs, which is apparent in Saito's liberalism during this
period, is therefore a record of this process of national integration at the citizen's level.
Saito was a strong nationalist from the very start. He joined the Kokuminto,
which was formed in 1910 by members of Okuma Shigenobu's Kensei Honto, who
advocated a belligerent expansion policy. Thus in 1915 he says, "The main course of the
[Japanese] Empire at the moment is not to maintain the status quo, but to advance... The
175 Matsuo Takayoshi, Taisho Demokurasht, pp. 7-39.
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interests that the country has gained should not be entrusted to other countries. Doing so
177would destroy the fundamental national policy." A year earlier Japan had declared
war against Germany based on the country's alliance with Britain. In the same year
Japan secured German possessions in the Shandong Peninsula and the Pacific Islands
north of the equator. For Saito, national expansion was the country's right. He seems to
belong to what Miyachi Masato calls the "nationalistic hawks" who became increasingly
active in Japan after the Russian war.
According to Miyachi, these "hawks" include the "1868" generation who grew
up while seeing Japan become a regional imperial power. They still adhered to the
traditional expansion policy, which first surfaced in 1873 when some government
leaders advocated attacking Korea. At the same time, they were eager to bring the
178
people into the political process, and to combine constitutionalism and imperialism.
Thus, while calling for popular politics, Saito also supported Japan's advance
into Manchuria. In January 1915 the government of Okuma Shigenobu, who headed the
Kenseikai, to which Saito belonged, submitted the Twenty-one Demands to China. The
party explained that the measure was intended to deal with the unstable situation in
China after Japan's war against Germany, to increase friendly ties between the two
179
countries, and to maintain peace in the Far East. However, the demands triggered
strong anti-Japanese activity among the Chinese. Saito had no doubts about Japan's
rights in South Manchuria, which the demands hoped to maintain. His laissez-faire
views, and his adherence to social progress, prompted him to embrace ideas of national
expansion and growth.
Such an attitude was long-lasting, and there is a nationalistic element in his anti¬
war campaign of the 1930s. Even in January 1937, Saito supported Japan's position in
1 OA
Manchuria. At the same time he had begun to see flaws in the military policy. He was
opposed to the plan to separate five more north-eastern provinces from China, and now
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had doubts about the aim of the war. If it was a war to maintain Japanese interests in
Manchuria, it was a just war because Japan had legitimate rights there. However, if it
went beyond that aim, then the war would become a war of aggression. Such logic
would not have been acceptable for the Chinese, of course, because for them Manchuria
was part of their integral territories. Nevertheless even if Saito's position was still short
of true conciliation, his ability to distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
demands allowed him to see aggression in Japan's overseas policy.
Similarly Saito continued to uphold his survival of the fittest world view, but not
for justifying Japan's aggression, but for criticising Konoe's new order doctrine. Thus,
using survival of the fittest rhetoric, Saito claims that the exercise of national
sovereignty is subject to various limitations, one of which is respect for others'
sovereignty. Konoe's new order doctrine ignores such limitations, and thus is both
impractical and destructive. "It is unclear what the doctrine really means. The only
comprehensible thing is that it advocates that the country should conquer weaker nations
181wherever possible and expand the country's territories and available resources."
Where Minobe had used the idea of power's limitations in order to assert a domestic
legal state, Saito uses it to restrain the country's external behaviour.
Maruyama Masao describes this loss of rational raison d'etre as a primary cause
182of war. But instead of attributing this process of accelerated irrationality to the
pressure of the masses "duped" by government propaganda, Saito points the finger at the
military. Quoting an army intelligence report, Saito concludes that the war started from
misunderstanding of both Japan and China about each other. "Many Japanese assumed
that China was what it used to be during the Sino-Japanese War, and failed to
I83understand the China of today." ' This failure of recognition cannot be attributed to the
Japanese as a whole, but it is the sole fault of the military.184 For him, political
accountability is specific.
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Saito then is a nationalist, but his world view is universal. In this sense, his
position differs markedly from those supporting the rights of the nation (kokken),
including Fukuzawa, and members of the younger generation who began to support
Japan's Asian hegemony. Saito's position will become clearer if we compare it with that
of Fukuzawa and with that of two "ultra-nationalists", Kita Ikki and Nakano Seigo.
Fukuzawa's shift from the advocacy of liberty and pluralism to that of autocratic
government and Japan's external expansion is often attributed to his changed view of the
world order and his hierarchical assumptions of a division between "the civilised" and
"the uncivilised".
Initially Fukuzawa was a strong believer in international and natural law. Thus
he wrote in 1865: "A country which abides by reason cannot be assailed from without. If
any other country should attack her without reason, another will always come to her
aid... Thus if a country should start an irrational war, not only will she be defeated, but
she will also incur the eternal contempt of the entire world. If she abides peacefully by
reason, she need not fear the hostility even of great countries."185
Such a Utopian view changed as his perception of the world order changed.
Carmen Blacker finds that in 1876, he felt a universal moral principle "would not work
in relations between nations, for the reason that it was impossible to get rid of the
sentiment (jojitsu) which bound groups of people together into clans or nations. It was
ridiculous to think that this powerful and persistent feeling could be dispelled by simply
invoking a 'universal moral principle' ",186 The abandonment of universal principle is
now replaced by more nationalistic attitudes, and in 1882 he writes: "The one object of
my life is to extend Japan's national power. Compared with considerations of the
country's strength, the matter of internal government and into whose hands it falls is of
no importance at all. Even if the government be autocratic in name and form, I shall be
satisfied with it if it is strong enough to strengthen the country."187
185
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This new embrace of the nation is often attributed to his concerns with national
unity and expansion resulting from such developments as the rise of the Jiyuminken
Undo and the confrontation between Japan and China over Korea.188
For many intellectuals, including Fukuzawa, the issue of national progress
became paramount, at a time when the nation became a concrete political entity through
the debate about treaty revision and also regional hegemony. Around this time, the
nation became the ultimate authority for such intellectuals as Fukuzawa. Saito on the
other hand adhered to the idea of social progress, but remained strongly individualistic.
Although his language in some of his speeches sounds nationalistic, calling for the
emperor's supreme authority, he is much less ideological than Fukuzawa. Such
psychological distancing from the centres of power observable in Saito may be
explained by his social position, as well as by his individualistic outlook. Lawyers were
also the main promoters of the Taisho democratic movement, according to Matsuo
Takayoshi. Along with their professional training, their "outsider" status may have
encouraged them to support reform, as they were supposed to confront judges who were
189 • a
"representatives of the emperor". Since he too was outside this state structure, Saito
may have been able to develop a less particularistic concept of the state.
Similar discriminations are also necessary in a comparison with the thought of
Kita Ikki (1883-1937). Kita was "the most important spokesman" for those in post-
Restoration Japan who began to call for radical change in Japanese society and
institutions and Japanese hegemony in "a unity of resurgent Asiatic peoples".190 Kita
advocated the organ theory and social revolution as Saito and Minobe did. But his views
were far from liberal. "For Kita, the state struggle was justified because it contributed to
the process of social evolution", according to George M. Wilson.191 "Based on an
optimistic appraisal of the prospects for 'social evolution', he predicts the ultimate
lxli Blacker analyses Fukuzawa's change of heart, saying "Influenced, probably, by the current high feeling
on the question of treaty revision, he ceased to stress people's rights, either as the necessary condition or
as the ultimate object of national power..." (ibid., p. 133).
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advent of a Utopian society made up of all mankind." However, if one distinguishes
between "the civilised" and "the uncivilised", it becomes easy to accept justifications for
imperialism or colonialism. Thus "Imperialism was a step on the ladder of social
evolution that led eventually to the goal of world federation. Imperialism... is the
193
precondition of internationalism (sekaishugi)." In Kita a millennial vision is combined
with a vision of Japanese hegemony.
"Clearly Kita was a stepchild of nineteenth-century Europe", says Wilson.
"Immersed but recently into the maelstrom of modern Western thought, young Japanese
intellectuals grasped at Darwinism with all the fervor of their Western counterparts.
Kita's reliance on the evolutionary model, as well as his tendency to think of the state in
organic terms, reveals the enormous influence positivism exerted on Meiji thought. He
shared with Comte, Spencer, and many of his own countrymen the impulse to create a
comprehensive system of knowledge based on supposedly universal laws. He glimpsed
the mirage of ultimate perfection in modern science and tried to apply its fruits to man in
society. In his own estimation, he had made a 'daring attempt to... establish social
democracy on the basis of a unified knowledge of all the social sciences... as well as
biology and philosophy'."194
Like Mill, Saito would object to such mysticism, and the contrast between Saito
and Kita is stark. Saito is a gradualist as well as a rational materialist, and for him the
idea of "ultimate perfection" is remote.
For the reformers, as well as for radicals such as Kita, the tension between
authority and the individual is a problem to be eliminated. For Saito, it is a condition that
people need to live with. In this context Saito understands the role of Parliament and
other constitutional institutions as mechanisms for settling that tension. In 1934, when
he saw the rise of the military-bureaucratic government, Saito said: "Show me if there is
an institution that can represent the people which is not Parliament? How can ordinary
people trust in a bureaucratic and militaristic clique which has nothing to do with them
ibid., p. jj.
194 ibid., p. 37.
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but has begun to say that it represents the people?"195 Saito knew that popular will was a
fiction, but an indispensable concept for the working of any constitutional system.
Accordingly Saito's concept of liberty rejects totalitarian attitudes, while the
"1905" generation had begun to use the idea of liberty to support Japan's colonial
expansion. Nakano Seigo (1886-1943) is one such example. Nakano is considered as
one of a very few Japanese who formulated fascist ideals akin to those of Europe,
without referring to the divinity of the emperor.196
Originally a journalist, Nakano won a seat in the House of Representatives in
1920 as an independent. In 1924, he joined Saito's Kenseito (later Minseito) and worked
towards the introduction of universal male suffrage. But after the outbreak of the
Manchurian Incident in 1931, his policy became more radical. In 1931, Nakano and one
of Minseito's senior leaders Adachi Kenzo, who was close to Saito, left the party
seeking a pro-military national unity government. The event led to the collapse of the
government of Minseito leader Wakatsuki Reijiro, as Adachi was a state minister.
Nakano's stance became more radical as Japan's war against China continued. He
organised his own group Tohokai in 1936 based on Nazi and Italian Fascist models. He
was on the planning committee of Konoe's Imperial Rule Assistance Association, when
it was launched in 1940. But in less than a year, Nakano resigned from the association,
criticising its bureaucratic control. He committed suicide in 1943 after he had been
investigated by police for his criticisms of the Tojo government.
Tetsuo Najita highlights Nakano in his study of the development of extreme
Japanese nationalist thought in the early twentieth century. For him Nakano provides "a
meaningful thread" of continuity with the "spirit" of the Meiji Restoration. Najita finds
Nakano's concept of "spiritual autonomy", which is derived from his attachment to the
intuitionism of Neo-Confucianism, to be a catalyst for fascist thought.
For Najita, Nakano's career constitutes "a reaffirmation of liberal
individualism...in fact, a reaffirmation of the rebellious moral individualism of the
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Oyomei [Wang Yang-ming] tradition". It testifies to the fact that Japanese
individualism "in its uncompromising and extreme form could not be intrinsically
related to the modern political framework within which movements were to be launched
and sustained. Nakano's propensity for thinking in the mode of radical spiritual
autonomy made it virtually impossible for him to relate this autonomy with legal and
organizational concepts, such as definitions of property or concrete mechanisms of
1Q8
parliamentary politics."
In our time, in his highly relevant 1969 essay entitled "Two Concepts of
Liberty", Isaiah Berlin examines the nature of the concept of liberty that may lead to
totalitarianism. The aim of the essay is to demonstrate that the pursuit of a single value,
which is liberty in this case, may lead to the denial of other ultimate values, such as
equality, justice, and happiness, and thus may be used to justify the oppression of others.
The essay defends pluralism for maintaining a free society.
To reveal the potentially destructive power of the concept of liberty, Berlin
distinguishes between "positive" and "negative" concepts of it. In the negative sense,
liberty means liberty to protect one's private space. In the positive sense, liberty means
liberty to demand one's rights. Liberty in the positive sense often leads to a revolution,
such as the French Revolution.
Berlin is concerned with our immediate history of violence, both metaphorical
and real, carried out in the name of liberty, and questions what are the safeguards
essential to the creation and preservation of a free society. For this purpose, Berlin
resorts to the nineteenth century liberals, such as Mill, de Tocqueville, and Constant,
who felt that their "negative" rights were threatened by "positive" liberties as the result
of the emergence of "a democratic Majority". For them, "Democracy may disarm a
given oligarchy, a given privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crush
individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler."199
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However, even the negative sense of liberty may lead to radicalism, to denial of
others' freedom and even to colonialism. This is because the idea of liberty becomes
detached from the idea of a common community. This detachment can be as dangerous
as the positive concept of liberty. According to Berlin, the negative concept of liberalism
may lead to self-abnegation, "the very antithesis of political freedom". But Berlin also
says: "Those who are wedded to the 'negative' concept of freedom may perhaps be
forgiven if they think self-abnegation is not the only method of overcoming obstacles;
that it is also possible to do so by removing them: in the case of non-human objects, by
physical action; in the case of human resistance, by force or persuasion, as when I
induce somebody to make room for me in his carriage, or conquer a country which
threatens the interests of my own."200
One possible outcome of such self-preserving opinion is the failure to recognise
others as one's equals, be it a person, a class of people, or a nation. In this sense
Nakano's radical "spiritual autonomy" is relevant to both Japan's domestic system and
to its colonial policy in the 1930s. Hence Mark R. Peattie describes Japanese colonialism
in the 1930s as "as much a state of mind—a constellation of attitudes and assumptions—
as it was a system of bureaucratic mechanisms, legal institutions, and economic
enterprises".201 An idea of liberty that can sponsor self-preservation is one strand of
Japan's expansionist ideology, since it entails a policy of removal and absorption, either
of domestic opposition or neighbouring countries. Such logic is recognisable in
Nakano's thought, and Saito repudiates it as detached from reality.
Thus Berlin's answer to preserving a free society is a practical compromise.
"Positive" liberty is meaningful as long as "negative" liberty is protected. Yet "negative"
liberty cannot be pursued on its own, because that would destroy the liberty of others.
Following the nineteenth century liberal tradition, Berlin asserts that such a
compromise must consist of the general recognition of basic rights and common rules.
He says: "... no society is free unless it is governed by at any rate two interrelated
:t)l Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction", in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese
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312
principles: first, that no power, but only rights, can be regarded as absolute, so that all
men, whatever power governs them, have an absolute right to refuse to behave
inhumanly; and, second, that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men
should be inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely
accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is to be a
normal human being... When I speak of a man as being normal, a part of what I mean is
that he could not break these rules easily, without a qualm of revulsion... The freedom
of a society, or a class or a group, in this sense of freedom, is measured by the strength
of these barriers, and the number and importance of the paths which they keep open for
202
their members—if not for all, for at any rate a great number of them."
Thus Berlin provides two types of safeguard, institutional and ideological: the
rule of law and the general recognition of basic rights. He believes that they constitute a
self-defining mechanism of society, and society's ability to permit diverse opinion is
essential to the working of this mechanism.
Such endorsement of pluralism stems from Berlin's liberalism, from attitudes
towards social change shared by nineteenth century liberals such as Mill. They believe
in people's spontaneous ability to organise their common life. They defy "imposed"
change but believe in protracted, perpetual change initiated and carried out by members
of society themselves. Thus Berlin explains his vision of free society and his
understanding of liberty: "This is almost at the opposite pole from the purposes of those
who believe in liberty in the 'positive'—self-directive—sense. The former [the school of
Mill] want to curb authority as such. The latter [advocates of positive liberty] want it
placed in their own hands... These are not two different interpretations of a single
concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable situations to the ends of
life."203
Such a comparison is applicable to Saito and Nakano. Loyal to nineteenth
century liberalism, Saito remained wary of positive liberty. Positive liberty, the right to
participate in public decisions, had driven him to seek a political career. However for
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him, liberty was negative, and it constituted an inviolable area of private life, the attitude
shared by his two contemporaries in this study, Minobe and Sakai. This attitude grew as
he got older, and he felt compelled to confront government when it increasingly
overrode negative liberty. Such an attitude sometimes earned him the reputation of being
indifferent to social rights. But he was even more hostile to the radical right, and
jingoistic nationalism, precisely because he did not believe in the positive concept of
liberty on its own. Thus for him parliamentary politics was a practical compromise
essential to a free society, because the very concept of popular will is supposed to check
the imposition of authority. For Nakano, such a compromise is corruption, and he seeks
a more "effective" and "efficient" way of conducting social and political change.
Such observations lead us to a larger assessment of Japan's totalitarian system in
the 1930s, and of Japan's modernisation and nation-making in general. For the elite who
lived through pre-war Japan, combining negative liberty and social engagement was a
demanding task. The difficulty derives from the constant interference in one's life of the
state, the speed of social regimentation, and the way in which modern Japanese national
identity was formed. The challenge would have been harder for the younger generation,
as the institutional grip on people's lives was firmer among this generation, as Ishikawa
Takuboku observed in his 1910 essay.
The autonomy of society, which Fukuzawa took for granted, had by then become
increasingly an alien concept. Japan's modernisation did not allow the growth of
common, universal values essential to "the ends of life". Aims became temporal and
immediate. Japanese society was deprived of the invisible "barriers" whose strength is a
measure of free society. Japan's colonial expansion is also a symptom of Japan's
modernisation, its emphasis on specific interests and failure to find universal common
values, as well as a conscientiously formulated policy for dealing with the world.
In Japan's modernisation process, the erection of such "barriers" was not only
discouraged, but also constantly undermined by the arbitrariness of power. This fragility
of the political system became all the more serious when the uncertainty and insecurity
created after World War I further exposed the shallowness of the political and social
foundation of free society. In the following passage Saito observes the post-war world as
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well as his country: "The abolition of the monarchy [in many European countries after
World War I] has caused the loss of central state power, resulting in power battles, such
as are seen in new presidential elections. The political system is constantly in disarray. If
such a condition is unfixed and left to natural development, nations will fall into further
confusion, and eventually collapse." He anticipates dictatorship, with Russia and
Germany as the two most likely examples. Nevertheless, people should not follow
dictatorial government, because they forsake their own freedom. "The freedom of a
people will be lost, and original ideals of the revolution will disappear amid personal
ambition. It will be too late for the people to regret their previous support [for such
dictatorial power]."204 What Saito warns against here is the rise of radical thought, of
both right and left, in Japan itself.
According to Juan Linz, fascism is a common phenomenon in post-war Europe,
in response to a "sequence of development crises" and also popular demands for
democracy, which raised such issues as "state-building legitimation, participation,
incorporation of new social forces, representation in legislative organs, and ultimately
205
share in the executive power". Also, some "late-comers" such as Italy and Germany
experienced "a heightened need for a sense of national cohesion" in the face of the
success of Britain, France and others in their colonial expansion. In those countries, "the
consciousness of the proletarian nation" became paramount.
Japan's colonial expansion must be understood in this context. The idea of
national unity was threatened by the disappearance of other monarchies, and by the rise
of nationalism in Japan's colonies and in China. Such developments shook the "new"
country, which was without a solid political system or public consensus about political
values. Japan too was without the defences against fascism that existed in other
countries. According to Linz, these included "the organizational penetration of the
socialist, communist, and anarcho-syndicalist labor movements", the strength of "the
social doctrine of the Church", and the presence of "old parties".206 Faced with its own
:<)4
Saito, Kakushinron oyobi Kakushin Undo o isamu, pp. 103-4.
205 Juan Linz, "The crisis of democracy after the First World War", in Roger Griffin (ed.), International
Fascism (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 175.
206 ibid., p. 182.
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"development crises", Japan resorted to a variant of what Hannah Arendt has called
"tribal nationalism", which began to be intertwined with the course of government.
Saito viewed this process as the gradual erosion of substantial rationality from
government policy. Such a stance is due to his universalist vision, his adherence to the
liberty of the individual, and to the constitutional framework. Despite being an advocate
of social progress, his values are therefore antithetical to many of the principles that
supported Japan's modernisation, and which then nurtured fascist thought.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: Dissent and its Uses
Perry Anderson describes the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western
Europe not as "an organic internal succession" from a lower to a higher mode of
production, but as a "concatenation of ancient and feudal modes". Thus while "the
weakening of the mediaeval conceptions of vassalage.. .conferred new and
extraordinary powers on the monarchy, it at the same time emancipated from
traditional restraints the estates of the nobility".1
Even though Japan was without that "rebirth of antiquity" that Anderson
finds so important in the development of the West, it too experienced its own "mesh"
of social formations that brought together old and new. Hence in the post-Restoration
period extensive changes, generally government-led, were "imposed" on the people
in the name of modernisation. Nevertheless, these changes also involved the removal
of traditional barriers to free association among the population. Authority and the
people simultaneously entered the "public" sphere, in ways that were unprecedented.
How, then, could the individual attempt to influence the general course of
society when such changes were taking place so fast and forcefully? Such a question,
of course, may seem to exaggerate the role of the individual at a time of drastic
social, political and economic change. State authority had now come into people's
lives as overwhelming social and economic force, with the people given an
apparently subordinate role.
Yet the same question may also shift our attention away from modernisation
as "social engineering" to modernisation as the spontaneous formation of the
common life in response to, and as the result of, what can be described (following
Anderson) as "a vortex of heterogeneous movements".
Maruyama Masao is one of the most articulate social commentators to have
dealt with this question, in his study of shutaisei (subjectivity). This enquiry has
shared Maruyama's concern with the role of the individual in political
1
Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, p. 20
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modernisation, and it therefore seems appropriate to conclude by returning to a
question that Maruyama has addressed so steadfastly.
Rikki Kersten defines a key emphasis of Maruyama's work as follows:
"Maruyama's analysis of Japan's history assumed that human agency had been
supplanted by a structure of change which precluded a sense that human history was
in human hands. This was surely the basis of Maruyama's pleas for social autonomy
in Japan's political culture."2
Maruyama is therefore counted as one of the "modernists"," who believed
that true modernisation could not occur until the people themselves became free and
active agents in a political community. For him, social autonomy implies an
autonomous self awakened by the tension between the "private" and "public" spheres
of life. Yet in a country where the conflation between value and reality prompts a
traditional mode of thought,4 there is little room left for the individual to develop a
sense of social autonomy. Maruyama thinks that the problem is epistemological.
Thus, as Fukuzawa did before him, Maruyama engaged in severe criticism of
prevailing patterns of Japanese thought and behaviour. Active especially in the years
immediately after the end of World War II, he made serious attempts to link what he
called the "pathological" aspects of Japanese society to the Japanese fascism he had
just witnessed.
Maruyama attributes the dwarfing of social autonomy to the weak traditions
of individuality and the "traditional" emphasis on obligation. In 1961 he wrote that
despite the country's dynamic industrial advances, the people still adhered to a
status-based hierarchical order, and had not fully grasped the concept of the
contributing individual who actively participates in the running of society.5 The
pattern of behaviour that focused on personal loyalty was still omnipresent, and had
been chiefly responsible for the consolidation of the emperor system before and
during the war.6
2 Rikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 74.
3 Andrew E. Barshay, "Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan: Reflections on Maruyama Masao and




Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso, pp. 174-5.
6
Maruyama, "Chusei to Hangyaku", Chuseito to Hangyaku, p. 79. The article originally appeared in
Kindai Nihon Shisdshi Koza, vol. 6, 1960.
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Central to Maruyama's thought is an idea of progress which blends respect
for European modernity and a priori morality. For "Unless you commit yourself to
values which surpass present reality and which cannot be seen, you will be dragged
along by the reality you can see and your way of thinking will be changed. In the end
you will became an appendage of circumstance."7
Such a Kantian and historicist approach is now subject to criticism.
Maruyama's analysis is criticised for its "alienation from, even 'antipathy toward'
the masses".8 Seeming to rely on excessive reification of such categories as
feudalism, capitalism and modernity, his analysis of Japanese fascism is found not to
incorporate aspects of the inner dynamic of society, such as "the role of technocrats
and of the 'intelligentsia' ",9
Furthermore (in my view) a major limitation of Maruyama's work involves
an insufficient grasp of value creation. Questions about institutional procedures,
including the role of public debate, escaped his analysis. But by omitting politics
from his inquiry, Maruyama failed to deal with the role of the individual in the
formation of the common life, which is central to social autonomy even in his own
definition.10
Obviously there remains much of value in his thought (and I will defend his
position shortly), but this neglect of politics, of what Barshay calls "the
peripheries",11 is a major weakness of his analysis, because it can neither deal with
the relativism of social values, nor cope with the rational scepticism expressed by
those who choose to dissent.
My own position is that Japanese social modernisation intensified the tension
between authority and the individual. Hence "the fatal conflation of value and
reality" is both an outcome of tradition and a reflection of the conditions imposed by
an organic system. Thus without recognising the "peripheries" and the active
1
Quoted by Kersten, op. cit., pp. 98-9.
8




Thus, expressing her frustration with Maruyama's incomplete inquiry into social autonomy, Kersten
says: "But... was there legitimate room for the creative subject in the law of historical materialism?...
was it possible to regard subjectivity (shutaisei) as a scientific entity, or one which could be treated in
a scientific way?" (Kerstcn, op. cit., pp. 98-9).
"
Barshay notes that: "His [Maruyama's] concern remained less with social solidarity at the
peripheries than with personal subjectivity and political integration at the national level....
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interaction between society and the individual, it would be difficult to imagine any
form of debate about democracy and political modernisation.
In this sense, I am reluctant to follow the definitive demarcation between
state and people, to which Maruyama himself adhered. For it ignores the familiar
difficulties of negotiating one's public and private life, and eliminates value creation
from debate about the nature of civil society. Thus the three subjects of this study
were all social beings, and consciously so. For them, society was inseparable from
what they were. They all took the public sphere seriously, and for them it was not
necessarily equivalent to the state.
I would also venture to claim that a totalitarian state emerged in Japan, not
primarily because a still feudal people blindly followed their leaders, but because
they aspired to be members of a new political community. This does not mean that
they were willing participants of a totalitarian movement. But the concept of the state
epitomised by the emperor in person appears to have gained strength because they
recognised themselves as active and equal members of a community. Otherwise it is
difficult to explain the long history of social protest that characterises pre-war
Japanese society, and also the significant successes of the bureaucracy in social
mobilisation.
De Tocqueville in this regard warned that dictatorship may occur in
"democratic" nations, unless restrictive forms and private rights are respected. De
Tocqueville was witnessing a transition from feudalistic arrangements to
"democratic" states in the early nineteenth century. But a period of transition
conceives of both promise and danger. Like many of his liberal contemporaries, de
Tocqueville was concerned with what appeared to be the increasingly narrow domain
of personal freedom in the face of the growing role of the state and of social
regimentation.
The Meiji Restoration also marked such a transition. It created a
"democratic" state, while containing forms were still fragile. As for the protection of
private rights, it would take some time for a majority of the population to share an
integrating creed. The great promise of the Restoration was therefore accompanied
by the instability inherent in a newly democratised nation.
Maruyama's image of the 'periphery' was one 0f traditionalism and irrational attachment" (Barshay,
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Hence the pre-war period is one of great fragility. Not only did the abundant
use of discretionary power constantly undermine the available democratic forms, but
repeatedly moves to promote so-called "progress" were grounded not on shared
values or social consensus but on political expediency. Given the fragility of both
forms and consensus, it becomes easier to understand how the original "prerogative"
state evolved into the totalitarian system of the late 1930s. Minobe, Sakai, and Saito
all strove to strengthen the available forms and to promote their acceptance. Each in
their different ways worked to define and preserve rational authority within a
common framework. Yet the fact that they rarely had to change their political
opinions in any fundamental way, and that what made them "heretical" was a change
of social mood and political climate, points to the lasting weakness of the new forms
of state and to their failure to win general acceptance.
Thus what failed to survive in the course of Japan's modernisation was a
pluralism upheld by the tension between collective goals and the liberty of the
individual. The careers of the three subjects of this study all record this process of
vanishing pluralism.
The values that supported Meiji reforms involved a belief in social progress,
equality, and the liberty of the individual. How then did these values, a great engine
of political modernisation in the country, come to support the totalitarian system? In
her study of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt attributes the rise of totalitarianism in
Europe shortly after World War I precisely to the superimposition of "state" value on
"reality". Hence post-war Europe saw the dissolution of traditional national
boundaries and the emergence of new nation-states, with unity justified ideologically
rather than founded on genuine communal feeling. Communal disintegration, social
atomisation, and imperialist desires all contributed to the rise of "tribal nationalism".
A major victim was pluralism and tolerance based on authentic experience.12
Even the idea of equality can lead to totalitarianism, if it is detached from a
belief in common humanity, according to Arendt. For those who assumed that people
were equal by nature, the prevailing inequality was due to history and circumstance.
Thus, for them the main aim of social reform became education and assimilation, and
op. cit., p. 394)
12 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, third edition (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1967), p.232.
321
coercion could be justified. Human diversity and cultural differences were no longer
values in themselves. They became something rectifiable so as to ensure a higher
value, equality. Thus Arendt gives her warning:
Nineteenth-century positivism and progressivism perverted this purpose of human equality
when they set out to demonstrate what cannot be demonstrated, namely, that men are equal by
nature and different only by history and circumstances, so that they can be equalized not by
rights, but by circumstances and education. Nationalism and its concept of a 'national mission'
perverted the national concept of mankind as a family of nations into a hierarchical structure
where differences of history and organization were misinterpreted as differences between men,
residing in natural origin. Racism, which denied the common origin of man and repudiated the
common purpose of establishing humanity, introduced the concept of the divine origin of one
people as contrasted with all others, thereby covering the temporary and changeable product of
13
human endeavor with a pseudomystical cloud of divine eternity and finality.
Thus if a viable politics assumes a state of perpetual suspension between political,
economic and social imperatives and value judgements, it yields to totalitarianism
when this cmcial distinction begins to break down.
Minobe, Sakai, and Saito on the other hand did not seek to place political
values at the service of a compensatory national vision but always attended to
genuine social need. They adhered to values such as the liberty of the individual, yet
remained highly sensitive to the "weight" of reality. The emergence of the
totalitarian system in Japan in the 1930s, signalled by their demise, reflects the loss
of their ability to bring values and reality into sceptical relation.
This argument brings us back to Maruyama. Maruyama may have been
deficient in not enquiring into the formation of values, but in his approach,
subjectivity is always the product of the tension between self and the outer world.
Kersten notes that for him "great danger lurked in historical materialism's claim to
objectivity. In this view objectivity meant that 'responsibility for one's actions is shut
out, as though history was screened off from you, working all on its own'." 4 For
Maruyama, the subjective was part of one's ability to take responsibility for one's
actions based on a clearly felt tension between value and reality.
13 ibid. p. 234.
14
Kerstcn, op. cit., p. 101.
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Also, although Maruyama's intellectual background (German metaphysical
thought, Hegel) is not apparently compatible with the idea of the formation of
organising principles, his insistence on the private sphere and on individual values
are part of the fundamental tenets of liberalism. Thus, through his value-centred
deductive analysis, Maruyama made a powerful exposure of the problems of the
Japanese state and society. My own study, inductive rather than deductive, is meant
to fill a gap in his work, as well as to enquire into the democratic traditions of the
country.
Maruyama then, by default, can serve to remind us of the role of dissent in
the formation of the common life. And here once more Mill seems relevant: "But on
every subject on which difference of opinion is possible", he says, "the truth depends
on a balance to be struck between the two sets of conflicting reasons... it has to be
shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown, and until
we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion."15 Mill's
position thus differs fundamentally from Hegelian dialectic which assumes that
higher truth is to be found through metaphysical exercise. For Mill, the opinions of
"others" are essential to comprehend his own. He assumes a common "domain" of
knowledge, and in this domain contrary opinions are vital.
Such a common domain of knowledge is also essential for the creation of
liberating forms and consensus in a political system. But to what extent could Japan
create such bases for common governance in its modernisation process? As
Habermas points out, such developments require freedom of speech and association.
However, we know that Japan's modernisation did not ensure such conditions.
Firstly, government harassment, deliberate attempts to eliminate opposition,
and the use of discretionary power all constantly threatened the consolidation of still
fragile institutional forms in the political system. These measures were justified as
politically necessary in order to pursue national goals and social cohesion. In the
short run, such measures may have been justified. In the long run, however, strong
emphasis on collective well-being at the expense of the liberty of the individual was
damaging. It not only discouraged the people's desire to help consolidate the existing
structures but also eroded their trust in the embryonic forms as a whole.
15
Mill, On Liberty, pp. 41-2.
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Secondly, when "national" policies were pursued with great strength, it was
difficult for spontaneous organisations to grow. In this sense, the speed of change,
prompted by the collective insistence on social progress, seriously affected political
participation.
Thirdly, the Japanese "world view" was linked to the "world system" of
capitalism, and while they were aware of their country's need to accommodate that
system, a sense of being marginal was strong among the elite. To proclaim a belief in
"common humanity" was quickly to invite suspicion, particularly among those who
were brought up believing that their country was now an imperial power. To assert
values as universal ones while deeply aware of "unfair" international arrangements
was a highly ambivalent task for intellectuals. For them, distinguishing between
reality and value became a source of frustration rather than a crucial starting point for
the creation of organising principles.
Given these conditions (and from our perspective) traditions of plurality and
tolerance still seem the only reliable mechanisms to ensure free government and thus
achieve political modernisation in the long run. Continuous governmental attempts to
silence opposition and the increasing regimentation of social life may have
contributed to swift "modernisation", but they also created serious problems of
common governance. For such measures not only prevented the development of a
self-regulating mechanism of government but also eliminated the self-protecting
functions which must be inherent in society in order to check its collective action.
And it is important that opposition becomes a part of the system. For instance,
although Saito was a capable critic of the system while he was in opposition, he very
often acquiesced in it when he was in government. This aspect of his career reveals
the limitations of merely "private" dissent. For the role of opposition must be
institutionalised so as to become an integral part of governance.
To incorporate opposition into the normal political system may appear
enormously difficult. Flowever, modernisation under autocracy has serious risks.
Thus even in a developing country with an acute sense of vulnerability to "the world
system", tolerance of dissent seems the only effective means to ensure true
autonomy. Politically this means debate, value creation, and the scrutiny of power.
Minobe, Sakai, and Saito all show that such individual intervention is essential in this
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process. Their careers show that when both government and society begin to
eliminate dissent, it may signal the loss of those self-scrutinising mechanisms so
essential for their long-term survival.
Hence the importance of personal intervention in social change. The three
men were all strongly individualistic. They possessed the intellectual ability to assess
the outer world and to formulate their position based on it. They affirmed their own
freedom, and they found compromise repugnant, because they took personal freedom
for granted. They participated, crucially, in the evolution of the political community
as critics and commentators, and without the intervention of people like them,
Japanese society would have had had even less chance of achieving modernisation
even in the narrow political sense.
Each of the three has his own particular debts: Anglo-American legal thought
via Jellinek for Minobe, humanistic Marxism for Sakai, and nineteenth century
British liberalism for Saito. And yet they were fiercely independent, adapting and
reinterpreting their reading so as to attend to immediate circumstances. What
sustained them was a belief that their arguments would connect with the "wider
community", including future generations. And such a belief was inseparable from
their long-term vision for social progress. Economic and technological advances
surely change the way we live, and yet fundamental questions will stay with us. They
felt they were tackling questions essential to our way of living.
E. H. Norman, more than a half century ago, spoke of "the complexity of
modem Japanese society; a society of which it is easier to describe some
characteristic feature than it is to explain its significance to the whole". For "it is not
so difficult to present a brief account, for example of the bureaucracy, of the
financial houses, of the armed forces, or of the political parties, but to ascribe to each
group its own proper position, its relation to other parties of society, to judge
between any of these groups and say this one is master and that one servant, this
would be something of a Sisyphean task, but one which none the less ought to be
shouldered".16
16 E. H. Norman, "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State", in John W. Dower (ed.), Origins of the
Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p.
316.
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According to John Dower, Norman's self-imposed task was "integration,
never to lose sight to the 'seamless web' of history".17 Such integration must remain
Sisyphean in any study of history, yet a more inclusive understanding of modern
Japanese history still seems to be missing. Yet Norman also wrote: "The crucial
problem is to distinguish between deceptive surface changes and those that are deep
and therefore harder to detect but in the long run of the most decisive character."18
Perhaps the historian has yet to uncover significant aspects of the Japanese past
which are still relevant to our own immediate and future experiences.
To do so, we need to hear more voices from the "periphery". Critics (and
social critics) very often play that role, presenting us with basic issues we tend to
forget or simply cannot see. Thus, Andrew Barshay characterises Maruyama as a
critic capable of long-term vision. "Maruyama's self-appointed task was to serve as
postwar Japan's public ironist. His texts relied heavily on an irony that sought 'to
split their audience into insiders and outsiders (and split each member of it)'... By
this means Maruyama may have sought to awaken in his audience a latent capacity
for historical judgement."19 We should be grateful to him and the other public critics
we have examined for their challenges to collective blindness.
Minobe, Sakai, and Saito all had their own limitations. But they still speak to
us about some of the essential dilemmas of modern Japan, and show us that it is still
possible to influence society through critical examination and proposal. They show
us that some of the permanent dilemmas of social organisation can be dealt with,
even in such hostile conditions as were created by "modernisation" and a "world
system", intelligently and humanely.
17 John W. Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History", Origins of the Modern Japanese
State, p. 71.
18 E. H. Norman, "By Way of a Preface: The Shrine of Clio", Origins of the Modern Japanese State,
p. 106.
19
Barshay, op. cit., p. 390.
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